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ABSTRACT
Three decades of ethno-nationalist war in Sir Lanka has contributed to a major social 
change for Tamil women in Jaffna. An important component of this change has been 
the recruitment of women in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This thesis 
explores the role of the women combatants from a gender perspective to identify how 
gender is constructed for women within the revolutionary movement, and the impact 
that construction has on civic society. The research is based on the narrative life 
histories of seven combatant women, one ex-combatant woman and seven civic women. 
In undertaking this research, the methodology had to take into account the researcher’s 
positionality through reflexivity, and the multiple identities that link and separate the 
researcher and participants. Through these life histories, the thesis investigates the link 
between displacement to LTTE controlled areas and women’s recruitment. It identifies 
the LTTE as providing an ‘alternative’ familial kinship founded upon friendship, which 
transcends caste and religion. It further enquires into the role of women suicide 
bombers, revealing a self-image of unselfish givers of a ‘gift’ to those they care for, 
including the Tamil nation. The main argument of the thesis is that combatant women’s 
paradoxical equality may differ from Western feminist notions of emancipation but 
represents a profound change within Jaffna’s patriarchal society. The engagement in 
armed conflict has transformed combatant women into female slayers of injustice and 
protectors of the Tamil nation, with a (re)constructed gender identity and empowerment 
(Ah-lu-mai). The combatant women and the war are a powerful force for change, and 
combatant women’s alternative roles radically alter the perceptions of women in civic 
society. The Gender (re)construction and form of equality that both combatant and civic 
women achieve accelerates a social change towards a new gender identity, ‘new’ women 
(Puthumai Pen).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This thesis is the result of the support of many, without whom I could never have 
completed the research and the writing. I would like to thank the women combatants of 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Tamil civic women of Jaffna who 
were willing participants of this research. I am grateful to them for giving their time 
freely and feel highly privileged for being allowed access into their lives.
I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Mary Kaldor of Global Governance, and Dr 
Clare Hemmings of the Gender Institute, for helping me to formulate my arguments and 
taking me through the maze of writing a PhD dissertation. I would also like to thank 
Prof. Diane Perrons, Drs. Ross Gill and Karen Thorsby for their support over the years, 
both before and after field research. I am particularly grateful to Prof. Ann Phillips for 
granting me an opportunity to study at the Gender Institute where my mind was opened 
to a wider picture. She also gave me a letter of introduction to meet with the LTTE in the 
middle of the jungles of Vanni District, making me feel invincible (and I was!). I wish to 
extend a special thanks to the Gender Institute Manager Hazel Johnstone for her 
efficient assistance over the years. I would also like to thank all my feminist friends at 
the Gender Institute who have helped me to understand various intricacies in gender 
issues.
I am grateful to my funding authority BTP and Centrex for awarding me a Fellowship 
that greatly facilitated my research and personal development.
My gratitude extends to the family of S (in Jaffna), who took me in as their own, and 
taught me to appreciate the people and the culture, and to focus on the positive and the 
good in all situations. I would also like to thank A and D (in Colombo) for taking very 
good care of me during my field research period in Sri Lanka. I am extremely grateful to 
C (in London) who became invaluable for developing my understanding of Tamil 
language, its culture, and specifically on the topic of Tamil women of Jaffna. I would also 
like to extend a special thanks to JH who believed in my ability and gave me all the
assistance I needed. I wish to thank my family for their understanding and patience, 
especially my father HMG for his unwavering encouragement. I wish to include a very 
special note of gratitude to Stephen for his support in reading every single word I have 
written in this thesis and offering suggestions and corrections throughout.
Finally, I wish to acknowledge the death of CH, a civic woman participant, whose 
untimely death is a tragic loss. With the ongoing war, and lack of many basic items such 
as food and medicine, I fear there will be more deaths of those I have now come to know. 
Our differing ethnic identities were not held as barriers by the women combatants or by 
the civic women participants, raising hopes for a better future.
ACRONYMS
Please see the appendices for a list of acronyms used in the text.
- 5 -
NOTES ON THE LANGUAGE CONVENTIONS USED 
IN THE THESIS
N o te  o n  C ita tion s:
I have used the commonly accepted English language spellings for Tamil words such as Thambi 
(younger brother) or the name Prabhakaran  for ease o f accessibility.
N o te  o n  T ra n slitera tio n :
The usage of Tamil language words in the text are based on phonetics as reflected in the writings 
of Tamil speaking authors.
N o te  o n  r e se a r c h  in fo rm a n ts:
Most participants were mono-linguistic (Tamil language) with a few who were bi-lingual (Tamil 
and English language).
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P r e fa c e
This thesis is about women combatants in the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LITE), 
an armed resistance group that has been active since the early 1970s in Sri Lanka, led by 
Vellupillai Prabhakaran and pursuing the goal of an independent Tamil state, named 
Tamil Eelam1 (see Maps on page 291). The LTTE control large parts of the North, 
including the central Northern Province known as Vanni and parts of the Eastern 
Province, although the Sri Lankan government currently control all other areas 
including the Jaffna peninsula in the Northern Province and land along Mannar in the 
North West.
The central research question of the thesis asks “How is gender constructed within the 
revolutionary movement of the LITE?” My main conclusions are that female gender 
identity is negotiated in complex ways and is transformed as a consequence of women 
becoming fighters. They become socially constructed images of armed virgins (viewed by 
some feminists as androgynous), female warriors of injustice, who protect Tamil 
nationals. Civic women have also adapted to changing socio-political conditions, 
although they have retained some aspects of their traditional gender identity. There is 
evidence that both combatant and civic women become part of the (re)construction of 
‘new’ women (Puthumai Pen), with a new gender identity. This new identity may not 
conform to Western feminist notions of emancipation, but within the Jaffna Tamil 
context, it represents a profound change.
My thesis addresses the currently limited understanding that exists in relation to the 
combatant women of the LITE. I believe the original contribution of this thesis lies in 
increasing the knowledge about women’s involvement in the LITE. In addition, two of 
my findings have more general application. First, the empirical evidence gathered
1 The word Tamil Eelam means the Tamil part of the Eelam. The word ‘Eelam’ it self is synonymous with 
the word ‘Sri Lanka’ and believed to have been in use circa 200B.C. to 250A.D., when the Tamil language 
word for Sri Lanka was Ilankai, (pronounced as Eelankai) meaning Lanka. Tamil phonetic language does 
not contain la ’ to be a starting sound, thus the vowel ‘ee’ comes before ‘lankai’(Sivathamby 2006).
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during this research reveals a previously unrecognised link between those who are 
internally displaced to the LTTE controlled area of Vanni, and voluntary enlistment. 
Those researchers who have studied displacement in Sri Lanka have previously 
overlooked this link. This may be due to inaccessibility, or difficulties in gaining entry to 
both LTTE controlled areas and combatant women. However, this is a key point in 
understanding the combatant women, as the sense of security that is offered in Vanni 
(even when living under a tree exposed to the elements) is preferable to living with the 
comforts of a home but in a state of continuous fear. The finding that displacement is an 
important factor in the recruitment of armed combatants may be relevant in other cases 
elsewhere.
Second, I also contribute to the debate on suicide bombings, by focusing on women 
combatants’ involvement in the act. Through the empirical research, I have concluded 
that women combatants view suicide bombing as a selfless act of giving, a view that 
directly connects suicide bombing to Durkheim’s concept of ‘obligatory altruistic 
suicide’. My research findings show that there is a clear gender dimension to the women 
combatants’ involvement. Although suicide bombing at first appears to contradict the 
traditionally socio-culturally constructed female role of carer and unselfish giver, the 
combatant women’s discourse construes the act an extension of this nurturing and 
giving role. Consequently, the combatant women view it is a willing gift to the Tamil 
nation, rather than a sacrifice, in order to progress the cause of Tamil Eelam.
I also contribute to discussions of the feminist methodology of representing the Other 
through multiple identities (Sinhalese, Tamil, and British), which both link and separate 
the researcher and the participants. Issues around multiple identity form recurring 
themes both in, and away from, the field, and had to be continually negotiated. These 
negotiations form the base of a reflexivity that links me to the combatant women, 
through our shared identity (Sri Lankan) and yet separates us through the differences of 
ethnicity (Sinhalese/Tamil, British identity) and language.
C hapter One is an overview of Sri Lanka’s history and the conflict. It discusses the 
historical influences in the social construction of female identity in Sri Lanka and in 
particular Tamil women in Jaffna. Sri Lankans have practiced diversity and tolerance of 
religion and ethnicity for many years. However, within the last three decades, their 
social position has changed to a deeply embittered and divided ethno-centric split
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between Sinhalese and Tamils. The chapter describes the construction of a Sinhalese 
ideology that treats Sri Lanka as Sinhalese-Buddhist and views Tamil nationalism as a 
minority issue. Tamil Nationalism argues that only war and the construction of their 
own state can address Tamil political aspirations, and the way that the government has 
treated the Tamil nationals has enhanced and strengthened that belief. The conflict is 
then defined in terms of ethnic identity based on language and geography and is 
intrinsically linked to territory. Therefore, both ideologies have become further 
entrenched in war and violence.
This chapter also illustrates that Tamil women’s traditional gender roles have evolved to 
include ‘new’ social roles, which are contradicted by the recruitment of combatant 
women. A new image of an ‘Armed Virgin’ is emerging in the combatant woman that 
contrasts with the civic woman. This image is socially paradoxical and the newly 
constructed womanhood is fraught with multiple issues.
Chapter Two discusses the methodological and ethical concerns that are central to the 
thesis. It analyses the issues relating to the gathering of data under violent socio­
political conditions. It also addresses my own field research experiences that lie within a 
framework of concerns and the specific issues of access, power of the Gatekeeper and 
security. It addresses the differences encountered in Power relations in conflict areas 
where the researcher is more dependent on others and the relationship dynamics that 
impact on these relationships. Ethnic identity is an influential factor that is examined 
through a discussion of legitimacy and how ethnicity affects the data collected.
The chapter is divided into three sections consisting of Interviews, Safety, and 
Reflexivity. The Interviews section addresses a range of issues from planning through 
conducting interviews. The Safety section addresses the key components of safety of 
participants, safety of data gathered, and safety of the researcher. The final section on 
Reflexivity focuses on my own position, as well as issues relating to presenting the 
Other, objectivity and impartiality.
As the conflict continues, the safety of all participants has been paramount to this 
research. Therefore, the interview participants have been given anonymity with 
alternative names and alphabetic characters. It must also be noted that the interviews 
conducted in the English language on a one-to-one basis retain their original format
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throughout the thesis. These transcribed texts have been identified with the asterisk 
symbol (*) next to the alias of the interviewee.
The pronunciation of Tamil language is different to English, often resulting in 
Prabhakaran’s name being written phonetically by Tamil-speaking writers (variations 
include Pirabhakaran, Pirapakaran, and Pirabakaran and other words such as Tahmbi 
or Tahmby meaning younger brother) but this does not interfere with the text or the 
context of the thesis.
Chapter Three discusses the effects of displacement that impact on the lives of women 
who later became combatants. Displacement affects a significant number of people, with 
many emigrating overseas. The majority of displaced people are from the Jaffna 
peninsula, and Tamil nationals describe displacement as Idampeyatha, meaning a 
forceful expulsion from home, which has now entered into the mainstream language.
The chapter discusses the factors that contribute to women joining the LTTE, which 
include the loss of home, exclusion from schooling, helplessness and loss of agency, and 
the break up of the family unit. It then examines the influence of a nationalist 
environment, with particular emphasis on the recruitment of children by the LITE, 
because of both displacement and the sympathies of their families, along with the 
insecurities felt by the children. The chapter suggests that displacement is a key factor in 
the recruitment of women into the armed struggle, and explores the link between 
displacement to LTTE controlled areas and the decision to join the L'lTE.
Chapter Four addresses the LTTE construction of a sustainable fictive kinship through 
friendships amongst women combatants from various socio-economical, religious and 
caste backgrounds, which to some extent replicates the familial kinships. In this chapter, 
the words ‘kinship’ and ‘friendship’ are used as analytical tools to explore the non- 
consanguine ties that are built and maintained within the LTTE replacement family. The 
word kinship is detached from its consanguine roots, and kin terminology is used to 
metaphorically describe an alternative family unit or ‘fictive’ kin (re)created by the 
LITE, which is founded upon friendships that override blood ties.
One success of the LTTE’s (re)constructed family is its ability to transcend the basic 
social prejudices that are engrained in Jaffna society; hence, kinship in the LITE 
successfully rises above social barriers such as caste and religion, and has freed
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combatant women to accept each other. I also critically examine how combatant women 
(re)construct an alternative gendered role within the movement that challenges the 
socially dictated roles for women. Kin relationships cultivate loyalty regardless of 
personal circumstances and reaffirm the combatant women’s shared experiences that 
place them in a valued position within the kinship group.
C hapter Five discusses the involvement of women in suicide bombings and the 
gendered dimensions of the motivational forces behind their participation. It argues that 
the LTTE suicide bombings are part of a collective rational strategy for cost-effective 
attacks and that individual motivation is best explained through Durkheim’s notion of 
‘obligatory altruistic suicide’. The chapter also analyses the loss of sexual purity as a 
motivational factor and reveals a number of politicised issues ranging from body politics 
to the nation state. It discusses the symbolic nature of rape victims, using their socio­
culturally viewed “polluted bodies” as bombs, in a process of purification by immolation. 
The engagement of women as suicide bombers raises issues about individual agency and 
autonomy along with gender identity. The chapter argues that social perceptions of 
women lie behind the sensationalised media reporting of women who commit such acts.
The chapter explores the way in which death is constructed in the LITE, and how it 
impacts on equality. Women Combatants see the role of a suicide bomber as a career 
pinnacle and as ‘a gift’ to society, the ultimate gift to those they care for and the nation. 
The women combatants reveal that they feel the act of suicide bombing empowers them, 
by reinstating the individual’s lost agency. However, the gender equality argument needs 
to be seen in the context of violent political conflict, and it is questionable whether 
women can maintain the equality gained through self-sacrifice, and sustain this 
particular form of negotiated equality.
C hapter Six analyses the gender (re)construction in the LTTE and the levels of gender 
equality that the combatant and civic women have achieved. It argues that the LTTE 
struggle has accelerated a social change, sweeping women towards a new gender 
identity.
This final chapter highlights that the number of women combatants in leading roles is 
limited and that their lack of training in decision-making may contribute to them being 
excluded from higher levels of the LTTE. It argues against adopting an essentialist 
feminist view of women as pacifists by claiming that this runs the risk of overlooking the
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social impact of combatant women on both civic society and civic women. It maintains 
that women have moved from support roles to active roles and challenge the existing 
patriarchal views and subordinate roles of women in society. The combatant women’s 
(re)constructed identity has granted them a form of equality that must be seen within 
the historical framework of Jaffna and its patriarchal culture.
This chapter investigates a number of paradoxes that the new gender identity has 
created, and the levels of achievements are contrasted and compared between 
combatant and civic women. The chapter also questions the role the leader 
(Prabhakaran) has played in promoting combatant women to new social positions above 
that of the women in civic society and how their active involvement in the LTTE has 
placed combatant women outside civic society without their realisation. The chapter 
ends by claiming that the combatant women, together with the continuing civil war, 
form a powerful force for social change and have radically altered the perceptions of 
women in society.
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CHAPTER l
THE LIONS AND THE TIGERS 
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE 
SRI LANKAN CONFLICT 
AND THE ROLE OF WOMEN
Introduction
According to the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE), three decades of violent 
political conflict in Sri Lanka has now entered a ‘Final Phase’2. Historically and 
culturally, Sri Lankans have regarded themselves as both peace loving and tolerant, with 
particular empathy shown to the ethnicity and diversity of religion. However, within the 
last three decades their social position of "... warmth, hospitality, and good humour [...] 
that amongst other things, can laugh at themselves...” (Tambiah 1986:1) has changed to 
a deeply embittered and divided ethnocentric nation split between Sinhalese and Tamil 
identities. This division has caused fear amongst the Sri Lankan people, resulting in 
suspicion, animosity, and violence against each other’s community. The unitary state 
established in colonial times gave way to a war between the State and the LITE that is 
reflective of a contemporary conflict constructed in the postcolonial era as a 
consequence of the state-building process.
The conflict is defined in terms of ethnic identity, and in this chapter, I argue that the 
conflict can be understood as an instrument for constructing an ethnic identity based on 
language (not religion at this stage) as well as geography. According to the nationalist 
ideologies of identity politics, ethnic identity is linked to territory (e.g. Tamil speaking 
areas must belong to LITE etc). Therefore, extreme forms of violence are a method of
2 Human Rights Watch Report (March 2006). See The Hindu International (28 May 2007), Ministry of 
Defence Sri Lanka (15 March 2007), The Asian Tribune (21 March 20007) Access 22.10.2007. See also 
information from personal contacts, identity withheld due to safety reasons.
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gaining exclusive ethnic control over territory. To this end, the membership of the LTTE 
was formed from disenchanted and frustrated young men, with women being added 
later.
I argue that gendered relations play a critical role in the construction of identity. In 
particular, Tamil identity is based on a gendered concept of masculinity within which 
women are cast in a female role defined by the hegemonic masculinity embedded in 
patriarchal Tamil society. At the same time, the realities of the conflict have directly 
challenged gender construction in Tamil society. According to the cultural perspective of 
Tamil society, women play the role of patriotic mother which is extended during conflict 
to include their becoming embattled. However, this ideological paradigm of patriotic 
mother has been contradicted by the recruitment of women as fighters that in turn has 
created a new kind of femininity, which is culturally alien to Tamil women. The newly 
emerging image that encompasses the roles of female slayers of injustice in order to 
protect the Tamil nationals is in contrast to the civic women in society.
This newly constructed womanhood is fraught with multiple issues and social 
paradoxes. The role is heavily criticised by some Sri Lankan feminists as an 
androgynous role that is contrary to femaleness (see Coomaraswamy 1996, Maunaguru 
1995 and de Mel 2001). The next few chapters will address the socially paradoxical 
issues that Tamil women (both combatant and civic) have learnt to negotiate during a 
period of heavy conflict and violence.
This chapter is separated into two main sections, which focus on the evolution of the 
conflict, and the role of women in Jaffna’s Tamil society. The first section provides a 
chronological history to the country’s political history and the issues relating to 
discontentment, and ethnic separation, resulting in the war with the LTTE. The second 
section provides an overview of the history of women, covering the social changes that 
affected all women in Sri Lanka, and focusing on Tamil women in particular during 
colonial and post-colonial periods. It also addresses the gender roles in Jaffna from 
ancient times through to modern era, which has transformed Tamil society from a 
matrilineal society to a patrilineal society under the influence of cultural practices that 
have evolved to include ‘new9 social roles for women.
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The Evolution o f the Conflict
Background
According to narratives from both sides, the complexity of the ethnic conflict is 
embedded in history and mythology; a legend claims that a union between an exiled 
Indian King and a Lioness created a new ethnic group, the Sinhaleses. The word Sinha 
means lion in Sanskrit, which is believed to be the language used in Sri Lanka during 
ancient times (Mendis 2003)4.
The ancient Buddhist text, Mahavansa that chronicles Sri Lanka from A.D.362 to the 
mid 18th century does not mention the existence of Tamil nationals in the island (Mendis 
2003:2) s. Despite the lack of formal evidence, Tamil nationals (in Jaffna) claim that 
they are the original inhabitants of the island, asserting an ancient Tamil presence in the 
northern part of Sri Lanka (Mendis 2003, Pujangga 1997, Thambiah 1954, Navaratnam 
1959, Rasanayagam 1926). There is however later historical evidence of a Tamil ruling 
monarchy during the arrival of the Portuguese invaders in 1505 (Tambiah 1954, Mendis 
2003, Rasanayagam 1926, Ram 1989)6.
3 The king Vijaya arrived with 700 “fair skinned” Aryan men (Ram 1989:32). The ‘lioness’ may well have 
been a woman from an existing indigenous group3 that called themselves the Lions that were inhabiting the 
island at the time of King Vijaya’s arrival.
4 There is a claim by Navaratnam (1959) that earlier forms of language were a mixture of Tamil and 
Sinhalese.
5 Mahavansa is an accepted text amongst historians as a record of ancient history of Sri Lanka; it is none the 
less considered a religiously biased document written for the period “encrusted with miracle and invention” 
(de Silva 1984:3). Somasundaram (1998:34) and Sivanayagam (2001:13), argues that Mahavansa has given 
rise to an ideology of ethnocentric claims of descent from the Aryans of Northern India. The North Indian 
culture and civilization is perceived as more advanced than that of South India. The conceptual notion that 
Sinhalese are an Aryan ethnic group is portrayed by Bose as a “racist myth that made its first appearance 
during the second half of the nineteenth century” (1994:14). The use of the term Aryan to describe a race of 
people is further argued by the German indologist Mueller to be a scientific descriptive term unsuited to 
application to a race (Bose 1994:41 referring to Gunawardena 1990:71).
6 Tambiah (1954) refers to a number of scholarly works including Rasanayagam, Ancient Jaffna (English 
edition); Fr.Gnanapragasar, Yalpana Vaipava Vimarsenam (Tamil edition); Sivanathan, Early Settlement 
in Jaffna (Tamil edition); Muttutamby, Jaffna History (edition not known). Detailing a number of regency 
periods in The Laws and Customs of Tamils of Ceylon, which includes fifteen kings and the periods in which 
they reigned in Jaffna (1954:10-16).
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The Portuguese found three kingdoms in the island upon their invasion: Kotte, Kandy 
and Jaffna. Of these, the Kandiyan kingdom retained its autonomy through winning 
battles first with the Portuguese (1505-1658), and then the Dutch (1658-1796). The 
British expelled the Dutch in 17967 and made the whole island a Crown Colony in 1802, 
but they did not control Kandy, its kingdom and the surrounding hill country until 1815. 
Scholars argue that the Tamil kingdom in Jaffna had ceased to exist by this time (Ram 
1989, Weerasooriya 1970). The British began the creation of modern Ceylon by 
centralising its administration and economy, and that included controlling Sri Lanka’s 
two ethnic groups. “In their administration the British favoured the Tamils over the 
Sinhalese, in their typical “divide and rule’ policy.” (Bandara 2002:19)
Ethnicity, Language and Nationalism
The current violent political struggle between the Tamil minorities and the Sinhalese 
majority is a relatively recent development. Indeed these two ethnic groups have co­
existed for several centuries, pre and post-colonial eras that I would argue is indicative 
of some degree of tolerance, which makes the conflict a new war (see Mendis 2003, Bose 
1994 and Weerasooria 1970). In her book, New and Old Wars Kaldor (2001:70) states,
New forms of power struggles may take the guise of traditional nationalism, 
tribalism or communalism, but they are, never the less, contemporary phenomena 
arising from contemporary causes and displaying new characteristics.
The emergence of Sinhalese and Tamil national identities based on language and 
religion was borne out of a reaction to colonialism and the need to provide a political 
basis for statehood. The start of open disharmony dates to when the struggle for 
independence from Britain was the main objective of both groups. A strong national 
identity began to emerge amongst the Sinhalese Buddhists who challenged the western 
Christian values of the colonialists. In addition, the suppression of Buddhism under 
colonial rule became a tool used by Sinhalese nationalists to challenge the existing social 
order created by the ruling British. The British in turn “...devised arrangements and 
made concessions in the 1870s, that in the long run evolved into a policy whose central
7 The Dutch expulsion and British acquisition of the country came via the British take over of the Dutch East 
India Company in 1796, of which Sri Lanka was a part.
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features was a special concern for -  if not a special position for -  Buddhism within the 
Sri Lanka polity” (de Silvai998:4).
The first Sri Lankan Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake withstood pressure from the 
Sinhalese Buddhist majority to break away from the colonial historical past to create a 
‘new5 Sri Lanka with a concept of a utopian state based on its Buddhist tradition8. 
However, the 1956 elections changed this tenuous political position.
S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike’s election victory in 1956 was a significant turning point in 
Sri Lanka’s history, for it represented the rejection of the concept of a Sri Lankan 
nationalism, based on plurality which Senanayake had striven to nurture, and the 
substitution of a more democratic and populist nationalism, which was at the same 
time fundamentally divisive in its impact on the country because it was resolutely 
Sinhalese and Buddhists in content.
(de Silva 1998:5)
The elevation of Buddhism continued until 1972 when there were visible signs that 
Buddhism had marginally failed to become a state religion, but had promoted a national 
identity based on religious status (ibid:4). In 1977, the government declared Buddhism 
to be the state religion despite much opposition from minority groups. This declaration 
effectively rendered all non-Buddhist practitioners as the Other within the state of Sri 
Lanka. It led to the notion that Sri Lankan nationalism was based on Buddhism and 
Sinhalese ethnicity.
To be Sinhalese is to be automatically a Buddhist and an Aryan, and to be Buddhist 
is to be able to make a total claim -territorially and politically -  over Sri Lanka. 
Conversely, to be a Buddhist is to be Aryan Sinhalese by “race” and “language” and 
to be Sinhalese by race gives the right to exclude, perhaps even exterminate, other 
“races” in Sri Lanka, especially the Dravidians.
(Tambiah 1986:58-9)
Sinhalese nationalism is then based on the idea that they are the ‘sole’ indigenous ethnic 
group in Sri Lanka, and Tamils are regarded as foreigners9. It is often argued that 
‘Tamils have India to go to, but the Sinhalese only have the small island of Sri Lanka’. 
The view that the Sinhalese are the sole indigenous ethnic group of Sri Lanka, at its
8 A list of Prime Ministers and Presidents can be found in Appendix 1.3.
9 The argument of a sole indigenous race of a single country resonates heavily with the Bosnian struggle (in 
conversation with Kaldor 2004).
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extreme, is translated into a feud that is substantiated by violent conflict. The majority 
of the Sri Lankan population is Sinhalese by ethnicity and Buddhist by religion10. De 
Silva claims that “language became the basis of nationalism, and this metamorphosis of 
nationalism affected both the Sinhalese and Tamil population” (de Silva 1998:5). As 
Tambiah (1986) states “to be truly Sinhalese was to be bom Singhalese, speak Sinhalese, 
and practice the Sinhalese religion, Buddhism” (Tambiah 1986:69). The identity politics 
reflected in these sentences forms the veiy basis of the nationalist struggle linking 
religion (Buddhism) to language (Sinhalese) as a single unit to include the majority and 
exclude the minority. This linking of language and religion as the basis of the ethnic 
identity makes the hegemonic group even more powerful.
Under British rule, English was the official language and became a tool in the hands of 
the Sinhalese elite and a large number of Tamil nationals in Sri Lanka (Ariyaratne 
2001). The Tamil nationals viewed the English language as a necessity to succeed in 
daily life, granting them economic advancement as well as social mobility. Advanced 
academic qualifications opened pathways to professions such as Medicine, Law and Civil 
Administration that were taught and practiced in the English language (Ram 1989). In 
1948, Tamils constituted 10 % of the population and 31% of students at universities, 
which resulted in Tamils gaining a higher percentage of employment in the professional 
sphere (Ariyaratne 2001). Though a majority of Sinhalese did feel discriminated against 
due to their lack of English language skills, this did not become an issue of concern until 
the 1930’s.
In 1935, linguistic discontent resulted in the development of a new nationalistic 
ideology. The Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) was the catalyst, created solely to 
promote Sinhalese and Tamil languages as ‘swabasha’ meaning ‘one’s own language’, 
and promoted the idea that Tamil and Sinhalese languages should gradually replace the 
English language as the nation’s official languages for education, legislature and civil 
administration.
The ruling Sri Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP) brought in the Official Languages Act in 
1956. The minority Tamil representation at parliament were unable to influence the
10 According to the last conclusive census carried out in 1981, the non-Sinhalese minority was 26 % and the 
non-Buddhist minority was 30.7 % (of the total population) (Hyndman 1988:7).
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Sinhalese majority who dictated that Sinhalese became the official language of trade, 
commerce and education, which sowed the seeds of disharmony.
In a democratic polity, if the majority community becomes autocratic and the 
promoter of its own interest at the cost of the minority, it is not only an infringement 
of basic democratic norms, but also creates a very fertile ground for ethnic violence 
which will lead to a civil war.
(Ariyaratne 2001:2)
In 1957 S.J.V. Chelvanayakam, a leading Tamil politician, launched a ‘satyagraha’ 
(peaceful protest) demanding the repeal of the Official Languages Act (1956) and equal 
status for the Tamil language, which culminated in the first major anti-Tamil riots in the 
capital city Colombo, with many deaths and destruction of property owned by Tamils11. 
Many Tamil nationals moved to the safety of northern part of the island where there was 
a larger Tamil presence (Sabaratnam 2001:181, Ram 1989:39-41, Narayan-Swamy 
2002:13). The Official Language Act caused the Tamil language to be restricted to the 
North and East parts of the island, and those (Tamils) who lived in any other part of the 
island were subject to a compulsory requirement of undertaking a Sinhalese proficiency 
test within 3 years12.
Educational standardisation
The 1960’s saw Sinhalese disenchantment over the difference in social status between 
Tamil nationals and Sinhalese that was directly linked to the level of education obtained 
by the Tamil nationals to secure a superior life style. As Vittachi states, “the extent of 
[Tamil] participation in public life had been far in excess of their numbers” (Vittachi 
1958:18 cited in Bandara 2002:43). The increase (in effect) was due to the post-colonial 
promotion of free education,
11 Ram (1989:41) claims that over 10,000 Tamils were evacuated from Colombo to Jaffna and another 
12,000 were kept in camps “for their own safety.”
12 This policy not only affected the Tamils but also other minority nationalities in Sri Lanka such as the 
Burghers (European descent), Muslims and those Sinhalese who were educated in the English language.
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however, the expansion in all-round education, and the nascent presence of 
discrimination in favour of the Sinhalas, added to the pressures of competition at the 
higher level. The Tamils needed to look to higher and more specialized professional 
education (engineering, medicine and science) to stay ahead in the competition...
(Ram 1989: 46)
In 1971 the government reacted to Sinhalese national discontentment by creating a 
‘standardisation’ policy to address this imbalance by marking down Tamil university 
applicants to allow the Sinhalese of rural areas, where education was not easily 
accessible, to compete more easily. The actual underlying principle of this rule meant 
that Tamil applicants had to gain higher marks in order to enter the education system; 
consequently, there was a rapid decline of Tamil students entering into universities. 
According to Ram (1989:47), the figures comparing pre-standardisation university 
entries with the post-standardisation period showed the numbers of entries by Tamil 
students into higher education were significantly reduced. The results of the 
employment statistics of 1980 exemplify that Sinhalese nationals occupied the majority 
of civil service, professional and technical positions in comparison to Tamil nationals. 
This is also reflected in the administration and management sectors (ibid).
Tambiah (1986) argues that three main factors contributed to the volatility of the 
political situation; the language restriction, free education system and the slow growth 
of the economy during this period. Tambiah correctly identifies that language has been 
central to the arguments raised in politics since post-independence, and language is 
highly relevant to both education and employment. The white-collar employment in the 
government sector became the ideal occupation for young people in the post-colonial 
period. Jaffna is a diy zone, meaning that there is extreme hardship involved in 
agriculture-related employment and so education and white-collar employment was the 
way for Tamil nationals to move out of poverty. The ethnic tension started from the 
beginning of the post-colonisation period when young people dreamt of becoming 
white-collar workers with middle-class social status and gain employment in the 
government sector. Tambiah states,
that is why it is no distortion to say that although the educated ‘middle classes’ 
amongst the Sinhalese and Tamils may not actually participate in the rioting -  
violence and thuggery is the play of the urban poor, the footloose and the displaced -  
it is in their bosom that the ethnic conflict incubates.
(Tambiah 1986:74-5)
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The Sri Lankan economy was not growing at a sufficient rate to accommodate the 
emerging educated youth with meaningful employment, and with impending 
unemployment, a new generation grew up with unfulfilled expectations and bitter views 
of the future (ibid:55).
Sinhalese became the official language of administration but education in schools (both 
primaiy and secondary) and in universities both Sinhalese and Tamil continued as 
separate mediums, with English used as a subsidiary language. The separation based on 
language distanced the two ethnic groups in the same educational establishments or in 
separate language-based schools. The reduced social contact between the young turned 
“...into enmity and confrontation, and to create distrust, dislike and fear...” (Tambiah 
1986: 76)
The first casualties of the emerging Sinhalese nationalism were the Tamil nationals of 
Indian origin, who were born in Sri Lanka. The Ceylon Citizenship Act no. 18 (1948) 
demanded proof of eligibility for citizenship through descent or registration. This can be 
identified as the first instance of state discrimination against the Tamil nationals (Ram 
1989).
Causes o f Discontent
The stable birth and death rates changed rapidly during late 1940’s primarily due to the 
usage of western medicines (Somasundaram 1998). The increase in population was 
evident in the urban areas (e.g. Colombo) and the South West of the island. In order to 
accommodate the growing population the government initiated a relocation programme 
in 1953 to distribute the population evenly throughout the island and avoid any 
centralised or dense growth in urban areas. The programme was known as the Peasants 
Colonisation Scheme, which relocated the urban poor of all ethnic groups into dry zone13 
areas of the North East of the island (Manogaran 1987, Somasundaram 1998). The 
majority of these relocated people were Sinhalese, but Tamil nationals already inhabited 
the zones to which they were relocated, even if they were relatively sparsely populated.
13 The island of Sri Lanka is divided into dry and wet zones based on rainfall. The wet zones are fertile land 
easy to irrigate, unlike the dry zones, where water is often difficult to obtain. The government has addressed 
this issue by building a number of irrigation facilities and man-made lakes.
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The Tamil nationals believed that ‘Tamil speaking’ areas must belong to them, a notion 
of regional exclusivity not shared by Sinhalese nationals or the Sinhalese government14.
The Tamils perceive the influx of Sinhalese as a threat to the integrity of their
‘traditional homeland’ where they want to retain their voting majority, control over
their own affairs and cultural identity, if not, at least the names of their villages.
(Somasundaram 1998:32)
The Sri Lankan economy worsened in the 1970s for two main reasons. First, the 
government of the day decided to follow a policy of ‘self-sufficiency’ creating adverse 
international trade terms, and secondly there was a decline in the agriculture sector 
especially the tea and coconut export markets. Tambiah (1986:55) argues that this 
decline was primarily based on Mrs Bandaranayake’s government nationalising 
industries with foreign investment, such as the tea industry. The mismanagement and 
incorrect economic decisions taken during this period were evident by the 1980s. The 
economic depression, along with the Sinhalese nation State’s anger, were focused on 
Tamil nationals as the “nominated enemy” as the Tamils were seen as being gainfully 
employed and prosperous against a backdrop of rising unemployment (ibid. Also, see 
Wilson 2000).
The 1970s also became an era of discontent for many Tamil youths in Jaffna and saw a 
rise in revolutionary organisations operating in Jaffna. These organisations mostly 
recruited disillusioned Tamil youths who saw no future prospects and were disappointed 
with moderate Tamil political leaders who engaged in ‘Gandhian’ style peaceful 
agitations for a political recognition that was not materialising. The Tamil politicians 
were adamant in following the same path of peaceful negotiations with the Sinhalese 
government that they had relied on for many years whereas many Tamil youths wanted 
both a radicalisation of policy and of methods. They shifted the demands from an equal 
language status to a newly initiated concept of an independent state of Tamil Eelam in 
areas they recognised as their traditional homeland in the Northern and Eastern parts of 
the country. Nadaraja Thangavelu, a well-known smuggler from the Velvetithurai
14 The second and third generations of Sinhalese and Muslim peasant farmers and their families living in 
these areas are often targeted by the LTTE, who see them as outsiders, and brutally murdered.
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district^ of Jaffna, initiated the use of violent methods, and held meetings with other 
known criminals to plan their campaign of violence (Kalansooriya 2001). Yet, these 
incidents were of a minor scale when compared to the violence that was to follow in 
Jaffna. Against this backdrop the Tamil Tiger movement was born in 1972 with 
Vellupillai Prabhakaran as its leader. At the same time, the Tamil political parties united 
to create the Tamil United Front (TUF) that changed its name in 1976 to the Tamil 
United Liberation Front (TULF)16. They moved away from the equal language demand 
and promoted a single self-government in the North and the East as the only way out of 
their predicament (Ram 1989).
In 1977, disregarding the Tamil opposition, the Prime Minister, Sirimavo 
Bandaranayake not only enforced the ‘Singhalese only ruling, but also proclaimed a 
special status to Buddhism as the state religion1?. This action created a fresh phase of 
communal antagonism along religious lines.
In July 1983 the ‘Black July riots erupted following the response of the LTTE to the 
death of a close friend18 of Prabhakaran. The reprisal attack by the LTTE killed 13 Sri 
Lankan soldiers 19(Narayan-Swamy 2002, Hyndman 1988). Many of the Sinhalese 
population retaliated with frenzied attacks upon Tamil citizens living in the city. This 
particular period in history is described by Bose (1998:96) “...was [of] crucial 
significance in exacerbating Sinhalese-Tamil polarisation, and in driving thousands of 
previously uncommitted young Tamils into armed struggle.” Many young Tamil 
nationals who were displaced in refugee camps in South India and within Sri Lanka 
joined the LTTE. McGowan (1992:182 cited in Bose 1998:96) observes, “issues such as 
national self-determination, university admissions and equity in land settlement paled 
before basic desire for vengeance and the quest for safety in an independent Tamil
15 The LTTE leader Prabhakaran comes from the same district, Velvetithurai, is situated by the sea. He 
attended meetings and was recognised as an animated speaker (Kalansooriya 2001)
16 The Tamil political parties that united were the Federal Party, the Tamil Congress, and the Ceylon 
Workers Congress
17 The Sinhala Only rule contributed greatly to sympathy and support of Tamil militancy (Kalansooriya 
2001).
18 Charles Anthony was known to be the closest friend Prabhakaran had. Prabhakaran’s eldest son is named 
after this person.
19 The torture and killing of the 13 soldiers (all under the age of 21) happened in Tinnevely, Jaffna.
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state.” Balasingham also noted that in 1984 the LTTE had a “rapid expansion and 
growth” (2003:76).
The early wars fought in Jaffna by various revolutionary groups were factional, with 
different parties fighting each other as well as the state, but they were unable to 
maintain their revolutionary status without overseas government assistance. In this 
instance the assistance came by way of the Indian government, who allowed them to be 
trained and nurtured in Southern India under the auspices of its government ministers 
and India’s secret service Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). RAW performed both a 
covert and overt role in the training and arming of Tamil youths for guerrilla type wars 
against the Sri Lankan government (Ram 1989, Narayan-Swamy 2002). The LTTE along 
with other revolutionary groups (three key revolutionary groups in Appendix I) received 
additional training by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) (Narayan-Swamy 
2001). The fractional nature of the Tamil revolutionary groups continued and by the end 
of 1986, the LTTE took a strategic view to eliminate all opposition and promote 
themselves as the sole representative of the Tamil population, and the single 
revolutionary force for the state to deal with. By taking this action the LTTE was able to 
radicalise not only their own image as a violent revolutionary group but also the type of 
demands they made. A brief summary of the relationship between the LTTE, PLOTE 
and the TELO is given in Appendix I along with a list of other revolutionary groups that 
were operational during this period.
Present Political Situation: “no peace no war”
Following the anti-Tamil insurgency of 1983, the Indian government made the first 
peace interventions, with an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) being based in 
Jaffna20. Indian diplomats organised the signing of the peace accord whilst 
Prabhakaran attended talks in New Delhi 21 (Narayan-Swamy 2002), which heightened 
his animosity towards the Indian government (Pratap 2001). The IPKF enjoyed a warm 
welcome that did not last beyond their arrival, as they got involved in the conflict.
20 The involvement of dealing with peace negotiations in Sri Lanka came at a time when Rajiv Gandhi was 
badly in need of a political uplift. At the time, it was believed that Rajiv Gandhi had received somillion US 
dollars to support a Swedish arms deal, raising many questions in the Indian governments tarnishing Rajiv 
Gandhi’s image.
21 Prabhakaran was returned to Jaffna in August, almost after a month of being held.
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Further, the Sinhalese opposed the Indian intervention in what was seen as an internal 
Sri Lankan political matter (Narayan-Swamy 2002:248). The unpopular and 
controversial agreement between the Indian and Sri Lanka governments was finally 
dissolved in 1989 with the newly elected Sri Lankan government offering a unilateral 
ceasefire to the LTTE and inviting them to discussions on the future of the island.
Since then there has been many failed peace talks, at times resulting in temporary 
ceasefires. Often these talks would collapse due to LTTE being dissatisfied with the 
progress and actively disengaging from the talks, plunging the country back into civil 
war. A chronology of events given in Appendix 2 illustrates all the peace talks that have 
taken place to date.
On the 22nd February 2002 the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), which includes 
the Nordic countries of Norway, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Iceland, undertook the 
role of monitoring the cease-fire agreement signed by the Sri Lankan government and 
the LITE22. However the Sinhalese view the SLMM as sympathetic to the cause of the 
LTTE and within February 2002 a new government agency was created titled ‘the 
Secretariat for Coordination of the Peace Process’ (SCOPP) to facilitate the peace­
making process23. Its mandate includes liaising with the SLMM and the monitoring of 
ceasefire agreement (CFA) between the LTTE and the State (Global IDP 2002 and 
http://peaceinsrilanka.com, accessed 10.9.2007).
In 2003, as part of the Peace Process a Sub-committee on Gender Issues (SGI) was 
created with representation from a government appointed group of feminist academics 
and a group of LTTE women combatants, which was suspended by 2005 due to the
22 The SLMM website claims “The cease-fire in Sri Lanka is not a result of a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU), but that of The Cease-fire Agreement (CFA), signed formally by the GOSL and LTTE” (accessed on
24.1.04).
23 It is also interesting to note that the LTTE has been ‘active’ during the ceasefire period. An example of this
can be seen in the summary of recorded complaints and violations from all districts compiled and published 
by the SLMM for a period of 8 months from 1st January 2003 to 1st September 2003 . Further the activities 
include forceful recruitment of children, and gathering of firearms. One of the most frequent activities is the 
recruitment of children into the ranks of combatants by the LITE. UNICEF has identified a large percentage 
of children who have been forcibly conscripted into the ranks of the LTTE (UTHR: 10.5.02, SPUR: 
downloaded 20.9.01: Harrison: 2003). The figures referred to by the SLMM show an incredible 537 child 
recruitments, which does show that there has been no active policy change in the LTTE where child soldiers 
are concerned.
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collapse of peace talks and the lack of autonomy of women from both groups, (see del 
Viso 2005, Harris 2004, http://www.peaceinsrilanka.com, accessed 20.10.2007,)
The major political parties hold differing views towards the struggle with the LTTE. 
Ariyaratne (2001) describes how Chandrika Bandaranayake-Kumaratunga (People’s 
Alliance Party) supported a strategy of a political solution that did not result in a 
military victory. The political deal is viewed as a tool to isolate and defeat the LTTE, and 
not a possibility of opening dialogue for peace. Ranil Wickramasinha (United National 
Party) drafted a framework for a 'unitary state and non-militaiy approach’to be adopted 
towards the LTTE and stated in 1999 that he would begin discussions with the LTTE, 
even through a third parly, for a negotiated settlement2* (Ariyaratne 2001). The current 
President Mahinda Rajapaksa has invited the LTTE to the negotiating table, backed up 
with a militaristic assault in retaliation to the LTTE attacks upon the army and Sinhalese 
citizens 25 (International Alert: 17.4.2007). The daily situation in Jaffna remains tense as 
stated in the SLMM weekly reports with continuing killings and abductions (SLMM 
2007)26.
An Overview: The Liberation Tigers o f Tamil Eelam (LITE)
Prabhakaran was bom on 26th November 195427, and he personally identified with the 
Tamil youths who were disappointed by the lack of state reforms. This made it possible
^  Ranil Wickramasinha was the Prime Ministers of Sri Lanka from 9th December 2001 to 6th April 2004.
25 From 19th November 2005 onwards Mahinda Rajapaksa held Presidency in Sri Lanka.
26 SLMM weekly report 27August -  2 September 2007 access 10.9.2007. The latest (September 2007) 
security measures in Jaffna require anyone over the age of 10 years to carry identity cards and all vehicles 
(including bicycles) to be registered with the government. All mobile phones will also need to be registered, 
however the registration process is difficult as the documents provided by the Sri Lanka Government are not 
in the Tamil language. Currently those who enter Jaffna (by air as there is no road link) are photographed 
before being issued with a temporary entry permit. They must return these permits and be re-photographed 
upon leaving Jaffna. Further, there are restrictions imposed on movements including those related to 
employment such as fishing (Sibemews 2007).
27 Prabhakaran is the youngest of 2 sisters and 2 brothers from an educated lower middle class background. 
His mother, Vallipuram Parvathi, is known to be a deeply religious housewife. His father Tiruvenkatam 
Velupillai was a District land officer in the government’s civil service, who adored his youngest son 
Prabhakaran and was very concerned with his average abilities relating to education. Due to this concern the 
father would take Prabhakaran along with him on his various postings around northern parts of the island 
including Batticaloa and Vauniya (Narayan-Swamy 2004:49).
- 2 9 -
for him to form the Tamil New Tigers (TNT) in 1972 and subsequently the Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 1976.
According to Ram (1989:47), the Tiger emblem portrays a roaring tiger with its paws 
stretched out in preparation to attack and signifies both guerrilla warfare and the rise of 
Tamils. Although the animal analogy is again seen in the LTTE’s use of the word Tiger, it 
has a different symbolic meaning to the Sinhalese Lion as it does not represent the 
creation of a nation. The use of the tiger image by the LTTE is discussed later in this 
chapter; however, the everyday usage of the word does not refer to tigers but to 
leopards28.
It is also believed to be the emblem of the historical South Indian Cholai kingdom, which 
is linked to ancient Tamil history in Jaffna through South Indian invasions (ibid). 
Hellman-Rajanayagam (1986:77) referred to in Sabaratnam (2001:256) claims that the 
function of the symbol represents the coming together of Tamils from Jaffna and 
Batticaloa2 .^ Narayan-Swamy (2002:52) on the other hand claims it to be the result of a 
particular fondness Prabhakaran had for Phantom comics, where the Phantom wears a 
skull ring whilst fighting evil men and always is one-step ahead of his captors.
In Ram’s (1989) book Sri Lanka, the Fractured Island he clearly suggests that the 
LIT E focussed on an area where there had not been any previous political dynamism or 
extreme violence. Somasundaram also notes that, “the Tamil youth dedicated 
themselves wholeheartedly and with full force of their youthful energies to the historical 
task of saving their threatened community, of regenerating the Tamil nation” 
(Somasundaram 1998:97).
28 The Tamil word for tiger is Puli and leopard is Si-ru-thai. The LTTE uses many animal names for its 
combatant units e.g. Karup Puli meaning the Black Tigers, the elite suicide squad. Further, Sri Lanka is not 
known to have had tigers, but they do have leopards in its jungles. Both Sinhalese and Tamils often use the 
word tiger to describe a leopard. The misuse of the word tiger and leopard is generally attributed to the lack 
of a correct linguistic understanding of the two English words in relation to the animals.
29 Amongst Tamil nationals, those from Jaffna district are generally viewed as superior to other Tamils in 
Sri Lanka. There is currently a breakaway group of LTTE combatants led by Col. Karuna in Batticaloa 
region. The cause for its separation is believed to be the Jaffna combatants being treated more favourably 
within the organisation than those of Batticaloa. The Sri Lankan army is using this split to their advantage 
by providing support to Col. Karuna and his breakaway group to cause further disharmony against the rest 
of the LITE.
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In the initial stages, the LTTE carried out similar guerrilla attacks to the other Tamil 
revolutionary groups such as PLOTE, TELO etc. (A list of the main Tamil revolutionary 
groups is given in Appendix l table l). The revolutionary groups had a membership of 
some 2 to 3 thousand trained in both Sri Lanka and India and had the ability to mobilise 
many more should the need occur (Narayan-Swamy 2002:186. Also, see O’Balance 
1989, Manogaran 1987, Hellman-Rajanayagam 1994 and Wilson 2000).
The revolutionaries favoured attacks on police stations and army patrols. In addition, 
the robberies of state-run banks were greatly favoured, which provided some of the 
funding for the group’s activities. Other sources included a local tax system on a number 
of goods such as cigarettes and liquor and combatants further collected money from 
house to house known as ‘funds’. It is arguable whether the funds were given willingly or 
under fear and duress. However many civic citizens support and assist the rebel groups 
and by doing so incur the wrath of the armed forces which often results in their deaths30 
(Narayan-Swamy 2002:187).
The LIT E used a method widely known as ‘Lamp posting’, a method of public execution 
to eliminate individuals amongst the civil population believed to be informants of the 
state, which was very effective in instilling fear amongst the civic citizens in Jaffha31. 
The act of lamp posting also conveys a message of deterrence to others who may 
consider being disloyal to the LTTE (Thiruchandran 1999, Narayan-Swamy 2002). The 
LTTE ‘mastered suicide bombing’ and soon gained notoriety as a deadly revolutionary 
groups. The LTTE also film and photograph their major operations, which is 
characteristic of contemporary revolutionary groups32.
The LTTE raised funds through the Tamil diaspora living in Canada, England and 
Australia. However, the latest Anti-Terrorism legislation in Britain (that came to effect 
on 19th February 2001) outlawed the LTTE and its funds were frozen. Though the LTTE 
no longer raises funds openly in the UK, Canada and other western countries, they have
3°Some of the civic women I interviewed confirmed that their assistance was interpreted by the state run 
army as collaborating with the revolutionaries.
31 Lamp posting is a form of punishment metered out to collaborators and criminals by the LTTE. The 
suspected person is tied to an electric pole Gamp post) and shot in the head, generally with a single bullet 
(Narayan-Swamy 2002)
32 Furthermore these video recordings are used as propaganda material and are readily available to be 
purchased along any of the high street stores in Jaffna and Vanni.
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devised a new system whereby extremely polite and well-mannered young Tamil men 
visit homes of the Tamil diaspora and request that a large sum of money should be given 
to the LTTE as a bond to develop war-torn Jaffna. The sum of money is negotiable up to 
a point, and assurances are given that the bond will be repaid in full by the future LTTE 
Tamil State (information received through a Tamil contact, details withheld for safety 
reasons). The LITE is also involved internationally in credit card fraud, which became 
headline news in the UK in April 2007. The change in legislation also changed the face 
of the conflict between the LTTE and the Sri Lanka government from a national to a 
global level of conflict. The LITE is essentially involved in a nationalist struggle but they 
are aware that in the future they will be dealing with the international community and 
are increasingly aware of the international dimensions to their conflict (Uyangoda 
2003).
In her book The Will to Freedom Adel Balasingham (the wife of Anton Balasingham the 
political theoretician of the LITE) refers to the complex nature of the LTTE’s 
revolutionary struggle.
The national liberation organisation conducts its struggle on the politico-military 
level. In an armed revolutionary struggle for political freedom, the military and the 
political aspects are inextricably inter-linked. The military struggle becomes the very 
instrument to achieve the political cause of liberation
(Balasingham 2003:75).
Within these issues, she discusses how the social dynamics based on repression are able 
to attract people to the LITE revolutionary movement (also see Bose 1994). One such 
person was Anton Balasingham, grounded in both Marxism and Leninism. He was 
invited to join the LTTE in 1979 to teach ideological classes, although the LTTE is 
neither a Marxist nor a Leninist organisation (Narayan-Swamy 2002). After joining the 
movement, he became the LTTE’s theoretician and chief negotiator. Although 
Prabhakaran was a practical man with no interest in political ideologies of Marxism, 
they shared a passion for Tamil nationalism that made them very close companions.
The LTTE’s major tactic is ‘hit and run’. They often justify their actions through the 
claim of acting in self-defence. This argument is frequently used for revenge killings 
against the State’s armed forces. Pratap claims that Prabhakaran once stated, “we don’t 
want Eelam on a platter. We will fight and win Eelam” (ibid:94).
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Thousands of my boys have laid down their lives for Eelam. Their death cannot be in 
vain. They have given their life for this cause, how can I betray them by opting for 
anything less than Eelam?
(Prabhakaran interviewed in Pratap 2002:95).
Thus, the usage of violence appears to be a tool to achieve the objective of a Tamil nation 
state of Eelam.
The LTTE has a respectful view of death in battle, which can be argued as being 
manipulative due to the portrayal of such deaths as martyrdom, (as discussed in detail 
in Chapter Five). In the LTTE movement, there is a pragmatic approach to killings and 
assassinations that are considered as part of the revolutionary process. The veiy first 
political assassination (of Jaffna’s Mayor Duraiyapah on 27th July 1975) is credited to 
Prabhakaran (Narayan-Swamy 2 0 0 2 :5 6 )33.
In the early stages the LTTE only targeted the Sri Lankan armed forces (Kalansooria 
2001) but then spread to Sinhalese villagers in rural farming areas in the n o rth ea st3 4 . 
The attacks then spread to Colombo and the targets became more high profile, with the 
then President P r e m a d a sa 35 (2nd January 1989 to 1st May 1993) and a number of cabinet 
ministers assassinated in successive suicide bombings
The greater claim for notoriety by LTTE is in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi on 
Indian soils6. The act committed in 1991 by a woman suicide bomber had until recently 
been denied by the LTTE. For many years, the only admittance was in private, made by 
Anton Balasingham who referred to the incident as a “historical blunder” (Pratap: 2002) 
and a public apology was made in 2006. However, the attack on Gandhi prompted India 
to close down and outlaw LTTE operations in India. The attack further led Indians to
33 It is believed that Prabhakaran used an old rusted revolver and bullets made out of matchstick tips to 
carry out this assassination (Narayan-Swamy 2002:56).
34 These areas also forms part of governments redistribution of population to Northeast sector of the island, 
which the LTTE viewed as their land. The LTTE is known to have used knives to commit murder, especially 
in Sinhalese villages. This may be because it is easier to kill unarmed and untrained civilians (children and 
babies included) with a knife than wasting expensive bombs or bullet to accomplish the same result of 
taking lives.
35 President Premadasa was in power from 2nd January 1989 to 1st May 1993.
36 Dhanu, a woman combatant from the LTTE suicide squad known as the Black Tigers killed Rajiv Ghandi. 
She detonated the bomb whilst bending down to touch the feet of Rajiv in the accepted customary manner 
of showing respect among Indians.
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view the LTTE as a dangerous and untrustworthy group of militants rather than a 
desperate collective of innocent victims (Pratap: 2002).
Impact o f Violence
Between 1989 and 1995, Sri Lanka plunged into a civil war after several failed peace 
talks with distrust, hostility and violence against each other’s ethnic communities 
(Thiruchandran 1999). This fear has been manipulated by the ruling government, which 
contributed to a state of confusion amongst the people. The armed forces and the State 
police misinterpreted the inactivity and the silence of the Tamil civic population as 
support for, and collaboration with the LTTE (ibid). The reality of such behaviour (often 
unrecognised) is that their silence and inactivity is the result of intimidatory pressure on 
the population by the LTTE.
The Prevention of Terrorism Act 1979 contributed to the legalisation of State violence 
against Tamil nationals. Under the Act, a suspected person can be held incommunicado, 
with no access to legal representation or trial, for a period of 18 months and confessions 
obtained through torture are accepted as admissible evidence. Many indiscriminate 
arrests took place amongst Tamils and relatives were taken into custody by the armed 
forces until the wanted people gave themselves up (ibid). There were many violations of 
human rights37.
Details of violence committed by the State’s own armed forces; the IPKF and the LTTE 
are widely documented and published by international agencies such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch. The brunt of such violence is borne by the 
citizens by way of beatings, rapes, disappearances and murders, contributing to ethnic 
polarisation and mutual fear.
37 One such tale conveyed to me by an interview participant, how a Tamil peasant farmer was put inside a 
sack and thrown into an open fire in front of his wife and children by the Sri Lanka army. The child, who is 
now a grown woman, has said she “saw the sack dance in the f ir e ” This was not an isolated incident. There 
were many more equally horrifying and violent tales.
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W om en in Jaffna’s Tamil society
Background
A few English language texts reflect on Tamil ethnic identity in ancient Jaffna, but these 
often overlook the roles played by women. In her book, Ideological Factors in 
Subordination of Women Thiruchandran (1993) focuses on the historical roles of Tamil 
women. However, the specifics of gender discussed focus more on Tamil women of 
Southern India rather than Jaffna. This was not problematic, as the related identity 
between the two groups of women has made the text relevant to both. With such 
limitations, it was exciting to discover literature relating to a matriarchal society with a 
matrilineal social structure in Jaffna C.2000BC. Within this socio-cultural structure, 
Tamil women had a great deal of autonomy and social freedom (Rasanayagam 19263®, 
Navaratnam 1959), and were free from the moral sanctions that were to follow a few 
centuries later.
Women enjoyed great freedom and liberty. Young men and women met each other 
freely in pleasure gardens, in groves and in the fields where the girls were engaged in 
guarding the crop. They fell in love and later married39 with consent of the parents
(Rasanayagam 1926:170).
The period in reference to this text is claimed to be the Sangam4° period c.2347 B.C, a 
time of enlightenment in ancient Jaffna, where women were encouraged to develop their
38 Rasanayagam (bom in 1870 and died in 1940) wrote Tamils of Ceylon in i926.Since then his work has 
been criticised for inaccuracies. With such criticisms in mind I have only included his work where I can 
corroborate it against other works, such as Navaratnam (1959) or Thiruchandran (1998). However 
Rajsanayagam’s work must be recognised for the elements of nationalist ethics in Tamil Historical literature 
produced at a time when there were none written.
39 Marriages of this type were known as ‘kalavu’ and were widely practiced amongst Tamils during early 
historical times.
40 The Sangam period described by Rasanayagam (1926) refers to circa 2347 B.C. and Thiruchandran 
(1998) refers to the same period as AD 100-300. Whilst the accuracy of dates for their period has been 
debated, Thiruchandran (1998:37) states this debate has now been settled, which reflected in her writing as 
AD 100-300 and in Rasanayagam as 2347 B.C. This variation may be due to Rasanayagam book published 
in 1926, prior to the debate being resolved. The first preserved literatures of Tamil areas are known as 
Sangam literature, also spelt as Cankum. The poems themselves were written by citizens of varying social 
backgrounds with twenty-eight women and four queens amongst women writers and amongst the male 
writers including kings, chieftains, and various carpenters, blacksmiths and artists (Thiruchandran 
1 9 9 8 :37 ).
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minds and engage in education. However, the matrilineal cultural practice may have 
predated the records of the Sangam era (Rasanayagam 1926:171, Thiruchandran 
1998:37). It is not known what precise social changes occurred that ended the 
matrilineal socio-cultural system and gave way to the patrilineal society that is seen to 
date.
After the Sangam period, a clear division was seen separating women into two groups, 
those who stay within the confines of home, Kula Makal, meaning ‘women of the 
family5, and Vilai Makal, those who are ‘available for a price5(Thiruchandran 1998:23). 
The role of the Kula Makal became more focused then with an added dimension of 
religious fervour elevating women to a pious social role and at the same time reducing 
their sexuality to procreation purposes and a passive submission to the domination of 
males (ibid). Thiruchandran however does not address the issue of this social separation 
creating moral social hierarchies amongst women. I would argue that the piety 
attributed to the female body, at the cost of its5 sexuality, was the start of the perception 
of women in the domestic sphere as morally virtuous, meaning ‘good5 -  as opposed to 
those women engaged in sexual activities being seen as morally decadent, and as ‘evil5. 
Therefore, women who were engaged in sexual activity fell into the category of Vilai 
Makal, women who were seen as being available for a price, and were viewed as evil 
temptresses, set against the good and pious wife41.
Colonial and post-colonial eras
The separated social roles played by women in the domestic sphere and the public 
sphere continued until the colonisation by the Europeans. The male consciousness and 
the masculinity of colonisation contributed to Tamil conservative ideology forming a 
new social identity for Tamil women in the community in the 19th century. 
Thiruchandran (ibid: 109) claims that female roles were idealistically feminised, in
41The separation of women in society into either good or evil further created new words to describe women 
who are engaged in the sexual appeasement of men. “Prostitution had become institutionalised with a 
stigma on the women who were socially marginalised with derogatory names” (Thiruchandran 1998:24. also 
see Kersenboom 1987). Names such as ‘Paratat meaning prostitute; ‘Vilai Matu’ meaning women available 
for a price; ‘Porudpendir’ women who are paid materially with goods; ‘Kanikaiyar’ meaning courtesan and 
‘PotumakaF meaning morally loose common women. Within these sexualised groups of women there 
emerged a secondary group containing ‘III Parataf the concubines, and ‘Seri Parataf meaning women from 
slum dwellings that accommodated any paid customers (ibid).
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which rigid moral behaviour was considered the only acceptable social norm for Tamil 
women. Interestingly much of the prescribed normative behaviour imposed on Tamil 
women was drawn from Victorian morality, with the bodies of women being turned into 
sites of male moral consciousness.
Female gender construction in Sri Lanka is full of paradoxical complexities. On one 
hand, women of high socio-economic status have made considerable strides towards 
emancipation; on the other, lower class women are defined by cultural boundaries that 
have not changed for generations. Women from middle or upper classes backed with a 
strong English education provided a fertile ground for creating a women’s movement in 
Sri Lanka during the latter part of colonial rule through to the early postcolonial period. 
Jayawardane and de Alwis (2002:246) describe the women’s movement as being “...a 
broad based movement that encompasses a variety of organisations and groups that 
have arisen out of different struggles and conflicts, at different historical moments”. For 
example, women succeeded in winning the right to vote in 1931 despite adverse male 
comments such as “Do not throw pearls before swine, for they will turn and rend 
you...[...]...what suits European women will not suit us”*2 (Jayawardena and de Alwis 
2002:0).
The women of the Women’s Franchise Union (WFU)43 are particularly remarkable as 
they were not militant (in comparison to British and Indian women’s movement), but 
part of the conservative elite in Colombo. Their role should be recognised not only for 
their active participation in obtaining the vote for women, but also for the fact that they 
were “the first autonomous, multi-ethnic women’s organisation in Sri Lanka that was 
founded with the sole purpose of claiming their political right...” [my italics] 
(Jayawardena and de Alwis 2002:247)**.
42 This comment was made by Sir P.Ramanathan as cited in Special Commission on the Constitution, Oral 
Evidence, Vol.i, 30 November 1927PP 248. The full reference of which is St Mathew chapter 7 verse 6, “Give 
not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under 
their feet, and turn again and rend you” cited in de Alwis and Jayawardena (2001:10)
43 More information on the movement can be found in de Alwis M and K. Jayawardena, (2001) Casting 
Pearls: the Women’s Franchise Movement in Sri Lanka, Colombo, Social Scientist Association.
44 Their confidence was reflected in their conduct as seen by Agnes de Silva, the leader of the WFU 
delegation who remarked, “w]e went in the spirit of crusaders and answered the questions in an inspired 
manner. Lord Donoughmore asked if we wanted Indian Tamil women labourers on the estates to have the 
vote. I replied certainly, they are women too. We want all women to have the vote” (Tambiah 2002:427).
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The Donoughmore commission (1927) made recommendations on engaging the 
“...population in the election of Ceylonese to the Legislative Council, as well as to devise 
a constitution that would give substantial power to the Ceylonese representative in the 
council to govern the country” (Manogaran 1987:34). It recommended that the vote be 
given to all women aged 30 and over but upon implementation this became 21 years of 
age to broaden the basis of political power across both ethnic groups (Jayawardena 
1992:128-9, Tambiah 2002:427).
Women have generally entered politics in Sri Lanka because of the death of a male 
relative such as a husband or a father. The best example of this was the political 
engagement of the world’s first female Prime Minster, Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranayaka, 
who succeeded her assassinated husband, S.W.R.D. Bandaranayaka. Jayawardena 
(1992:129) refers to this pattern of female entiy into the male world of politics as 
“inheriting, as it were, the male mantle of power,” which could be argued was the only 
way of entering the masculine world of politics and state governance in a postcolonial 
era. Mrs. Bandaranayaka’s victory gave many women confidence to enter the patriarchal 
public arena. This dynastic approach was further seen when Mrs Bandaranayaka’s 
daughter (Chandrika) also entered the political arena. This is reflective of many other 
countries (e.g. India and the Nehru family; Pakistan and the Bhutto family) where elite 
women have spearheaded political change (see Minault 1989).
Tamil women with influence all resided in Colombo, a progressive modem society when 
compared to Jaffna, a city still steeped in patriarchal culture and values. As noted by 
Tambiah (2002), Jayawardena and de Alwis (2002), the concept of modernity was 
embedded in Sri Lanka’s socialism. It is the privileged and educated minority of women 
that have led social change. Their very education and idealism “...contributed to the 
socializing of women into roles that were only superficially different from those of 
traditional society” (Jayawardena 1992:136).
It is unfortunate that those most in need of pragmatic social change were overlooked in 
the march towards progress. Women of rural areas and the non-elite who lived in urban 
areas (both Tamil and Sinhalese), were committed in their demands for social change 
and female recognition, but their lives were still dictated and controlled by hegemonic 
masculine practices.
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Sri Lanka is thus an interesting example of a society in which women were not 
subjected to harsh and overt form of oppression, and therefore did not develop a 
movement for women’s emancipation that went beyond the existing social 
parameters. It is precisely this background that has enabled Sri Lanka to produce a 
woman prime minister, as well as many women in the professions, but without 
disturbing the general patterns of subordination
(Jayawardena 1992:136).
The number of Tamil women who have entered politics since the postcolonial era is 
limited. Tamil women have historically been supporters of their husbands or sons who 
were the carriers of the cause. During the early postcolonial era, Tamil women in Jaffna 
have never been in leading positions of any political struggle which is reflective of their 
social position, and their relationship to the struggle or the cause was through their 
secondary roles to masculine politics by way of engaging in peaceful protests known as 
satyagraha (Maunaguru 1995:160).
However, a number of Tamil women c.1920 made political statements with public 
criticism of the patriarchal state s y s t e m ^ . De Alwis and Jayawardena (2001:56) describe 
these women as “professional independent women [who] were able to speak out loud 
and clear.” Tamil women conducted their activities through writing articles to national 
newspapers on gender equality (ibid). This kind of non-conffontational but effective 
activity is reminiscent of the maxim of ‘the pen is mightier than the sword* because they 
were forthcoming with their approach and criticisms46. The first Tamil woman to enter 
the State Council in 1932 was a popular figure who lasted a decade in that role47. From
45 A journalist named Mangalammal Masilamany, a doctor Nallama Sathyavagiswara Aiyar and a writer 
Meenachi Animal Natesa Aiyar. Of all of these women, Masilamany was the most vociferous, for instance in 
regards to the issues of women and marriage she stated, and “Marriage is not the end result of a woman’s 
life.” Dr Nallama Sathyavagiswara Aiyar became the first Tamil woman to practice medicine in Sri Lanka 
(de Alwis and Jayawardena 2001:57)
46 The maxim ‘the pen is mightier than the sword’ is legendary in Sri Lankan history with a story of E.W. 
Perera, a nationalist minded lawyer from the ‘National Congress Party’ carrying a letter to the Queen of 
England requesting independence from Britain. The letter is believed to have been hidden in his shoe for the 
fear of it being confiscated by the governing authorities in Sri Lanka. Since independence the schoolchildren 
have always been taught that the “pen is mightier than the sword” and much can be achieved through non­
violent means.
47 Naysum Saravanamuttu joined the State Council from Colombo North Seat that she kept for 10 years. 
After many years, Ranganayaki Padmanathan was appointed as a replacement for her dead brother in 
Pothuvil district in 1980. In 1989, Rasa Manohari Pulendran was nominated in place of her murdered 
husband. From her re-election in 1994, she became the first Tamil woman Minister in Sri Lankan 
government, in charge of the Minister of Education.
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1942 to 1980, there has been no Tamil female representation in the government; 1994 
saw the first Tamil woman as a government minister in charge of the Education 
Department. These culturally imposed limits were exacerbated by the assassination of 
Sarojini Yogeswaran, the mayor of Jaffna in 1997 -  believed to have been carried out by 
the LTTE -  which reduced the number of political appointments for woman in politics*8.
According to the Human Development Report, women in Sri Lanka are a “model for 
developing countries” (Tambiah 2002:428). They have some of the highest literacy 
levels (83.1%) and female life spans (74.2 years) amongst developing countries.
The same report records that the female fertility rate have dropped, due to the number 
of females entering higher education and a rise in the average age of women at marriage 
(25.2 years) (Women and Men in Sri Lanka, A Report, Department of Census and 
Statistics, Colombo 1995, cited in Tambiah 2002:428). These figures reflect the State’s 
commitment to welfare issues during the postcolonial era, which created a Women’s 
Bureau and a Ministry for Women’s Affairs, along with a constitutional guarantee of 
equality and the adoption of a Women’s Charter.
Nevertheless, these achievements:
...do not necessarily mean empowerment of women in terms of greater participation 
in the decision making process
(Tambiah 2002:428).
Tambiah argues that it is still difficult for women to enter public spaces hence women’s 
representation in the labour market is still half that of males. This significant difference 
can be explained by the gender construction in a society that sees women’s roles as 
primarily being wives and mothers and is central to the nationalist discourse of the late 
colonial era and its heavy reliance upon the postcolonial female identity (de Alwis 1998a 
referred to in Jayawardena and de Alwis 2002:258).
Women of Sri Lanka (regardless of ethnicity) act as primary carers in families for the 
children and the elderly as is common in many other societies. In addition to these roles
48 Sarojini Yogeswaran was a widow of former Member of Parliament in Jaffna who was assassinated. Her 
own assassination was allegedly committed by the LITE for her calling for an ending to the culture of 
violence that was taking place in Jaffna and for her election affiliation with the Tamil United Liberation 
Front (TULF), whom the LTTE considered as one of its enemies. (Tambiah 2002:434).
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in the domestic sphere, many women are compelled to seek employment, which may not 
be in the formal economy, and so not recorded in official statistics (Tambiah 2002:428). 
Women are tied to a moral code of conduct, which unites all women in Sri Lanka and 
overlooks their ethnic identity.
The do’s include chastity, modesty, servility, self-sacrifice, and confinement to home, 
preoccupation with children, husband, relations, and husband’s friends, not to 
mention looking after his property. There were also several don’ts including loud  
talk, laughing, running, idling and keeping the company of independent (therefore 
bad) women
(Jayawardena 1986:23 referred to in Tambiah 2002:249).
The women’s socialisation process that takes place at home constructs a culturally 
acceptable female identity.
These ideas are then internalised and reproduced from generation to generation. 
Education has done little to change these attitudes and perceptions, and all along 
had been a powerful reinforcing factor operating as an agent to socio -cultural 
reproduction, legitimising gender-role stereotypes
(Ibid).
This reinforcement of gender roles also restricts women’s activities in public spaces, 
where women’s representation in decision-making roles or in political activism is often 
thwarted and at times discouraged by the men in their families.
During the past two decades, there has been a notable change in women’s social 
recognition, with the Covenant for Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (1981) 
and the Women’s Charter (1992). In 1994, the existing colonial laws regarding the age of 
consent and marriage were changed, and incest was criminalised (Jayawardena and de 
Alwis 2002:255). It is clear that the influence of a few progressive women changed much 
in society for all women.
An anti-feminist backlash was seen in the mid-1980s. Women who wished to change 
discrimination were accused of being culturally misguided due to their westernised 
views and of failing to understand the freedom women in civic society have always had 
(Jayawardena and de Alwis 2002:257). Some feminists claim the reason behind society’s 
change of attitude was the intrinsic tie of the role of women to masculinity.
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Consequently
One of the reasons all males, including those of the left, refuse to support women’s 
liberation is that they do not want to lose the benefits of participating in their homes 
as well as in society
(Jayawardena and de Alwis 2002:257 
in reference to Jayawardena and Kelkar :i989).
The gap has widened since the ethnic violence of 1983, prompting feminists to criticise 
the military and its handling of Tamil civic citizens. This action has further enraged the 
men in society, who are supported by the media, which has portrayed Sri Lanka 
feminists as “...dishonouring their country by publicising ‘private’ and local problems 
internationally” (ibid:263). They accused the feminists of Sri Lanka of not collaborating 
in the ‘nationalist’ agenda and exposing the ‘private’ matter of ethnic violence to the 
world.
An overview o f modem Tamil women in Jaffna
Jaffna has a strong hierarchical caste-based social structure; for example, the landed 
gentry known as the Vellala are defined by a higher social position by the caste system 
(see Pfaffenberger 1982). Although there is a social link between the women of Jaffna 
and Southern India, there are some major differences between the women of Jaffna, the 
community in which they live, and South India. One such difference is seen in the 
hierarchical roles played by Brahmins. Whilst they are respected in both communities, 
the roles of the Brahmins of Jaffna are limited to attending to rituals in temples, 
whereas the Brahmins of South India hold a great deal of power in society and have 
imposed a very strict code of conduct for women (Subrahmanian 1996,Thiruchandran 
1994 and 1993). Due to this hierarchical variation, the women of Jaffna have not 
suffered the same extreme socio-cultural conditions, and this has meant some freedom, 
albeit marginal, within the patriarchal social structure.
Women within the domestic sphere hold either an elevated social position, as auspicious 
women (married with children), or a lowly position, as inauspicious women (widowed 
and/or childless). In modern times Jaffna Tamil women have enjoyed a great deal of 
power within the confines of the home, but are dependent on their male family members 
whilst in public spaces. A woman who behaves in an assertive way in public spaces may
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be criticised for her immodest behaviour. However women with a lack of social capital 
are restricted to seeking employment away from domestic boundaries, and are aware of 
and negotiate their roles in public spaces. At the onset of war, Tamil women in Jaffna 
renegotiated this identity, without straying too far from its core patriarchal values. 
Thiruchandran (1998:79) states that those who do not follow the existing norms are 
seen as the Other, which includes women who practice various forms of Christian faiths. 
Such women, though seen as the Other, are not totally excluded from society, due to a 
shared hegemonic identity based on ethnicity, language and culture. This invokes a 
sense of belonging to the Tamil nation state, and a consequent nationalistic identity. 
This has prevented the creation of an exclusive religious value-based subculture for 
Christian-Tamil women. The absence of any politicisation of religion has assisted the 
LTTE in demanding a traditional homeland rather than a Hindu-based identity.
The opening of a university in Jaffna in 1974 contributed to the development of a 
political consciousness amongst Tamil women. The women of the university, such as 
Maunaguru and BP (one of the civic participants in this thesis), were founding members 
of the ‘Women’s Progressive Association’. Their aim was to raise awareness amongst 
both their male and female peer groups who met up for weekly meetings to discuss 
feminist literature. They also included those outside the campus and introduced a 
‘Women’s Study Circle’ to engage with a wider peer base in Jaffna. The Association and 
the Study Circle, with the support of the faculty, were immediately successful 
(Jayawardena and de Alwis 2002:255 in reference to Maunaguru’s unpublished paper). 
Unfortunately, the article by Jayawardena and de Alwis (2002) does not go beyond the 
beginning of the Association and Study Circle, however through my research interviews 
I am able to confirm that the groups were forced to dissolve under escalating violence 
that made it impossible for them to meet and discuss social issues. The group is now 
scattered around the world, barring a very small number still residing in the country 
that pursue an alternative form of political activism amidst the ongoing conflict.
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The Women and the LTTE
The Tamil women of Jaffna found themselves highly exposed during the periods of war, 
as the LTTE guerrilla style fighting made it difficult for these civic women to be 
distinguished from the combatant women (Ram 1989). This also meant many civilians 
were tortured, raped and murdered as suspected LITE combatants or supporters and 
women who suffered sexual violence often committed suicide (Thiranagama, Hoole et al 
1990). This was particularly poignant when the IPKF stated that they could not 
differentiate between the civic and combatant women. As one officer stated:
We are not checking women deliberately. You see, one day, when one of our officers 
was going on an open vehicle, there were two young women on the roadside. One 
waved while the other raised her skirt and fired an automatic gun at our officer and 
Jawan. Don’t you think we have to check women? It is women who are carrying 
weapons strapped to their thighs and in their blouses.
(Thiranagama, Hoole et al 1990:316)
It is apparent that women were targeted due to their vulnerability with a clear disregard 
fo: the social norms concerning civilians and women in particular49.
As discussed later in this thesis, the reasons for women joining the movement are both 
varied and complex, however the LTTE policy of recruiting women has brought criticism 
from some feminists. De Mel (2001), Maunaguru (1995), de Alwis (1998b) and 
Ccomaraswamy (1996) state that it is the need for human resources within the LTTE 
thit prompts them to recruit women rather than the promotion of women’s social 
involvement and equality during a period of political conflict. This debate is analysed at 
length in Chapter Six. In 1984 the Tamil language magazine Thalir stated in their 
editorial the following,
Women are half of our population and hence their participation in various levels of 
armed struggle is extremely necessary. Women are the internal revolutionary force 
in any national movement. The level of participation of women in the Eelam struggle 
including armed combat will prove the revolutionary potentialities of Tamil women
(Thalir magazine 1984, issue 2i:pp3i cited in Maunaguru 1995:163).
49 dale soldiers (Hoole et al 1990) were giving women full body checks at sentry points manned by the IPKF 
soHiers. The continual targeting of women is cited as a contributing factor that led women to join the LTTE 
du» to the lack of safety they felt as discussed in later chapters.
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Whilst globally it has become a familiar sight to see women combatants in the 20th 
century armed forces (see Carreiras 2006, Elshtain and Tobias 1990, Enloe 1988, 
D’Amico 1998, Elshtain 1987 Klein 1998,) it is still a new concept for Tamil nationals to 
see Tamil women in this role. In other countries there have been clear examples of 
women warriors such as the Trung Sisters of Vietnams0 (Eisen-Bergman 1975) and the 
Dahomey women warriors of West Africa (Edgerton 2000), however Tamil history does 
not have any similar militant female figures to draw upon (Coomaraswamy 1996). I 
suggest that this is a result of the dominance of patriarchal religious culture in Tamil 
society, as discussed earlier on in this chapter. The LTTE based its women combatants 
on the image of a masculine warrior in a feminine guise, and placed her in a role of a 
protector, combining the cultural ideology of the auspicious mother and the modem 
concept of the female warrior/combatant (see de Mel 2001, Jayawardena and de Alwis 
2002, Maunaguru 1995 and de Alwis 1998b). The LTTE recognised Tamil women’s 
potential beyond the narrowly constructed gender roles of reproducers to include them 
in a wider social context of a combatant, “...‘woman’ was not only considered to be a 
reproducer of male heroes, but also a fighter herself’ (Maunaguru 1995:163). Women 
are trained to the same skill levels as men in guerrilla warfare, the paradoxical nature of 
this role is discussed throughout the thesis to establish the precise role that the women 
combatants now hold.
Summary
The Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic groups have co-existed for centuries. Post-colonial 
Sinhalese and Tamil national identities were based on language and religion. The basis 
of nationalism was Language, and this affected both Sinhalese and Tamils. The 
suppression of Buddhism under colonial rule became a tool used by Sinhalese 
nationalists, and Sri Lankan nationalism was based on Buddhism and Sinhalese 
ethnicity.
Nationalist identity politics linked of religion and language in a way that favoured the 
majority and excluded the minority. From the Sinhalese perspective, the issue of Tamil 
nationalism was viewed as a minority issue not a question for the whole nation. The 
Sinhalese ideology has assumed Sri Lankans to be Sinhalese-Buddhist, a view that
50 Trung Trac and Trung Nhi known as the Triing Sisters led and army of 80,000 people to drive the 
Chinese out of Vietnam in 40 A.D. (Eisen-Bergman 1975:30-31).
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excludes all other inhabitants. The view that the Sinhalese are the sole indigenous ethnic 
group of Sri Lanka translates into an ethnic polarisation that is substantiated by 
violence. The radicalisation of Tamils shifted demands from an equal language status to 
an independent state of Tamil Eelam, in the context of growing discontent of youth 
generally and romanticism about armed struggle.
The LITE has developed a vision of a secular autonomous geographic state and 
responded that Tamils are a nation and not a minority. The fundamental belief amongst 
Tamil nationalists is that Tamil political interests can only be addressed through war 
and the construction of their own state, and the way that the government has treated 
Tamil nationals has only strengthened that belief.
Since the late 1970s Sri Lanka has endured a civil war, several failed peace talks, and 
distrust, hostility and violence between the ethnic communities. The LITE targets 
changed from military personnel to Sinhalese nationals, and the elimination of anyone 
who criticises or disagrees with its practices. Thus the usage of violence appears to be a 
tool to achieve the objective of a Tamil nation state of Eelam, and the dominance of the 
LITE within that state.
Many civic citizens support the rebel groups and incur the wrath of the armed forces 
that often results in their deaths. The State, the peacekeeping forces, and the LITE itself 
have all committed acts of violence that have targeted civic society -  beatings, rapes, 
disappearances and murders. One poignant story is that of the IPKF claiming not to be 
able to differentiate between civic and combatant women.
The entry of women into the political sphere did not challenge the patriarchal social 
fabric. Tamil women’s historical autonomy changed to domesticity and subservience. In 
modem Jaffna civic and combatant women are inextricably linked to a patriarchal 
society constructed through hierarchies of caste, class and masculinities, which they 
have to continually negotiate.
The emphasis on women who stay within the confines of home, Kula Makal, elevates 
domestic women to a pious social role and reduces their sexuality to a passive 
submission to the domination of males. The women’s socialisation process takes place at 
home and constructs a culturally acceptable female identity that is idealistically 
feminised, where rigid moral behaviour is the only acceptable social norm for Tamil
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women. Further, domestic women are viewed as either auspicious women (married with 
children), or inauspicious women (widowed/childless).
Tamil women do not actively participate in decision-making, which is still in the hands 
of men (as discussed further in the Chapter Six), and it is difficult for women (who are 
also reluctant) to enter public spaces, including the political arena. This significant 
imbalance in female representation can be explained by the construction of gender by a 
society that sees women’s roles as primarily being wives and mothers.
The LITE combatant women have an image of a masculine warrior in a feminine guise, 
a role with the paradoxical nature of the protectoress, combining the cultural ideology of 
the auspicious mother and the modem concept of the female warrior. By this action, the 
status of Tamil women is raised from their traditional role of subservience. Against this 
backdrop, the combatant women of the LTTE are critically important to the success of 
the revolution. But does this promote female equality and empowerment? That is the 
central question of my thesis.
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CHAPTER 2
ENTERING A TIGER’S LAIR: 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN GATHERING 
DATA
Introduction
“In situations where the roots of conflict are deeply structural, the possibility of violence 
often restricts the methodological options open to the researcher” (Lee 1995:18). This 
statement highlights one of the issues faced in conducting this research in the Jaffna 
peninsula in March and October 2003. Methodological and ethical concerns are central 
issues for all theses; however, through my own fieldwork gathering data under violent 
sono-political conditions, difficult and dangerous for both the researcher and 
participants of the research, I have also gained an insight into the particular 
methodological and ethical issues such research raises.
The focus of this chapter is the many methodological issues that confront researchers 
coiducting fieldwork in subject areas involving violent political conflict. My own field 
research experiences lie within this framework of concerns and I address specific issues 
of gaining access, the power that is held by the Gatekeepers to grant and withdraw 
access, and the issues of security of both the researcher and the participants and the 
data collected. There is a vast feminist literature addressing issues such as power in 
research, and concerns regarding representing ‘the Other’ which I have also drawn on. I 
also discuss the issue of language as a primaiy concern when interviewing combatants, 
ghen an incorrect usage of words may cause suspicion and even withdrawal of 
cooperation. Ethnic identity is also an influential factor, as it separates the researcher 
fran the researched and this is examined through discussion of the legitimacy of 
coiducting research in violent political conflicts where one’s ethnicity may be expected 
to indicate a loyalty to a particular regime. This line of inquiry includes consideration of 
qiestions such as how far ethnicity affects the data collected.
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Power relations in conflict zones differ to those conducted in non-conflict zones. In 
conflict areas the cultivated relationships are riddled with relationship dynamics that 
influence the power relationships and the researcher is more dependent on others. I find 
that this dependency led to increased caution in the relationship interactions and 
increased awareness of the need not to offend the participants during the interview.
This chapter is divided into three sections consisting of Reflexivity, Interviews and 
Safety. Reflexivity, focuses on the researcher’s position as a British-Sinhalese in the 
research, raising issues relating to presenting the Other and the dilemmas this particular 
research situation raises in relation to issues of objectivity and impartiality. The 
Interviews section addresses a range of issues, from planning to conducting interviews. 
The final section, Safety addresses three key components of safety in relation to this 
thesis, namely the safety of participants, the safety of the data gathered, and the 
researcher’s own safety.
The in-depth biographical narrative interviews discussed in this chapter are from a 
small number of combatant women and civic women (15 in total), with the aim of 
gaining an insight into specific women’s roles within the revolutionary organisation and 
the impact they have had on the women in civic society. Therefore this thesis is not a 
generalised study of whole of the LITE movement, but impact upon widening the 
available knowledge.
The interviews were all conducted in the Jaffna and Vanni provinces, located in the 
Northern part of Sri Lanka. A selection of maps of the areas are provided in Appendix 9. 
At the time these interviews were conducted, Jaffna was returning to being a bustling 
township. The basic food items appeared on streets along with luxury items such as 
apples and grapes. Electricity, telephones and public transport were working as normal 
giving an impression of a returned normalcy to the town and its villages. This overall 
impression however is only on the surface. The street corners still had bunkers manned 
by soldiers with automatic weapons and State Army foot patrols were a regular sight.
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Reflexivity
Researcher Identity, Positionality, and Empathy
The researcher location, positionality and identity has impacted deeply on the research 
conducted amongst the Tamil women of Jaffna. Throughout this chapter I have 
identified issues based on my dual Sri Lankan and a British identities. During the time 
spent in the field, I positioned myself within my British identity and actively distanced 
myself from my hegemonic Sinhalese identity. I took this decision with a view that being 
British would grant me a more favourable position of acceptance by the combatant 
women and simultaneously make me acceptable to the group and the Gatekeeper as I 
was seen as being impartial. The intricacies of a dual identity based on Britishness 
placed me outside of the struggle whilst my Sinhalese identity connected me to them 
through my hegemonic Sri Lankan identity. This was in line with Anthias ( 2002:512) 
argument of “...location and positionality are more useful concepts for [the] 
investigating process...”. It did concern me that being an outsider with multiple 
identities but without a Tamil ethnic identity might make it harder to build trust with 
the LTTE.
My own fieldwork experience showed that being a student of a prestigious university 
that is viewed as progressive of acceptance by made it easier to be accepted by the 
Contact, the Gatekeeper and the LTTE. A common background in academia made the 
Gatekeeper aware of the importance of my research into the LTTE and to me personally, 
and as an outsider (researcher) I formed a potential voice for their struggle. Once 
contact was made with the Gatekeeper, and he had established my credentials and my 
loyalties, it became easier for me to be accepted.
In 1967 Becker wrote,
There is no position from which sociological research can be done that is not biased 
in one way or another.
(Becker 1967:245 cited in Hammersley 2000:61)
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This highly insightful view became the foundation upon which I thought through my 
reflexivity. At the preliminary stage of planning the researcher can be clinical about how 
they wish to direct the whole of the research project. However once the researcher enters 
the actual field relationships develop. Blackwood (1996) states that the word ‘friend’ is 
often used amongst American field researchers to describe their participants. The word 
‘friend’ emerges as a situation-specific word that describes relationships built in the field 
and the comfort that such relationships offer the researchers who are away from the 
home environment. Through these friendships the researchers gain a valuable 
understanding of the conflict they research. I found that the Gatekeeper and his wife 
located me as part of their family and I was accepted as a friend. They took it upon 
themselves to act not only as hosts but also as teachers of Tamil culture and as 
previously mentioned, as interpreters for the participants on some occasions.
The relationship between the Gatekeeper’s family and myself as the researcher was built 
upon a common focus, that of the political struggle of Tamil people but with differing 
objectives, mine was focusing on an academic research and theirs was finding a voice for 
the suffering endured. This common aim also brought forth an empathy with the 
participants, as they became the face of the struggle. I had heeded Kondo’s (1986) 
separation of Toiowledge’ and ‘understanding’. She claims that knowledge is obtained 
from a certain perspective and that understanding is based on culture, history and 
biography. My relationship with the Gatekeeper provided me with much-needed 
understanding. This relationship was reflected in Kleinman and Copp (1993:29) who 
claim that, “participants are the teachers and we are the students.” The understanding 
was obtained by my constant questions requiring explanations of situations and 
behaviour that left little room for ambiguity.
I was always very aware that the enhanced status of residing with the Gatekeeper, who 
was viewed by the LTTE with a great deal of respect, enabled me to have a level of access 
and trust based on the Gatekeeper’s extended connections.
The ethnographic experience is more than an identification of positionality or 
subjectivity; we occupy multiple positions and identities that transform over time, 
forcing us constantly to reconstruct who we are in relation to people we study.
(Blackwood 1996:55)
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Based on the above I discovered that self-reconstruction located me within the 
Gatekeeper’s family circle as a ‘trusted’ person. Trusted to live with the family; trusted to 
roam free in their home; trusted to see their interactions with other civic citizens and 
combatants of the LTTE. In a way, this kind of trust is historical in Sri Lanka and forms 
part of its customs, where strangers are welcomed and treated as part of a family. 
However I was surprised to discover this custom is still practiced in Jaffna, especially 
after many years of bitter civil war. They would organise their day around my needs and 
safety as they were concerned about me firstly as a British student of Sinhalese ethnicity 
and secondly as a female in a foreign country where the rules of equality are not as 
defined as in western countries. Moreover this custom was extended to someone who 
could have been a British Agent or Sinhalese spy. Being neither is irrelevant to this 
argument, however what remains is the result of such trust being bestowed upon a total 
stranger, as neither the Gatekeeper nor his family knew anything about me other than 
what I chose to tell them. I presume such kindness was previously extended to Schalk 
when he was conducting his research in Jaffna in 1990.
Some view Schalk’s (1992) work on women combatants of the LTTE to be biased, as he 
became sympathetic to the LTTE cause. I do not share this view as I found (based on my 
experience) that Schalk has written quite an accurate description of the women of LTTE. 
Many who are critical of the women combatants and of Schalk have never met any 
women combatants in their own socio-political and geographical location. Not meeting 
the women in their own space often leads to alternative forms of representations that 
may not be accurate. One can question whether he was blinded to the harsh realities of 
the LTTE by being overly involved with his research topic, and those who were part of 
that topic. My own research visits illustrate that he is well known and highly regarded 
amongst the LTTE and its sympathisers. Was this Tiigh regard’ then due to his inability 
to criticise the LTTE as a violent political organisation? Can I criticise those who placed 
their trust in me and accepted me so readily? These are hard questions but are 
recognised in other academic writing, such as Kleinman and Copp (1993:27) who argue, 
“...favouring intimacy over analysis also reflects the value we place on empathy, 
understanding the perspective of those we study through role taking”.
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It is perhaps inevitable that researchers tend to locate themselves within the research 
based on loyalties and relationships formed in the field51. Researchers are often 
challenged to ascertain where their sympathies lie in a conflict. The explanation given by 
researchers generally centres on being neutral in the setting as objective observers 
rather than engaged participants (see Gilmore 1991, Sluka 1990 referred in Lee 1995). 
The advantage of being neutral is the fact that the researcher stands outside “local 
categorical distinctions and boundaries” (Lee: 1995: 23). That said, there are occasions 
when claiming neutrality becomes problematic, as the researcher’s intentions are then 
questioned -  especially in areas of high conflict, where social relations have little 
precedence (Gilmore 1991 referred to in Lee 1995). Peritore stated, “assertion of 
scientific objectivity or neutrality can be perceived as being naive or as screening a 
hidden agenda” (1990:360 cited in Lee 1995:23). Complete neutrality is perhaps 
extremely difficult as it is impossible to be sympathetic in equal degrees to all parties 
engaged in the conflict (ibid).
There is an issue of empathy that a researcher needs to be aware of where there is the 
possibility of being drawn into a subject area. This may well be due to romanticising 
abmt or empathising with those that the researcher is researching which means we are 
umble to represent those we research without romanticising. This danger of 
ronanticism /  empathy can spill over into one’s own research. At times, I may be guilty 
of representing the participants in idealistic and romantic ways in my own research, 
wlich reclaims a romantic notion that suits my own social perspective, especially in 
representing an Other who is involved in danger and violence. Above all it is 
dommented that to challenge the gender stereotyping of a patriarchal society may cause 
sone romantic awe of the researched where, as Salazar(i99i) claims, the participants
51 Belated issues include political sympathies that researchers may bring with them to an issue. An example 
hen is Moreno, recognised as the only sociologist ever to have played a participant observer role in a 
poltical struggle (Whyte 19843:31). In the late 1960’s Jose Moreno from Cornell University went to the 
Doninican Republic to research inter-village systems for his PhD study. A few days after his arrival in Santo 
Doningo an armed struggle ensued resulting in the city being taken over by the rebel group, to whom 
Mcreno was sympathetic. He volunteered to work with them as a non-combatant, and “his dedication and 
abilties in organisation the supply of food and medical and health services for the people of the beleaguered 
city led him into a close working relationship with the rebel leaders” (Whyte 1984:31). When Moreno 
returned to university, he changed his research topic and “Faculty members on his committee agreed that a 
stuly of inter-village system could always be done, while major rebellions aimed at over throwing a 
go\5rnment were relatively rare events” (ibid). Following his PhD, in 1970 he published a book based on the 
sane titled Barrios in Arms.
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are aware of their circumstances and actively take up issues to end their oppression. 
This notion clearly applies to the women combatants of the LTTE.
However I am a researcher who has an agenda to understand the women of Jaffna and 
especially those who become combatants. As the research developed, it has become 
difficult not to empathise to some extent with the women and the harrowing experiences 
they have undergone, whilst not agreeing with all of their political ideologies or 
objectives and struggling to develop a cognitive empathy with them52. “Researchers 
usually argue that participants' immoral acts stem from a social or structural problem 
rather than individual failures in moral behaviour” (Kleinman and Copp 1983:39). I was 
aware that at this point I needed to defer any sympathy and understanding of the 
women’s plight (including that of the combatants) and arrive at my own findings. In a 
way my research is founded on this subtleness between attachment (empathy /  
sympathy) and detachment (neutrality).
Role o f the Researcher in representing the Other through interviews
Many feminists confront with the dilemma of how to represent the Other (Russell 1996, 
Wilkinson and Kitzinger 1996, Bola 1996, Ang-Lygate 1996). It is imperative to 
recognise the fundamental reasoning for conducting research of this nature, which in 
essence tries to give a voice to the Other that has been overlooked under masculine- 
orientated data gathering. Feminists argue that research conducted under the auspices 
of feminist research does not merely reflect and validate whatever the interviewees 
choose to say about their experiences but also supplies “a feminist critique and challenge 
to the way in which women’s experience is constructed under (hetero) patriarchy” 
(Wilkinson and Kitzinger 1996:573).
I would like to contribute to the debate of validating the researcher in the research by 
identifying the researcher’s positionality in the research. In some situations it may be 
appropriate for researchers to come from similar background as the participants, as the 
difference can enhance the resulting data. However this concept comes from a belief that 
social research is best obtained if the same ethnic group conducts the research, for
52 Kleinman and Copp (1993:38) define ‘cognitive empathy* as “understanding why people think, feel, and 
act as they do”.
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example a black researcher is best suited to conduct research on the black community, 
as the same racial group will be less inhibiting and more forthcoming with one of their 
own social group53. Social science often deals with the non-ideal world where the 
researcher has to manage with the researched subjects as given. The interviewer has an 
effect on the responses received, either by the social characteristics of the interviewer 
impacting on the results in various ways, or by the expectations harboured by the 
interviewee about the interviewer (see Lee 1995, Collins 1980, Bradburn 1983). However 
Phoenix (1995) argues that,
...the strategy of matching interviewers and respondents on particular characteristics 
(such as gender and ‘race’) does not produce ‘better’ data. Indeed, since respondents 
are not positioned in any unitary way, it does not avoid the necessity for analysis of 
the ways in which wider social relations enter into the interview relationship”
(1995:70).
Following from the above it can be argued that had I been a Tamil national the women 
of the LTTE may have been more forthcoming with their life histories. However, my 
status as an ‘Outsider’ may have given rise to attempts to ‘explain’ their experiences in 
ways that were more productive, as is suggested by the primary and secondary 
interviews with both groups of Tamil women. They might otherwise have made incorrect 
assumptions regarding my level of knowledge about the issues they were explaining.
The issue of legitimacy directed me to a certain kind of behaviour when dealing with the 
revolutionary group. I found that I was distancing myself from my hegemonic 
background and embracing my British identity more, as I believed this would make me 
appear less hostile to those I was interested in interviewing. English language was 
perceived as much less prejudicial even though this had to be conveyed through a 
translator. I found that each single ethnic group I laid claim to brought specific socio­
political differences to my research. My British passport helped me to gain access far 
more easily than my hegemonic origin of being Sinhalese, however through the latter I 
had a related identity to the researched Other5*.
53 The debate can be extended to intersectionality of class etc, but the focus here remains as race or 
ethnicity.
54 Albeit the ‘enemy* in the greater context of the political discourse.
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Upon reflection the legitimacy argument regarding my hegemonic identity bears a 
strong dichotomy that can be viewed in somewhat contradictory terms. My Sri Lankan 
identity ties me to the Tiger women thus legitimising my involvement in the research; 
however my Sinhalese ethnicity within the hegemonic discourse distances us and 
thereby questions my legitimacy. Therefore legitimacy has no precise definition or 
standard recipe. Researchers will invariably raise issues of legitimacy, especially when 
feminists conduct research in representing the Other away from their own ethnic 
background (see Phoenix 1995). Thus my role as a researcher was constantly being 
negotiated.
Power dynamics and power relations in representing the Other
Within debates concerning Otherness it has become evident that the impact of 
conversation between the researcher and the researched is of greater significance than 
was previously understood (Oakley 1981 and Phoenix 1995). Women’s own knowledge 
and experience tends to be obliterated thus invoking a silent Other, which forms a 
central theme in the feminist debate and raises further important issues such as the 
power relationship between the interviewer and the interviewee which has been a major 
topic of debate for many years. A new twist to this argument arose in the 1980’s that 
contradicted this power status. It was argued that women enjoyed talking with other 
women who happened to be researchers, thus disregarding the inherent power 
relationship within the interview scenario (Oakley 1981). However there is an 
acknowledgement by Phoenix (1995) that the ‘cosiness’ is not a bi-product of gender 
based on “women discussing women’s issues” (1995:50), but also due to a shared 
identity based on ethnicity or class. As such, gender may not be enough to indicate a 
shared identity.
Simply being women discussing ‘women’s issues’ in the context of a research 
interview is not sufficient for the establishment o f rapport and the seamless flow of 
an interview
(Ibid).
This creates a positioning of both the researcher and the researched in a specific social 
formation, enhancing the seamless flow of an interview. Thus class, race, gender, and
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sexuality should be recognised only if they bear any procedural consequence on the 
research or are influenced by the researched themselves (Schegloff 1997).
Feminist researchers interviewing mostly non-feminist interviewees further reflect on 
this tension or conflict. The women I interviewed, or had social interaction with within 
the confines of an interview scenario, were not familiar with Western notions of 
feminism. Therefore one of the challenges in this research was not to use words which 
were not readily understood such as ‘feminism’, and to find terms that might be more 
familiar, such as ‘women’s liberation’. The very fact that women combatants are active in 
the field of armed conflict (which some feminists have argued to be a masculine subject 
area55) and successfully train alongside men to the same standard, is central to the focus 
of the research considering gender identity. Based on this I would agree with Schegloff 
(1997) that the intersection of class, gender, sexuality and ethnicity do form a more 
complete picture within the above-mentioned context. Therefore singling out one 
aspect, such as ethnicity, risks obtaining partial data, as the Otherness is only seen 
through a spectrum of understood differences. Further, from my own research 
experience with the Tamil women of the LTTE, I would argue that the major obstacle to 
conducting interviews was not so much a difference in ethnic identity but in language, as 
described above.
Outsider inside the friendship and kinship formation: the researcher's positionality 
within the combatant womens’group
I was prompted to look at my own friendship with the combatant women whilst 
analysing the data relating to the breakdown of the family and subsequent transference 
of affections to an alternative family within the LTTE (as discussed in Chapter Four). 
Understanding my own position (as a researcher) in relation to the group meant having 
to understand the kind of relationship that is practiced within the revolutionary group 
itself. This understanding became heightened once I realised that ‘kinship’ in this 
context refers to a deep friendship, unlike a kin identity that is indicative of a familial 
relation rather than a depth of emotion. Friendship itself encompasses many levels, such
55 See Coomaraswamy (1996), De Alwis (1998b) and de Mel (2001). Also Enloe (1988), Tickner (1992), 
Carreiras, (2006), Elshtain and Tobias (1990).
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as the friendship that is extended to the outside Other (e.g. strangers such as visiting 
researchers, journalists etc.), and the friendship that is practiced within the group.
The friendship offered to the outside Other has many complicated facets that 
differentiate it from the friendship that is practiced within the revolutionary kin group. I 
was offered a friendship as a researcher that overlooked my hegemonic identity and was 
extended to me due to my British identity and my status as a foreigner in ‘their’ (the 
LTTE’s) geographically controlled area. However I was very aware of being accepted at a 
different level and being granted the hospitality of partaking in meals where casual 
conversation flourished, spending time viewing videos together with women combatants 
or going on day trips with them, which made me conscious of occupying a certain 
privileged position of friendship with women combatants. At the same time, I was aware 
that this friendship also removed me to some degree from civic women in society.
I was also aware that my position was fragile and restricted, as discussed in this chapter. 
During the visits made to the LTTE Political Wing office, I noticed a number of foreign 
nationals, predominantly journalists, visiting with the aim of interviewing Arasi (as 
Head of the Women’s Political Wing). Though these outside Others were treated politely 
and with caution, they were not given the same quality of hospitality as I was. In turn the 
outside Others had a different type of freedom than I, due to the level of acceptance 
based on relationships other than friendship. For instance another PhD researcher who 
was a New Zealand national had easier access to women combatants than I, due to her 
New Zealand identity presenting her as more of a foreigner than I. However her level of 
acceptance into the inner realm was also restricted by these veiy same differences.
It can be argued that from (a Western perspective) these outside Others were not friends 
but mere visitors, gathering information in order to gain an insight. However within a 
Sri Lankan /Tamil cultural context they are none the less viewed as friends and it is 
noteworthy that the word ‘acquaintance’ does not exist in Tamil culture. The extent and 
development of the friendship is dependent on issues such as levels of trust and 
compatibility. My own position has been one of a continued friendship with the 
combatant women of the LTTE since the initiation of the field research. However had I 
been a Tamil national there would have been the possibility of putative kinship, for 
example being called a sister or aunt, depending on the physical appearance of the 
individual. This particular form of kin identity overrides identity politics as the
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relationship in this instance is based on a non-political level. My position stops short of 
a kinship identity and affinity due to my Sinhalese ethnic identity and British cultural 
differences.
As discussed in Chapter Four, these forms of address convey a certain degree of 
acceptance through kinship, and also operate as a mark of respect for the Other. 
Addressing me by name places me in the position of an outsider, who does not have a 
kin identity that can be related back to the revolutionary group. The lack of kin identity 
also forms a part of the social interaction within the friendship and its power 
relationship. My relationship with the women combatants was part of a friendship and 
not in the inner realms of kinship. However an inevitable question arose as to whether 
the women combatants or I were in fact exploiting this extremely unusual relationships6. 
The answer perhaps lies in our separate needs, theirs for a recognition that reaches 
beyond the shores of Sri Lanka and mine, a British individual of Sinhalese origin (and a 
females?), to conduct a piece of academic research that is accessible. Therefore it is safe 
to assume that within the dynamics of the discourse of friendship and exploitation, we 
both stand to gain rather than lose due to the very nature of the research. It would be 
unwise to assume that any continuation of the relationship during the current period of 
‘Final War* is possible where communications have been greatly hampered.
Interviews
Pre-Interviews
The nature of this research required careful planning and necessitated a detailed 
understanding of safety issues involved58. The initial plan included two visits to the field, 
a short visit in the early part of the year 2003 (March), and a second longer visit during 
the latter part of that same year (October). The aim of the preliminary visit was to
56 The unusualness of the relationship lies not only of my being the quintessential enemy, the Sinhalese, but 
also the foreigner, the British. Further it is my understanding that I am the only Sinhalese woman to have 
ever undertaken such a task of researching women combatants of the LTTE through personal interviews in 
their own environment.
57 From a cultural perspective, most activities that are considered as dangerous remain in the realms of 
men.
58 The issue of safety was discussed with a number of people both within and outside the university who 
gave sound advice.
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establish contact with the Gatekeeper and the revolutionary movement and allow an 
assessment of the potential dangers that might occur in the field when conducting such 
research with women combatants. The dangers to be assessed included the extent of the 
control the Sri Lankan Army had over the Tamil nationals in Jaffna and over the women 
combatants. The initial visit was scheduled for three weeks. The second and final visit 
was scheduled to last for six weeks and was designed to concentrate solely on 
conducting both single sitting and group interviews.
Plans for fieldwork cannot be rigidly implemented and adhered to under field 
conditions, and often flexibility is needed in order to achieve the objectives desired 
which includes taking any opportunities that present themselves in a dynamic 
environment. For example, during my initial visit I was not expecting to conduct any 
interviews. An opportunity arose to interview the most senior woman combatant of the 
LTTE, Arasi, though not under ideal interviewing circumstances, and it proved 
productive. The reason for accepting opportunities when conducting interviews with 
senior members of any organisation (not necessarily in a revolutionary set-up) as 
discussed by Dexter (1970) in Elite and Specialized Interviewing is often due to the 
difficulty of meeting senior people and the fact that there may not be a second 
opportunity. This sense of limited opportunity is heightened when dealing with those 
who are engaged in conflict, given the nature of the activities they are engaged in.
Within the planning stages personal safety was considered from two angles. One 
considered ethnic identity relating to Sinhalese hegemony, and the other considered 
employment identity relating to an organisation that can be perceived as part of British 
government’s extended interest in Sri Lanka or the assistance given to the Sri Lankan 
State when engaging in sensitive data gathering. Therefore I took a decision that my 
British identity only would be maintained in the field and any personal representations 
were only to be conducted as a doctoral research student at a university in London. I 
also decided to withhold any personal address details or family details as I viewed these 
as being potentially high risk. The LTTE, as stated in Chapter One operate quite strongly 
in the UK (as well as in Canada, Europe and Australia), even though legally they are an 
outlawed organisation. They have a network system that has the ability to identify any 
individual; therefore, it was important not to volunteer any personal information. The 
best way of self-presentation was to put forward a university student identity only, 
which has a universal acceptance with less suspicion attached to it. Thus a number of
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university business cards were printed and readily handed out at every opportunity with 
a view to dispel or avert any possible suspicions. Furthermore, in order to enhance this 
identity, a letter of introduction was also taken from the Gender Institute of the LSE. 
The planning stage also included one final safety point and I took the cautionary 
measure of being registered at the British High Commission in Colombo prior to 
travelling to Jaffnas?.
Many researchers describe field research as a rite of passage. Though there are many 
books written on the subject, such as Raymond Lee’s Dangerous Field Work (1995), 
Don Kulick and Margaret Wilson’s Taboo (1996), Smyth et al (2005) Researching 
Conflict in Africa and Geraldine Lee-Treweek and Stephanie Linkogle’s Danger in the 
Field (2000), they cannot replace the physical experience of being in the field, of coming 
into contact with situations and potential problems that need to be resolved on the spot. 
Sanders (1980), referred to in Lee (1999:121), suggests that learning the ropes of 
fieldwork itself also brings forth ‘rope bum’ and it is not possible to achieve one without 
the other. He states that the requirements for researchers to carry out tasks that run 
against social experiences and socialisation may cause them unavoidable fear. There is 
also the fear of rejection that is inevitable when dealing with strangers and seeking 
detailed information about their life, and the fear of violating the normative standards of 
the participants (ibid). Whilst there is undoubtedly excitement and anxiety in being in 
the field, the reality of fieldwork conditions can be hostile, alien or simply difficult to 
manage unlike a controlled setting with which the researcher is fully familiar. These 
hostilities can vaiy from natural elements of heat or rain to antagonistic human 
interaction. The costs of errors in this environment are high as the damage that can be 
done is difficult to resolve (Fiedler 1978) hence the fear factor is greater.
The participants and the selection process
The Gatekeeper and the Head of the Political Wing selected a suitable group of women 
for interviewing, the implication of which meant that I only had access women who were 
considered by the organisation to be appropriate or suitable. Whilst this was not an
59 Once arrived in Sri Lanka’s capital Colombo, the British High Commission was contacted and they very 
kindly said it was not advisable for me to travel to Vanni (the LTTE held area) and referred me to their 
Health and Safety in Travelling web page; which unfortunately I had no access to, and when this 
information was passed back to them, they took the trouble to read out the web advice over the phone.
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ideal selection method, I had to accept those that were offered, as it would have been 
difficult and extremely dangerous to interview combatant women without the implicit 
approval of the Gatekeeper (and therefore the LTTE). The combatant women 
participants were chosen by both the Head of the Political Wing and the Gatekeeper that 
are allocated for the interview may well be based on the qualities that the Gatekeeper 
and Head of the Political Wing view as necessary, and are likely to include the ability of 
the participant to offer a favourable image of the revolutionary organisation. However 
they did meet with my requested criteria that the women combatants represented a 
cross section of combatants from early recruits to later recruits. My civic participants 
were chosen through the contacts of the Gatekeeper and his wife according to my 
specifications for a cross-section of women, varying from the educated socially affluent 
to less educated working classes.
Once the selection process was completed it was clear that the research participants 
were chosen to meet with the requested criteria and any further assessment was 
avoided. Furthermore, it must be understood that when conducting research amongst 
revolutionary organisations or in conflict zones, the option to negotiate over the selected 
participants is limited. Whilst all of the interviewees met my requirements, I was still 
aware that I would have to work with the women (both civic and combatants) offered to 
me. The effect of the Gatekeeper in choosing the participants and the interpreter adds 
another dimension to the data analysis, as the interviews then had to be checked by a 
third party who was not involved in the research project for the usage of language and 
the accuracy of the translation.
The research consisted of in-depth interviews with a group of fifteen Tamil women. 
Seven of these were combatants, one was an ex-combatant, and seven were civic women. 
As detailed in the later section on participant safety, women combatants were given a 
new identity at the time of their recruitment, granting some form of anonymity to their 
consanguine families. I have decided not to use the names of the combatant women 
because of the current state of the conflict, despite the fact that they have given their 
consent to such usage. For the purpose of this thesis, the women combatants have been 
given pseudonyms that carry a related meaning but are not an exact match to the names 
that had been given to them by the LTTE. The names all of the civic women and the ex­
combatant woman have been given an identity based on initials in preference to a 
pseudonym in order to separate them from the combatants. Further, I have withheld
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detailed explanations of their occupations with a view to restricting their identity, but I 
have given an overview of the type of occupation that they were engaged in.
The seven women combatants from the LTTE were Arasi (aged 30) who is the most 
senior woman combatant in the LTTE60; Kavitha (aged 30) who is the current Head of 
the Jaffna District office; Arulvili (aged 23) the previous Head of the Jaffna District; 
Yalini (aged 24) who is currently the LTTE Political Office translator and Arana (aged 
25), Roja (aged 22) and Mallika (aged 21) who are rank combatants. The ex-combatant 
AK (aged 34) is now married with a 5-year-old son but was a section leader and led 
teams to war. She had to leave active service due to the severe injuries she received 
during the Elephant Pass battle.
The civic women included both married women (with and without children) and 
unmarried women. BP, a middle-aged married former teacher with no children of her 
own, was the wife of the Gatekeeper and in this research she acted as an interpreter on 
many occasions. CH (aged 26) was the only Christian participant in the interview group, 
and the only one whose parents were of mixed race (Sinhalese and Tamil). CH died the 
following year at the age of 27 due to a misdiagnosis of cancer and lack of medical care. 
DK (aged 27) was a professional woman engaged in a highly masculine industry running 
her family business. GV and HA were both middle-aged professional women from 
wealthy middle-class backgrounds. HA is unmarried and GV was married during the 
war period. ES (aged 27) is an academic attached to the university, and FP (aged 40) is a 
married mother of two sons aged 10 and 11 years. A short description of each woman 
can be found in Appendix 6.
AK was connected to the Gatekeeper and his family through an action workshop based 
on theatre work. She was identified specifically because of her previous role as a 
combatant. The civic women were limited to those who were known to the Gatekeeper 
and his family through their extended social network. They all appear to be primarily 
from similar social backgrounds, with the exception of FP who was working class. It 
must also be noted that though the civic interview participants appeared at the outset to 
be independent of the LITE, some later information revealed that their connections 
were closer to the revolutionary group than previously indicated. For example, DK was
60 All ages are given as of 2003.
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active in the reconstruction of an LTTE graveyard which was destroyed by the State 
Army; both BP and HA were prominent speakers at various LTTE ceremonies.
Interview format and issues o f language
The key question of the thesis is to identify how gender is constructed within the 
revolutionary movement of the LTTE and tracking women’s transformation through 
their engagement in the movement. I am aware of the implication that women talking 
about themselves expresses a female perspective only, but due to time restrictions it was 
not possible to engage with men. Hence the focus of the questions asked ascertained 
information pertaining to the lives of women combatants only. The questions asked 
were in a chronological order, e.g. starting with childhood experiences, progressing 
through their formative years, and ending with their adulthood, and were the same for 
all women (combatants and the civic women). However there were some questions that 
only applied to the combatant women (such as the type of training they had undertaken 
and the context in which the training was undertaken, i.e. single sex training or both 
men and women training together). The aims of the questions were to find similar or 
contested themes that could then be analysed further to form part of the thesis. 
Therefore the interviews were conducted in a semi-structured format allowing the 
participants to discuss the subjects raised in full, which then developed into separate 
chapters of the thesis. At the end of each interview session, the participants were given 
an opportunity to ask any questions they wished of me. These questions ranged from 
trying to ascertain my view of them as women combatants, to predictions of their 
political future.
From the veiy start of the research planning stage as it was understood that knowledge 
of English language alone would not suffice in the field. My own Tamil language skills 
were not up to the level of conducting comprehensive interviews with native Tamil 
language speakers, even though I was aware that there would be a number of people in 
Jaffna who are able to speak in English and some who are able to understand what was 
said but not be able to respond comprehensively. Therefore the service of an interpreter 
was needed for the interviews. This issue was raised from the outset with the contact 
and assurances were given that language would not be a problem, even within the LTTE.
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The interviews conducted in Jaffna with the women combatants were translated by 
three different people; the Gatekeeper, his wife BP and HA. The interviews conducted in 
Kilinochchi were translated by one of the combatant women, Yalini. Details of the 
translation and participants are given in Appendix 4. Although many in Jaffna 
understand the English language, the ability to communicate in English is mainly 
restricted to the educated middle-class, with a bilingual upbringing. This was evident in 
the interviews where a majority of civic women were able to communicate in the English 
medium whereas a majority of combatant women spoke in the Tamil medium only, 
which may be reflective of a class dimension to the decision to become a combatant.
The interviews were kept fluid to allow women combatants and civic women to speak 
freely, without hindering the path the conversation took, or their own thought processes 
relating to the conversation. On occasions in a group situation, someone else would 
answer the question asked, or a debate would ensue to define a word that does not 
translate easily into English language (such as Ah-lu-mai’s agreed meaning as 
‘empowerment’). As the interviews progressed the answers from combatants did not 
pursue some specific questions in detail. This did not affect the interview process, but 
did confirm the level of knowledge within the organisation that was restricted to senior 
ranks. For instance there appears to be a limited knowledge of the organisational 
structure amongst lower combatant ranks, in comparison to senior women combatants 
such as Arasi or Kavitha.
The interviews conducted were in two types of settings: those with individual 
participants with or without an interpreter, and those in a group setting with an 
interpreter. The translation process and the recording of the interviews was not a 
problem with any of the participants. Some, such as Arasi, were highly experienced in 
giving interviews and came across as confident and articulate public speakers in the 
Tamil language.
The translations of the interviews into English carried the nuances and the strengths 
expressed in Tamil language. The translations conducted in this way highlight the 
insider/outsider status between the researcher and the translators, who construct the 
questions in a way that they can understand and relate to. This is illustrated by Temple 
who states that “ [t]hey construct the concepts used in the research and structure what 
can be said from it” (Temple 1997:610). It must also be understood that the translators
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continue to live in the society once the researcher leaves the field (ibid). I was aware that 
the relationship between the interview participants, the translators and myself carried 
certain dynamics which are important to the research (also see Hatim and Mason 1994, 
Bauman 1987, Temple and Edwards 2002). These include the women combatants’ 
reverence to the translators and their acceptance of me, and are extended to my 
expectations that the meanings of words should be familiar to the translator. This may 
have been a burden upon the translator who never complained. However it was 
interesting to notice at times that Arasi was adamant that the translator made sure I 
understood a certain point that she viewed as important and ‘must’ be understood in the 
way it was presented. For example it was of great importance to Arasi that I understood 
that war was ‘forced’ upon them, or that the use of suicide bombers was a mere tactical 
strategy.
It was interesting to note that the combatant women in a group, away from their rank 
hierarchy, were able to giggle and laugh when discussing certain topics raised with 
English words as ‘boyfriends’. Amongst most of women combatants there was an initial 
shyness at the start of the interview. Often they soon lost this shyness and became eager 
to participate with Yalini as their interpreter. This was particularly visible in the group 
interview of Arulvili, Aruna and Yalini. This could be due to the fact that they were the 
same age and knew each other, which made it easier for them to laugh together. In 
contrast the two younger combatants (who were interviewed together) maintained their 
shyness throughout the interview, but they were still fully engaged in answering the 
questions asked. At this interview, it was BP who acted as an interpreter, thus bringing 
in an element of respect the younger women needed to pay to the older woman. It must 
also be noted that the conversation was still flowing during times of non-recording. 
There was a noticeable ease amongst the civic women, most of who were able to express 
themselves in English. All the interviews conducted had an atmosphere of friendliness 
and interviewees demonstrated a willingness to participate. The willingness amongst the 
combatant women may be due to Arasi ordering them to participate, but if that were the 
case, it was not shown in any tangible way as unhappiness at being part of the research. I 
got the distinct impression from GV, one of the civic women, that she was keen to tell me 
about events that affected her, in particular the issues of displacement that had forced 
her to re-evaluate her life in a completely new way in contrast to her conservative 
upbringing.
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The interviews with the civic women were conducted in both Tamil and English. The 
questions were asked by me in English, translated into Tamil by the interpreter and 
responses then translated back into English. The translators varied from civic 
sympathisers of the LTTE to LTTE’s own combatants. The use of a variety of translators 
and engaging in an exhausting process of translating back and forth caused some 
concern to me. There was also the issue of possible sanitized versions of answers being 
presented. Therefore, upon return to the UK, all the tapes were checked by a native 
Tamil language speaker, who confirmed that -  despite the occasional incorrect usage of 
English -  the meanings were accurately conveyed.
The transcripts
The transcripts were all translated into English and typed out by a native Tamil speaker 
to maintain a level of accuracy and any nuances intended in Tamil language. The 
involvement of the women ceased once the interviews were concluded, as it was not 
logistically possible to follow the accepted feminist methodological practices, which seek 
to involve participants in the research process through letting them, check their own 
transcripts or add additional comments. As well as potential safety concerns, there were 
also pragmatic issues to consider: if the interview transcripts were sent back to the 
country there was always a risk that these would never reach the participants, given that 
the safety of posted documents cannot be guaranteed even under normal conditions, let 
alone during times of trouble. These particular circumstances limit the extent to which 
participants can be involved in the post-interview process. This limitation heightens the 
requirement that researchers represent the Other to the best of their ability.
Though I intentionally stayed off the subject of self-disclosure, I did not discourage them 
to think of me other than as a young university student, who had spent most of my 
growing years in Britain61. The only self-disclosure was made the night before my 
departure on the second visit and only to the Gatekeeper’s adopted daughters. I 
informed them of my relationship with my partner whom I felt was a safe subject to 
discuss, not only because he was English hence not a part of the conflict, but also being 
an academic he would be counted as a neutral party. The inter-racial relationship aspect
61 My physical appearance was often accepted as a younger person even though I was already heading for 
my 43rd year.
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of my life appears to have fascinated them resulting in one of them stating that perhaps 
they should have asked more questions about me. Whilst feminist research debates 
about surrendering power to the participants, my personal reasons behind some self­
disclosure (though limited) was a feeling of needing to part with something of myself 
and not to leave them under too many misapprehensions regarding my personal 
circumstances. On reflection this can be argued as a form of relinquishing my own 
power and passing control to the subject, however it can also be viewed as an effort on 
my part to alleviate the one-sidedness of the interview process whereby the subjects 
disclose much information about themselves but the researcher remains apart or 
unknown.
Access Process : Entering The Field Through The Gatekeepers
Fundamentally, access involves gaining permission to conduct research in a 
particular social setting. Far from being a straightforward procedure, it involves 
negotiation and renegotiation, influences the kind of investigation that can be 
completed, and occurs throughout the research process. It is, of course, an essential 
phase of the research process- a prerequisite, as it were for the research to be 
conducted.
(Shaffir and Stebbins 1991:25)
Many researchers (Van Maanen 1991, Burgess 1991, Shaffir and Stebbins 1991, Lee 1995 
and 1999) have shown how vital the access process is when conducting field research. 
This importance is heightened when the chosen field involves violent political situations 
where conflict forms a part of daily existence.
Researchers invariably carry differing degrees of credibility into the field. Based on my 
own experience I would say that the key to the acceptance of the researcher (by the 
researched) depends primarily upon the researcher’s ability to present themselves and 
the subjects of the research in a manner that is acceptable to those whose assistance is 
sought. As suggested by Fiedler (1978), the researcher’s credibility is enhanced by the 
organisation or the sponsoring body to which the researcher is affiliated-
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It is easiest to enter the community under the auspices of some known and respected 
institution. Students doing fieldwork will find it useful to operate under the 
sponsorship, or at least under the name, o f their parent university
(Fiedler 1987:40).
In Jaffna I constantly carried a letter of introduction from the Head of the Gender 
Institute on my person. This letter became an invaluable tool both as a formal form of 
identification and as a validation of my research interest. It further became a highly 
valuable document to illustrate that there is a close relationship between the university 
and the research that is conducted, confirming Fiedler’s observation that “such tokens 
carry a disproportionate weight in the field” (Fiedler 1978:42).
I was also aware of Fiedler’s cautionary note that the group on which the researcher 
intends to conduct the research may not view the sponsoring authority or the 
organisation favourably. She suggests that when there is an issue of conflict it may be 
better to describe the research in such a way that the researched person will not be 
threatened by the sponsor’s interests as “...it may be necessary to use terms that do not 
carry strong connotative associations” (Fiedler: 1978:41). Fiedler advocates a total 
disclosure of information prior to embarking on the research. However I made a 
conscious decision based on my own circumstances not to disclose my main funding 
body to the LTTE as I knew the funding given was for me to pursue further studies 
rather than to research the LITE in particular. This decision was made after much 
deliberation over a number of ethical and safety issues62. It must be stressed that this 
decision was not made at the cost of other ethics, but by way of actively controlling any 
personal information exchanges.
The major hurdle within the access process was obtaining relevant data based on the 
level of access that was granted. I was granted a level of access that included the 
possibility of requesting the type of person I wished to interview and at the same time it 
also indirectly prohibited me from making direct contacts. I have no doubt that the level 
of access granted to me was due to the use of a highly respected intermediary (the 
Gatekeeper).
62 Even though the funding was not given to research the LTTE, the very fact that my sponsoring body was a 
law enforcement agency in Britain, would certainly have become problematic in the field. In addition, the 
LTTE has been outlawed in Britain since 2002 under the UK anti-terrorism legislation, further complicating 
matters.
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The existing literature on dangerous and sensitive fieldwork emphasises the need to 
have a theoretical understanding of the social organisation that researchers are seeking 
to access. The specific nature of the organisation cannot be experienced in advance (Lee 
1999:122) and I would add could only be gained through their own experiences. A 
number of researchers claim that the best way of gaining access is to be physically placed 
inside the setting in order to carry out the research, thus claiming it to be specific to that 
particular situation (Warren 1980, Hunt 1984, Adler and Adler 1987). Johnson 
(i975’50) describes this as, “seemingly unlimited contingencies...^..]...ranging from 
being gleefully accepted to being thrown out on one’s ear” (cited in Lee 1999:121). 
Johnson, like many others (including feminist researchers), argues that access is an on­
going process that needs continuous re-negotiation. Johnson’s use of the term ‘freeze- 
out’ is particularly apt in depicting situations where a researcher is originally accepted 
but whose presence is then challenged or even rescinded. This concern is supported by 
Laslett and Rapoport’s (1975), described as the ‘inter-interview dynamic’ (Lee 1999:113), 
where the initial interview has raised anxieties in the participant causing resentment 
towards the researcher (also see Smyth et al 2005). Therefore gaining access is 
characterised by an unpredictable nature that all researchers have to confront.
I gained first-hand experience of this during my field research where access was denied 
due to a language misunderstanding. I was interested in gaining direct knowledge of the 
power structure within the LTTE and to ascertain the number of women who were in the 
Central Committee, believed to be their main decision-making body. This was a 
complicated question, which the civic translator found difficult to understand and 
consequently it was not translated into Tamil accurately, causing a misunderstanding 
and concern for the leader of the local sub-organisation whom I was interviewing at that 
time. Before we started the interview, she agreed to allow two of her female combatants 
to be interviewed by me, but the confusion that arose during the interview made her 
exceptionally waiy of my intentions, and her agreement was withdrawn. This 
misunderstanding caused me a number of wasted days on a tight field research schedule 
and a deep concern as to what had taken place for this situation to occur, as I was not 
aware at that time as to the precise nature of this misunderstanding. Later it transpired 
that she was not familiar with academic researchers having previously only spoken to 
newspaper journalists, whom they (the LITE) do not care for greatly, although they do 
give interviews in order to gain public support or promote awareness of their struggle. I 
was then in a situation of having to re-negotiate the research and the whole of the access
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process all over again. These re-negotiations required careful handling and were 
emotionally draining and extremely time-consuming. They involved a number of phone 
calls and personal visits to the local leader of the sub-organisation by the Gatekeeper 
and his family to clarify my position in the interviews. I was fortunate at this time in 
having the Gatekeeper’s wife as my interpreter, who was able to clarify the 
misunderstanding and to facilitate the re-negotiation of my position.
It is necessary to consider the opposite position where researchers are denied access to 
the field. The literature on access-denial is very limited. Lee (1999) argues that the 
reason may be continued pressure to move to where access can be obtained rather than 
spending valuable time analysing the reasons why access is denied. He further points 
out that the denial of access may be due to the possibility of the researcher raising 
unwelcome questions in the minds of Gatekeepers, who question whether the granting 
of access in the first instance was a wise decision. Finding proof of refusal is difficult as 
the whole of the access process is often shrouded in secrecy. Sometimes the researcher 
will be informed of the reasons for access denial, but at other times the reasons may not 
be clearly communicated. I view this as a serious point to bear in mind when posing 
questions, as I had no wish for my access to be withdrawn.
Asymmetric nature o f power relations with the Gatekeeper
It is understood amongst researchers who enter the field through a Gatekeeper that this 
person invariably holds the power to grant or deny access at will, and that the 
relationship can prove to be either beneficial or a hindrance (Lee 1995, Jamieson 2000). 
This is enhanced when operating in a culture of political distrust. As a researcher from a 
western university, I had a different type of power and status in comparison to that held 
by the Gatekeeper, where access to those targeted by the researcher is achieved through 
bargaining and negotiation. I consider this not to be an equal power status but an 
asymmetric form of power that favours one party more than the other.
The asymmetric nature of the power relation was visible from the moment I met the 
Gatekeeper to obtain access. I was able to mention the name of my Contact (whom I 
have never met), who suggested I met the Gatekeeper. The Gatekeeper questioned,
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quizzed and watched me keenly to ascertain where my sympathies lay in the conflict63. 
The fact that the Gatekeeper was not aware of my visit gave me an advantage in the 
power relationship by having a space to locate myself directly face-to-face. I would argue 
that such direct social interactions have the ability to change the power settings leaving 
little room for misconceptions. At the same time the asymmetric nature of the power 
relation allowed the Gatekeeper to ask questions and observe my reactions prior to 
granting any form of access. This power is initially non-negotiable; perhaps the only 
occasion that it can be re-negotiated is when the researcher has ‘earned’ their trust.
The asymmetric nature of the power relation is also addressed by Lee’s (1995:123) two 
categories of‘social access’ and ‘physical access’. He states that social access may depend 
on establishing an interpersonal trust with the Gatekeeper, but it is the Gatekeeper who 
controls the physical access and the levels of trust granted. I would say that the trust 
given or built with the organisation through the involvement of a Gatekeeper involves 
asymmetric power relations that are exacerbated by ethnicity and hegemonic identity. 
The Gatekeeper will only allow access to the research candidates that they think will be 
most suitable for the research and beneficial to the revolutionary organisation.
There are a number of Sri Lankan feminist academics (such as de Silva 1994, 
Coomaraswamy 1996 and 2002, de Alwis 1998b, de Mel 2001 and 2004) that have 
written about LTTE combatants. With the exception of Rajasingham-Senanayake (who 
had an opportunity to interview Dhanu without knowing that she was interviewing Rajiv 
Gandhi’s future assassin), none appear to have conducted any fieldwork and most 
certainly not on the LTTE’s own territory. Rajasingham-Senanayake’s Tamil ethnicity 
and the fact that she attended a western university in part may have contributed to her 
being granted access. Other Sri Lankan feminist academics have published material that 
had offended the LTTE by the way in which the organisation was portrayed or by the 
way in which women combatants were described (suggesting for example, that the 
women’s agency is non-existent in the movement and the movement is merely using the 
women for its own ends). It may also be far too dangerous for Sri Lankan women 
academics to enter an LTTE camp to conduct research and it is likely to remain so until 
peace is restored. It may also be a reason why foreign nationals such as Schalk 
(Swedish), Bloom (American) and Alison (New Zealand) and I (British though of
63 At that instance I recall maintaining steady eye contact, and trying my best to look earnest. I remember 
thinking of all the interview techniques I had developed over the years, when in need of a new job.
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Sinhalese origin) have managed to carry out field research where the Sri Lankan 
academics have been unsuccessful. I would argue that these failures to conduct field 
research in the organisation’s own environment might limit results in the feminist work, 
given the issue of missing elements in knowledge not gathered first-hand. My own 
position of representing women combatants does contradict existing views, in that I 
present a picture of the women combatants as being empowered and regaining their lost 
agency. Having more of a British national identity than a Sinhalese identity I was more 
open minded in my approach to the revolutionary organisation and conducted research 
in the LTTE’s territory without any preconceptions.
In addition to other difficulties in establishing such trust discussed elsewhere, the 
researcher must be able to spend a lengthy period in the field to earn trust. In the 
absence of such long periods, the researcher needs to focus on gaining the most out of 
the interviews conducted. When conducting research in violent political conflict areas, 
the researcher needs to be fully aware that research participants may not be willing to 
discuss their fears with a total stranger, especially if the stranger is residing with the 
Gatekeeper.
This Gatekeeper (as I found out) was in a position to provide their own interpreter. 
Though this is far from an ideal situation, as a researcher I was very aware that decision­
making in this instance lay solely with the Gatekeeper. As stated previously the 
interpreter chosen by an organisation has the potential to act as a filter, to stop any 
undesirable comments from being translated. The field research in Jaffna showed the 
interpretation to be conducted by civic citizens who were LTTE sympathisers. The 
interpreters appeared at the time to carefully and considerately construct the language 
used by the participants (in response to my questions) to express a meaning nearest to 
the original statement.
Interview Settings : Single interview
Referring back to the early stage of planning the research, while there is no one strictly 
suitable method that can be applied to all interview settings, I was aware that single 
interviews would have been the best method for this particular research6*. Often with
6* Based on experiences already gained with the women of the IRA
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revolutionary organisations they will only put forward a member for research purposes 
once. This is not always due to issues of mistrust or lack of co-operation, but due to 
other demands on their time. With the LTTE I found that sometimes the interviews were 
expected to be conducted in groups of three or more, or in an open room where a 
number of others who were not directly involved could come and observe at their own 
leisure.
Single interviews are favoured by researchers such as Brannen (1988) who argues that 
anonymity is of great benefit in a single interview situation being less demanding on the 
participants and a necessary component in order to maintain a level of trust. This issue 
is of particular concern for researchers dealing with sensitive or dangerous research, 
providing a ‘one-off character’, which, as Lee clarifies, should “...in other words...[...]...be 
no fear on the parts of the respondent that the paths of interviewer and the interviewee 
will ever cross again” (Lee 1999:112). Oakley (1981:44) however disagrees and claims 
that single interviews encourage the ‘ethic of detachment’ (cited in Lee 1999:113), 
reasoning that single interviews will not develop into “a deep, lasting and genuinely 
collaborative research relationship” (ibid). Whilst noting Oakley’s views, I would re­
assert that the dynamics of research conducted in revolutionary movements are 
different to other forms of social research.
I acknowledge Oakley’s contributions to feminist research and her claim that the 
absence of collaborative relationships hinders long-lasting relationships. However, I 
argue that my research gives rise to specific pragmatic and ethical issues, which counter 
these claims. The research I am conducting needs to be understood in the context of an 
uncertain political climate, where women are only available for ‘one-off interviews. This 
makes building relationships difficult at best, and maintaining them impossible at worst. 
Given issues of safety of both participants and the researcher, the fact that long and 
meaningful relationships may not take place should not be viewed as less than 
satisfactory but as a pragmatic and ethical response to a specific conflict situation. That 
said, until the recent development of the new wave of violence (the LTTE calls it the 
Final War) I have been able to maintain some contact (through email) with one of the 
key interview participants of the LITE and continued contact was maintained with the 
Gatekeeper and his family. However in this kind of environment contact is only possible
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if there are common tools for communication such as a shared language (English) and a 
global communications network in a stable environment^.
Taboo topics not for discussion: sex and sexuality
Female sexuality (sakti) is highly valued in Tamil society with a cultural belief that it 
holds hidden powers. At the heart of that power lies female sexual purity, as discussed 
further in Chapter Six. Therefore I took a measured view that the sexuality and sexual 
needs of the women combatants would not be discussed in the research, with the 
exception of marriage within the LTTE organisation. The reasons for this decision were 
many and I must make it clear that is not due to “...interviewers [researchers] feeling 
uncomfortable about asking questions than with the interviewees being embarrassed” 
(Lee 1999:101). Arguably there may be an element of this that is based on an awareness 
of cultural understanding of how sexuality is constructed in civic society, which is 
extended to the revolutionary organisation. This issue is addressed by Farberow 
(1963:6) who states, “[t]he various kinds of taboos also involve personal, moral, or 
ethical questions in varying degrees. Investigations of sexuality arouse social 
reactions...”. To put this into the context of the research, Tamil culture and the way it 
regards sex and sexual orientation (heterosexuality is only kind of sexual activity that is 
accepted in society) determines that this is a taboo topic to discuss in public66.
Privacy was not possible when interviews were conducted through an interpreter, and 
even though they were of the same gender/sex, asking direct questions about sexuality 
might have violated the individual woman combatant’s modesty, or undermined the 
researcher’s ethical position, by placing interview participants in an awkward position. 
Furthermore, any inaccurate translation could create an antagonism and run the risk of 
being insulting to the individual combatant woman’s sexual morality and virtuousness, 
which in turn would reflect negatively upon the revolutionary organisation.
65 I have been unable to conduct any form of email communications since the beginning of the Final War 
c.2005 as all email addresses appear to be non-existent.
66 Hooker (1963) in reference to conducting his/her own research in to the field of male homosexuality 
states that, “for the researcher to be trusted, he must demonstrate repeatedly and over time that he takes 
professional ethics seriously, that under no circumstances would he reveal to anyone what has been told 
him in confidence...”(Hooker 1963:47 in Farberow 1963:6/7).
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As detailed in Chapter Four, marriage is not forbidden for the combatant women, but 
pre-marital sex is unacceptable and heterosexual sex is only accepted in a hetero- 
normative context. With these factors taken into consideration, it appears to be an 
inappropriate subject based primarily on the understanding of Tamil culture and on my 
own Sinhalese identity, which gave me a similar perception and understanding of sex 
and sexual morality.
Venues
The interviews were conducted at three separate venues, which were the Gatekeeper’s 
house, the office of HA (in Jaffna) and the LITE Women’s Political Wing Office (in 
Kilinochchi). The majority of the interviews were conducted at the Gatekeeper’s house in 
various rooms such as the large open space sitting area, my bedroom and the middle 
courtyard. A second set of interviews was conducted at the Women’s Political Wing 
office where I was allocated a private sitting room for this purpose. Though holding 
interviews in Jaffna was far easier and considerably safer, both environmentally and 
physically, than travelling to Kilinochchi to conduct the same, I opted for the invitation 
to conduct interviews in Kilinochchi. The main reason behind this decision was the 
notion of conducting interviews ‘in their own space’ with a view to granting the 
participants an equal stake in the power relationship (even though my own position was 
still based on a lack of /  or limited power in these scenarios. The issue of relative power 
dynamics is addressed later in this chapter).
The visit6? was rewarding as it gave me an opportunity to see the site, and meet other 
women combatants, including disabled women who were attending to their daily routine 
of assisting one another. This was particularly visible in tasks that many able-bodied 
women might take for granted, such as combing one’s own hair. My visit also presented 
them with an opportunity to meet a woman from a Sinhalese/British background, 
bearing in mind that most had never met a Sinhalese woman before68. Hospitality was 
also a key factor in the visit to Kilinochchi. The women of the LTTE take a great deal of
67 The journey to Kilinochchi is detailed in Appendix 2.2
68 Many months later in central London, I met a Tamil man from one of the Jaffna islands who told me that 
he had never met any Sinhalese people until he came to Colombo as an adult, and all his life he was told that 
Sinhalese are evil people. Hence, I perhaps was the face of the unknown evil they were curious to see.
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trouble to be hospitable by offering food and drink from the time of my arrival in their 
space. The luncheons were always healthy and homely enabling me to partake in the 
food they ate during times of some political stability where food products were widely 
available. The conversations at such times were informative, including one about 
Prabhakaran insisting that women who sat at his table at meal times must be able to eat 
well. It was such a friendly and welcoming atmosphere and I even got an opportunity to 
meet the woman who did the cooking and watched LTTE recordings of various battles. 
During these periods of watching videos, the women combatants got veiy animated and 
were visibly happy in seeing their actions on the screen.
Analysis
There are many ways of analysing interview data (Brenner, Brown and Canter: 1985). I 
considered computer-based data analysing systems such as ALCEST and NuDIST, but 
opted instead for a colour coded paper-based method, as referred to by Auerbach and 
Silverstein (2003). I was already familiar with this process prior to training on the two 
computer packages.
The interview transcripts were separated and grouped into combatant and civic women, 
then each transcript was read and notes written on the side to identify any emerging 
themes. Similar and contrary views were identified and separated into thematic subject 
areas identified from the answers given by the participants. Common topics based on 
shared experiences such as displacement, the breakdown of family units, equality 
between men and women, and the death of combatants, about which every interviewee 
had responded were used to build the main chapters of the thesis. They were also 
equally rich in comparing and contrasting the two groups of women, based on their own 
perception of the other group.
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S e n s i t i v i t y  a n d  S a f e t y
Dealing with Sensitive Topics
Some authors have written on the subject of sensitivity and danger in fieldwork (see 
Smyth 2005, Moreno 1996, Green 1995, Simons 1995, Nordstrom and Robben 1995, 
Schnabel 2005 and Albert 2005). However, it was Lee’s texts (1990,1995 and 1999) on 
sensitive and dangerous topics that I found most useful to my own work. Whilst 
acknowledging that sensitive issues can be life threatening for individuals who take part 
in the research as well as for the researcher, it must be recognised that researching 
sensitive topics is fraught with many difficulties.
“One difficulty in talking about ‘sensitive topics’ is that the phrase is often used in 
the literature as if it were self-explanatory. The term, in other words, is treated in a 
common-sense way without being defined.”
(Lee 1 9 9 9 :3 ).
Some researchers such as Farberrow (1963:1-7) look at sensitive topics through a 
definition based on themes that are considered to be taboo. Others such as Green 
(1995:105) views sensitive topics through elements of fear that merge the boundaries of 
subjective personal experiences to include collective social memoiy. She also claims that 
experiences of fear and terror are difficult to describe in words. Seiber and Stanley 
(1998) describe sensitive topics as being any socially sensitive research that may have 
consequences to either the researched or the group of individuals represented by the 
research (referred to in Lee 1999:3). Such attempts at defining sensitive research 
overlook a number of more specific problems that are embedded in conducting sensitive 
research and are deeply rooted in methodological issues (ibid), not least the risks to the 
researcher herself. As Lee states, “...sensitive topics present problems because research 
into them involves potential costs to those involved in the research, including on 
occasion, the researcher” (Lee 1999:4).
For the purpose of this thesis, the definition of “sensitive” is derived from a personal 
perspective, based on the potential it has to create a physically dangerous situation for 
the individual participants and /or the researcher. This physical danger could be a direct 
result of actions or disclosures of information to the researcher by the participants, or 
the researcher’s decision to withhold information that the State-run army or the
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revolutionary group may consider important to their own purposes. It could simply be 
an assumption by either party that the researcher holds valuable or damaging 
information and is unwilling to pass it on to them. Sensitivity does not necessarily 
change with political or social changes, as a physical danger may continue to exist after 
the war has ended.
The ceasefires and peace negotiations seen in Sri Lanka is an example of this. It is naive 
to assume that such changes in the political climate or various presidencies and other 
ministerial levels would immediately eradicate the fears that have been built up over 
long periods. On a positive note the researched may be more accommodating over 
questions asked and answer with a greater degree of honesty if the research is conducted 
during periods of relative calm, as threats of personal retribution are to some extent 
removed due to political stability.
The women of the LTTE whom I met were willing to talk and had no fear of their true 
identities being disclosed. They had very strongly held beliefs that they had the ability to 
make a difference. This kind of behaviour has much to do with the times in which a 
researcher meets the researched. At the time of research the LTTE were conducting 
peace talks with the Sri Lankan government through the Norwegian SLMM as 
intermediaries. This whole research process would have been very different if it had 
been carried out under the hostile political climate that has existed since 2006.
War Stories: safety infield research
Field research into violent political conflict raises safety issues on three levels: the safety 
of the participants, the safety of the data gathered and the safety of the researcher. Any 
researcher undertaking research on political extremism and/or organisations is exposed 
to threats and dangers by the very nature of the problems that the research will examine. 
Researchers must therefore be aware of the physical dangers inherent in certain 
situations of violent political conflict or amongst organisations where violence is 
commonly practised. Lee (1995:3) argues that violence falls predominantly into two 
categories: ‘presentational’ and ‘anonymous’ (see also Brewer: 1990 and Yancey and 
Rainwater: 1970). Presentational danger emerges usually from the presence or actions 
conducted by the researcher, invoking aggression, hostility or violence from those within
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the setting6?. Anonymous danger is an unavoidable danger that presents itself to the 
researcher when in a dangerous situation (in order to conduct research). As an example 
of this, he refers to Brewer (1991), who -  before the time of the current Northern Ireland 
Agreement -  had to regularly accompany police officers through streets where the 
officers were always potential targets for attack.
There were dangers faced in my field experience that can be described as ‘anonymous’. 
Here, the researcher (myself) is in a situation where the actions conducted by others 
whose company the researcher is in (the LTTE combatant women in this instance) put 
the researcher’s safety at risk. One example concerns a day trip to a nearby island 
arranged by the Gatekeeper. The group included Tamil civilian women who were 
sympathisers of the LTTE, LTTE combatant women and myself as the only outsider. In 
Sri Lanka’s conflict zone, photographing the armed forces is strictly prohibited, a policy 
that sometimes gets extended to border checkpoints. The aim of this policy is to protect 
the armed services personnel being identified at a later date and assassinated. This 
policy is not written overtly in any public place but is known by both parties in the 
conflict. Disregarding this accepted norm, one of the LITE women decided to 
photograph a group of soldiers at the quayside. Before I was able to grasp the situation, 
some of the group was hurled out of the boat by the navy personnel, their film rolls 
ripped out of the cameras and a heated row then ensued. After the situation eventually 
calmed down, I was unsure whether the LTTE combatant women had apologised or 
what assurances were given but the boat was allowed to proceed. In this situation the 
rest of the passengers and I were totally powerless. The nagging questions I had were 
what if the army decided to arrest first? Or what i f  they opened fire? What can I do as a 
researcher, an outsider whose presence has the potential to be viewed as suspicious by 
the State as well as the revolutionary group? 70 The issues of my role as a non-Tamil 
national conducting research in this field will be addressed further in section three of 
this chapter.
6? For further information refer to Carey (1972) and Bourgoius (1989).
7 0 1 was informed by one of the women in the group, who spoke Sinhalese, that when the Sri Lankan Navy at 
the quayside wrote down my passport details they had a discussion amongst themselves as to which 
“register” I should be placed. The issue here was a Sinhalese-British travelling with a group of revolutionary 
women.
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Sluka states, “it is not enough to be innocent, one must be ‘seen’ to [be] so” (Sluka 
1990:117 in Lee 1995:35). With the questioning of identity there lies a subliminal issue of 
loyalty and national allegiance. During the period of my research my national identity 
was questioned each time I crossed a State Army-run checkpoint. My being seen with 
the women combatants and residing with Tamil nationals (addresses of residency was 
recorded) raised questions amongst the Sri Lankan Army as to my intentions. Many 
researchers who have conducted fieldwork in Northern Ireland had to deal with the 
same issues of being seen with a group that the State considers a threat. There is a 
further disadvantage in this situation where the researcher has built up relationships 
and associations, developed in the field of conflict, that have the potential to indicate 
collaborations (Gilmore 1991 in Lee 1995).
Participant's Safety
The safety of the participants (both civic and combatant) is of paramount importance 
when dealing with violent political groups. Lee-Treweek and Linkogle (2000:1) argue 
“...threats to the researcher and to participants are shown to be connected.” Becoming 
involved with the researcher may have a detrimental effect upon the participants as the 
revolutionary group may view them as collaborators. The State-run security forces may 
see them as holding precious or sensitive information that could be of use to the State. 
In either case, the women’s physical safety could be at r is k 71. The issue of risk in 
interviewing both the LTTE combatant women and civic women was considered with 
pragmatism and without sentimentality as the discussion of sensitive or dangerous 
topics might place those who participated in the interview in a possible position of risk. 
Schnabel (2005) argues that “ ...the security of both researchers and their subjects may 
be at stake during research activities in societies marked by violence” (2005:33). As I 
was aware of the need to exercise caution in assessing the dangers, rather than relying 
on an assumption (see Smyth 2005, Schnabel 2005, Barnes 1979 and Becker 1964), I 
erred towards Becker’s (1964) view that potential harms need to be assessed as ‘direct’ 
and ‘tangible’ (Lee 1999:191). This criterion can be comfortably applied to both the 
combatant and civic women.
71 Though ‘lamp-posting’ executions (as described in cf 31) are not carried out during peace negotiations, 
there is still the threat of ‘disappearances’.
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In order to protect the participants from such risk, the researcher has a responsibility 
firstly to request the permission of the participants to use their names, and even if they 
do give their permission, weigh up the danger that they may then be exposed to. The 
women combatants of the LTTE were quite happy to give their names and be quoted. 
This openness may be due to the fact that once they join the revolutionary movement a 
new name is given to them that reflects the Tamil language and symbolises traditional 
Tamil culture. With the change of name, the women combatants also gain a new 
identity, a new birth and membership of the revolutionary family (Adele Ann 1993, 
Schalk 1992). The name change further guarantees a degree of safety to the combatants’ 
biological family, as their family cannot then easily be traced. This is not viewed as 
severing familial ties but as protecting their consanguine family from persecution by the 
security forces.
The same form of protection is not available for the civic women who participate in 
research (being a small community it is easy to identify an individual simply by their 
surname). Those who specifically asked me to withhold their identity were easier to deal 
with as these participants had already taken a decision. However, the second, undecided 
group laid the responsibility for personal safety decisions upon the researcher. My 
chosen method at the time of conducting interviews was that first names (not full 
names) and ages (not dates of birth) were only to be recorded in my notebook which was 
kept with me at all times. Whilst accepting this is not a totally risk-free system I took the 
best precautions I could, by not recording the addresses of the participants, thus aiming 
to avoid any of the participants being identified and targeted. The interview tapes 
carried only the first names of the women and the dates of the interviews, which allowed 
me to refer to my notes on that day to identify the person in detail. If the occasion arose, 
this lack of recorded information would allow me to deny any knowledge (quite 
honestly) of the whereabouts of these participants. I had further decided for the purpose 
of the thesis to rely on pseudonyms for both the civic women and combatant women. I 
resolved to withhold full details of their occupation due to the ease of identification, but 
an outline of their employment was included to provide information on their 
background. I gave the combatant women pseudonyms (e.g. Roja is a name that means 
‘Rose’). By this action, I aim to provide some form of protection for the participants of 
the research. Especially in the light of current wave of violence, I feel greatly burdened 
to ensure anonymity.
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Data Safety
Researchers need to protect the data that is gathered in military and politically sensitive 
areas as there are particular concerns for the safety of the material collected. Some 
researchers of political conflict (Lee 1995, Sluka 1990 and Jenkins 1984) discuss the 
problem of scientific data, gathered for academic reasons, falling into the hands of the 
State. An incident during the Iraqi war confirmed this widely held view (amongst field 
researchers) that government forces gather information systematically from academic 
journals as part of its intelligence gathering?2.
Even though I would prefer to say that my research does not carry any great political 
secrets, or any of the LTTE’s operational tactics, it none the less contains sensitive 
information from combatant and civic women regarding the LTTE, their support for and 
criticisms of the movement, and attitudes towards inflammatory topics such as suicide 
bombing or Tamil independence.
It is important that preventative action is taken prior to any information entering the 
public arena, as after it enters the public domain the researcher has little or no control 
over it. As discussed in the previous chapter the LTTE is an organisation that does not 
forgive Tamil people who are critical of the Tiger regime. Thus it becomes an issue of not 
simply gathering data but also protecting those who participate and help in the 
gathering of such data.
The reality that States do check academic research means that the researcher must try to 
ensure that any raw data gathered is not easily accessible by the intelligence services. 
There is also the potential for misinterpretation.
The researcher can take a number of preventative methods as discussed in the articles of 
Jenkins (1984) and in Sluka (1990 and 1989) relating to fieldwork. Jenkins (1984) 
advocates gathering data in a loose-leaf folder that contains only the day’s work thus 
giving a small glimpse of the overall picture. Thus anytime one is searched by the 
authorities they will only gain access to that day’s work. Sluka (1990) advocates sending 
research material out of the field but there is an argument that such a practice may
72 During the Iraqi war in 2003, the British Government relied on an obscure PhD thesis published in the 
USA to describe the political situation in Iraq. The British government plagiarised parts of the thesis and 
presented it as field intelligence report.
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undermine the strength of ethnographic methods and a fluid relationship between 
collection and analysis of data (Galser and Strauss 1967). However that maybe a penalty 
well worth accepting if it guarantees the safety of participants and the data.
The safe transportation of data out of the field environment concerned me sufficiently to 
take precautions with my interview tapes. The army has checkpoints linked to border 
crossings, including the jetty and the airport73. At these women and men were searched 
separately, including body-checks as well as the entire luggage that was being carried. 
Motor vehicles were also subjected to rigorous checking. By travelling with LITE 
sympathisers and LTTE combatant women, I discovered that my Sinhalese identity, my 
inability to speak Tamil and my unwillingness to speak Sinhalese proved to be a 
hindrance. I was often subjected to a more thorough search than the other women were. 
I may have presented the army with something of a puzzle, as I assume that the border 
checkpoint guards rarely meet Sinhalese people who have adopted a foreign nationality 
and are unable to speak either of Sri Lanka’s main languages. I had a difficult time trying 
to persuade them that living overseas for a lengthy period does result in adopting the 
native language and there was nothing sinister about it. My unwillingness to speak 
Sinhalese maintained a British identity that would not be unexpectedly compromised if I 
inadvertently acknowledged the Sinhalese language. It was an active form of distancing 
myself from my ethnic hegemonic identity in order to be part of a more neutral and 
accepted identity (for the Tamil nationals and the LITE) as a British national, but here it 
carried other dangers.
I decided to take further precautions with the LITE women’s interview tapes by making 
them appear as blank tapes. I deliberately did not record the full names of the civic 
women but made a note elsewhere, as if the army were to confiscate any of the tapes 
they would be unable to identify any individual. The security of luggage was another 
issue. In order to avoid any tapes disappearing from the luggage, I resolved to carry all 
the tapes by hand. As a form of distraction the LTTE’s printed matter and posters of 
their martyred heroine Malathy were positioned inside the hand luggage to be seen as 
soon as it was opened. The notebooks with hand-written notes were folded amongst 
clothing somewhat casually so as not to draw any attention by appearing hidden. I found
73 The LTTE too have checkpoint at the entrance to Vanni district, which is under the jurisdiction of the 
Tamil Tigers.
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that it did work to carefully position LTTE printed material to draw attention away from 
the tapes and notebooks.
Personal Safety: Anxieties in the field
Conducting field research in conflict areas where the researcher’s hegemonic identity 
makes her the enemy in the eyes of one side of the ongoing conflict gives rise to 
emotional and personal safety issues. It is considerably easier to reflect on situations 
away from field conditions, and from the safety of a few thousand miles away. The 
reality however is that in the field a researcher realises that their knowledge in fact does 
not prepare them to deal with all eventualities and there is much that they need to deal 
with on their own, reminiscent of Sander’s (1980) metaphor of ‘rope burns’. These ‘rope’ 
burns include the researcher’s unawareness of when she is being watched or followed.
On my first day in the field I changed accommodation. As it was at dusk I was not in a 
position to inform anyone in Colombo that I was moving from the address given, which 
was a breach of my own security process, but travel fatigue and the need to find other 
suitable accommodation in a place where there are no hotels, prompted me to overlook 
the safety aspect. I was in possession of a list of possible homes that were able to 
accommodate the visitors who have been arriving in Jaffna since the ceasefire, mostly 
from the Tamil expatriate community or aid workers, with only a nominal number of 
Sinhalese. Within an hour of being at the new accommodation I was informed that I was 
to receive a visit from the LTTE. During the LTTE occupation of Jaffna householders 
had to report all visitors staying in accommodation to the LITE. This was not the 
practice during my research period but I was aware that such practices were continuing 
during the period of ceasefire.
The impending visit caused me a great deal of concern and forced me to look at the 
accommodation in a very pragmatic way (I had paid no attention previously except for 
the size of the room, comfort of the bed, ceiling fan and a privacy of an attached 
bathroom). I considered many important issues such as entries and exits to the room, 
means of escape, the height of the window from the ground, the neighbourhood, the 
location of the nearest army camp (even though the army camp might not have been the
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best option for a single female traveller regardless of ethnicity) and the SLMM?4 office. 
Upon confronting the possibility of an impending situation with unwanted guests I was 
able to recall information that was held in mind without being counted as important 
until that point in time, such as remembering that the Red Cross office compound was 
less than quarter of mile away. I also become aware of the tropical nights being very 
dark with inadequate streetlights. It made me realise my own limitations, inadequacies 
and vulnerabilities. The euphoric feeling from the great sense of achievement on arriving 
in the field and making contact with the Gatekeeper slowly ebbed away in the face of 
possible danger. My concern at this stage had less to do with my hegemonic identity but 
more to do with my work identity that had been kept out of the research project. On this 
occasion, with much trepidation, I slept fully clothed fully expecting a visit at anytime 
during the night. However due to another incident in Jaffna town I was not visited, 
making me realise that my credentials and motives for visiting Jaffna may have 
appeared to be of less importance than I felt the night before. The next day I was invited 
to stay at the Gatekeeper’s home with his family, which I accepted even though they 
were unknown to me as the only alternatives I had was staying as an outsider in a 
stranger’s house with limited room for social interaction. Moving to the Gatekeeper’s 
accommodation also meant easier interactions with the women combatants and no 
threats of the LITE nightly visits. The relationship issues that arose by moving to the 
Gatekeeper’s family are discussed in the next section of this chapter.
The researcher’s vulnerability in conflict zones is a key part of my own positionality in 
the research. Emotions that are traditionally overlooked in field research (Kleinman and 
Copp 1993:26-48, Lee-Treweek and Linkogle 2000:14 and Porter, Robinson et al: 2005) 
become key factors within conflict zones. Whilst there was no sense of danger present on 
a moment-to-moment basis, there was a continuous sense of being in a very different 
place where familiarity and unfamiliarity continuously merged. This changing position 
was mostly experienced when I travelled away from the relative security of Jaffna to the 
Kilinochchi district, which is held by the LITE. The familiarity linked to emotions 
emanating from my own childhood memories of sunny tropical days gave way to a vastly 
unfamiliar landscape of partially destroyed houses, cement walls with bullet holes, and 
palm trees with their tops blown off in air raids. The skull and crossbones signs posted 
along the way warned of landmines. This was particularly poignant where the scenery
74 Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
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was exceptionally beautiful along the causeway of Elephant Pass with the reminder of an 
abandoned shell of a tank where one of the major battles (named by the LTTE as ‘Never 
Ceasing Waves’) for control of Jaffna took place. Every so often I was able to make out a 
camouflaged female face in the undergrowth holding a gun.
Lee (1995:28) refers to Reinharz’s (1979) experience in conducting field research in a 
border town in Israel. From the time of arriving in the field she was gripped by a sense 
of fear, “anxiety and over alertness (which) impaired her ability to think clearly” (ibid). 
Whilst my own positionality in the field was different to that of Reinharz, I can fully 
empathise with her; even though I was conducting research during a relatively calm 
period, it was ‘only’ a ceasefire and not a time of peace.
Safety and escapes routes are not an option away from Jaffna and its closest villages. 
There are landmines, no mobile phone signals, and my inability to speak Tamil fluently 
and lack of in-depth knowledge of geography of the island all gave rise to a series of 
negative thoughts. However, I took solace in the fact that I had a torch, a British 
Passport and my letter from the Director of the London School of Economics Gender 
Institute. Beyond those comfort blankets, I decided to leave the rest up to fate.
Whilst literature concerning dangerous fieldwork discusses issues such as access, 
Gatekeepers, being an outsider in the organisation and general safety, no one actually 
addresses the significant issue of clothing worn in field research. In comparison to many 
mundane tasks, dressing for the field appears to have been taken for granted, suggesting 
that all who enter the field must have an inbuilt knowledge of field dress code. 
Nevertheless, my research experience confirmed the importance of dress in many ways, 
as discussed below.
Leonard (1993) studied a working-class area of Belfast. Prior to her research she 
often walked, casually dressed, through the area without her presence being noticed.
On beginning interviewing, she decided to dress formally by wearing a suit and 
carrying her papers in a folder. She recounts that, within a half hour, she was stoned 
by a group of children who took her “bureaucratic” dress to indicate that she was an 
outsider
(Lee 1 9 9 5 :17).
In Lee’s (1995) Dangerous Fieldwork, he places the above quote under the sub-heading 
of ‘Access’ to highlight the fact that children can act as alarm bells in the neighbourhood 
to warn of an outsider entering the community. For me the most significant fact in
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Leonard’s dressing was that she was unaware of both the danger and the unwanted 
attention (and aggression) she was attracting by dressing in a specific manner.
To put this into the personal context of my own research, the clothing worn in the field 
needs to be modest in order to blend in with others, non-offensive and practical. I also 
wanted to be similar in my appearance to that of other locals, yet still ‘different’, 
believing that a minor difference in appearance would allow me to be accepted as ‘non- 
local’ but not as an ‘outsider’.
My own field experience in tropical areas shows that consideration should be given to 
clothing with multiple deep pockets that can hold survival essentials such as a small 
bottle of water, a torch, a map, travel documents and so on. Such trousers are invaluable 
if the researcher needs to leave the field suddenly, leaving behind bags and other 
equipment, and the logic of wearing trousers is clear from an ease of movement that 
could be hampered by skirts, and the additional protection provided from insect bites, 
cuts and grazes. Footwear, such as trainer type shoes, ought to be favoured over flip- 
flops, slippers or sandals even in the tropical heat. I would also say that any upper body 
covering must be modest, although showing the midriff, neck and arms were acceptable 
in this context, providing the rest of the body is not exposed. Tamil women do not cover 
their hair and have some form of freedom in dress but they must adhere to modesty 
which is the main quality expected of and accepted by Tamil women. As such, the 
decision of what to wear encapsulates the ethical and pragmatic issues that must be 
considered by the researcher conducting fieldwork in conflict situations.
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CHAPTER3
IDAMPEYATHA (FORCEFUL EXPULSION): 
CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO JOINING THE 
LTTE
Introduction
Idampeyatha is a word in the Tamil language that describes a ‘forceful expulsion from 
one’s home’75. During the pre-war era this word was considered as a formal/academic 
word but it has now entered into the mainstream language of Tamil nationals. The 
actual scale of the displacement that occurred during the periods of war prior to 2006 is 
claimed to involve somewhere between 700,000 and 730,000 people, with an equal 
number migrating overseas over a 30 year period76. Out of this total number more than
500.000 people from the Jaffna peninsula were displaced, and amongst them about
350.000 were forced to move to distant places such as Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar 
and Vavuniya. The second battle that was fought over the Elephant Pass causeway (and 
won by the LTTE in April 2000) caused a further displacement of more than 160,000 
people within the Jaffna peninsula. Between September 2000 and April 2001 there were 
more than 65,000 people displaced in Jaffna due to various operations conducted by the 
armed forces (UNHCR:7 March 2005).
75 Brun (2005) uses the word as Idampeyamtha describe both displaced and displacement. However the 
Tamil language usage of the word is applied to an article rather than a person. Further Brun appears to 
pronounce the word marginally different to the way it is used by participants of my research; this however 
does not affect the overall meaning of the word.
76 The FMO (access on 14.6.07) claims the figures to be 700,000 and the UNHCR IDP Working Group 
(access on 14.6.07) claims it to be 730,000. This difference may be due to the difficulties in gathering 
precise data under conflict conditions.
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As in all internal conflicts, the heaviest casualties were civilians and since 1980 
thousands upon thousands of Sri Lankans have been uprooted and forced to flee 
their homes. An estimated 200 ,000  have fled overseas while the majority has 
remained displaced within the country’s borders. Many of the IDPs77 have been  
displaced several times
(Gomez 2002 in UNHCR 2005:16).
With the renewed escalation of violence, the ceasefire brokered in 2002 subsequently 
failed in 2005 with the UNHCR (referred to in IDMC 16 November 2006:11) recording 
over 201,000 newly displaced in the month of April 2006, which rose to 240,000 by the 
beginning of September 2006. The figures published by the Intemal-Displacement 
group in November 2006 show some 600,000 to 800,000 people as being displaced 
across the North and North East parts of the island78. The current wave of violence in 
Jaffna has claimed some 48,500 displacements along with an unknown number 
displaced within the fighting zones.
The numbers that are given pre-2005 (which relates to the my research period) 
represents one in every two Tamil nationals being displaced and one in four Tamil 
nationals moving overseas as political refugees; this will give a much clearer indication 
of the scale of disruption encountered by the civic population that formed part of this 
thesis (FMO access 14.6.07) 79.
The literature has cited refugee camps as fertile recruitment grounds used by 
revolutionary groups (Stedman and Tanner 2003, Brownleese 2004), but has 
overlooked areas that are controlled by the revolutionary groups where displaced people 
go in search of safety. The revolutionary organisation invests in finding suitable
77 The definition of IDP according to UN Commission on Human Rights (1988) is persons,
“who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence in particular 
as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of, armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violation 
of human right or natural or human -  made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally 
recognised state border” (UNHCR 1988 cited in de Silva). This definition therefore includes civic citizens 
who were convinced or forced to move away from their homes by revolutionary movements such as the 
LTTE.
78 A part of this number includes tsunami victims from December 2004.
79 Muslim nationals were expelled from the Jaffna peninsula in 1990 by the LTTE as a move towards 
ethnically cleansing the Jaffna peninsula of all other races. It is also believed that Muslim nationals were 
ordered to leave by the LTTE due to their lack of sympathy for the Tamil cause and for taking sides with the 
Sri Lankan government. Schrijvers (1999) claims that some 75,000 Muslim nationals were ousted from 
Jaffna peninsula in 1990 by the LIT E and De Silva (2004) claims this figure to be one million.
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combatants amongst both women and children who are displaced. In this section, I 
examine the link between displacements to Vanni, the LTTE controlled area and the 
decision by young girls to join the LTTE and become combatants.
My research suggests that displacement is a key phenomenon that can in part explain 
the recruitment of women fighters, although the way that displacement leads to 
recruitment is complex and diverse. In this chapter, I start by discussing the loss of 
home, which is the most important shared experience of displacement. In the following 
sections, I outline a number of different factors that can contribute to recruitment: 
helplessness and loss of agency; break-up of the family and overcrowding; the influence 
of a nationalist environment; the exclusion from schooling and the lack of alternatives. 
In the final sections, particularly important is the recruitment of children to the LTTE, 
both as a consequence of displacement and of a family context where families who are 
sympathetic to the LTTE may influence their children’s decision to join the LTTE.
The spatial location o f se lf
The home represents a symbolic space “... frequently articulated through nostalgia, a 
form of melancholia caused by prolonged absence from one’s home or country” (de 
Alwis 2004:216). This is the basis from which GV explains her own self-discovery 
through an analogy of her relationship with her home. When GV explains that “the thing 
called ‘Jaffna culture’ is always kept in the house” she means that the cultural roles of 
women are linked to the house, which provides security, stability and modesty of 
women. As described by Porteous (1976:383) the “territorial core” provides “essential 
territorial satisfactions” including those of “identity, security and stimulation” (de Alwis
2004:45).
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“I want you to tell [her] this. Tell her that for a Jaffna woman her house is her soul.
The house could be a small hut. So for a woman who has been living like this to leave 
her home was a very difficult matter. Whether we had problems with our parents or 
had problems with our own thoughts, or if we loved someone or went out to do a job, 
we never left our homes we always came back to it and we wouldn’t do anything 
without our parent’s approval. We who were never able to break up our home were 
ordered to leave the house within an hour and break up the house that were never 
able to do before...[...]...At this time the rain that came down also played an 
important part. In that rain what can I carry and take. As far as I can remember I 
have tried to be a good example in the society and there is this house to which I was 
bound to and was never before able to break away from it and I have put all that I 
possessed in it. The sad part was that I was unable to get away from this house 
before all this happened... [...]... All these years I could not break away from this 
house because of all that I have put in it my relationships, my happy memories, my 
softness, my possessions I couldn’t leave these things and go. Though there were 
many opportunities and many chances where I could have achieved more and never 
left the house. But now in a moment’s notice I had to leave this house for a small 
reason. To me it felt like a small reason because I missed out on achieving a lot in 
this world because of being unable to leave the house and when asked to leave it 
didn’t affect me at all. Even if I had to die I didn’t want to leave the house. I was in 
Nallur [home region] and I refuse to go. I told even if I die I don’t want to go. When I 
think back I was a typical Jaffna woman culturally bound to her house”
(GV).
The house as described by GV in essence is relevant to all participants of the research. 
The concept of the house is more than a mere building of bricks and mortar but in effect 
is a space of self-location. De Alwis (2004:215) views this self- positioning as giving the 
house a specific personality along with a gendered dimension80. The house in Tamil 
culture represents female moral virtue, modesty and social respectability.
As discussed in Chapter One, from a historical perspective women were divided into 
categories based on the house (Kula Makal good women/Vilai Makal evil women) thus 
the links with the house for Tamil women are constructed in the gendered terms of 
space and place. De Alwis (2004:214) describes a space to be an ‘area of safety and 
security’ and a place to be an ‘area of uncertainty and unfamiliarity’. The act of leaving a 
known ‘space’ and moving into an unknown ‘place’ proves to be a deeply emotional 
experience as it is tied to the multiple positions that women occupy. Massey (1994), in 
de Alwis (2004), argues that ‘space’ is a ‘site of interaction’ and ‘place’ is a ‘site of 
enclosures’. That there are no ‘pure’ places and both the place and space are in essence
80 Whilst there may be earlier reference to the origins of equating self with home, it was notably seen in the 
works of Bachelard (1969), followed by Cooper, (1974), both referred to in de Alwis 2004.
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products of human interaction means that the gendered dimensions in the interaction 
make displacement a disruptive and life- changing experience. The conceptual notion 
held within the space of the house provided the same kind of respectable stability for 
civic women and combatant women alike. The continuous displacements forcing women 
into various “places” have eroded the security that is provided by the house (the space), 
and have damaged (irrevocably in some cases) the relationships contained within the 
boundaries of that space known as the house.
The women whom I interviewed and others I have met in the course of this research 
have spoken about the deep emotional impact of displacement. In order to gain a fuller 
understanding displacement needs to be seen in the context of the highly gendered 
traditional Tamil culture that identifies the home as a culturally confined and socially 
dictated personal space for women both young and old. The emotional and physical 
upheaval caused by displacement (by being uprooted from this space) is addressed by 
Brownlees (2004) as,
Disrupting traditional ways of life has dramatic consequences for young people. For 
example, patterns of learning and socialisation are interrupted and the artificial 
environments created in tradition’s place can distort moral development.
(Brownlees 2004:114)
The “artificial environments” Brownlees describes above in effect contribute to the 
nature of displacement that makes women break away from the narrow confines of their 
traditional roles, whether by re-evaluating their own views or by being pushed into 
becoming armed combatants.
Changing Roles and Family Structures
Displacement can be easily linked to the LTTE’s major wars with the State and ceased 
during the ceasefire agreement of 2002 until the current wave of violence. These were 
the First Eelam war on 27th November 1983 to 13 May 1987, the Second Eelam war 11 
June 1990 to 13th October 1994 and the Third Eelam war 19th April 1995 (Smith 
2003:11). Such displacement, whether it occurs once or many times, or is short or long 
term, causes a considerable amount of damage to intra-familial relationships.
- 9 3 -
My research reveals that the continual displacements that occurred in Jaffna have 
created circumstances that resulted in the deterioration of both the cultural norms and 
the social hierarchy of the family unit. “Before displacement there was a chance to join 
[the LTTE]” (Yalini* March 2003), but for many women in this research (except AK), it 
was 2m opportunity they did not take due to their strong familial ties. The prolonged war 
challenges the stability that forms the foundation of the family, where the father acts as 
both protector and provider as the ‘male’ head of household. There are also many 
families that are no longer headed by men shifting the gendered dimensions within the 
confines of the concept of home /house. The disrupted familial structure invariably 
leads to a social transformation, which under violent political conflicts means a constant 
contest for available social space. The boundaries of social interaction that are erected 
during non-war periods, such as respect for elders in the immediate family and /or the 
greater community, are obliterated when displacement takes place. The elders in the 
community find it hard to maintain discipline and authority as the stable structure 
within the set boundaries of home is no longer in existence (Brownlees 2004:117). 
Adults are often unable to articulate their feelings of helplessness due to depression, 
which in turn results in an inability to care for children, and thus they may loose their 
cultural and moral authority as an elder or head of a household (Brownlees 2004:119). 
The breakdown of the family unit extends to the relatives and decreases in particular the 
control men have over the unit, (which includes the women). When this formula is 
applied to the society as a whole it can be seen to produce an extensive reduction in 
social control over Tamil women as a collective (Schrijvers 1999).
Under the circumstances of displacement, the decline in importance of the head of 
household and in the control adults have over children in a domestic sphere makes these 
experiences equally hard to deal with for the young. This is particularly pertinent with 
young children who no longer see the family as a functioning unit.
"... My mother was very sad when Akka [elder sister] left home to join. But Akka was 
very unhappy with all the displacements and being at home without going to school 
must have made her join [the LTTE]. She was 12 years old.”
(Roja)
Roja raises three key points in this extract: one, her sister no longer viewed the family 
unit as a place she could be happy in; two, the unhappiness caused by being displaced 
could not be changed by the family and; three, the ability to leave the family
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environment to attend a different school was no longer an option. The combination of all 
these appears to indicate that Roja’s sister felt a sense of futility at being with her 
parents and a family that was unable to provide for her needs in the displaced 
environment.
The Vanni Influence: an ethno-nationalist revival?
I further suggest that there may be a high level of revival of ethno-nationalism in 
geographical locations controlled by the LTTE where women’s roles are varied to include 
changes. Szczepanikova (2005) refers to this as the women taking “The essentialized 
role of biological reproducers and cultural cultivators of the boundaries of ethnic -  
national collectives and their ideologies” (2005:283). This is often reflected in literature 
where women who are displaced due to ethnic conflicts become the symbolic 
embodiment of the conflict (Korac 2004, Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989, Szczepanikova 
2005, Moser and Clerk 2001).
In the context of violent conflict over ethnically homogenous territories and states, 
uprooted women have become symbolic and strategic sites of nationalism and the 
quest for the destruction of a multiethnic-national society
(Korac 2004:252).
I would assert that displacement should be seen within the context of the war, in order 
to fully understand the women combatants’ decision to join the LTTE. Through ethno- 
nationalism the women have been granted a new kind of gender identity, one that differs 
vastly from the socio-historical positions of pre-displacement times, when space and 
place were at odds with one another.
“I am from Alavetty. At the age of 12, 1 was displaced. We were displaced six times. 
First displaced from south Alavetty to North Alavetty. Then Innuvil, then Kondavil 
then Kaithady and then Vanni and then Jaffna. When I was in Vanni I joined the 
movement.”
(Roja)
Whilst the age that Roja gave (12 years old) at the time of her initial displacement does 
not add up correctly with the subsequent events -  a four year continuous displacement 
and joining the LTTE at the age of 14 (or younger) -  it can none the less be said that she 
was rather young when her continuous displacements took place. Her four-year
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continuous displacement ended when the family moved to Vanni, and she joined the 
LTTE as a child combatant.
In Jaffna, displaced women have emerged to play a very different social role to that 
traditionally expected of them, and articulate their interests beyond the confines of the 
family unit (see Schrijvers 1999, Zackariya and Shanmugaratnam 2002). In a culture 
where there have always been defined private and public spaces women find that “there 
are no family secrets anymore and there is no such thing as a private life” 
(Shanmugaratnam 2001:30). The impact of the lack of private life is reflected in the 
interviews of all participants but is particularly poignant in GV and Kavitha’s narratives. 
In Kavitha’s life displacement became an important influence on her decision-making 
process, and GV uses the displacement to re-evaluate her whole life and existence.
It is interesting to note that a pattern emerges, of those who were displaced to the Vanni 
area (which was under the LTTE control) joining the movement. The pattern of 
displacement to Vanni and subsequent enlisting in the LTTE is also reflective of Kavitha, 
Yalini, Aruna and Arulvili’s experiences. They all moved from various parts of Jaffna to 
Vanni for safety and security. The exception was Mallika who was a resident in Vanni 
and did not experience displacement but was acutely aware of the hardships of others 
through conversations heard at home. It was unclear from which particular geographical 
locality Arasi decided to join the LTTE; AK, due to her long-term role of a logistical 
supporter, joined the movement by invitation. In comparison none of the civic women 
who also encountered displacement joined the LITE but interestingly neither were they 
displaced to the Vanni area. The connection between Vanni and the women’s 
recruitment is significant here. Due to the prolonged war there appears to be no 
research conducted on the connection between the Vanni region and women’s 
enrolment in the LITE.
I would argue that the displacement to Vanni in effect combines space and place through 
a network of social interactions with a collective of displaced women. These interactions 
(with the collective of women) transcend the limited spatiality of secluded personal 
spaces that separate caste and class through the confines of home. By joining the LTTE 
the space changes to that of place. The place in this instance is Vanni, the heartland of 
the LTTE controlled area, which creates a definitive sense of safety, belonging, and 
above all some semblance of normalcy under violent conditions.
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Although displacement is not the sole reason for women joining the LTTE it appears to 
be one of the more prominent ones. I put this to the test by asking Kavitha if she would 
still have joined the movement had she not been displaced, to which she answered,
“As with anything when you want to do [something] you need some inducement. So 
displacement was the final push. Maybe if I had lived here [in Jaffna] there would 
have been something else that happened here that would have induced me to join.
Like the problem with Rajani81. Incidents like that would have made me want to join.
I am sure if I had lived here some of the incidents that took place here with the army 
would have made me join the movement.”
(Kavitha)
As stated by Kavitha, her displacement acted as the final catalyst for her joining the 
revolutionary movement, along with other incidents she had witnessed over a period of 
time. Although in this narrative she did not herself admit to experiencing violence 
directly, she none the less recognises it as a similarly influential force. Therefore, it can 
be said that the experience of displacement is perceived in the same way as other forms 
of more direct violence.
The spatiality aspect of displacement further lends itself to the issue of having to live 
with others such as relatives, friends, or with total strangers for long periods of time. 
Though communal living (same as living with extended families) is accepted by the 
Tamil society, there are issues of class and caste that makes this unacceptable for many 
in this situation.
“Being displaced and living in somebody else’s house was a problem. Also this was 
our first time in Vanni and it was not comfortable and suitable to me. I felt that there 
was no point in living a life in fear which I didn’t like and it was better to have a good 
life without fear.”
(Kavitha)
Both civic and combatant women mentioned fear as part of their daily existence under 
war conditions. However in Kavitha’s narrative she ties fear to the displacement pushing 
her and her family towards homelessness and an uncertain future. Kavitha is not alone 
in making life-changing decisions based on displacement, as others also revealed similar 
examples such as Yalini and Aruna. They both were displaced many times, which
81 Rajani was a school girl who was raped and murdered, by the State army. The army also killed her 
mother, brother and a neighbour who came looking for her into the army camp.
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resulted in their families being forced to find refuge under a tree in Vanni, away from 
Jaffna’s war areas.
“I faced 3 displacements. During the Kilinochchi battle, [and] During Sothiya 
operation I faced another displacement. Our family, also I, live[ed] under the tree... 
we were unable to do anything. So I felt”.
(Aruna)
“Yes. In Jaffna Fort and in 1995 the military occupied whole of Jaffna Peninsula. At 
that time we [were] displaced. Displaced to Vanni and we settled... not [that] we 
[were] settled... we had a home under the tree in Kilinochchi. Then we made a 
temporary cottage [mud hut] in Kilinochchi. Then I went to school in Kilinochchi 
only for ten days”.
(Yalini*)
Both women describe being forced to live outside, under a tree, but Aruna in particular 
strikes a keynote in voicing the helplessness she felt. When taken together these 
examples create a picture of not only dissatisfaction, but also of fear, helplessness, and 
lack of agency and empowerment. These issues will be discussed later on in the thesis in 
Chapter Six with an analysis of the roles of equality. These emotions are strong during 
displacement especially when a considerable percentage of the people who disappear in 
Jaffna peninsula are children. Somasundaram (2002) claims that out of a total of 600 
who disappeared in the peninsula 15% (90) were children (Sri-Jayantha 2002:7).
Positive aspects o f displacement
Much research relating to displacement and refugee studies shows that it is women who 
are far more affected by wars and also that it is women on the whole who take positive 
steps to change their social positions in times of displacement (Brownlees 2004, 
Szczepanikova 2005, Kirk 2006, Gardner and El Bushra 2004, de Alwis and Hyndman 
2002). The interviews reveals that a number of women have embraced the change as a 
positive move in their life rendering displacement as the catalyst to an alternative life 
which they might otherwise have only contemplated in passing. Being uprooted from 
their comfort zones of ‘space’ and being pushed into the ‘place’ has changed the 
gendered roles of women. This change was particularly visible amongst the financially 
affluent, educated middles class women such as GV and HA.
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“I was so used to my life in my home enjoying the nature that surrounded it, the 
people and my own thoughts and I always thought there was no other life than this.
But now because of this displacement I felt I could live anywhere and in anyway. I 
felt that had I lost my life earlier, I could have done all this [other activities] before 
all this [displacement] happened. I even started to cycle everyday. Before all this 
happened I had friends in other places, but I never went to see them [except] on a 
motorbike, or a car or a bus because they were far away places and I didn’t want to 
stay there. I had to come back to my own home as I didn’t like staying away from  
it....These are places that I never wanted to go but now I [can] tie things on the back 
of the bike and cycle to that place.”
(GV).
“Survival. So there are so many places to meet [people], things to discuss, so many 
things to face. I can’t worry now. I can ride bicycle even ten kilometres, I can carry so 
much. This is [the] main advantage of this war for Tamil woman.”
(HA*)
Removing the private space and opening the public place has resulted in these women 
reflecting on the social changes that have taken place due to displacement. In 
displacement the home is no longer represents the gendered values of previous times. 
GV and HA in particular were able to identify and relate to the positive aspects these 
changes brought to their lives.
Another notable positive aspect of change due to displacement was that women of high 
caste and/or the financially affluent middle classes were confronted with sharing their 
living spaces with other social classes and castes. This shared physical space was 
described by GV as ‘multi-culturalism’, even though there were no other ethnic groups 
apart from Tamil nationals present.
“At this time we had to go and live with four families a total of 25 people in a small 
house with two bedrooms and a veranda. Only here I came across the multi-culture 
society. All these days [previous to displacement] we lived an independent life in 
Jaffna and now we had to live with 25 other people. This is where my independent 
life broke.”
(GV).
The mixing of different social status, castes and classes caused GV to adjust to living 
with others in a communal way, thus merging the certainty of space with the uncertainty 
of place. For the first time in her privileged life, she realised that she had to learn to live 
with others and that she no longer held the same position of power as she had within her
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own home. Displacement forces social groups to share personal /  physical spaces that 
the traditions of caste and class would not have permitted before82.
Effects o f displacement on education
School is recognised amongst displacement literature as being a stabilising factor in 
children’s lives. Machel (2001) who compiled global evidence on child displacement as 
part of the impact of war on children, claimed education to be the “fourth pillar” in 
displacement along with food and water, shelter and healthcare. The breaking of 
routines such as attending school is often found to be destructive for young children in 
particular, who thrive on stability as suggested by many of the narratives discussed in 
this chapter.
Herringshaw (2000:1) states that education in displacement bears the same high level of 
need as food and water (referred to in Brownlees 2004:126). The young are keen to 
learn, but upon displacement, they are denied such an opportunity, as reflected in the 
discourse of both the civic and combatant women alike.
“ One of my dreams was to go to the university. The circumstances and the war 
environment that we were living at that time didn’t permit us to study”
(Arasi).
“And in 1995 we [were] displaced. For six months we can’t come to Jaffna. We are in 
the Thenmarachi area out of Jaffna. We have no books nothing for about six months 
we studied nothing. Stay like this in the house and playing games and like that. Even 
we can’t study anything.... That time was six months’ waste. ...I think about if I can 
enter the medical faculty and I became a doctor no problem no... ”
(ES*).
One main disruption in the displacement period is that many people sought refuge 
inside school buildings causing those schools to close for an indefinite period of time.
“Displaced people were [living] there [in the schools]...”
(Arulvili)
82 As discussed in Brownlees 2004:118, such mixing of social groups appears not to be unique to the Tamil 
displacement but happens in a global context.
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The schools were not necessarily recognised as official refugee sites, but people often felt 
a sense of safety in being together during periods of violent army attacks, which 
included aerial bombardments of homes and villages, although in fact the schools often 
were the targets for bombardments.
“Here you can see. Many schools were destroyed by the Sri Lankan government. In
Kilinochchi also lot of schools ...Not because school was not there but not
functioning].
(Yalini*).
The reasons for the non-functioning of schools are not limited simply to the occupation 
of schools by refugees or IDPs but also include the State’s armed forces occupation of 
the buildings for military purposes. During the period before the 2002 ceasefire 
agreement it was assessed that there were some 150 schools in the northern part of Sri 
Lanka that were used either as army camps or as sentry posts by the Sri Lankan State 
Army. This position changed after the ceasefire agreement as one of its conditions was 
for all public buildings that were occupied by the armed forces to be vacated 
immediately 83(Sri-Jayantha 200:5). It is difficult to ascertain the precise number of 
schools that were operational during periods of conflict and displacement, however an 
overview of the situation just before the ceasefire period reveals that in the Jaffna 
district alone only some 85 out of 402 schools were functioning (Sri-Jayantha 2002:5- 
6). It has been noted by a World Bank official that there were 128,000 students in Jaffna 
with only 862 teachers (ibid).
The number of children walking many miles to a functioning school underlines the 
importance of education. One such person was Yalini, an academically bright student 
who was prepared to attend school whilst being forced to live under a tree, then in a 
temporary hut erected in the same place. Though the cost of sending a child to school 
becomes hard for displaced parents to bear, they often try to make adjustments to allow 
this to happen, with a strongly held belief in education being the only way out of their 
problems. The State provides free education and gives a form of allowances for school
83 “The letter of this agreement has been followed in the main, yet in many cases the camps have been 
moved directly adjacent to the schools, so intimidation still occurs” (Sri-Jayantha 200:5). As stated in 
chapter 1, it must be recognised that it was not only the State that was monopolising public buildings such 
as schools, but the LTTE too were erecting their camps either amongst the village population or next door to 
a school as noticed in Kavitha and AK’s interviews. Thus each time the State attacks an LTTE camp it 
inevitably decimates the schools and houses nearby.
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uniforms but the cost of textbooks and other material must be bom by the parents. Also 
the displaced children who attend schools are outsiders in the community and tend to 
become stigmatised (Smith 2003:24-33).
Displacement can again be seen as a catalyst that pushed young people to pursue 
alternative lives.
“Already I know about the movement.... but I didn’t decide to join. After 
displacement...I cannot [attend school].... I was unable to continue my studies.... I 
decided to join the movement”.
(Aruna)
Education is seen as the sole route to a better life, which once denied, allows the LTTE to 
be seen as the only remaining pathway open to the young. It is clear that the State was 
either unaware or simply did not care to recognise the importance of schooling during 
the periods of conflict and of displacement. The complacency in regards to children’s 
education by the Sri Lankan government was pointed out by Sri-Jaynatha (2002:6) who 
states that the government was sending alcohol by ship to Jaffna (the only mode of 
transport to Jaffna other than by air) far more regularly than much needed textbooks for 
schools.
W hat is a child?
The precise definition of what or who is a child has been one of the difficult problems 
that have been encountered by academics. Many rely on the 1983 United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child declaration, which states that ‘a child must be a 
human being below the age of 18 years’. On the surface this appears to be a sensible 
approach to a difficult problem of definition. However it overlooks cultural practices 
that are inherent in certain societies, along with the biological development of physical 
maturity and mental capacity that is in the 15 to 18 year old age group. Goodwin-Gill and 
Cohn (1997:6) argue that the identification of children between the ages of 15 to 18 
perhaps needs to be referred to as ‘youth’ or ‘young adults’ rather than children. 
Breaking the age group down into these categories will allocate some leeway for the 
cultural norms and practices to be pursued within the greater definition. It also allows 
the young person to take some responsibility as dictated by their individual cultures 
(ibid).
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There are some 300,000 children involved in 30 separate conflicts globally and many 
are under the age of 16 (Brownlees 2004, Machel 2001). It is interesting to note that 
during periods of violent conflict both lawgivers and politicians have an opportunity to 
utilise the lack of clear theoretical definition for the benefit of the state. For instance, 
Usher (1991:15) notes, “the Israel military's definition of the legal criminal age had been 
remarkably fluid. In 1987, it was 16; by 1988,14; more recently it has been 12” (cited in 
Cairn’s 1996:9) thus granting a space for the state to prosecute children as adults. In Sri 
Lanka criminal responsibility starts at the age of 8 years (although those who are 
between the ages of 8 and 12 have a defence of ‘maturity’ that will be taken under 
consideration by a court of law)84.
The extensive research conducted by Goodwill-Gill and Cohn (1997) on the global use of 
children as soldiers by the State-run armed forces or in militia revealed that out of 185 
countries only 103 had documentation on child soldiers. Seven countries8^  recruited 
from under 17 years of age and 24 others accepted volunteers from under 17 years of age 
but with parental consent86.
Child soldiers o f the LTTE
In a global setting displacement has been linked to children wanting to join 
revolutionary movements, as a result of the insecurities felt in their lives (Cairns 1996, 
Machel 2001, Stedman and Tanner 2003, Brownlees 2004). This however is not widely 
debated in the available literature focusing on the LTTE and its combatants. The 
literature does little to emphasise the issue of displacement being a catalyst for many 
children and young adults wanting to join the revolutionary movement as an alternative
84 Only children under the age of 8 are considered as incapable of possessing “mens rea” (the ‘Lectric Law 
Library).
85 Afghanistan, Iran, Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, Mexico, Namibia, Nicaragua and South Africa.
86 These countries included many western states including the United States and the United Kingdom. 
However it is difficult to be precise which of the revolutionary groups started the recruitment of children to 
its ranks.
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to the instability of continuous displacements and life in refugee camps, but discusses it 
under the theme of forced recruitments or abductions (Smith 2003, Schrijvers 1999) 8y.
The recruitment of children into the LTTE can be traced back to around 1987 (Child 
Soldiers Global Report 2001:34), at a time when the LTTE suffered heavy losses, 
resulting in the deaths of many male fighters. This was a period when the immediate 
enemy was the IPKF and not the Sri Lankan armed forces88. This drastic shortage of 
combatants forced the revolutionary movement to re-assess what alternative human 
resources were available to them (by this stage women had already started to join the 
movement). The recruitment of children as combatants is recognised as a low-cost and 
efficient way for revolutionary organisations to increase the strength of their force 
(Singer 2005:38). However there is literature (see Bandara 2002, Gunaratna 2001) that 
reveals the creation of a children’s unit known as the Bakuts, meaning Baby Brigade, in 
1984. Their training was limited to primary education and physical exercises as there 
was no need at that time to use children in combatant roles. By 1986 some of those 
children emerged as 16-year-old combatants (Gunaratna 2001:2).
The present situation regarding child combatants differs greatly from earlier times as 
illustrated by the National Child Protection Authority in Sri Lanka which claims that,
In 1994, 1 found that one in nineteenth child recruits was abducted. Now in 2004, 
the reverse is true and only one in nineteen is a volunteer.
(Human Rights Watch Report 2004:16)
There are a number of reports on the subject of forcible child recruitment by the LTTE 
prepared by the Human Rights Watch, UNICEF, the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child 
Soldiers, UTHR (Jaffna) and others, clearly indicating that such malpractice does 
happen in the LTTE.
The enrolment patterns have changed over the years with a notable decrease in children 
‘volunteering’. Whilst the cause for decreased enrolment is not specified in available
87 The LTTE has been accused of going into refugee camps to recruit children who have been orphaned in 
the December 2004 tsunami (Human Rights Watch :14 January 2005, Refugees International : 21 March 
2005, BBC News: 13 January 2005)
88 Child Soldiers Global Report, 2001:34, Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, cited in Human Watch 
Report November 2004:5.
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literature it can perhaps be attributed to a number of reasons, including the result of the 
children becoming less romanticised about the role played by combatants, and the 
families and children themselves being less naive or innocent of the realities of war. 
This in turn has resulted in increased forced recruitment through abductions or 
demands made from households to provide a child for the cause89. It must be said from 
the outset that this chapter is not actively seeking to address the issues of forcible child 
recruitment, as the women combatants of the research were willing participants90.
The debate on child recruits continues with various agencies, such as the Human Rights 
Watch, Amnesty International and UNICEF demanding an end to the practice. The 
LTTE has not openly claimed the use of child combatants but they have given 
assurances since 1998 that they will discontinue the practice and release all children 
engaged within the organisation91. Needless to say this has not happened in the way that 
was expected and only a handful of children were released92. It is also interesting to note 
that whilst the SLMM claims that child abduction figures have reduced since the 
ceasefire, UNICEF have claimed that the numbers have increased, and that between the 
beginning of ceasefire up to November 2004 there had been some 3,516 children 
recruited into the LTTE movement (Human Rights Watch November 2004).
The most comprehensive study that is currently available on the gendered aspect of 
child soldiering in the LTTE is by Keaims (2003). The Voices o f Girl Child Soldiers was 
part of larger study that included four separate countries and twenty-three female child 
combatants. The part concerned with female child combatants in Sri Lanka reveals three 
contributing factors in a child’s decision-making process to become a combatant; the 
first is personal circumstance and environments, the second is abduction and financial 
hardship, and the third is a means of contributing to something meaningful with their
89 Each household was ordered to give one child to the cause. Theses instances have been detailed in 
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty, and UNICEF documents (various dates).
90 That said I do recognise that international law has explicitly prohibited the use of children under the age 
of 18 being recruited into armed revolutionary groups and partaking in hostile activities. I also acknowledge 
that under the same law (since 1998) it is a war crime to recruit children under the age of 15 years (see 
www.humanrightswatch.org or UN Document A/CONF.i83/2/Add.i for fuller details).
91 In 2003, the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE signed a formal document titled Action Plan for 
Children Affected by War, which gave assurances to end child recruitment and release of existing children 
from the organisation.
92 Human Rights Watch report November 2004 states, those who were released in fact were of no use to the 
LITE due to their physical conditions.
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own lives. There is also a perceived assumption that respect will be granted by the civil 
society to those who become combatants of the LITE.
Some authors, such as Gunaratna (2001), argues that it is the uniforms of the 
combatants that attract children into the movement.
Interestingly, the appearance of the young recruits was a strong factor in attracting 
youngsters to the movement. Tiger-striped uniforms, polished boots and automatic 
weapons acted as magnets to the children.
(Gunaratna 2001:3)
The exact numbers of child combatants recruited by the LTTE are unknown. In 2002 
President Kumaratunga stated in an interview to CNN television that there were 1,000 
child combatants serving in the LTTE93. Sri-Jayantha (2002) argues that if this figure is 
compared against the estimate of 10,000 total LTTE combatants it reveals that one out 
of every ten combatants is under the age of 18 years. Basu (2005) claims the total 
numbers of children in the LTTE to be 40 percent. As with all data relating to the LTTE 
this too is an area where there are no means to obtain accurate data. Therefore a crude 
method had been devised by the State that involved counting the number of dead bodies 
of children found after various battles. The Sri Lankan Government’s Directorate of 
Military Intelligence claims that a figure of 60% of combatants killed were under the age 
of 18 years (Gunaratna 2001:1). Gunaratna argues that even if the state’s intelligence 
have over-estimated the number of child recruits, the battlefield deaths show a figure of 
40% being children between the ages of 9 years and 18 years of age of both sexes, and a 
notable number of whom is between the ages of 10 years and 16 years (ibid).
Whilst acknowledging that many publications by various international organisations 
collate and publish details on child recruitment, it is only a very limited number that 
discuss the role of female children that have either been forced into the LTTE movement 
or become willing Volunteers’. The numbers involved vaiy between authors and their 
sources, often with a gender-blindness that fails to distinguish male children from 
female children, although Gunaratna does acknowledge that both male and female 
children’s bodies were included. One exception to this has been Smith (2003:23) who 
added to the debate by focusing on the battle at Ampkamam (in the northern part of the
93 CNN television 16 May 2002.
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island) where 140 LTTE combatants’ bodies were recovered, out of which 49 were 
children, and 32 out of those were female children between the ages of 11 years and 15 
years old.
All of the female combatants in my research state that they were volunteers. The 
majority of them were at least 18 years of age at the time of joining the LITE. The 
exceptions are Arulvili who had just turned 17 (she joined after her 17th birthday), while 
Mallika and Roja claim to have been 15 years of age at the time of their recruitment. 
However there is a one-year age gap between them, which indicates that either Roja was 
15 and Mallika 14 years or they were both younger than they stated. During this research 
it proved very difficult to obtain precise age of combatant women at the time of joining 
the LTTE. Therefore the ages were ascertained by linking their recruitment to a time of a 
major event in their lives, such as during key exam times (e.g. ordinary level and 
advance level exams). Whilst I would not say it was a deliberate ploy to confuse the 
researcher, it does go some way to suggesting that the LTTE may have instructed those 
who joined under the age of 18 to be economical with precise details of their age at the 
time of recruitment. It none the less confirmed that they were young enough to be 
classified as children based on the United Nations Convention Declaration definition of 
a child being under the age of 18.
It must also be noted that, as with many other revolutionary groups that use children as 
combatants, the LITE openly values parents who have sacrificed their children to the 
movement by granting them material advantages. Afshar’s (2004) states in relation to 
mothers of Iranian child combatants who died in battle as,
[wjomen who had many martyred sons were offered pensions for their 
achievements, given prizes, hauled up at Friday prayers, and praised for offering 
their sons to the war and helping them achieve martyrdom.
(Afshar 2004:53)
This is reflected in the LITE as stated by Singer (2005),
In Sri Lanka, parents within LTTE-controlled zones who lose a child are treated with 
special status as “great hero families.” They pay no taxes, receive job preferences, 
and are allocated special seats at all public events.
(Singer 2005:63-64)
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Whilst Singer does not reflect upon the implications of the above paragraph, I would 
argue that there are a number of reasons why the LTTE use this tactic. On one level, a 
clear message is sent out to the community that all is not lost due to the death of a child 
in a family, as the family will be cared for by the LTTE. On another level, it sends a 
message to the child that their demise will mean that their family will not endure 
hardships in the future, with no one to care for them. It also encourages the children to 
join and the parents not to discourage such interests in children. Further it also publicly 
overlooks Tamil society’s deeply ingrained caste and class system by promoting such 
families to a socially elevated position, so bypassing their caste and class. This in itself is 
an interesting phenomenon as class can be changed to a degree by education and wealth, 
but caste usually remains with a person from the time of their birth until their death. 
Thus being recognised as a ‘great hero family’ is an honour that a low caste family would 
never encounter under normal conditions.
There is one aspect that makes the LTTE very distinctive from other revolutionary 
groups, which is their issue of cyanide capsules to all combatants regardless of age or 
sex, as mentioned in chapter one (see Keairns 2003, Schalk 1992, Narayan-Swamy 
2002, Bose 1994).
The day I was given the cyanide (capsule) I was very happy because no one would 
catch me alive -  abuse or harass me. This was for m y safety. I felt good to carry this 
round my neck.
(Keaims 2003:15 in reference to a female child combatant).
By issuing child combatants with cyanide capsules, the LTTE instils a sense of 
confidence amongst the child combatants that the enemy will not be able to capture 
them alive. The LTTE tell the children that death by cyanide is considerably better than 
being captured and tortured by the Sri Lankan armed forces (Keairns 2003:15), so the 
children believe that the cyanide capsule is for ‘their’ own safety, issued by a caring 
revolutionary organisation.
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The politicisation o f children
The position in the current literature is that the family is a stronger influence over the 
development of a child’s political conscience than was previously recognised, mostly 
amongst families in divided ethno-nationalist societies, where ethnic identity is re­
created to fit in with the political situation. These views can be divided into three main 
areas that implicate parental influences, namely: parents sharing the same political 
ideology, eliminating any political confusion; the importance of politics to both of the 
child’s parents; and the child’s own perception of the importance of politics to the 
parents (Cairns 1996:124).
During my research it transpired that the women combatants developed their initial 
relationships with the LTTE combatants whilst still living at home. “Through my father I 
came to know more of Prabhakaran and the Tigers.” (AK October: 2003). Thus AK’s 
view of Prabhakaran and the Tigers was formulated by her father and quite 
unconsciously and unquestionably adopted by her. Cairns observes this to be an indirect 
way of parents politicising the children:
This is of course not to suggest that parents necessarily give direct political 
instructions to their children. Instead, what probably happens is that children 
overhear parental conversations or that they informally learn of their parents’ 
political views. Also, parents are required to answer questions about politics ‘just as 
they are asked to answer a thousand and one other questions as children grow up.
(Cairn 1996:125)
In keeping with the above literature, Arasi describes the influence of the family in a 
child’s political awareness:
“During this time, at night my parents, my uncle and neighbours will sit and talk 
about these things [LITE activities] very softly... After that only I started reading the 
newspapers that were in the house. I read about the problems that were going on 
here and there. Sometimes I used to ask my mother about all what was happening 
and my mother would explain things to me.”
(Arasi)
As with AK, Arasi’s political awareness was directly gained through listening to parental 
views and thoughts, which in turn influenced her to choose the same political views. 
These views and thoughts were additionally confirmed as the ‘correct’ thinking, in an 
external environment of school.
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“Also I heard stories [at school] about the fighters who were fighting for us. We have 
heard it at school. And also we have seen our parents giving them food and treating 
them kindly when they came home in the night. When we went to school the next 
day we found that all my friends’ parents were also doing the same thing and we 
discussed it amongst ourselves. Then we [school children] began to like them.”
(Arasi)
As can be seen in Arasi’s narrative, whilst at school, children discuss the issue of the 
LTTE and its combatants. They then realise that not only their own family, but also 
many others, hold the LTTE in high regard. These views were reinforced by her school 
(both by her teachers and fellow pupils -  her peer group), formalising a righteous belief. 
Further, the discussions conducted at school about the LTTE and the political situation 
meant that LITE combatants were seen as fighting on behalf of others, thus creating a 
certain admiration for acts of selfless braveiy.
The combatants’ active visiting of the homes of civic citizens, to collect food and/or 
medicine, also allows them to get closer to families that are sympathetic to them as 
individuals.
“Even before the IPKF came all of us liked the Tigers very much.... I liked the Tigers 
very very much... My family also liked them very much. Because they go through a 
lot hardships, and go on without food. At times they come to our house in the middle 
of the night asking for food... When ever they came, even if it was in the middle of 
the night we would get up and cook for them and feed them. At home, when our 
mother ask us to do some work around the house we will give excuses not to do, but 
when the Tigers came at any time of the day we will do everything very eagerly. At 
home everyone will say that you are ever ready to do things for them. When you see 
them you don’t mind doing any work for them. Whenever there is a celebration or 
festivities at home and when we prepare nice food and eat we think of the tigers and 
wonder what hardships they are going through at this moment and whether they had 
any food to eat. They are people who are fighting for us. The thought that army 
might be hurting them upsets us”
(Arasi).
Arasi, who sees the combatants through the eye of a child captivated by the tales of 
hardships, appears to have a sense of guilt that she articulates as “they are people who 
are fighting for us”. As a child with few resources available to her, she was able to 
express her admiration to the combatants by eagerly awaiting the combatant’s nightly 
visits to her home, where she could actively take part in the preparation of food for the
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combatants. Further, the concerns expressed illustrate that the LTTE combatants were 
no longer seen as outsiders but as an extension of the family.
The fact that Arasi was ‘ever ready’ to assist the LTTE goes far deeper into the personal 
fears she felt as a child. She stated,
“...because with the army they will just come and shoot people at random without 
saying anything. Then I realised that they [LTTE] are the only people who can save 
us from the army. Then as we were growing up we began to like them [LTTE 
combatants] very much and wanted to talk to them [the combatants]. We felt that we 
would be safer if we go with them [the LTTE combatants] and was scared to stay at 
home”
(Arasi).
Arasi’s narrative highlighted children as being shifted from one safe space to another. 
Her description described a shift from home to the LTTE as a safe space when the home 
is threatened. In effect the shift in perceived safe spaces (home and the LTTE) feeds the 
childhood fantasy of the LTTE as a safe space, but in reality recruitment is a clear path 
to danger. Therefore the LTTE combatants were inevitably seen as selfless beings that 
were not only committed to the cause, but also to the community and especially to the 
young, seen as the future of the nation.
“So at times I have asked them take me with them. But they always told us ‘you must 
study well and be good, then only you can look after our people later on’. ‘If 
tomorrow we get our land you are the people who are going to be in charge, so don’t 
come with us but study well’. They emphasised on us studying well. We were very 
much inspired by them so we studied hard to please them. And it was like our goal to 
study well.”
(Arasi)
As illustrated above, Arasi accepted their advice, which was given before the LTTE 
started to recruit children into their ranks. It was also a time when parents still 
welcomed the combatants, and children openly admired them. Quite often, they were 
also seen as part of the family. In a culture that is known as accepting and obeying 
parental views unquestioningly, it is easy to see how the older combatants became 
heroes in the eyes of the desperate young adolescents.
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“When we started helping the Tigers he [father] never stopped us. So by that time I 
started to help in projects, which the Tigers had started. Also I used to go and collect 
food parcels for the LTTE and take care of the wounded. He [father] allowed us to go 
and do all these work without any objections.”
(AK)
AK’s father was known to be a strict man with an authoritative parenting style who saw 
no need to curb AK’s movements with the LTTE, or the time she spent with them. By 
this token, her father conveyed his acceptance of her involvement with the LTTE. Along 
with such admiration there was also an inevitable obligation felt by the individual child 
and their family, as a perception and a belief of basing their safety upon the selflessness 
of the LTTE combatants. Singer (2005:64) claims, “Parents may also drive children into 
war indirectly” by their own admirations of combatants. This was highlighted in Yalini’s 
family, when her father pointed out that her freedom depended upon the sacrifices made 
by the combatants.
“My father told us they are fighting for us they are fighting in the jungle without 
having food like that my father will talk [to] us, you studying, you are living freely 
because the Tigers are fighting for us. My father will talk with us.”
(Yalini*)
Such parental statements often made a child feel they were indebted to the LTTE. The 
child ‘owed’ her life and daily existence to the non-selfish commitment and self-sacrifice 
made by the LTTE, on behalf of the child and her family. Many authors (such as Singer 
2005, Gunaratne 2001 and Smith 2003) overlook the cultural context, in which children 
accept these parental ideologies unquestioningly, as the ‘correct’ belief. However, based 
on my own findings, I agree with Cairns that there is strong evidence to suggest that the 
parent’s political views do foster the child’s own political socialisation.
It must also be noted that the civic women did not discuss the same type of admiration 
and appreciation as seen amongst combatant women’s families. The civic women 
supporters of the LTTE in their adult years did not get involved with the combatants 
that visited them, although their parents offered food and medicine and at times 
monetary contributions, so ensuring they did not antagonise or be noted in any way.
Whilst acknowledging the feelings of admiration the women felt as children for the 
LTTE through parental influence, there are also non-parental influences that instil or
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reinforce these feelings of admiration. One such influence that encourages women to 
join the LTTE is the visual imagery of the billboards along main roads that depicts the 
glamour and excitement of being a combatant. During the research, I noticed a number 
o f billboards depicting many ‘storyboards’. One such board illustrated a group of girls in 
school uniform, talking with a group of women in combatant uniform (Figure 7). There 
were also other storyboard sketches, clearly aimed at girls, illustrating the violence 
committed by the army upon civilians, and how young girls were retaliating, by 
becoming combatants and confronting the injustices committed (Figure 8). In a society 
where age, caste, class and gender identity all play a recognisable role, continuous 
environmental imagery can be powerful, and form an added incentive to be part of a 
revolutionary movement.
Power relations in the family
During the times of displacement the amount of control able to be exerted by the 
parents is reduced and the children are often exposed to a harsh and cruel environment 
where they have to learn to survive. The displacement camps became fertile grounds for 
finding new recruits for the LTTE94, as inadequate facilities (including lack of 
educational facilities) in camps made the LTTE appear as a very alluring alternative 
(Goodwin-Gill and Cohn 1997:34). Brownlees (2004:119) and Cairns (1996) both argue 
that in such environments children begin to develop an additional political conscience, 
which may have some of its roots in parental political ideologies, but could also have a 
stronger influence based on own feelings of “having nothing to lose”. This in itself is a 
direct result of the “desperation and dispossession” that is generally felt in 
displacement^. On such occasions, armed resistance is viewed by the young people as 
granting them some form of “empowerment” (Goodwin- Gill and Cohen 1997:41). The 
LTTE offers such an empowerment to these young people thus enabling them to regain a 
certain level of control that was lost to them.
94 News reports covering the tsunami disaster in December 2004 had claimed a number of young children 
at refugee camps have been approached by the LTTE for recruitment purposes.
95 This is an agreed view amongst psychologist and child care workers who work amongst Palestinian 
displaced children (Goodwin-Gill and Cohen 1997:41).
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This was reflected in my interviews with Roja and Mallika who revealed that once a child 
recruit reached the age of 18 years96 (not 16 years as stated in Gunaratna 2001) they are 
given an option to remain with the organisation or to return home.
M allika: Her sister [referring to Roja’s older sister] studied for nearly five years.
And we studied for three years. According to LTTE rules only after you are 18 years 
old you are allowed to go for fighting. But the youngsters were all the time wanting 
to go into fighting.
T ran sla tor: After the age of 18 they will ask again [whether they still wants to be 
with the LTTE and do battle]. They can decide if they want to go home they can go 
home. Isn’t it so?
R oja: Yes. We can go home. But not many go home like that.”
(Mallika, Roja and the Translator)
The analyses of the narrative indicated there was a strong sense of voluntarism than 
coercion felt by young combatants. It may be that many young combatant women do 
not return home because of the empowerment they gain, or the alternative family they 
create, within the revolutionary movement. The argument of many children deciding to 
stay with the LTTE rather than return home is discussed in Chapter Four under kinship 
in friendship.
Research relating to relationship interactions within families during periods of violent 
political conflict is riddled with contradictions (Cairns 1996). Parenting styles tend to 
change during conflicts due to reasons that include displacement, financial and domicile 
instability, and a heightened sense of parental responsibility. There is a tendency to 
develop an authoritative style of parenting, to compensate for the fear of being unable to 
protect the children (ibid), as is seen amongst those that are displaced.
However during the interviews it became quite clear that the relationship parents had 
with the LTTE combatants, which was both cultivated and developed by the combatants, 
was in fact strained when the women (as young adults) decided to join the movement. It 
appears that though the parents were fully prepared to openly admire the combatants 
and their endeavours, they were wholly unprepared to face their children’s desire to 
become combatants. There is a notable distinction between children discussing their 
desire to join the revolutionary movement with their parents from actually obtaining
96 UNICEF defines a child as 18 years and under, which is accepted by Sri Lankan government.
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parental blessings. The children’s own desire to join may stem from their desire to be 
accepted in the same way as combatants, having seen their parents’ admiration for 
them. Or the children may think that by becoming combatants they are actively 
protecting their parents.
However the relationship between the women combatants and their parents is not as 
clearly defined as it first appears to be. The cultural normative together with gender 
dimension has created a highly complex social interaction within the family unit during 
times of war, displacement and violence. There are new forms of power relation being 
bom within the family unit itself. The power used by the children to negotiate their own 
position and determine their own views (based on the internal domestic sphere as 
politics discussed by the parents or/and the external sphere of school, peer groups and 
the greater society) have in effect distanced them from their parents.
Most of the combatant women who took part in this research have admitted to their 
parents’ grief when they discovered their child had joined the LTTE. None of the 
participants in this research had informed their parents prior to leaving home to join the 
LTTE. The excuses given by the women combatants in order to leave the house without 
raising their parents’ suspicions are wide and varied.
“I told them [parents] I was going to the temple.” (Roja)
“I told my mother I was going for tuition.” (Mallika)
“....as we were going we passed the school in which our younger brother and sister 
were studying and they were just coming out of school. They asked us where we were 
going. They knew that we often went to Morris’s [local LTTE leader’s] meetings so 
we told them that we were going to the meeting and we went.”
(AK)
None of the women combatants viewed these excuses to be significant deceptions. They 
simply viewed the excuses as a means of getting themselves out of the home with the 
least resistance from their parents. If the parents did discover what they were doing then 
it was very likely that they would prevent their daughter(s) from leaving home. AK 
related the story of her friend ‘Navamany’ who was active with AK in providing logistical 
support to the LTTE until they were both invited to join the movement. When
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Navamany went home to gather her belongings, her mother became suspicious, locked 
her in the house, and prevented her from leaving with AK. However the action taken by 
her mother did not prevent Navamany from joining the movement on a later date97.
Yalini sums up the emotional anxiety that is felt by her parents upon her enrolment in 
the LTTE. It also shows a definitive decision being made by Yalini to join the 
revolutionary movement.
“Many times I talked with my mother about joining LTTE. Everyday I will tell. My 
mother tells me that if you go to LTTE you have to face many difficulties. You will be 
without food. How can you survive? I told my mother yeah there are lot of cadres in 
the movement and they are fighting, why cannot I also fighting. My mother didn’t 
believe. Only I am saying but not joining. But one day I have joined, [going for 
tuition] I went to a LTTE men cadre then he left me in a women’s cadre base. In the 
women’s cadre base I was for 5 days and then I went to the training. So now when I 
meet the man cadre, he will talk with me about my mother. My mother went to that 
cadre’s place and my mother was crying and lying down and my mother said I will 
not go back to my home without my daughter and just lied down and that’s it and 
refusing to get up again. Then my father came to that place. And my father talk with 
my mother and both of them came back to home. After 5 months I saw my mother. 
They came to my base”.
(Yalini*)
Once the parents overcame the initial shock and disappointment, they eventually came 
to accept their child’s choice to join the LTTE. In this situation the child has altered the 
power relationship she has with her parents to gain her own wishes. The fact that the 
child is not going to leave the organisation, regardless of the emotional trauma caused to 
the parents, is a new kind of relationship dynamic that was not seen to the same extent 
before in Tamil culture. Parents have less agency within the changing relationship 
dynamics and are then left to deal with the situation in an alternative to the traditional 
way they have been accustomed to.
97 Navamany subsequently died in battle.
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“At the beginning any parents find it difficult to see their child leave. Our culture is 
that always the family stays together. Usually we don’t leave the parents until we get 
married and go. But as time went by when they too experienced lot of difficulties 
during the war and they felt that it was ok for one to join the movement and fight for 
the cause...Until they met me for the first time after I joined they were not happy. 
There was a certain period of time when we were under training I couldn’t meet 
them. But once they saw me after the initial parting they were happy.”
(Kavitha)
The word happy’ is used by Kavitha to describe her parent’s acceptance of her into the 
revolutionaiy movement, but this needs to be looked at in a broader sense of the word as 
it is used to describe a situation where parents had neither power nor control. The usage 
of the word also makes the situation a lot more congenial and devoid of conflict. 
Kavitha’s description is without any of the sentiments attached to that of Arulvili 
(below).
“At first when we say we are going to join they [parents] don’t like it but after we 
joined they [parents] accepted  it.”
(Arulvili)
This statement also illustrates the disempowerment of the parental authority practiced 
in Tamil culture. The acceptance of a female child’s action as irreversible by 
disempowered parents challenges the gender normative in a society that grants more 
freedom of choice to a male child than a female child. The male child is viewed from the 
beginning of his life to be part of the world outside, spending his adult life in the public 
places and making his mark. The female child on the other hand is seen from the time of 
her birth to be a part of a family, confined to the domestic spaces, away from anything 
that is public. Thus the only time she can truly leave home is when she is married. If she 
does not get married then she will always live within the confines of the parental home 
as discussed in Chapter Six.
Summary
There is a universal acceptance that children have no place in wars, either as victims or 
as perpetrators. Whilst the LTTE use children, justifying it as an operational need, the 
children themselves are driven by circumstances towards the revolutionary 
organisation, which of course welcomes them with open arms. Within these 
circumstances, displacement is one of the key factors.
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The claim made in the Human Rights Watch report that there were more child 
volunteers in 1994 indicates that during the first decade of war, with multiple - 
displacements, children have actively sought an alternative life with the LTTE.
Education in displacement is recognised as a key factor that provides a certain sense of 
stability and normalcy for a young person. Education is disrupted during displacement 
with many school buildings closed because of people seeking refuge, or being the targets 
for bombardments due to the proximity of LTTE camps, or occupied for military 
purposes by the armed forces. It also gives hope as a central factor in every day existence 
linked to the longer-term betterment of an individual’s life that extends beyond the 
times of displacement. Therefore education is seen not only as a short-term means of 
providing immediate stability, but also as a form of providing long-tem opportunities for 
the future where none can be seen.
Children’s roles are generally moulded under the watchful authority of the consanguine 
relationships of elders. However the role of the elders gets obliterated under 
displacement when the revolutionary group can step in and take control under the same 
cultural normative of a ‘watchful’ elder. The involvement of the revolutionary group as 
the nominated elder in time will restore the disempowerment felt by the young person 
as the new kinship develops and becomes stronger than the consanguine genealogical 
relationships.
The prolonged war challenges the stability that forms the foundation of the family and 
together with displacement causes further damage to intra-familial relationships, 
especially affecting the male roles (including that of head of the household), which alters 
the traditionally gendered dimensions of the concept of home.
The combatants were seen as a righteous group of people with no moral corruption, and 
their reputation was such that parents openly encouraged their children to associate 
with the LITE. Thus the admiration of the young person towards a serving older 
combatant is often fuelled by parental involvement and support for the rebel group in 
the presence of that young person. By joining the LITE the young women gain a 
powerful protector whom they have admired for a period of time based on the 
politicisation they received at home under the guidance of parents or from non-parental 
influences without the knowledge of their parents. The exercising of agency by young 
Tamil women needs to be recognised in a cultural context as a challenge to the parental
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authority within a patriarchal culture where women (regardless of age) do not usually 
take the main decisions that effect their lives and do not leave home other than in 
marriage.
Displacement both contradicts and questions an individual’s agency and the control they 
are able to exert over their lives. It raises questions on traditional values of caste and 
class. The displacement allows an individual to break away from traditional holds that 
keeps them subjected to set roles in society. They are able to make some decisions 
regarding their lives and those of their families but are unable to carry out the decisions 
made thus creating a paradoxical position in their lives.
Those displaced to LTTE controlled areas felt a sense of safety, and a stronger sense of 
ethnic identity, even without proper accommodation. From their perspective, it was 
better to stay under a tree in Vanni, with some degree of safety, than to live in an area 
with comfort but no safety. The LTTE steps in where the family has failed to provide 
stability or address the insecurity that is felt within the immediate biological family.
I would argue that displacement cannot be dismissed as a mere oddity in the women’s 
decision-making process, and when combined with the safety and security felt when 
under the protection of the LTTE in the Vanni district, is a common theme that appears 
to have attracted women to the movement. Again, as with the issues of lack of control 
and empowerment, this is indicative of the LTTE replacing the lost agency of the 
individual that is lost to victims of displacement.
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CHAPTER 4
THE TIGER FAMILY: KIN IDENTITY 
AMONGST WOMEN COMBATANTS OF THE 
LTTE
Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter the family unit and its loyalties are tested to the full 
under conditions of war. The effects of displacement create instability for some women 
and leave many of them with no alternative but to break away from their culturally 
defined roles of womanhood. Such acts can be seen as an attempt at re-establishing an 
individual’s sense of lost agency and a need to be in an environment where they feel they 
have some control. In order to feel a sense of empowerment some women have actively 
sought out and joined the LTTE movement, which has embraced them as a part of a 
substitute family unit.
The definition of kinship according to the Concise Oxford Dictionary (1980) is a “blood 
relationship; similarity or alliance in character.” Within the anthropologically defined 
social understanding of kinship the term breaks down to describe three forms of 
kinship. A strong bond created within the ‘consanguine’ (blood-related) social groups; 
the ‘affinal’ kinships that extend to include familial ties made through marriages to non- 
consanguine others in the society; and finally ‘Active’ kinships that include those who 
are attached to a family unit that are neither connected through blood line nor through 
marriage. Kinship terminology in this chapter is used in reference to the Tamil culture to 
describe the relationships that traditionally exist in a consanguine family. In this chapter 
I have taken the word kinship away from its consanguine roots (to a great extent) and 
have used it to describe the alternative family unit recreated by the LITE. This family 
unit can be described as a Active family unit founded upon friendships that in turn 
imitate or replace the kinships of a consanguine family.
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The word friendship is defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary (1980) as “being 
friends, relation between friends; friendly disposition felt or shown.” It also describes 
the word ‘friend’ as “one joined to another in intimacy and mutual benevolence 
independently of sexual or family love.” In this chapter Active kinship is based on the 
friendship that occurs among the women in the revolutionary movement. My argument 
that friendships form a major part of the Active kin family will assist in using the words 
‘kinship’ and ‘friendship’ as analytical tools to explore the use of familial ties that are 
idealised, built and maintained within the conAnes of the substituted LTTE family. The 
moral economy (Sayer 2004) of this situation identiAes that both the reasons why 
women join the movement, and their bonds with each other in kinship, arise through a 
moral obligation to both the LTTE and the Tamil nation as a whole. The moral 
economics of kinship that regulates relationships changes the views on traditional roles. 
In this chapter, I look in detail at how the LTTE has succeeded in constructing a 
sustainable Active kinship through the friendships amongst women combatants who are 
effectively from various socio-economical, religious and caste backgrounds.
The Concept o f kinship
Schneider (1984) challenged extant assumptions about the measurement of kinship 
through consanguine ties, arguing that relationships are practiced in socio-cultural 
groups. In his seminal text A Critique o f the Study o f Kinship (1984), he states that 
biological relatedness is not the sole factor in forming kinships in society. While 
consanguine ties are an important factor in determining relationships, there are other 
inAuences that need to be acknowledged as key considerations in kin relationships, such 
as socio-cultural inAuences. However, the literature that addresses the issue of 
developing friendships as part of solidarity between consanguine kin members is limited 
(Contarello and Volpato 1991 referred to in O’Connor 1992). Many kinship studies were 
conducted primarily from a Western point of view, focusing on the formation and social 
interaction of consanguine relationships at a cost of overlooking valuable cultural 
practices (Schneider 1984, Bell and Coleman 1999, Carsten 2004 also see Collier and 
Yanagisako 1992).
Carsten’s research, published in 1997, addresses the issues of consanguine and 
socialisation in kin groups, which she further explores in Culture o f Relatedness (2000). 
She argues that cultural practices external to conventional anthropological research
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must be taken into consideration when trying to understand kin relationships. An 
awareness of cultural practices may distinguish Active kinship from the real thing. 
However, a recognisable change did occur in kinship studies with the rise of feminism 
that challenged the way in which kinship is depicted in anthropology, where it is often 
difficult to separate or identify metaphorical kinship from other forms (Carsten 2004, 
O’Conner 1992). An example of this can be seen in White (2004) where Active kin 
relaAonships are created through the economic circumstances that women And 
themselves in (“webs of indebtedness”), who refer to one another using consanguine kin 
terminology. It must also be noted that amongst the literature on friendship, there is no 
direct link to kin relaAonships, except under sexual orientaAon (see Carsten 2004).
The focal point of the LTTE’s kin relationships appears to promote metaphorical kinship 
as a temporary substitute for consanguine kinship. As the women of the LTTE face many 
difficulties in their lives, the notion of kinship is signiAcant to the understanding of their 
relaAonships that are formed with one another. The success of the LTTE’s newly 
(re)created family and the security and stability that the LTTE family provides is veiy 
much dependent on the promoAon of a AcAve kin idenAty that is devoid of blood Aes 
(see Weston 1991, Carsten 2004).
Though feminism has changed the way in which Western thinking affects tradiAonal 
kinship studies, the research conducted amongst combatant women on a global scale is 
also limited. Within this limited literature the relaAonships that women combatants 
have with each other are neither discussed at length nor critically analysed or debated, 
but inferred as part of the text that discusses the women’s involvement in various armed 
revolutionary struggles. Often these discussions emanate from a strong gender 
perspecAve based on changing social roles for women, with occasional references to the 
metaphorical kinships within the individual revoluAonaiy group (see Taillion 1999, 
Ward 1983, and 2001, Hillyar and McDermot 2000, Kampwirth 2002, Young 2001, 
Young 1998, Wilson 1991, Eisen-Bergman 1975, Turner and Hao 19989®). This is also
98 TaiUion(i999), Ward (1983 and 2001), both wrote about women revolutionaries in the Irish struggle in 
the 1900s. Hillyar and McDermot (2000) focused on women revolutionaries in Russia during 1870-1917. 
Kampwirth (2002) wrote about women guerrilla fighters in South America. Young (2001) and Young (1998) 
concentrated on women’s involvement in the Chinese Cultural Revolution, including women’s active 
participation in the Long March. Wilson(i99i) wrote about the women fighters in the Eritrean conflict. 
Eisen-Bergman (1975), and Turner and Hao (1998) discuss the role of women combatants in the Vietnam 
war.
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reflected amongst authors who focus on the LTTE such as de Mel (2001), Rajasingham- 
Senanayake (2004), Coomaraswamy (1996), Maunaguru (1995), who have written about 
the LTTE and the women’s involvement in the organisation, but have overlooked the 
positive development of familial identity encouraged within the movement. The 
exceptions to this are Balasingham (1993 and 2003) and Schalk(i992) who do discuss to 
some degree the combatant women’s involvement with the LTTE from a perspective of a 
friendship. These discussions are referred to throughout this chapter.
This minimal recognition regarding women combatants’ relationships has resulted in a 
shortfall of documentary evidence supporting women’s kin identity during conflicts. 
Young (2001:5) defines her work as “historical narratives based on oral interviews” and 
writes extensively on women’s involvement and participation in the Chinese 
Revolution’s Long March. However, together with other authors, she has failed to 
examine in depth the very strong bonds built up amongst the women, and only provides 
a glimpse of the kind of kin identity the women combatants may have had with one 
another.
We women cooperated very well, we were united, all o f us were one heart. At the 
time, we women had to be united. We couldn’t quarrel or fight. At that tim e we 
shared everything from food to clothes -  we suffered together, enjoyed together.
(Young 2001: 246).
One may speculate that, although there is a lack of documented evidence, a considerable 
amount of emotional support must have been given to women revolutionaries by then- 
fellow women within different revolutionary contexts. The above narrative may infer 
that there were strong relationships, which outlasted a very difficult time for the women 
as revolutionaries who fought and endured hardship together. The suffering of women is 
further seen amongst the women guerrillas of various South American revolutionary 
groups (Kampwirth 2001 and 2002, Rovira 2000) as well as in the Vietnam War 
(Turner and Hao 1998). The recognition of the relationships that are built between 
women combatants has never been at the forefront of the literature, as opposed to 
masculine-dominated literature, which discusses male identity, comradeship, and
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friendships relating to kinship at length (see Leon 2001, Davis 1985, Graves 1981, and 
Richter 1997)
Kin the chosenfamily
When the LTTE created the revolutionary family, it was required to maintain a 
respectable and socially accepted format, which was achieved in a number of ways. 
Firstly, the LTTE adheres to the strict moral code expected by both civic society and the 
women combatants themselves. Although the LTTE enforces the authority and 
responsibility of a consanguine family they also provide opportunities for women 
combatants to re-negotiate and challenge their gender roles, as discussed in later 
sections. Secondly, by using linguistic expressions that suggest familial ties, the male 
and female combatants avoid any sexual connotations that could be misconstrued when 
addressing one another. This in turn introduces a form of respect that is shown by a 
consanguine family unit through a trusted and familial set of kin terminology. Lastly, the 
women are given a sense of belonging to a family through both consanguine and non- 
consanguine ties, along with a sense of loyalty to the family unit, and especially to its 
patriarchal head of family, Prabhakaran. The LTTE tends to rely on the loyalties of the 
combatants to a higher degree as illustrated by the combatant’s oath, where they pledge 
allegiance not just to the LTTE but also to Prabhakaran directly.
“The movement has high moral values and is a very  sw eet fa m ily”.
(Arasi)
The above statement by Arasi is reflective of the view held by combatant women 
regarding the LTTE and its re-constructed family unit. The high moral values are often 
seen as part of the LTTE’s strength that grants them a great deal of respect from those in 
civic society where women’s behaviour is often critically observed. The ‘family’ that is 
actively promoted within the LTTE reproduces many of the social values of the broader 
patriarchal society. The gender-based social controls amongst civic society, which
99 Leon (2001) discusses Subcomandante Marcos and the Zapatista movement; Davis (1985) discusses the 
second world war fought in Burma, Robert Graves a seminal autobiographical text on the First World War; 
Lionel Sotheby’s diaries and letters from the Western Front during the first world war.
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restrain women’s social interaction with men, are seen in an alternative guise, which do 
not necessarily restrict but expect conformity100. As Balasingham (2003) suggests,
[t]he LITE upheld a rigid code of moral conduct amongst the cadres. Premarital 
separation between the sexes is a well-entrenched cultural norm amongst the 
conservative section of the Hindu Jaffna society and Mr Pirabakaran [Prabhakaran] 
was sensitive to the importance of this sensibility amongst the Tamil people. He 
demonstrated considerable political acumen by identifying this socio-cultural factor 
as critical if he was to continue to enjoy the widespread support of the people that 
the LTTE did at this stage and sustain the recruitment level into the organisation.
(Balasingham 2003:79)
The organisation was aware that women’s acceptance into the LITE family meant that 
there must be a way to include them, along with the men, without being criticised by the 
civic society as being morally decadent. This is an important factor as the LITE relies 
heavily upon the support of the civic community, not just for its logistical support but 
also for new recruits.
“Just like the normal women we are also working with men in the movement. We are 
with them together everyday but we don’t think like that. We think w e are all 
brothers and sisters o f  one fa m ily”.
(Arulvili)
A great emphasis is placed on the kinship aspect of the revolutionary family even though 
the combatant women see parallels between themselves and the women working in the 
greater civic community. The emphasis on the kinship aspects works to allay the fears 
derived from the social taboos concerning women’s close association with men. This will 
also distance the notional view of women who spend time with men as having a bad 
character as pointed out by Balasingham (2003) who claims that,
100 When the LITE have celebrations it is noticeable that there are no male /female mixed dancing. The 
men dance in their own group and women within their own group.
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... aspersions cast on the moral character of women is a death knell to her 
maintaining or establishing any kind of credible friendships and respect amongst 
people in the community. Once a woman is labelled as a ‘bad’ character in the Tamil 
society she loses her moral authority.... [... ]... The concept of h ad ’ character is 
loosely used and is broad in its application. The social perimeters around which a 
woman can operate before she is considered as had’ character are indeed narrow by 
western standards. For example, an unmarried girl seen frequently talking to boys 
runs the risk of being considered a ‘bad’ character
(Balasingham 2003:85)
With a strong understanding of how society constructs women’s character, the women 
combatants maintain a familial kin identity and an intimacy that is never displayed 
publicly other than with a well-trained and completely composed interaction between 
each other. The very nature of being in a revolutionary organisation means that women 
combatants need to be both private and secretive, which in turn forms part of the 
cultural constellation of friendship in the LTTE.
A closer examination of the family unit reveals that when women from civic society join 
the LTTE movement they are in fact joining a group of people they have already had 
some contact with over a period of time and have become friendly with although they 
may not be friends. As discussed in Chapter Three, all the women combatants in the 
research knew a number of active combatants in the LTTE prior to their enrolment. The 
significance of this information is that when they leave home and take up residence with 
the LTTE they are not considered to be amongst ‘complete strangers’, but are with 
known people whom they are already used to calling Annay (older brother) or Akka 
(older sister). This type of address forms the basis of the LTTE’s (re)construction of a 
non-caste based family unit, which is reflective of a consanguine family unit using 
familial references.
From a cultural perspective, it is respectful to refer to one another as older brother 
Annay and older sister Akka, or younger sister Thangachchi and younger brother 
Thambi. This usage of kin terminology amongst the combatants encourages both men 
and women to overlook to some degree the power relations that exist between the sexes 
by focusing directly on the relationship aspects. (The issue of gender and power 
relations will be looked at in more depth in Chapter Six). The relationship aspects create 
levels of authority that an older sister (Akka), would gain over a younger sister 
(Thangachchi) by recreating the natural hierarchy of a family unit. The socio-familial
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interaction is further discussed by Balasingham (2003) upon her first meeting with 
Prabhakaran in 1979 at Chennai101, South India:
He was obviously concerned as to how to address me. In Tamil culture the titles Mr. 
and Mrs. are not generally used to address people. Titles of address are linked to 
social hierarchy and social and familial relationships. Since our relations were not 
familial or familiar he couldn’t address me as ‘akka’(older sister) and at the same 
time he couldn’t be so formal as to address me as Mrs. Balasingham. Since I was 
older than he was it would not be culturally correct to address me as an equal by 
using my Christian name either. ‘Thamby’ [Prabhakaran’s familial name given to 
mean younger brother] found a solution to his dilemma by christening me with the 
affectionate compromise and comprehensive title ‘Auntie’. Apart from Bala 
[hu sban d] and one or two others, Tamil people of all ages have come to know and 
address me as ‘Auntie’ many, I think, unaware of my real name (43-44).
What is particularly interesting in the description given by Balasingham is the fact that 
the English language word Auntie in reality makes her an outsider inside the family unit 
of the organisation. The English language words Auntie and Uncle are generally given to 
outsiders who are older to denote a mark of respect. As stated by Balasingham it is not 
acceptable for younger people to call older people by their given (Christian/forename) 
names. The word Auntie carries both an external distance and a closer kin identity 
within a context of friendship that Balasingham was part of for many years and still is.
On extremely rare occasions the familial hierarchy of a younger brother may change, to 
accommodate him as an older brother based on his merits, if they are perceived to go 
beyond those of a younger person. For instance, Prabhakaran was referred to as 
Thamby during the early stages of the revolutionary struggle when he was based in 
Chennai. The affectionate form of addressing him as a younger brother changed to a 
respectful older brother Annay with the battle of Elephant Pass in 10th July 1990102. 
Though Prabhakaran lost the battle, he none the less proved to the world that he was a 
formidable combatant and a revolutionary leader of considerable standing.
101 Chennai was formally known as Madras.
102 The Elephant Pass battle was of great significance as a vast number of combatants were killed in a short 
period of 3 weeks. It is estimated that over 600 LTTE combatants died in this battle in comparison to the 
800 combatants who died in a period of two and half years battle with the IPKF. (Pratap 2001:90-92)
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It was a crushing military blow to the LTTE. But Pirabhkaran’s [Prabhakaran] spirit 
was far from crushed by the debacle. It actually blossomed and crystallised into a 
new persona. Gone was the boyish guerrilla. Instead, there was a man who moved 
and behaved like the Big Boss... [...] ... nobody called him Thambi anymore. 
Everybody now referred to him as Annai, or elder brother...
(Pratap 2001:92-93)
Added to the created kin terminology practices, Tamil culture views the extended family 
as part of the greater familial system. This reaches beyond the immediate family of 
elderly parents and other relatives to those of distant blood relatives and also to friends 
and neighbours. Though Balasingham (2001:47) discusses social relationships and 
interactions in the daily offering and sharing of food from one household to another, or 
amongst neighbours and friends, she fails to mention the caste boundaries that operate 
within Tamil culture and particularly in the Jaffna province. Skjonsberg (1982) 
illustrates ways in which the caste system is perpetuated and legitimised by the 
community itself; which I would argue does not apply in the same way to a non-Tamil 
national. (Adele) Balasingham, being a white Australian, is an outsider; hence the 
customary practices of caste-related prejudices within the greater Tamil community 
would not affect her in the same way. Her marriage to Anton Balasingham, the highly 
respected theoretician of the LTTE, granted her a certain trusted, respected and secure 
position amongst the combatants and amongst the Tamil civic community in Jaffna. 
Further she was not looking for an alternative nor for a substitute family unit, hence she 
was not dependent on cultivating the same level of kin identity as others. Therefore I 
would argue that from the very beginning her kin identity with the LTTE revolutionary 
family is somewhat different, but she was nonetheless tied to the familial relationships 
of the extended LTTE family.
From a global perspective, revolutionary families often offer women a sense of 
belonging. “For almost all, participating in the revolution meant finding a place to 
belong...[...] ...The Party was my family” (Young 2001:132-133). This sense of belonging 
takes on a different meaning when part of the revolutionary group may already be 
related to each other through consanguine ties. As the LTTE is founded amongst a small 
community having some consanguine kin amongst the combatants is inevitable. For 
instance, Arasi, Roja and AK all have sisters in the movement, some of whom joined up 
at the same time as they did. Both CH and Aruna have brothers in the movement. In 
addition to the immediate family members in the movement, both Roja and Kavitha
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have cousins enlisted in the movement. Thus connections include both close 
consanguine kin members and extended family members within the LTTE organisation.
Knowledge of blood relatives within the organisation was not necessarily disclosed to me 
until I directly posed the question.
A runa: my brother joined
M e: He has joined as well?. How old is he?
A runa: Same age.
A rulvili: [shouts]  Twins
Me: oh really! Identical?...do you look alike?
A runa: yes...yes
A rulv ili: A little bit different. He’s got a beard.
[Laughter]103
The conversation at that moment appears to be light-hearted with a close knowledge of 
one another’s family. Allan (1979) claims that being a friend “...involves some degree of 
personal knowledge and mutual communion...” (36) as opposed to being friendly, which 
Bums (1953) calls ‘polite fiction’ (referred to in Allen 1979:36) meaning a polite 
interaction, which can happen between individuals even with a dislike of one another. I 
was aware of the usage of the word ‘friend’ amongst the women combatants with its 
primary variable of socio-cultural construction and the secondary variable of nuances. 
Clear examples of the two variables are seen within the revolutionary group’s kin 
relationship with Adele Balasingham and the titled reference of ‘Aunt’ (as discussed 
previously).
K in sh ip  in  F rien dsh ip
In addition to consanguine relationships the women combatants often have a large 
number of peers who have joined the revolutionary organisation. Updergraff et al 
(2002) acknowledge that friends in this context offer the same emotional support and 
intimacy as siblings do in adolescent years, meaning that women who joined at a young 
age formed their kin relationships with more ease. This was seen in the relationship
103 This was a group interview conducted with Yalini acting as the main interpreter as well as a participant. 
However both Kavitha and Aruna were able to understand some English and to give some responses in 
English without the assistance of Yalini. This particular piece relates to such an occasion.
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between Roja and Mallika. They were approximately of the same age (as discussed 
previously in Chapter Three) when joining the revolutionary movement and undertook 
their training together. During periods of training they endured many physical 
hardships. Once training was completed they went in different directions, Roja 
becoming part of the ceremonial musical band and Mallika an active front-line 
combatant. They were reunited during the ceasefire period when these interviews were 
being conducted. This kind of friendship based kin bonding is seen amongst other 
revolutionary groups too. For example amongst the Zapatista women where young 
combatant women start a very different life from their previous existences in the 
community discus as thus,
It gets easier with time, you have to forget the things you left behind. The 
com paneros teach you, we talk together; it is like a family again, we learn to love 
each other because our brothers and sisters stayed on the other side and that brings 
us together.
(Rovira 2000:41)
This discourse in effect illustrates the transference of consanguine familial affections to 
the non-consanguine relationships made in the revolutionary family. The relationship 
identity of the strength of kin relationship was recognised by Reed-Danahay’s (1999) 
who observed kin relations,
...in peer socialisation, and in the formation of social bonds that persists throughout 
adulthood, cutting across household ties. Moreover, the strength of peer friendship 
is connected to the adaptation of the community to social change, in that age -m ates  
provide forms of social support for new adaptations and changes.
(Reed-Danahay 1999-138)
The ‘new adaptations and change’ discussed by Reed-Danahay (1999) are seen amongst 
the close bonds built between women combatants. Within the LITE there is a definitive 
peer friendship that replaces blood ties. This adolescent familial support is received 
unconditionally from peers who have had similar life experiences since joining the 
revolutionary movement.
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LITE in a parental role
During the interviews with the combatant women it became apparent that there is a 
great significance attached to friendship that is understood as part of the acceptance into 
the LTTE kin family. The individual’s personal differences are not held against them as 
an obstacle but accepted as part of their personal disclosure of ‘true’ self. The diverse 
upbringing may be revealed to chosen friends within the kin family of the LTTE. The 
similarities identified may be of schooling or home life prior to joining the revolutionary 
organisation.
Kondo (1990) referred to in Rezende (1999:91) argues that the narratives and the reality 
in a friendship relationship may vary due to the values and ideals it expresses. She 
further claims that these ideals are constantly reviewed due to the power they hold in 
directing an individual’s behaviour towards others. Based on this argument I examined 
the power relations within the LTTE family and its negotiations which from the first 
instance were revealed to be set in a (somewhat) complex format. The relationships are 
conducted through a set style of familial structure as well as the disciplined hierarchical 
militaristic structure of the revolutionary organisation. In other words, the LTTE family 
uses both the familial hierarchical powers of an older sister (or an older brother) in 
combination with the militaristic seniority style of senior combatants directing those 
under their command. Employing both these methods would grant them a certain 
position of power to negotiate both an authoritative kinship along with a (somewhat) 
complex friendship within the overall relationship. This would identify kinship through 
a friendship structure based on the traditional familial structure and through the 
militaristic structure. However it must also be recognised that both these relationships 
(kinship and friendship) are also tied to a highly disciplined structure that supersedes all 
the other relationships within the organisation. The exclusivity of these kinships forms a 
tighter relationship within the kin group. Also it must be noted that the exclusion of 
women combatants from the wider society, both socially as well as physically, makes 
them dependent on one another for safety and well-being along with other daily 
demands during times of war and conflict. Therefore, the kin and friendships are both 
subordinate to, and a facilitating factor in, the militaristic frame that supersedes them.
The younger women combatants who have grown up in the revolutionary group place an 
implicit trust in the organisation to attend to their needs justly, in the same way that
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they might expect a consanguine parent would. This is reflected amongst the women 
combatants by their view of the organisation as the ‘mother’, one who will not only 
protect them but will do their best for the combatant women which extends to decisions 
that are made on behalf of the young women combatants, and which encompass their 
future and welfare.
“I will work for the Political side. But in the movement they know which skills we 
have and what we are good at. Just like a m other knows her child is good a t 
something  they [the LTTE movement] also know and give us work according to our 
skills”.
(Roja)
In this discourse, Roja has placed the LTTE family in a position of a mother, a person 
who cares, provides and protects those that are born of her. She also places herself as a 
child who depends on all that is given by a mother in order to survive. The familial 
relationship shown in this instance is a strong bond between a mother and a child. The 
individualised knowledge that is akin to that of a parent generates a belief in Roja that 
the organisation is able to recognise the skills and qualities that the combatant woman 
possesses. This belief gives rise to a form of symbolic trust, built between the individual 
combatant woman and the organisation. This trust is metaphor for the relationship 
between a mother and child.
The strong parental role is particularly visible amongst the combatants whose kin roots 
have been in the LTTE maintained children’s homes. My research revealed that the 
LTTE actively avoid using the word ‘orphanage’ and instead use the word Tiome’ which 
reframes the residence as a space where the LTTE representatives take a parent role 
rather than being ‘parentless’. This is reflected in the kinship that is formed between 
Prabhakaran and the children which is also steeped in the familial structure of a father 
and sons/daughters.
Prabhakaran regularly visits the two main children’s homes San Cholai (meaning 
beautiful garden filled with trees and flowers) mainly houses female children, and 
Kantha Ruban (meaning of Kantham is magnetic and Ruban may have been given in 
memory of a dead combatant closed to Prabhakaran) houses male children. His visits 
develop the contact with the orphaned children so that he becomes an alternative father 
figure to them. Members of the elite squad Siruthai Padai are mainly recruited from
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these children’s homes 104 (Gunaratna: 2001, Bandara 2002:547). There is however 
insufficient information to identify if the children were voluntary recruits or were 
compulsoiy conscripts. The squad is known for their fierce fighting ability as well as 
their unwavering loyalty to Prabhakaran. The position of Prabhakaran as the substitute 
or kin father identity replacing the biological father results in an enhanced loyalty that 
reaffirms the relationship built on the familial kinship developed in childhood. “Most 
see him [Prabhakaran] as a father figure and equate a request from him to a directive 
from heaven” (Gunaratna 2001:6), meaning that Prabhakaran’s non-consanguine 
paternal role has in fact risen to a level of patri-centric veneration of godliness in the 
eyes of many young combatants. This veneration can be seen as a part of the nationalist 
patriarchal cosmology of the LTTE. However it none the less illustrates Prabhakaran’s 
close interactions with the young confirming a systematically cultivated kin identity. It 
must also be noted that whilst Prabhakaran is actively involved with the children of the 
LTTE, the rest of his family are not. His wife, sons and daughter are never brought into 
the organisation to be part of the kin family or involved in the LITE movement and are 
widely believed to reside in an unknown location somewhere in Europe rather than live 
in the LTTE controlled parts of Sri Lanka10s.
M arriages
Marriages in many revolutionary groups appear to challenge existing social customs and 
suggest progress in gender roles for women, and include allowing them to choose their 
own partners. For instance, women combatants on the Long March in China married 
male colleagues of their choice with no ceremonies, which was contrary to the Chinese 
customs of the time106 (Young 2001:74). Also women combatants in marriages arranged 
prior to the Long March were allowed to dissolve these and find new partners of their
104 Siruthai is pronounced as ‘si-ru-thai’ meaning leopard and Padai means brigade. Gunaratne:200i has 
spelt the word Leopard brigade as Sirasu Pah, this may be due to phonetically spelling.
105 His wife is Mathivathani (known as Mathy), his eldest son Charles Anthony (named after his friend who 
died in battle), his youngest son Balachandran (named after Math/s younger brother killed in combat with 
the Indian army), and his daughter, Dwaraka (named after one of Math/s bodyguards who died in battle). 
This indicates that within Prabhakaran’s family they have adopted the same custom as practised within the 
LTTE of naming the children after dead combatants as a means to keep the names alive (Balasingham 2003 
:89)
106 The women combatants merely reported their marriage and subsequent cohabitation to the Communist 
Party (Young 2001:74).
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own choice (ibid:200). In the Eritrean conflict, marriage was forbidden for both male 
and female combatants during the first eight years of their recruitment into the EPLE. 
The EPLE believed that celibacy would maintain good order, which started at the 
training centres that separated female and male combatants. By the time they arrived at 
the battlefields they were expected to have developed a sufficient asexual body language 
that would not interfere with their tasks10? (Wilson 1991:13). However after a period of 
time these views were abandoned as being too oppressive and replaced by laws that were 
guaranteed equality to both parties in marriage, as well making marriages monogamous 
(ibid: 135-6).
In the Zapatista movement, the role of women combatants challenged marriages 
imposed by the patriarchy, where women had no choice but to marry the men who 
obtained permission from their fathers (generally by offering them a bottle of rum). 
Within the movement, the combatants (both male and female) had to seek permission 
from their commanding officers. Whilst it can be argued that this is the same as 
practiced in society (seeking permission from the father), there is a notable difference 
that grants both female and male combatants an autonomy to agree or disagree to the 
marriage proposal. The justification given for a continuation of a civic practice is that 
the Commander will be in a position to know if the woman combatant is already 
engaged and so avoid any unnecessary complications (Rovira 2000:51). There is also a 
free-will-practice that informalises the process of marriage by simply allowing a 
combatant woman to get together with a combatant man and celebrating publicly their 
union. The other option is for the couple to prepare an agreement stipulating that they 
are entering into the marriage with their own freewill and the “most important thing in 
their relationship is their work and not their partners” (ibid:52). The emphasis on the 
commitment to ‘work’ rather than to ‘each other’ is also reflected in the wedding ritual 
that carries significant support of the movement. The married couple walks under a row 
of crossed rifles, which is viewed by the Zapatista combatants as the organisational 
commitment to defend their marriage and consent to have them as comrades in a 
fighting unit.
107 To aid an image of asexuality women combatants of EPLF were given loose fitting clothing which 
included shirts that button up at the neck worn with baggy trousers (Wilson 1991).
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The LTTE also were initially against combatants having romantic relationships which 
were strictly forbidden on the basis that they would be a distraction from achieving the 
key aims of the revolutionary organisation.
When Prabhakaran drew up the LTTE constitution, he had made it veiy clear that he 
considered family life [marital] and love affairs as an impediment to revolutionary 
politics
(Narayan-Swamy 2002:66).
This led to internal differences in the LTTE between Prabhakaran and Uma 
Maheshwaran, the chair of the LTTE’s nine member Central Committee, based on a 
breach of the LTTE’s constitution that excluded marriage and romance as distractions to 
the focus of the revolution108. Eventually Maheshwaran left the LTTE and a few years 
later Prabhakaran stated,
I am no way responsible for the problem. It was Maheshwaran who created the 
issue. A leader of a revolutionary movement should commit himself totally  to the 
discipline of the organisation. If a leader violates the basic rules and principles, then 
there will be chaos and the organisation will crumble.
(Narayan-Swamy 2002:67- my italics)
These restrictions on marriages between combatants changed with Prabhakaran’s own 
marriage on 1st October 1984 when he fell in love with a Jaffna university student he 
arranged to kidnap (along with eight other students) in order to prevent her from fasting 
to death in protest at the government’s injustices on education109. Prabhakaran’s 
intention to marry caused a considerable ruction within the movement that had up to 
that point been extremely inflexible in regards to romantic relationships and marriages, 
especially in reference to the previous bitter separation between Prabhakaran and Uma
108 Uma Maheshwaran was rumoured to have been having a sexual relationship with his cousin Urmila, one 
of the women supporters of the LTTE. Prabhakaran is loyal and at first disbelieved but upon being 
convinced requested Maheshwaran leave the LTTE, which he refused to do (Narayan-Swamy 2002:66). In 
early 1980s the situation between Prabhakaran and Maheshwaran became intense as Prabhakaran 
demanded Maheshwaran leave the organisation due to his break of the constitution and accused him of 
being “unworthy of the Eelam cause” (Narayan-Swamy 2002:67). It became a bitter struggle that eventually 
ended in 1979 when the LTTE organisation in London intervened to limit the damage done to the movement 
by introducing Balasingham as the LTTE theoretician.
109 Prabhakaran kidnapped her and 8 others who were fasting stating that fasting and other peaceful 
methods of protest are long over. The kidnapped students were taken to Tamil Nadu and the four girls of the 
group were kept at Balasingham’s residence as the LTTE women’s wing during it’s early stage of creation.
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Maheshwaran, (the former Chairman of the LTTE). Adele Balasingham wrote, “we were 
never comfortable with the lack of flexibility of the [LTTE] rules” in regards to love and 
marriage as practiced in the LTTE (Balasingham 2003:80).
If Mr Pirabakaran [Prabhakaran] had retained his chaste status he would have had 
to live up to the image of a saint and all the cadres then and now, would have been 
condemned to emotional sterility and frustration.
(Ibid).
Balasingham’s introduction of a human element into Prabhakaran’s desire to marry 
Mathivathani (Mathy) in effect paved the way for a great deal of change within the 
movement. Interestingly Balasingham placated the bitter combatants who had 
renounced their own love interests due to the commitment they had made to the LTTE. 
Balasingham brought in an argument that the former moral code needed changing in 
order to keep up with changing times. He further claimed that “romance and heroism 
were values upheld in Tamil culture” (Balasingham 2003:81). He convinced the 
combatants that this was a positive move needed to improve the image of the movement 
(ibid).
In political terms Mr Pirabakaran’s relationship with Mathy was crucial, healthy and 
progressive element in perceiving as a leader. The Tamil community, which views 
unmarried people as not fully mature adults, would be more confident in the 
judgement of a leader who has been mellowed and matured by the profound 
emotional experience and responsibility of marriage and family life.
(Balasingham 2003:80)
Marriage is seen as having its rightful place in society and as such, those in the LITE 
have a set format that they need to follow in order to achieve this end. Though the rules 
were changed granting combatants the right to marriage, they still contain a prescriptive 
formula for an accepted minimum age for marriage. For women combatants the 
minimum age of marriage is 25 years and for a male combatant it is 30 years.
“Once we are over 25 if a man and woman like each other they have no restrictions 
in getting married”.
(Arulvili)
There is also a minimum service caveat that requires a five-year minimum period of 
service prior to being considered as eligible for marriage. The women combatants
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informed me that there are dispensations for those who have served less than five years, 
but the minimum age for marriage is generally upheld and those who are under 18 years 
of age and wish to get married are actively discouraged.
The change brought in to the LTTE by Prabhakaran’s marriage was still based on a 
similar system to that practiced in civic society, with a notable difference of women 
having a say in the choice of the proposed marital partner. By being able to contribute 
their own view about whom they wish to marry, the women combatants control if they 
wish to accept the proposal that was brought to them. When a man (either from civic 
society or from the ranks of the LITE) is interested in marrying a combatant woman or 
vice versa, a proposal of marriage is sent to the leader of the woman combatant’s unit, 
seeking the woman’s views.
“The boy will approach the [team] leader in charge of the girl. She [woman 
combatant] will make her own decision. It is not for her [the team leader] to decide 
whether they should get married or not but when the marriage can take place. She 
[the team leader] will ask the girl whether she wants to get married to this particular 
person and if the girl says yes, she will decide on the date etc. The [team] leader will 
come to the Central Committee and then they decide on the date”.
(Kavitha)
The woman combatant has the option to accept or reject the proposal (unlike in civic 
society) and is not compelled to marry by a certain age or constrained within caste and 
class. If the woman combatant is unwilling to accept the proposal sent,
“Then of course the leader will tell the man ‘I am sorry but the girl is not interested 
in marrying you”
(Kavitha).
Within the LTTE’s revolutionary family the leader of the team acts in place of a 
consanguine parent who is responsible for the welfare and the future of the women 
combatants under her care. The Central Committee acts in place of the greater family 
that is traditionally involved in the planning of the marriage and attending to the 
ceremony.
Combatant women are also allowed to marry men from civic society as seen with AK. 
Within the LTTE romantic relationships and courting rituals are not practised. Pre­
marital relationships, especially those of a sexual nature, are strictly forbidden. It must
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also be recognised that within the cultural parameters, sex is always seen within a 
hetero-normative framework, with sexual connections between a man and a woman and 
only after marriage. Any other forms of sexual activity (may it be pre-marital or extra­
marital sexual liaisons) are unacceptable for women both within civic society and 
amongst the revolutionary group110.
“It is the same as how the society treats pre-marital sex, it is the same in the 
movement”.
(Arasi)
As stated in Arasi’s discourse the LTTE movement reflects the moral values of civic 
society and their cultural expectations when she states that,
“We didn’t  not have any problems regarding sex. Our women’s leadership and male 
and female leadership made sure that we didn’t have to face any such problems. Also 
[have] very strict moral codes. But we had the permission to love some one and get 
married. Say for instance I love someone and he also loves me then we let the 
leadership know about it. There are many cases like that. Then they [are] allowed to 
get married. Oh yes. They are given separate home and monthly allowances. But they 
can have sexual relationship only after marriage. Before that if they love each other 
they can talk to each other with the permission of their leaders, they can write to 
each other but they are barred from going out alone together”.
(Arasi)
The inference made in Arasi’s discourse suggests that women combatants did not have 
to face any predatory sexual approaches within the movement. She clearly indicates that 
both men and women in leadership roles are entrusted with ensuring that women 
combatants are not sexually violated within the organisation and a high level of sexual 
morality is preserved within the movement (it is also noteworthy that the LTTE is not 
known for any sexual aggression /violence against any Sinhalese women). The 
preservation of female sexual morality is in effect a mirror of a consanguine family 
protecting its females in the family unit.
110 Conversation with Tamil nationals in Sri Lanka and in London reveal that the men in civic society have 
some sexual freedom that does not involve homosexuality or freedom to engage in such activities. The kind 
of sexual freedom I mention here may be limited to visiting brothels, however this is not publicised. 
Furthermore, brothels in town were closed during the period of LITE control in Jaffna. The interview 
participants (both combatant and civic) informed me that in the LITE the male combatants are tied to the 
same sexual and moral code of conduct as the women combatants.
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The relationships that develop between men and women are also continued under the 
watchful eyes of the leaders, who ‘grant’ permission for the couple to communicate with 
one another. It is interesting to note that though the combatants are trained extensively 
in codes of conduct which include modes of behaviour, and are sent on missions 
together (un-chaperoned by the leaders), the leadership will not allow a female 
combatant and a male combatant to meet each other if they are romantically linked. The 
restrictions on male and female association have intrigued many authors, play writers, 
novelists and academics111. The lack of freedom to associate each other is argued by 
Coomaraswamy as “...sexuality is seen [within the LTTE] as an evil debilitating force” 
(1996:10).
Within the LTTE the combatants who are engaged in pre-marital relationships are 
expected to behave in the same way as they would in the civic society. The women 
combatants are upheld for their sexual morality and overall good behaviour in regards to 
the opposite sex.
“We feel that person who is morally good only can be a brave fighter...[a] good
fighter,... [a] good leader... [and a] good cadre”.
(Arasi)
By linking fighting abilities with moral conduct, the LTTE reinforces society’s dominant 
view of patriarchal control over feminine virtue and modesty, along with their own view 
of moral conduct linked to ability to perform as a fighter. I would argue that this is also 
reflective of the way in which gender is constructed within the LITE. Its roots are deeply 
embedded in patriarchy that links morality and physical virtue tied to an ability to 
perform, all neatly packaged as Armed Virgins, who have risen above social decadence.
Many of the women combatants do not see a need for marriage and socially accepted 
normalcy of a family life, which is often against the wishes of the biological parents, but 
not the wishes of the LTTE. Unlike women in civic society the combatant women are 
neither frowned upon nor penalised within the LTTE for being unmarried, even if they 
are of mature age. Interestingly this reveals both a replication of patriarchal views of 
civic society along with questioning of that same ideologies and norms.
111 See play 'Forbidden Area’ (2000), films ‘Kalu SuduMaV (2005) and 'The Terrorist (2001).
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The women combatants who harbour different views to that of their consanguine family 
with regards to marriage mediate these expectations by positioning themselves as
children. This was highlighted by Arulvili who states, “we are the children ” meaning
that they are too young to be considered for marriage and thus having no need for them 
to be in a matrimonial relationship. They were unanimous in saying,
Arulvili: We don’t like it [marriage]. We don’t need to have boy friends. We don’t 
need...
Yalini*: We don’t need to have a boy friend, but they [female combatants] don’t like 
to [get married] ....in our movement they [female combatant] don’t like to get 
married before 25. We don’t like (laughs)
Arulvili: We joined young and our mind is still like small children. We are the same 
now as the time we joined the movement. We are quite happy at the moment, so we 
don’t have the desire to be married
Close social interactions between the sexes are frowned upon by the civic society. 
Though the LTTE may not take into consideration all of civic society’s moralistic views, 
they none the less need to rely on the support of the civic society, especially on the issue 
of sexual morals. It can be argued that the creation of the ‘Armed Virgin’ with her pure 
sexual morals does feed into this mindset. Therefore the justification for the ‘dislike’ of 
marriage is given by Arulvili as “We like our work” and the lack of a ‘need’ for a 
boyfriend needs to be seen in the context of the environment in which they live. Female 
combatants live in separate compounds to male combatants, with little interaction 
between the two sexes except during certain types of training or in the field of battle. 
Social interaction is virtually non- existent. That is not to say that they do not speak to 
each other out of field conditions but there is a definite lack of male-female social 
interaction. This is viewed as part of the discipline that is coveted in the organisation 
and the civic society.
The separation of the sexes in effect preserves the sexual morality of the women 
combatants within the confines of the LTTE movement and overlooks the possibility of 
same-sex relationships forming. As explained in Chapter Two, an individual woman 
combatant’s sexuality away from the hetero-normative understanding of sex and 
sexuality is a taboo topic that was not discussed with the combatant women. Whilst 
reflecting on the individual combatant woman’s sexuality I became aware of the 
stringent nature of morality linked to homosexual interactions as viewed by the society
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in general and the LTTE in particular. It must also be understood that not only does the 
society (regardless of ethnicity or religious persuasion) abhor single sex sexual- 
relationships; this view is also reflected in law as an offence under Sri Lankan Penal 
Code 365A112. It is interesting to note that whilst the LTTE does not prevent women from 
moving away from their traditionally constrictive gender class /  caste roles, they do not 
condone any aspects of sexual liberation. As stated previously, the LTTE relies heavily 
on civic society’s support and will not isolate themselves over the valued issue of sexual 
morality. The complex nature of same sex interaction is highlighted when society is 
observed as a whole where single sex friendships of women (and men) tend to be very 
tactile. This is often seen by the very close physical proximity in which women conduct 
their interactions with each other; as well as holding hands with other women in public 
places. This form of behaviour is perfectly acceptable in a society where women’s sexual 
morality in regularly scrutinized and criticised. Also it must be noted that a woman 
keeping company with another woman is far more socially acceptable than a woman 
keeping company with a man. As sexual morality is held in high esteem for both men 
and women, I am unable to confirm or deny with any certainty whether the strict claims 
of sexual morality and chasteness as depicted by women combatants in effect are a true 
indication of their sexuality.
However when discussing (hetero-normative) marriage, it became evident that the 
combatant women see marriage in a different way to the civic women I interviewed. This 
difference can be seen in two main ways. Firstly, as the women combatants questioning 
patriarchy and secondly as combatant women seeing male partners as equals, thus 
expecting domestic chores and responsibilities to be shared equally with a male partner.
“After they got married...men and women are both doing their housework they take
turns.” (Yalini*)
The equality of sexes within the domestic sphere is quite a novel idea within the Tamil 
culture where there are clearly defined boundaries between men and women, and their 
roles both within the house as well as away from it. Men do no laundry, cooking,
112 Section 365A of the Sri Lankan Penal Code prohibits homosexual relationships and carries a maximum 
penalty of 10 year imprisonment. It must also be noted that the law is directly aimed at male homosexuality 
rather than lesbianism. However, attempts were made in 1995 to include lesbianism into homosexual laws. 
It is also noteworthy that no prosecution has been attempted for homosexuality for the past 50 years (see 
WSG :2002).
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cleaning or childcare, which are strictly the duties of women. The women combatants 
however see their male counterparts in a different light to men of civic society.
“Our cadres are different. Our cadres do the sweeping and all other work... cooking, 
sweeping”.
(Arulvili)
“Our cadres are unique ones. LTTE men are all the same. They won’t expect us [to do 
all house work]. They are also prepared to do anything. They can cook. ”
(Yalini*)
The gender implication raised in Yalini’s statement positions both male and female 
combatants firmly within the LTTE’s own gender construction. It is interesting to see 
that women combatants see the male combatants as progressive in comparison to men 
of civic society. The male combatants are viewed as ‘unique’ and ‘prepared to do 
anything’ meaning any domestic chores that have historically been in a female domain. 
The women combatants’ comments gives a clear indication of male combatants being 
comfortable with their masculinity that requires no boasting or approval from the 
society and embraces a moderate social role that is quite alien to the Tamil culture. This 
kind of alternative masculinity within the LTTE may be a direct result of the familial 
structure that is cultivated within the LTTE where hyper- masculinity is not visible 
within its overall gender construction, or through a militarist context where the 
discipline of combatants is partly enforced due to sex segregation and the regulation of 
everyday tasks.
The female combatant’s view, that male combatants are a more suitable marital partner, 
is not reciprocated by male combatants. Stack-O’Conner (2007:51) claims that in 2006 
there appears to have been a preference amongst the LTTE male combatants to marry 
women from the civic community over these within the LTTE family.
The male LTTE members prefer to marry outside of the LTTE where they can find 
‘traditional’ wives despite the LTTE efforts to encourages marriage within the LTTE.
(ibid)
The reason given by Stack-O’Conner for male combatants’ preference for ‘traditional’ 
women is the stark division between combatant women and civic women’s conduct and 
expectations. As I discuss in Chapter Six, combatant women have been separated from
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the women of civic society by being able to do anything tbat a man can do, in effect 
removing themselves from the matrimonial eligibility criteria by being independent of 
male assistance. Added to this, the interviews revealed that the women combatants do 
not view marriage as the life changing experience as many of the women who remain in 
civic society. If a marriage is to happen, it is accepted in a veiy pragmatic way, but not as 
a means of distancing one’s self from the movement.
“Even after getting married the women cadres cany on working. Not changed. After 
married also not changed.”
(Arulvili)
“After the LTTE women cadres got married they also doing their work within the 
LTTE movement as normal”.
(Yalini*)
The commitment made to the LTTE can continue after marriage as seen in AK’s 
narrative that only considered marriage to a civic man on the condition that he would 
not interfere with her work in the movement. AK was discharged from the LTTE at the 
time of her marriage (due to injuries received in combat) and moved back to living in the 
civic community, but continued to work in LTTE related areas. It must be noted that this 
is in direct contrast to civic society where a married woman is expected to be totally 
committed to her husband’s family as she is seen as belonging to another household. 
The combatant women of the ‘LTTE household’ do not necessarily hold this view as their 
Active kin relationships and responsibilities to the LTTE must be able to co-exist with 
the marital relationship. The active combatants who decide to marry one smother are 
provided with housing by the LTTE. Married combatants with children are given an 
option to opt out of battle engagements. If parents do decide to engage in battle 
activities, there is a choice to leave the children either with the maternal or paternal side 
of the family. There is also a care home in the Puthukuddyiruppu area that is provided 
by the LTTE for the children to stay in until their parents return from war. In the event 
that both parents die in battle, care is provided by the grandparents or other family 
members. If there is no one to provide such care, the LTTE steps in as an alternative 
family making provision for the children to be housed with them in one of the LTTE’s 
own children’s homes and continue to provide a familial structure based on kinship as 
discussed through this chapter.
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K i n s h i p  a n d  t h e  n a t i o n  s t a t e
The LTTE’s usage of kinship is reflected in the narratives that are extended to link 
kinship, the individual and the nation state. The women in the revolutionary group 
invoke a metaphor of family and kinship that is tied to the nation state. Arasi expands 
on this use of kinship linked to nation-state by defining the symbolic role of the 
protective mother in the guise of a Hen rising to protect her helpless chicks (the Tamil 
civic citizens) being attacked by a mighty Hawk (the state run armed forces).
“I will give you an example. In our homes we all have poultry. The mother hen looks 
after her chicks with love and care. When you look at the mother hen she looks 
gentle, soft and very loving. But if a hawk comes down to catch one of the chicks. The 
mother hen will immediately jump up and fight with the hawk to protect her chicks.
So the strength she gets to fight with the hawk comes from her gentleness and her 
motherhood. We love our community and we want to protect them because we felt 
the responsibility to protect our community we had to become fighters”.
(Arasi)
The first reading of the above discourse reveals a narrative that is straightforward, 
discussing the weak rising against the strong regardless of their inabilities, incapability 
or inadequacy. However underneath the veneer of strength and weakness lies a whole 
plethora of kin and nation-state complexities, which are mixed with female roles in 
society based on theories of biological essentialism, that require women to be ‘givers’. 
The ‘givers’ are seen in multiple roles as givers of life and givers of self as always rising 
above their own needs to provide for others. It also portrays women as mothers who are 
seen as the good women in the society, who are expected to harbour a maternal instinct 
that has a ‘need’ to protect others (see Enloe 1993, Yuval-Davis 2000, Narayan 1997, 
Puri 1999). The ‘others’ in this instance are seen as kin relations based on an 
understanding of the ethno-national Tamil nation-state and its collective identity. The 
narrative further addresses the women combatants’ own awareness of the ‘difference’ in 
kin ideology between the greater Tamil community and the women combatants. This 
particular aspect will be discussed at length in Chapter Six, however it does reveal an 
awareness on Arasi’s part of the women combatants’ role of being the protectors of the 
Tamil community, and through this a stronger part of the nation-kin group.
The awareness by women combatants of their differences with women of civic 
community is the result of combatant women having stepped out of the consanguine 
family that forms part of the community that Arasi claims to ‘feel’ a responsibility to
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protect. In order to protect the civic community she had to step out of one community 
(civic) into the other (revolutionary) community. With this transition she in effect 
moved from one family to another; but it is interesting to notice that she is still 
contained within a family unit.
The idea of the nation as part of the kin group is claimed by Ryang (2004) to be an 
aspect of war when “...morality of the nation as family emerges as a dominant 
ideology...” (2004:763). She further argues that the non-consanguine familial 
identification is in effect achieved through the usage of language such as “our sons and 
daughters” (ibid); which in Arasi’s discourse is highlighted as the ‘protective mother’. By 
such references those who have gone to war as part of ethno-nationalistic bidding 
become metaphorical mothers, fathers, sons and daughters as directed in kinship. As 
stated earlier, linguistic expression is important in constructing the alternative family 
unit.
The ‘Active kin’ concept as discussed in anthropology describes non-consanguine or 
non-affinal individuals treated as members of one family. The ethno-nationalism related 
to kin identity has the same ability to create a fictive kin identity amongst a whole 
community without any kind of blood ties, illustrating that within the nation state the 
kin identity of individual combatants blends with that of the civic society during periods 
of social unrest and mass protests. This was particularly visible during the hunger 
strikes carried out by LTTE combatants or their sympathisers. On such occasions a kin 
identity develops on a non-consanguine basis, which identifies the individual as part of a 
blood-related family.
“In 1987 Thileepan Anna [older brother] had a hunger strikeii3 but the Indian
government or Sri Lankan forces [did nothing] And in 1980 one Amma [mother114] had
a hunger strike for a month. She died. They [government] did nothing. Almost everyday 
the cadres attained martyrdom everyday dining the battle” . (Yalini*)
113 Thileepan was a male combatant of the LTTE in charge of the male political wing in Jaffna during 1980s. 
He began a fast unto death on 15th August 1987 at the, Nallur Kandaswamy temple in Jaffna. He refused 
food and water until his demands of withdrawing Sinhalese army camps and Sinhalese government 
colonisation of Tamil areas etc are met. Thileepan died on 26th August 1987.
114 Kanapathipillai Poopathy was a 56 year old grandmother, a civic citizen, who fasted for 30 days before 
dying on 19th April 1988. It is believed amongst Tamil nationals that she was the 1st woman to have died for 
a political cause by fasting unto death. She conducted her fasting at Mahmangam Pillayar temple 
(Balasingham 1988). In April 1990 Prabhakaran paid her the following honour.
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The very identification of Thileepan as Annay (a brother) and the elderly woman 
Poopathy as Amma (a mother) illustrates a kin identity with those of civil status who are 
joined together by a single cause. This narrative clearly identifies the martyred dead as 
members of the same non-consanguine family through the use of familial kin 
terminology. The shared cause and related identity lays the culpability for their deaths 
with the state and also absolves the LTTE of their responsibility in supporting an act of 
this kind solely to gain attention from the wider public.
The sense of injustice that is felt by wider society in turn becomes a stronger and more 
forceful part of the ethno-national consanguine identity leading to the development of a 
notional Active kin (in this instance civic citizenship). This in turn has the potential to 
move towards a greater nation state based on kin identity. The wider concept of such kin 
identity runs parallel to the socio-cultural ways of addressing those who are respected in 
the community as dictated by age and casteus.
Summary
One of the catalytic aspects of displacement is the breakdown of the consanguine family 
structure causing women to actively seek alternatives away from home, where they may 
feel safe, secure and be part of a family. With the limited options open to women they 
often end up with the LTTE who has re-constructed a form of metaphoric or Active 
family unit that is both culturally and socially integrated with the ideologies of the Tamil 
society, with its attendant hierarchical familial relaAonship structure. The LTTE’s use of 
the metaphoric family facilitates the building of strong interrelationships that can be 
used to serve the aims and objectives of the revolutionary organisation. It also maintains 
the socially accepted moral values as part of its own discipline procedure causing the 
familial structure created within the organisation to be further in line with the civic 
society.
The interview discourse also revealed that the friendships that were formed amongst 
women revolutionaries were different to other forms of friendship. In the LTTE warm 
and Auid friendship is often illustrated through kinship terminology. I would agree with
115 Whilst acknowledging that there is a strong caste dictated hierarchy that operates in Jaffna, it must also 
be considered that the LTTE operates on a non-caste based metaphorical family unit, therefore caste does 
not form part of this study.
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many researchers in the field of friendship and kinship, such as Bell and Coleman 
(1999), Rezende (1999), Reed-Danahay (1999), and Schneider (1984), who claim that 
Western notions and understanding of kinships must not be used to measure friendship 
in a non-Westem cultural setting, such as the extent of the LTTE women combatants’ 
relationships with one another. The subtle ways used by women combatants to describe 
their own roles or their relationships with fellow combatants (including Prabhakaran), 
from an ambiguous yet identifiable process of social distinction, very much based on the 
culturally accepted family structure. Within this structure there is a great deal of respect 
given to fellow combatants, who are identified as elders within the group.
The kinship provided by the substituted family feeds a need and fills the void that has 
been left open by the absence of a consanguine family. The consanguine families are 
unarguably patriarchal in Tamil society. The LTTE travel along a fine line of what is 
expected by civic society and accepted by the combatants. There is a degree of 
replication of a patriarchal family, with its morality and behavioural codes, but without 
the rigidity that is seen in consanguine families with its gender division. Prabhakaran 
has been actively involved in the recreation of that familial unit by his personal 
involvement in the LTTE’s children’s homes where he is seen very much as a father 
figure. He has further developed Active kinship by naming his own children after those 
who were close to him and died in various battles. This practice serves the purposes of 
keeping the names and memories alive to venerate friendships that were built within the 
LTTE’s kin family. Similarly, the combatant women show the same kind of respect for 
their dead comrades, which can be likened to, that which is shown to dead family 
members (as discussed in detail in Chapter Five).
The combatant women’s marriages within the LTTE can be seen as perpetuating the 
values of a society that dictates all women to be married at a given age and become 
mothers. The fact that the women combatants do not see any need for marriage can 
however be argued as their own way of reconstructing an alternative gendered role 
within the organisation that challenges the socially dictated roles for women, which 
includes marriage. The combatant women have stated an apparent lack of need for 
marriage or the companionship a marital union offers which could be seen as a direct 
result of their strong friendship ties within the kin group.
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The non-consanguine uniqueness of the relationships is particularly reflective within the 
Active kinship formation amongst women combatants who have adopted a friendship- 
based kinship that is a replacement or mirror to the familial structure in civic society. It 
is imperative to understand that the metaphorical kin relationships that are formed 
between the women combatants of the LTTE are deep and significant. As such these 
relationships are a result of not only a shared commitment to the political cause but also 
extend to include socially formed kin relationships with the wider community.
The kinship in the LTTE discussed in this chapter critiques the use of relationships 
within the revolutionary movement as an environment for women tied to the patriarchy, 
that has been successfully structured to rise above social barriers such as caste, class and 
religion and has pushed combatant women into accepting one another. I would argue 
that the success of the LTTE’s revolutionary family has been its ability to transcend the 
basic social prejudices that have been engrained in Jaffna society for generations. I 
would further argue that the kin relationships created within the LITE cultivate loyalty 
and trust amongst individuals regardless of the similarities or differences in their 
personal circumstances. It is also an affirmation of relationships conducted in private 
spaces of public arenas within the revolutionary group. The strength in Active kinship 
forms a foundation that reaffirms women combatants’ shared experiences. Such 
affinities translate into being valued and placed in a familial position within the kinship 
group.
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CHAPTER 5
DEATH AND THE SUICIDE BOMBER
Introduction
The Black Tiger M arching Song
With the nam e o f  Black Tigers -  would ‘u see-
With a bomb which’d  blast the strong enem y
We march w ithout a battalion arm y-
We die by  routing our adversary
Our deaths are o f  exceptional history-
In them are w ritten  hundreds o f  victories
There ain’t  a thing like this bravery-
Life g ift -  the m ax lim it in philanthropy
M arching w ith  thoughts o f  not missing our aim  -
With prideful anger -  w e kill the enemy
We die n o w -fo r  our fo lks to enjoy their lives -
In Tamil hearts -  even in death w e still live.
Greeting the Leader’s fe e t  -  like thunder w e blast -  
Sagging like a fla g  - f o r  Tamil Eelam to stand  
Tiger f la g  w ill sw a y  strong in the M otherland- 
Glory w ill engulf the global bands.
(Translatedfrom Tamil by Sri Kantha (2006)
On the 21st May 1991 at Sriperumbudur Stadium in Tamil Nadu (Southern India) an 
LTTE combatant woman Dhanu (real name Thenmuli Rajaratnam) placed a garland of 
flowers around former Indian Prime Minister Rajeev Gandhi’s neck and bent down to 
touch his feet as a cultural mark of respect. As she bent down she pressed a button of a 
vest packed with explosives that was carefully concealed under her dress. The explosion 
killed 16 people who were nearby along with Dhanu and Rajeev Ghandi.
Whilst the precise circumstances were unknown, the culpability for the act was directed 
at the LITE movement. Knowing the inevitable political backlash, the LITE swiftly
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issued a statement denying any involvement in the attack116, but claimed that Dhanu was 
in fact a victim of rape committed by the IPKF117 (which was based in Jaffna during 1987 
to 1990). Whilst many ambiguities remain over Dhanu’s motives, the LTTE have stated 
that she carried out this act to avenge her loss of sexual purity (de Mel 2001, Schalk 
1992, Narayan-Swamy 2003, and Knight 2005).
An analysis of Dhanu’s act reveals a number of politicised issues, ranging from body 
politics to the nationalist nation state. In the eyes of most women combatants, Dhanu’s 
act elevates her to an equal status with male combatants. Her actions crossed over 
gender polarisation into the realms of significant political activism by targeting the key 
player in the ill-fated Indo-Lanka Peace Accord. This can be seen as redressing the 
violation of her own and other women’s bodies, and of her country. The symbolic nature 
of Dhanu using her socio-culturally viewed polluted body by engulfing it in fire feeds 
into her cultural upbringing that views immolation as purifying. Dhanu’s subsequent 
suicide mission can be interpreted as an act of redemption for the trauma and the 
culturally perceived shame she suffered (see Maunaguru 1995, de Mel 2001).
The woman killing her oppressor using her polluted body as a weapon symbolically 
performs the above two functions [taking revenge against the perpetrator and self 
purification]. In other words, by killing Rajeev Gandhi, she not only takes revenge 
against the enemy, but also performs an ancient purification ritual- the 
agnipravesam  (immolation by fire).
(Maunaguru 1995:171)
Other combatant women view Dhanu’s suicide as a brave act of revenge and regard her 
as a goddess who will protect the living. Whilst I do not glorify Dhanu’s actions she can 
be recognised for being successful in killing the perpetrator (although not the individual 
directly responsible). She attained purification by fire, and pushed the cause of Tamil 
Eelam to the forefront of the world’s media. In so doing she challenged the fundamental 
social construction of gender in relation to Tamil women. If her action was indeed 
revenge for the violation of sexual purity, it can be questioned whether this was an
116 The LTTE as a practice deny any responsibilities for political violence, especially high profile 
assassinations.
117 There is a lone claim made by Bloom (2005a) that it was Dhanu’s mother who was raped rather than 
Dhanu.
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emancipatory act in the way that the female gender role is constructed in Tamil society 
as discussed in Chapter One.
In this chapter I put forward the argument that suicide bombing by LTTE combatant 
women has to be understood as part of a rational strategy on the part of LTTE, and in 
the case of the individual woman suicide bomber, as an example of what Durkheim 
(1952) calls ‘obligatory altruistic suicide’. I also suggest that suicide bombing contributes 
to the development of gender equality within the LTTE. In developing this argument, I 
start with an overview of women’s suicide bombing in the LTTE. I explore the gendered 
dimensions influencing women combatants’ social roles, and the possible motivational 
forces behind their participation in suicide bombings, including the impact of loss of 
sexual purity. I then survey the literature on suicide bombing and the various 
explanations that have been put forward for this phenomenon.
The last section focuses on the way the LTTE has constructed death as a form of 
reverence, and presented this to both the civic society and to those within the movement 
(to exclude religious variations and existing social perceptions). It further analyses the 
involvement of women as suicide bombers both from a global and an LTTE perspective. 
It addresses issues that arise from women’s participation in suicide bombings, including 
the changing perceptions of gender polarisation in the civic society and the way that 
suicide bombing is used as an argument for the existence of gender equality by the 
LTTE. I also discuss the creation of the elite Black Tiger squad that recruits both men 
and women, and propose that this is seen as a further example of gender equality within 
the movement.
An overview o f wom en as suicide bom bers
A modern historical perspective reveals that the first woman suicide bomber was a 16- 
year-old Lebanese woman from the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) in 
Lebanon named Sana’a Youssef Mhayadaliin 1985118 (Cronin 2003:86, Bloom 2005:143, 
and Pape 2005:138). Her involvement is seen as part of then President of Syria Hafez al-
118 Bloom refers to her age as 27. Both Pape (2005) and Cronin (2003) states she was aged 16; The age 16 
needs to be viewed in relation to the culture of the country. In this case Sana’a was seen as an adult woman, 
(as discussed in chapter 4) as the definition of a child varies greatly according to the state. The name is also 
spelt as San Mheidleh in Cronin (2003) who describes the event as “Mheidleh] ...drove a car packed with 
450 pounds of dynamite into an Israeli check point, killing herself and two Israeli soldiers”(2003:86).
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Assa’s attempt to ‘secularise’ the act of suicide bombing and gather support from the 
non-religious sector in his community (Victor 2004:17). Since then there have been a 
number of incidents involving women suicide bombers around the world.
An essentialist understanding of women as nurturers, allows women suicide bombers a 
certain freedom to be a successful phenomenon in revolutionary groups, and in 
particular the LTTE. The women combatants of the LTTE have been at the forefront of 
change by their active involvement in suicide missions since the early 1990s. The 
analysis of suicide missions by its very nature reveals an act that is differentiated from 
other forms of violence, where the focus is changed from an “act-based” event to one of 
an “actor-based” event (Bloom 2005:3). However there are also symbols that are 
attached to such acts as described below by Atran (2003).
Although a suicide attack aims to physically destroy an initial target, its primary use 
is typically as a weapon of psychological warfare intended to affect a large public 
audience. The primary target is not those actually killed or injured in the attack, but 
those made to witness it.
(Atran 2003 cited in Sri Kantha 2004:5)
Androcentric beliefs in society have granted the success of women as suicide bombers 
primarily due to the gendered nature of social perceptions of women. When this view is 
taken together with an essentialist view of women being incapable of violence, a new 
kind of dynamism is added to women’s participation in suicide bombings. The 
essentialist female identity often allows women suicide bombers to succeed in attacking 
the targets. The use of women as suicide bombers has led to a paradigm shift that moves 
women combatants beyond the biological realms of essentialism that focuses on gender 
identity (based on physical/emotional abilities) to an alternative identity that challenges 
the androcentric nature of the patriarchal culture and its perceptions.
The views of women as passive caregivers make it easier for women to penetrate high 
security areas. Leila Khaled (of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation), perhaps one of 
the world’s most renowned revolutionary women, has stated the following,
Strategically women are able to gain access to areas where men had greater difficulty 
because the other side assumed that the women were second class citizens in their 
own society -- dumb, illiterate perhaps, and incapable of planning an operation.
(Khaled: 1973 in Bloom 2005a:3)
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The gendered perception that discriminates against women's abilities as stated above 
allowed a suicide bomber disguised as a pregnant woman to gain access to a military 
hospital within the army headquarters in Sri Lanka, in April 2006. She carried out a 
suicide mission that killed her and many civilian bystanders, seriously injuring the 
target, a senior military commander of the Sri Lanka army. At the time of the attack 
there were conflicting reports as to the authenticity of the pregnancy. The subsequent 
claim that the woman was in fact not pregnant has none the less challenged the cultural 
view (amongst Sri Lankans) of motherhood as a role created by nature to protect one’s 
own child/children119. It must be noted that though this has been viewed by Sri Lankan 
society as a violation of the social reverence for motherhood, it must also be 
acknowledged that amongst global revolutions this is a tried and tested method of 
gaining access to hard to reach targets120. Therefore the use of pregnancy or 
motherhood as a disguise or subterfuge is neither new nor innovative, although the fact 
that such acts shatter the idealism of society makes them harder to accept.
Another issue pertaining to suicide bombers is their ability to leave the boundaries 
established by war zones where citizens actively take up arms, and enter those areas 
where civic citizens have little or no involvement in the political violence. The fact that 
some citizens live away from war zones is not seen by many combatants to mean that 
they are innocent bystanders. I have been informed (in conversation) by both combatant 
and civic women that often those who do not condone political violence, living in cities 
away from war and destruction, may inadvertently support the stance taken by the state 
simply due to their passive acquiescence121.
119 The earlier belief that the woman suicide bomber was pregnant give way to various rumours questioning 
the moral legitimacy of the pregnancy, for instance was it created by an act of rape by Sri Lanka armed 
forces? On the other hand, was it the result of a woman avenging death of a husband in the hands of Sri 
Lanka armed forces?
120 The German Baader Meinhoff used this method very successfully (reference Das Spiegel, Kampfmittel 
Baby-Bombe Tarnung, Klasse, einfach besser aals Manner-date not known)
121 This view is not limited to those of Jaffna, but has a resonance amongst Chechen revolutionaries who 
consider the Russian civic citizens as silent supporters of the state armed forces committing violent act in 
Chechnya (Bloom 2005: 99).
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The LTTE is the first revolutionary movement to use large numbers of women122 as 
suicide bombers and the only revolutionary organisation so far that has carried out 
suicide missions away from its home soil by engaging a woman as a suicide bomber. 
Women suicide bombers were involved in the assassination of Rajeev Gandhi, several 
cabinet ministers, some high-ranking armed force officials, and in the failed 
assassination attempt of President Kumaratunga123.
It must be understood that within the confines of the act there is a belief by the suicide 
bomber that they are saving the Tamil nation through suicide bombing. Therefore the 
violence committed in this extreme form is viewed by some civic citizens as well as 
combatants as an act of heroism (this emerged through the informal discussions with 
some the participants - civic women, the Gatekeeper and combatant women). However a 
cautionary note must be made highlighting that not all civic society support or condone 
the violence associated with suicide bombings.
The women who are involved in revolutionary groups are often labelled in gendered 
terms. “The Army of Roses” (Palestine) depicts the beauty of a flower, “the Black 
Widow's” (Chechnya) are named after a deadly spider (so named due to their wearing 
black clothing and some (not all) being widows) and the “Armed Virgins” (LTTE) who 
represent moral virtues based on an assumption of their sexual purity124.
The Black Widows o f Chechnya
The conflict in Chechnya escalated into open warfare in December 1994 when Russian 
armed forces occupied the capital city of Grozny from secessionist forces. The cost was 
high in terms of human causalities and collateral damage to the city, and did not bring 
peace as five years on a second wave of the civil war began.
122 Bayler (2003:3) claims women combatants of the LTTE have carried out some 30% to 40% suicide 
attacks. De Mel (2004:75) places the figure at 217 suicide attacks up to 2002 (there have been more since of 
late) out of which women conducted 64 attacks. These figures comprise of 46 Sea Tigers and 18 others.
123 The successful assassination of Prime Minister Premadasa was carried out by a male suicide bomber. 
The December 1999 attack on President Chandrika Kumaratunga caused death of some 23 bystanders and 
her to lose the sight of her right eye
1241 use the word assumed in order to include victims of rape as part of the Armed Virgin group.
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The women of Chechnya took active roles during the first civil war in 1994-1996, and 
grew from resistance fighters into suicide bombers. In 2003 women conducted six out of 
seven suicide attacks (Uzzell: access 2005, Bloom 2005:i27125). In 2004 women 
conducted all twelve of the suicide missions. The well- publicised Russian theatre siege 
(October 2002) included a young woman of 16 years of age. These women were known 
as the Black Widows and the status of widowhood in the traditional patriarchal society 
indirectly creates social outcasts and grants a sense of hopelessness and lack of self- 
worth to such women.
The Chechen anger was directed at the Russian State and its civic citizens, who are 
viewed as silent supporters of the State mechanism used against the Chechen nationals. 
The paying of tax was viewed as supporting the authority’s means of sponsoring the war 
in Chechnya and the unwillingness of the Russian civic population to protest against the 
Russian State’s atrocities meant condoning the same (Bloom 2005:99).
One of the aspects of the Chechen women’s involvement in suicide bombing is the lead 
given to other women to be suicide bombers. Although the Russians labelled the suicide 
missions conducted by Chechen women as ‘Palestinisation’, in reality it is quite the 
reverse. Letters sent by Palestinian women to Hamas argued that if Muslim women in 
Chechnya could become martyrs then why not the Muslim women of Palestine (Bloom 
2005:130).
From a global perspective the Chechen women suicide bombers have revealed their 
catalyst to be the loss of a loved one (Cronin 2003:87, Kline and Franchetti 2002). It 
must be understood that from a Chechen context a woman as a widow has no prospects 
but a bleak and miserable existence to look forward to as her identity and agency have 
always been linked to that of a man. An article in The Times newspaper titled, "The 
Woman Behind the Mask" (3rd November 2002) by Kline and Franchetti refers to other 
reports from Chechnya that show women being either sold into the Chechen 
revolutionary movement, due to the socio-economic needs of families (where a widow is 
a financial burden), or simply being forced into recruitment by patriarchal authority 
(ibid). However there is no academic input into this view.
125 BBC News Inside Chechen Bomber’s Mind, 4th September 2003 referred to in Bloom 2005:127
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The lack of empirical research is primarily due to the danger and difficulties involved in 
gaining access to such organisations. It is also interesting to note that the newspaper 
report on the Russian theatre siege claims that only the women wore suicide belts and 
not the men. The gendered aspect of Chechen suicide bombers is further reflected in the 
article written by Vinogradova (2003) titled “Deadly Secret o f the Black Widow” (22nd 
October 2003) where she questions a Chechen professor who resides in Moscow (who 
did not wish to disclose his identity). “Question: so is human life of no value in Chechnya 
today? Answer: “no, you have misunderstood....the human life is, it's a woman's life that 
isn't” (Vinogradova 2003). This then questions whether female social roles and women 
in society are of a lesser value than men are. Vinogradova appears to suggest that 
Chechen men are valued far greater than Chechen women, thus women are expendable 
to the revolution and the greater society.
The Army o f Roses
On 27th January 2002 Yasser Arafat shifted the focus on suicide bombers from the 
traditionally masculine role of a male suicide bomber shahide (the male martyr), to a 
newly created feminine role as shahida, (a female martyr). This role change was 
presented to an audience of over a thousand women as equality, selflessness and above 
all a responsibility of womanhood.
Women and men are equal...You are my arm y o f  roses that will crush Israeli 
tanks....You are the hope of Palestine. You will liberate your husbands, fathers, and 
sons from oppression. You w ill sacrifice the w a y  you, wom en, have a lw ays  
sacrificed fo r  your fam ily .
(Victor 2004:19-20 -my italics)
Suicide bombings conducted in Palestine have increased since the year 2000, with 
Palestinians claiming that their lives have become more unbearable since the A1 Aqsa 
Intifada (Bloom 2005:19). The targets identified by suicide bombers in Palestine are 
often ‘soft’ targets against the civic society, and it is said that the cost of a suicide attack 
can be “no more than $150 to mount” (Hoffman 2003:42).
Bloom (2005) and Victor (2004) argue that women’s involvement can be theorised as a 
direct result of the social conditions forced upon Palestinians. Those who live in refugee 
camps often view life as a transient journey into paradise that is full of hardships,
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shortages, humiliation and violence, and is not perceived as a life worth living. Within 
these external hardships the role of women in the domestic sphere is one of subjugation 
to men in the family. Decisions about their lives are made by men, moving from father to 
brother to husband. In addition to this patriarchal control, generations of Palestinian 
women have been born under Israeli occupation and filled with not only resentment but 
also prohibition. If they wish to attain equality with the men in the community they 
must then be prepared to pay a high price for such liberation. In highly gendered 
societies where there are clearly defined social roles, the use of women as suicide 
bombers adds a further dimension to the argument. It conveys a message to the men 
that their masculinity is under threat, and women have become sufficiently politicised to 
warrant active participation in any armed struggle (Victor 2004, Bloom 2005).
Women’s participation in the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is a relatively new 
phenomenon. The lateness of women’s participation in suicide bombing lies in the fact 
that militant religious political groups (such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad) did not 
engage women in their ranks (Victor 2004). When nationalist groups realised the value 
of the suicide missions carried out by religious militant groups, they tried to convince 
their secular members to act in the same way. The reason may well be that by this stage 
men who were already pre-disposed to such thinking had joined the religious militant 
groups of Hamas and Islamic Jihad (Bloom 2005:98). When the nationalistic 
movements called upon women to be active, Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigade stepped into 
provide the logistical support for women suicide bombers (Victor 2004:52).
The first incident of a woman being involved in a suicide bombing occurred on the very 
day that Yasser Arafat stated that women could be a part of the revolutionary struggle 
(27th January 2002). A 26 year old Palestinian Red Crescent worker named Wafa Idris, 
carried a bomb in her bag, and detonated it in a department store killing one and 
injuring some one hundred Israeli civilians. Al Aqsa Brigade claimed responsibility, 
stating she was a member of the Brigade, even though she never left a video message as 
Palestinian suicide bombers usually do (Victor 2004:20). This has been viewed by some 
as indicating Idris had no intention to be a suicide bomber, but fate had stepped into 
make her so, and in that act she became idealised as shown in her eulogy by the Fatah 
movement,
- 157-
Wafa’s martyrdom restored honour to the national role of the Palestinian woman, 
sketched the most wonderful pictures o f heroism in the long battle for national 
liberation.
(Victor 2004:54)
The first confirmed Palestinian female suicide bomber may well be Darina Abu Aisha, as 
her actions (though a few days later), were planned with a recording left for posterity in 
the usual manner (Victor 2004). Since then many female suicide bombers have followed 
her example, including two women suicide bombers from Palestinian Islamic Jihad in 
2003, and one from Hamas in January 2004. The Hamas engagement is of interest as 
Sheik Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, declared that there is nothing written in the 
Koran’s holy text to say that women should not fight in national liberation wars (Victor 
2004:111). They engaged their first woman suicide bomber on 14th January 2004. 
Although Reem Riashi was a wife, mother and grandmother, she undertook a role that 
previously had been open only to unmarried or divorced women with no nurturing 
responsibilities.
There are a number of religious-based justifications popularised by the media with 
regards to Middle Eastern suicide bombers. These include the popularly held belief that 
the afterlife would provide the suicide bombers with many riches and comforts that they 
lacked in life, providing the act was committed in the name of holy war, jihad. Sheik 
Yassin claims that women suicide bombers will be,
even more beautiful than the seventy two virgins...if they are not married they are 
guaranteed a pure husband in Paradise, and of course they are entitled to bring 
seventy of their relatives to join them there without suffering the anguish of the 
grave.
(Victor 2004:113)
Women suicide bombers are thus gendered even in the afterlife. Marriage is still their 
goal, as is physical beauty and allegiance to blood ties. In comparison these hyper­
masculine visions of female needs are not reflected amongst the women suicide bombers 
of the LTTE.
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A R eflection on the Literature
The majority of literature written on suicide bombers is androcentric, which I would 
argue is a result of war being perceived as a masculine domain thus limiting the 
advancement of knowledge gained in relation to suicide bombers with anything other 
than a masculine bias.
The single act committed by Dhanu raised the awareness of the LTTE on a global scale 
and the usage of a woman as a suicide bomber attracted and retained much of the 
world’s attention. However the extent of the literature that concentrates on women as 
suicide bombers is considerably less in comparison to that which focuses on male 
suicide bombers. This gender blindness is also reflected in academic conferences that 
focus on the global threat of suicide bombings, where there is a tendency to rush past 
women’s engagement in such activities. The narrow area of literature relating to women 
combatants becomes even narrower when considering the women combatants of the 
LITE.
During the early period of the Sri Lankan struggle there was a notable absence of 
western feminist writings that were willing to engage with the LTTE’s violent political 
discourse on suicide bombings. Interestingly since post 9/11 this position has changed 
dramatically with literature emanating from western women academics (such as Bloom 
2005, Alison 2003, Cronin 2003, Skaine 2006) some focusing solely on women’s 
involvement and participation in suicide bombings. Much of the literature regarding 
women’s involvement in the LTTE and their active participation as suicide bombers was 
written primarily by western educated (and westernised) Sri Lankan female academics 
of either Sinhalese origin such as de Alwis (1998b) and de Mel (2001 and 2004), or of 
Tamil origin such as Thiranagama (1990), Samuel (2000), Maunaguru (1995), Tambiah 
(2005) and Coomaraswamy (1996 and 2002). They have much in common with each 
other as social scientists not only based in Sri Lanka but also living in Colombo (the 
participants of my research constantly criticised these academics who never experienced 
the conflict staying well away from the danger zones). Their ethnic identity did not 
impair their shared feminist discourse that disapproved of women participating in 
violence and were forceful and forthright in the condemnation and criticism of women’s 
participation in the LTTE’s armed struggle.
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Some authors (de Silva 1994, de Alwis 1998b, Coomaraswamy 1996 and 2002, de Mel 
2001 and 2004), who have written about the LTTE have not had any direct dealings with 
the combatants of the movement in their own environment. I emphasise ‘own 
environment as many of those interviewed either were escapees from the LTTE or 
arrested by the armed forces. Interviews that are not conducted in their own spatial 
location carry a different dynamic to those conducted in the combatant’s own space (as 
referred to in the previous chapter). The result of such action is always a notable reliance 
on hypothesis or on others’ work.
A number of books and articles that were published by authors such as Skaine (2006), 
Brunner (2005 and 2007), Zedalis (2004), Bloom (2005), Cutter (1998), Beyler (2003), 
Cronin(2003), and Victor (2004), focus solely on women as suicide bombers, though not 
necessarily on the women of the LTTE but mainly women of Palestine and Chechnya. 
Even though the women of the LTTE have carried out considerably more suicide 
bombings (some which have been deeply challenging such as lone deep-sea attacks on 
armed navy vessels) their contribution is not recognised in the same way as that of 
Palestinian female suicide bombers.
Within the global discourse of women’s involvement in suicide bombings, the literature 
groups together the Palestinian, Chechen and Sri Lankan conflicts with the occasional 
comparative study. These writings run the risk of a western bias being imposed on non- 
Western cultural patterns and of overlooking the unique ways in which women negotiate 
their gender roles within the context of their own cultural confinements. The combatant 
women of the LTTE have actively negotiated a kind of gender role that is different to 
their historical social roles. A western bias overlooks this negotiation, and fails to 
understand the complexities and dynamics that are involved in these new social roles. 
The views that at times did emerge in Western academic writings were also seen 
amongst the Sri Lankan feminist writings (see de Alwis 1998b, Coomaraswamy 1996 and 
2002, Maunaguru 1995, Sangarasivam 2003, de Mel 2001 and 2004). These feminists 
bring a western-based knowledge and understanding into the discourse regarding the 
conflict in Jaffna, thus some of the writings are of a single mindset with a particular 
western strand of feminism as its foundation. This contribution caused the type of 
literature to change from an essentialist feminism, which argued that women should not 
be involved in violent activities, to an alternative liberal form of feminism that began to 
question the actual achievements of such participation. It is too early for this view to
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have made any significant impact on literary discourse, but none the less it is more 
representative of the current reality where women’s involvement is assessed within the 
cultural context of what was essentially a masculine act of self-sacrifice for the greater 
good of the nation.
Brunner (2007) claims that the narrow focus used to gain an understanding is a result of 
western academics that have conducted research and written about women suicide 
bombers from a western feminist perspective. She argues that racialising the non- 
European women as the Other distances academics from them. This argument of 
Occidentalism (Brunner 2007) is reflected in many works from western educated 
Eastern academics (de Alwis 1998b, Maunaguru 1995, Coomaraswamy 1996 and 2002, 
de Mel 2001 and 2004), which create a distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (e.g. Western 
society Eastern society). Feminist writers who research the field of violent conflict tend 
to distinguish the women combatants of the LTTE and other revolutionary organisations 
by labelling them as the Other.
Rose (2004) is also concerned by this and comments,
[i]t may indeed be that your desire to solve the problem is creating it, that burrowing 
into the psyche of the enemy, far from being an attempt at dignify them with 
understanding, is a form of evasion that blinds you to our responsibility for the state 
they are in.
(Rose, cited in Skaine 2006:26)
Whilst Rose is aware of the shortcomings in this narrow discursive perspective it is also 
clear that relatively few authors who write about suicide bombers show any kind of 
familiarity with the LTTE and its engagement in suicide bombings.
Rationality as discussed in literature
The key objective amongst most authors who study the rising global phenomenon of 
suicide attacks is to find the rationality behind such missions, and most claim that there 
are a number of reasons that act as motivational factors (see Hassan 2004, Gambetta 
2005, Hague 2003, Reuter 2004, Pape 2005, Hoffman 2003, Zedalis 2004, Skaine 
2006). Some have contributed to this debate by stating that differences between ethnic 
groups makes one group a legitimate target for the other by making the Otherness the
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basis for conducting suicide bombing campaigns. For instance Bloom argues, “[i]t 
becomes simpler to dehumanise people on the other side and perceive them as 
legitimate targets and appropriate for suicidal attacks” (Bloom 2005:79).
Others have identified the complexity of identifying any single reason as the 
motivations.
Motivated [motivation] is an open question. Some agents [suicide bombers] 
accounts are cast in a selfish, albeit extreme rhetoric, which makes us wonder. Some 
say that they want to achieve worldly immortality, guaranteed by the respect and 
status bestowed on them and their families by their communities....and some say 
they do it to acquire the status of martyr and reap the heavenly benefits that comes 
with that...
(Gambetta 2005: ix)
The literature shows that the complex nature of suicide bombing cannot be explained 
with a single reason but encompasses many, as discussed in this chapter.
Sexual purity as a motivation
Mirroring other ethno-national violent conflicts globally, the rapes committed on 
women in Jaffna carry a dimension of ethnic violation because women’s bodies and their 
virtue are used to symbolise the Tamil nation’s honour. Sexual violation provides a high 
level of motivation in gendered societies where female sexual purity forms part of the 
individual’s as well as the family’s honour.
The rape of Tamil women should not be considered as an expression of mere racism 
or sexual frustration. The basic aim of this is to humiliate in the most shameful 
manner the moral code of Tamil culture. The Tamil culture considers values such as 
purity and chastity as sacred. Hence, these rapes are planned assaults on the Tamil 
cultural values and moral codes.
(Balasingham 1984:34 in Ramachandran 2005:168)
The highly gendered Sri Lankan public has accepted that women who commit acts of 
suicide bombings are often victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence. This 
public view gives rise to a false reality based on cultural perceptions of women that
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preclude them from committing such extreme forms of violence without the personal 
violence they have endured126.
In Jaffna’s patriarchal society women’s sexuality and reproductivity is held in high 
esteem. Virginity is linked to chastity that defines a woman’s virtue and morality, and is 
seen though a spectrum of “nation’s honour” (De Mel 2001:214). The loss of a woman’s 
virginity due to violent sexual acts committed during conflict is emotionally and 
physiologically damaging and becomes part of the gendered discourse. Such civic 
women become socially stigmatised as polluted beings that do not deserve care and 
respect. The future life options these civic women have become limited to either living in 
the community as outcasts with little or no civic status, or joining the revolutionary 
movement where women’s gender construction based on sexual purity in particular does 
not form part of their contribution to the armed struggle, or importantly to women’s 
perceived worth (Cutter in Beyler 2003:16).
Women’s groups who challenged society’s gender polarisation and androcentrism 
during the 1980s in Jaffna, had to confront the discourse of rape, arguing that it did not 
reflect the way in which rape was perceived in the Tamil community. They discussed the 
cultural concept of female purity and chastity linked to virginity, the socio- patriarchal 
interest that underlies female sexual behaviour, and the social stigma (based on a 
patriarchal view of women) that apportions blame and encompasses the rejection of 
rape victims. The Women’s Group discarded the Tamil word “katpalippu”, meaning “the 
abolition of chastity”, which feeds into the notion of female purity, and introduced 
words such as “paladkaram”, meaning an act committed by force, and 
“paliyalvanmuraF, meaning sexual violence. The introduction of these words did not 
conform to the traditional view of purity (Maunaguru 1995:166) and forced society to 
contextualise rape as a forceful and violent act committed against an individual’s wishes.
The social rejection of rape victims is reminiscent of Vietnam’s traditional society where 
rape is viewed with shame. However the Vietnamese revolutionary movement have 
been active in dispelling and discouraging the continuation of prejudices against women 
who have been raped (Eisen-Bergman 1974:75). The LTTE interestingly hold an 
ambivalent position on the issue of rape victims. The cultural roots of the LTTE, as with
126 The violence suffered by the person can also be non-sexual physical violence, but it is the sexual violence 
that is considered far more damaging.
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civic society, are embedded in patriarchy and advocates sexual purity for its women 
combatants, known as Armed Virgins. However they actively distance themselves from 
the social perceptions of measuring a woman's worth by her sexual purity. Those in the 
LTTE movement recognise that those who were sexually violated receive little or no 
support in the community and they have stepped into this void left by the community. 
The LTTE’s advocacy of virginity and sexual purity is ostensibly contradicted by the 
acceptance of civic rape victims, thus disregarding the view that such women are 
polluted or social outcasts. These civilian women are accepted into the fold without any 
stigma being attached to them (Schalk 1992).
This organisational non-judgemental view along with the support and consideration of 
the revolutionary group creates a strong loyalty in the women combatants. The women 
who join revolutionary organisations due to a loss of sexual purity develop a newly 
created sense of strength, both emotionally and physically. Part of their reconstructed 
identity within the movement is the ambivalent compartmentalisation of women as 
combatants who care for their community and seek to avenge their bodily violation. 
“Acting as human bombs is an understood and accepted offering for a woman who will 
never be a mother...” (Cutter 1998 in Beyler 2003:16). The revenge aspect is nurtured 
separately by encouraging women combatants to feel hatred towards their aggressor 
(Ramachandran 2005:169) with a heightened need for self-purification.
As sexually violated women they can achieve purification of a kind by first and foremost 
being strong in mind and body; and by dispelling any weaknesses associated with the 
socially constructed female roles by performing what is seen in traditional Tamil culture 
as self-immolation “agnipravesam” (Maunaguru 1995:171, also Thiruchandran 1997b, 
Cutter 1998 in Beyler 2003). By engaging in the cultural belief of purification by fire, the 
women combatants are treading a fine line between the traditional role that requires 
purification by self-immolation and modernity where a shift in paradigm illustrates 
combatant women achieving a different kind of equality through being suicide bombers 
and the recognition that comes with carrying out a successful mission.
The collective silence of the LTTE preserves a woman’s honour and virginity, however 
there is an instrumentalised manipulation of the very same silence when the 
revolutionary group is forced to justify individual actions of suicide bombing by claiming 
it is revenge for sexual violation (De Mel 2001:221). This manipulation of sexual
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violence is presented to the world as an individual avenging their own and collective 
violation and adds to the ambiguous roles of women within the revolutionary 
organisation. It is incorrect to assume that all women who were raped end up as 
combatants or all suicide bombers were victims of rape. A substantial number of young 
women have committed suicide and an unknown number of women do not discuss their 
ordeals due to the social stigma. Instead many internalise their anxiety and build a wall 
of silence in the name of honour and purity. Living combatants are granted a silence 
whereas those that die become iconic images of avengers of sexual violence (ibid).
Brainwashing and/or Religion
Some have focused on religion by arguing that it is the “attackers psychopathology, 
poverty, and lack of education, or individual motives such as religious indoctrinations, 
especially Islamic fundamentalism" are the motivational reasons for suicide bombing 
(Hasan 2004: 2). Whilst Hasan’s (2004) assessment of Islamic fundamentalism appears 
on the surface to be accurate, it is noteworthy that suicide rates on a global scale are 
lowest amongst the Muslim nations (Pape 2005:181). From a religious point of view 
suicide is not a sin amongst those who practice religions with a belief in reincarnation 
such as Hinduism and Buddhism. However the linking of the LTTE motivations to a 
form of religious fundamentalism is a misnomer as religious differences are not a central 
component of the LTTE suicide bombings. Pape’s statement that “religious difference is 
a central component of the LTTE’s concept of self-sacrifice” (2005:150) ignores the 
nationalism that is central to the ethno-nationalist debate at the core of the LTTE 
struggle. The misunderstanding by Pape’s may have been due to the LTTE’s usage of 
religious terminology to unite the main religions practiced amongst Tamil nationals 
(Christianity and Hinduism) in its construction of martyrdom and death. Schalk 
describes the use of words such as punita ilactiyam (meaning ‘holy aim’) to describe the 
fight for an independent state (1997b: 27). It is important not to confuse the LTTE’s 
usage of religious based words with its secularist acts as they represent a more secularist 
terminology rather than a religious terminology.
The attachment to Prabhakaran by the combatants may be seen as a form of cultism as 
claimed by Reuter (2004), but I would distance myself from such an analysis as it runs 
the risk of overlooking all other aspects that contribute to the greater discourse.
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However the need to succeed that is profoundly engrained in all suicide bombers has a 
direct link back to Prabhakaran. An example of the fear of failure (based on total 
dedication and admiration) or of ‘letting him down’, or disappointing him on a personal 
level is referred to in Pratap’s (2001: 104) interview conducted with two male suicide 
bombers of the LTTE12?.
This is further reflected amongst the women combatants I interviewed who view the acts 
as recognition of themselves as individuals and as a collective reflecting Prabhakaran’s 
faith in women combatants. Pratap (2005), Bandara (2002) and Gunaratne (1998) all 
argue that Prabhakaran is very aware of the power he holds over the combatants and 
their desire to fulfil his wishes. It can therefore be argued that a subtle manipulation 
that is considerably more complex and significantly different to that of religious 
promises, or cultism is used to motivate combatants. One notable factor in cultism is the 
group’s isolation from any other social contact making them reliant only of each other 
(Pape 2005:179). Such isolation does not happen with the LTTE as they are actively 
engaged with the civic society as part of their ideological struggle for the greater good of 
all Tamil nationals.
When the motivational factors are unclear authors tend to hypothesise. Reuter (2004) 
claims that “Brainwashing methods have played a significant role in the Tamil Tiger 
organisation” (2004:160). He suggests that combatants are brainwashed into acting as 
suicide bombers, which is not an accurate representation as confirmed by Hopgood 
(2005). However what must be recognised is that the LTTE combatant training does 
include a substantial amount of visual imagery, such as schools and hospitals that were 
bombed by the State’s armed forces, and heroic songs of liberation being sung (Reuter 
2004, Gunaratna 2001, Bandara 2002). However it would be insufficient to count this 
alone as a formal way of brainwashing suicide bombers due to the fact that such training 
is given to all combatants in the movement.
The LTTE suicide bombers carry the term of endearment “suicide warriors” which is 
given to distance them from terrorism, so avoiding negative connotations and move
127 Pratap(200i)conducted her interviews with permission from Prabhakaran. It must be recognised as an 
extremely rare activity as the identity of the LTTE’s suicide squad is kept highly secretive. During Pratap’s 
interview, the two male combatants kept their faces covered throughout the interview, thus preventing them 
from being recognised.
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towards a warrior image that conjures up images of those who are engaged in a path of 
righteous action (Sri Kantha 2004).
Altruistic Suicide
The LTTE suicide bombers are often described by academic scholars, such as Schalk 
(1992, 1994, 1997a and 1997b), Pape (2005) and Sri Kantha (2006), as following the 
Durkheim model of ‘altruistic suicide’. A closer reading of Durkheim (1952) reveals that 
the L i t  e  suicide bombers follow not merely an altruistic but a closely defined category 
of obligatory altruistic suicide.
Having given the name of egoism  to the state o f the ego living its own life and 
obeying itself alone, that of altruism  adequately expresses the opposite state, where 
the ego is not is own property, where it is blended with something not itself, where 
the goal of conduct is exterior to itself, that is, in one of the groups in which it 
participates. So we call the suicide caused by intense altruism altruistic suicide. But 
since it is also characteristically performed as a duty, the terminology adopted 
should express this fact. So we will call such a type obligatory altruistic suicide.
(Durkheim: 1952
translated by Spaulding and Simpson 2000:221 -  their own italics)
I would argue that the obligatory aspects of the altruistic model would explain to a 
greater extent the nationalistic commitment felt by the LTTE’s suicide bombers. Such 
obligatory commitments are also reflected in the discourse of women combatants as 
discussed later in this chapter. The motivations often appear to be multi-layered with 
their own set of dynamics, which are deeply embedded in the nationalist commitment to 
the cause of a free state of Tamil Eelam and a need to succeed. It is also important to 
note that those who are involved in the LTTE’s suicide squad are focused on death 
rather than life as part of their commitment to the cause. This is the main difference in 
comparison to the combatants of non-suicide squads, who are focused on life and living, 
where only death on the battlefield is counted as inevitable.
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The LTTE and Suicide Bombers
The complex and secretive nature of suicide operations has inevitably made data 
gathering rather problematic. Within the LTTE it is almost impossible to gather data 
from failed suicide bombers due to the cyanide poison they carry. In the rare 
circumstances where authors had the opportunity to interview combatant suicide 
bombers the androcentric nature of the organisation becomes visible, as it has always 
been men who were participants of interviews (as discussed in Pratap 2001 and in BBC 
“Inside Story” Programme 2004). It must also be recognised that there is no prior 
knowledge of the ‘would be’ suicide bomber until after the event. Rajasingham- 
Senanayake conducted the interview with Dhanu without having the faintest notion that 
she was talking to the future suicide bomber of Rajeev Gandhi128. Interestingly the views 
expressed by Dhanu were no different from those of the women I have interviewed over 
a decade later.
As stated before, the information and data about the LTTE’s suicide bombers squad is 
virtually impossible to come by, except on a piecemeal basis, and with difficulty in 
verifying. However, it is noticeable that gender equality is less in need of negotiation 
within the suicide squad as the acceptance in the squad is itself a recognition of equality. 
It can be argued that the equality is a necessity, but it needs to be acknowledged as a 
recognition that narrows the gender polarisation which questions women’s abilities to 
carry out the same tasks as men129.
The data on combatant deaths that is published by the LTTE on their official web page 
‘Eelam web’ gives an indication of the gender blindness by not separating the number of 
male and female Black Tiger deaths, but merely gives the total sum as 241 killed between 
27th November 1982 and 30th September 2002. However there is a gendered breakdown 
of combatants (non-Black Tigers) killed which indicates that 3,766 female and 13,882
128 Rajasingham-Senanayake (2001) interviewed Dhanu some time before the Ghandi assassination, when 
she was a commander of an LTTE women’s wing. During the interview Dhanu conveyed the same ideology 
as all other women combatants of the LTTE who support the achievement of a separate state of Tamil Eelam 
above the promotion of the emancipation of women, and no indication was given of her views on suicide 
bombings.
129 The equality to die for one’s own country is a demand that the women of Hamas have been asking for 
over many years and which was finally granted to one woman in 2005. As a good Muslim woman she was 
chaperoned by a male relative to the venue. Of course this could also be to ensure she carried out the act. 
(But it is certain that Hamas has finally come to realise how effective the women are as suicide bombers).
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males combatants were killed during the same period (Hopgood 2005; 68 referring to 
information gained from LTTE web page www.eelamweb.com). De Mel’s (2004) data 
obtained from the army media spokesman’s office in Colombo claims that 64 of the 
suicide attacks have been carried out by women, a figure that also ties in with Sri 
Kantha’s (2004) data. None of the data recognises Dhanu as a suicide bomber, which is 
not surprising considering that the LTTE only admitted responsibility for the 
assassination of Rajeev Gandhi in 2006. It is also interesting to note that Sri Kantha also 
recorded a further 26 separate incidents (both male and female) of combatants who had 
died whilst training. Black Tiger training requires a higher level that can and does cause 
accidental deaths during training and on rehearsal runs for specific missions. 
Furthermore, his data reveals that the first officially recognised Black Tiger woman was 
Capt. Angaiyarkanni from the Sea Tiger squad that specialised in suicide sea attacks, in 
1994. In addition, a majority of women Black Tigers are of at least 21 years of age at the 
time of their mission. Further the majority of Black Tiger women combatants’ deaths 
occurred in 1998, totalling 13 deaths as detailed in Appendix 8.
My own data gathered from the Mulathir district Tamil Eelam Heroes Office Political 
Wing (the office is situated in the cemetery), Pudukudiirupu, Northern Jaffna indicates 
that there were 18 Black Tiger and 46 Sea Tiger130 deaths, giving a total of 64 deaths 
from 27th November 1982 to 31st October 2002. This latter figure ties in with data De 
Mel obtained from the Sri Lankan armed forces. Within this period the information 
board also stated that 64 deaths were attributed to women suicide bombers and the total 
number of male and female suicide deaths were 24 ^ indicating that 177 were male 
suicide bombers). My research reveals that there were 3,768 female combatant deaths (a 
difference of 2 more than cited on the LITE web page). It must also be noted that my 
research data extends one month beyond the LTTE web page information. Overall my 
findings support that of the information stated on the Eelam web page. The total 
numbers that were given on the board were not broken down to show details of the 
deaths which is not uncommon when dealing with the LITE as their mode of gathering 
data is never explained, nor are the LTTE willing to let information out into the public 
domain that could be used against them. It must also be noted that since the ceasefire 
unofficially ended in 2005, the number of women suicide bombings have increased with 
no current accurate data to reflect the true numbers involved.
130 Sea Tigers specialised in carrying out attacks in waterways and open sea
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kuppi -the cyanide vial
Prabhakaran first became aware of cyanide poisoning in 1974 through the death of 
Sivakumaran, a man he admired who committed suicide to avoid being captured by the 
police for his involvement in the militant Tamil student movement131 (Narayan-Swamy 
2002:55). As stated previously part of the LTTE’s graduation ceremony for combatants 
includes the allocation of a necklace with a cyanide capsule known as kuppi (meaning 
small jar) attached to it (Figure 11). The capsule itself is a glass vial filled with cyanide 
that is hung as a pendant on a string that is worn around the neck132. The vial contains 
sufficient poison to kill an adult, however some combatants carry two vials to ensure 
death is a certainty. The occasions when the vial should be used is described in the 
LTTE’s Mavirarkurippetu magazine as,
...in a frontal attack by the enemy where there is [a] threat of possible extermination 
or capture; when surrounded or in a prison; after the infliction of a mortal wound 
when the LTTE fighter realises that there is no chance of survival and that [s]he is an 
obstacle to his or her comrades; and after capture, facing torture and death.
(Schalk I997a:ii)
Whilst the magazine explains the situations when the poison should be taken it must 
also be recognised that the women combatants are particularly in favour of the cyanide 
necklaces. They have been educated by the movement to understand that the State 
armed forces will rape and torture them in search of answers prior to subjecting them to 
a brutal form of execution (Schalk 1997a). Hopgood (2005:74) expands the point further 
by stating, “excruciating torture would almost likely be followed by execution in any 
event.” This can be seen in context when analysing the epitaph written in the
131 The fact of Sivakumaran’s case stands as police raided the World Tamil Research Conference held in 
Jaffna in 1974 causing deaths of a number of delegates. This action angered Sivakumaran who planned a 
retaliatory attack on the police, but the information reached the police before the attack, leaving him no 
option but to commit suicide to avoid a painful death in police custody.(“Martyr Sivakumaran remembered 
to day”, June 2005, www.ltteps.org. accessed on 3.7.2007)
132 The glass vials worn by the combatants are made in Germany; the cyanide (effective form of cyanide is 
recognised as sodium cyanide than potassium cyanide) is purchased from India, and put into the vials by 
the LITE. The glass containers are bitten into at the point of suicide to release the poison that will enter the 
blood stream and prevent oxygen entering into the body, thus causing a painful convulsion mixed with 
confusion, ending with a painful death. The duration of the violent death will take no more than a couple of 
minutes. However, taking an insufficient quantity will not bring death, but permanent brain damage. The 
vials need to be replaced after 3 months or so, due to discoloration of the poison exposed to sun and 
moisture (Schalk 1997:10). The new vials used since the current wave of violence started, are believed to be 
easier to bite into than previous models.
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Mavirarkurippetu magazine issue 1:10 about the very first combatant who died by 
biting into the cyanide capsule.
Having been surrounded in a hideout in Valvettiturai by Sri Lankan soldiers and 
having enjoyed  cyanide, he died heroically.
(translated by Schalk 1997a: 11. my italics)
The wording that illustrates taking a cyanide capsule as a form of enjoyment needs to be 
seen in a situational specific context of the combatants finding themselves with 
impending torture and extreme violence prior to a slow death. Therefore a painful, yet 
quick death offered by taking cyanide poisoning is a highly preferred alternative.
The first woman combatant to be considered as a martyr was Malathy (a non-suicide 
squad combatant) who used her cyanide vial at the point of serious injury received in 
battle. By her actions she has become a venerated figure in the movement and her death 
is commemorated in October every year.
The vial that is worn around the neck is fully exposed for all to see including those from 
the civic society. By this action those who see it become de-sensitised and accept it as 
part of the LTTE’s combatant role and their commitment to the cause. Such openness 
removes the shock element from civic society and indirectly removes any forms of 
stigma or negativity that are associated with carrying a vial of poison.
Black Tigers
In 1987 Prabhakaran stated that “the method of war may change. But the aim of our war 
will not change” (Schalk 1997^25). Part of the changing strategy of war brought Black 
Tiger suicide squad into existence with their first reported action on the 5th July 1987 
with the kamikaze-style suicide attack performed by Captain Miller133. The creation of 
the Black Tigers has been attributed to Prabhakaran’s admiration for the INA, the 
nationalist army of Subash Chandra Bose. This group was operational against the British 
rulers in India during the 1940s. The INA had an organised suicide squad and was the 
first to use suicide-belts that were tied around the waist (Schalk 1997:174). This
133 Captain Miller filled a truck with explosives and drove into the Neeladi school grounds, which was 
occupied by the Sri Lankan army (N ar ay an- S wamy 2006).
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particular method was further developed and a vest used for the first time by the LTTE 
in the assignment of Dhanu to assassinate Rajeev Gandhi in i99i(Narayan-Swamy 
2006).
The Black Tiger suicide operations are “never spontaneous or arbitrary” (Schalk 
1997a: 12) and generally conducted in two ways: those who take part in the battlefield 
and those who are individual operators set up as lone bombers, penetrating heavy 
security to attack a hard to reach target.
The Black Tiger constitutes the armour of self-defence for our ethnic group, and also 
serve to remove the barriers coming in the way of our struggle. They are the balls of 
fire smashing the military power of the enemy with sheer determination.
(Prabhakaran speech on Mahaveera - Martyrs day - 5th July 1993 
referred to in Narayan-Swamy 2006:249)
The Black Tigers are a very unique and deadly creation of the LTTE with an emblem of a 
dark image of a head and shoulders with a beret, holding a gun (Figure 9). The image 
itself is publicly displayed (including in the Jaffna University134) and believed to be the 
silhouette of Capt. Miller. This specialised suicide squad has a reputation of being both 
fierce and elite with loyalty given solely and unquestioningly to Prabhakaran and to 
none other (Narayan-Swamy 2006, Pratap 2001). The elitism is a direct result of special 
training that primarily focuses the mind to distance itself from others, and retain an 
unwavering focus on the assignment. The fierceness is a by-product of the strength of 
mind that has made the Black Tigers an enigma to all who study suicide bombers. They 
serve a very useful purpose for the LTTE by being able to penetrate security and carry 
out successful missions.
The training programmes of Black Tigers are a secretive affair (Narayan-Swamy 
2006:234) but we can assume that women have negotiated gendered roles as 
combatants that are carried through to the next stage of training.
“I think she wants to know how we join that group. There is not much difference, a 
normal Tiger only becomes a Black Tiger. Yes. If they want to become Black Tigers 
they need special training. They have to be trained in both, mentally and physically.”
(Arasi)
134 There is substantial support for the LTTE within academia (staff and students) in Jaffna University.
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Arasi’s emphasis on mental and physical training resonates with the nature of pressure 
that a suicide bomber may face. Their specialised training is conducted separately from 
other combatants for a period. During this period they have minimum or no contact 
with consanguine and non-consanguine families including those in the revolutionary 
family. The training they receive during this period is primarily focused on their mental 
status, to ensure that when the time comes they will be fully prepared, mentally and 
physically, to carry out the act to the bitter end (Pratap 2001:103).
The issue of an individual’s autonomy and free choice to join the Black Tigers is often at 
the forefront of discussions about suicide bombers. There is no evidence to suggest that 
individuals are either drugged or conscripted against their will into the elite squad 
(Hopgood 2005:67). Many of the combatants and civic women informed me that 
becoming a suicide bomber is a decision made by combatants, who volunteer 
themselves. Pratap (2001:102) however claims the best 200 combatant students are 
selected to join the Black Tiger squad, suggesting that being chosen means the 
individual’s choice of volunteering, or putting one’s self forward and retaining some 
autonomy is taken away. My informal discussions with the Gatekeeper and female 
combatants reveal that the individual’s ability to make a choice is a widely held belief 
and that those who become suicide bombers are allowed to make a free decision and are 
not forced into the role.
“Say, I am a normal Tiger. I also can become a Black Tiger. The decision is mine. Yes, 
yes we have lot of choices. Even at the last moment I can say I cannot do it. If one is 
not mentally strong enough or prepared then they cannot achieve what they set out 
to do. We believe in this very strongly.”
(Arasi)
Arasi’s description grants those who join the Black Tiger suicide bombers a certain 
empowerment and control over their actions. However Arasi’s assurance that those who 
become suicide bombers are able to withdraw from a mission at the last minute is 
disputed in the writings of De Mel (2001). She refers to an instance when the decision to 
pull the cord of a suicide jacket is taken away from the individual suicide bomber by
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being remotely detonated133 (De Mel 2001: 225 referring to Tamil Times 15 March 
2000).
If we look beyond the accepted notion that it is a voluntary role to be a member of the 
elite force, then one tends to notice two strong influences being involved in the decision­
making process. Although this may not be coercion, the discrimination and suppression 
of one ethnic group and culture, together with the use of a combatant’s emotional 
involvement with Prabhakaran have an impact on the decision-making as discussed in 
previous sections. The following extract from Pratap’s interview with male Black Tigers 
illustrates that the commitment to Prabhakaran outweighs all other factors.
The only time they [Black Tigers] showed some emotion was when they talked about 
Pirabhakaran [Prabhakaran], their Annai [older brother]. A Black Tiger names Sunil 
said with something close to awe, ‘For us, he is mother, father and God all rolled into 
one. But I detected one fear in all of them: the fear that thy might let Pirabhakaran 
[Prabhakaran] down. They would die happily; their only hope was their death would 
inflict the kind of damage on the enemy that would make Pirabhakaran 
[Prabhakaran] happy. Securing A nn afs  happiness was all that mattered -then , they 
would not have lived and died in vain.
(Pratap 2001:103-104 -my italic)
Suicide bombers who make the choice to put themselves forward believe it is their own 
conscientious decision. Through my interviews with combatant women it is clear that 
when an individual first volunteers to join the Black Tigers they are chosen or rejected, a 
decision based on the LTTE’s assessment of an individual’s capabilities. The potential 
women Black Tigers submit an application in writing^6, and if successful they become 
part of the elite squad (Hopgood 2005:60 referring to Elliot 2003). The transition from 
being a ‘normal’ Tiger to a ‘Black’ Tiger is seen as a procedural change with a great deal 
of mental and physical training to toughen up the individual. The Black Tiger unit is 
differentiated from other units by a powerful song that expresses pride (Sri Kantha 
2004). Those who join the elite squad are the most dedicated and committed to the 
cause.
135 Therefore the freewill to decide may not be as clearly defined once a combatant becomes a member of the 
elite squad. It must also be noted that there is no published material to illustrate a change of mind being an 
issue for combatants in the elite squad to withdraw their services. The change of mind argument seems to 
appear in fiction and cinema as discussed later on in this chapter.
136 All applications are based on skills, motivation and domestic situation including care responsibilities.
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“We never ever force anyone to fight if they don’t want to. We explain to them why 
we have to fight but the final decision to fight is their decision. Everything within the 
movement is like that. Yes, that is true.”
(Arasi)
Arasi’s description revolves around choice being given to the individual to make the 
decision based on their own understanding, which itself may be asymmetric due to the 
nature of warfare and based on the explanation given to them by the organisation.
An enactment of their appreciation of Prabhakaran has become part of a created ritual 
of a suicide bomber’s farewell by having their photograph taken ceremoniously with 
Prabhakaran137 There is an unsubstantiated but popularly held belief that the photo 
session is followed by sharing a meal with him before the individual is sent out on their 
mission (Pratap 2001:103, Narayan-Swamy 2006:235 and 273, De Mel 2004:78). It 
must also be noted that those who are assigned a mission may or may not know who the 
target is until the last minute. The chosen suicide bomber may have to be a ‘sleeper’ for a 
period of time until she (or he) is given the go ahead by the LTTE to carry out the 
attack138.
The freedom to decide needs to be seen within the context of the LTTE’s teachings, and 
its discipline, which merge in creating a hybrid (a special kind of) conscience that 
Prabhakaran describes as,
...that commitment comes from discipline. From the beginning I felt that for a 
person to dedicate his life to a cause, he must be free from self-centred, egotistic 
existence. He has to renounce personal pleasures. I have instilled discipline in the 
(LTTE), and selected a group of persons capable of renouncing their lives.
(Narayan-Swamy 2006:233)
It can be argued that Prabhakaran’s own statement is gendered by his referring to 
suicide bombers as Tie’. However, the message he conveys is that those who are chosen 
to join the Black Tiger squad are of a higher calibre than the average combatant. There is 
no information available to identify if the unit was created from the outset with both
137 The photographs becomes a cherished possession of the dead suicide bomber’s family(de Mel 2004:78)
138 a good example of a ‘sleeper’ was Babu, the 23 year old male suicide bomber who assassinated President 
Premadasa on 1st May 1993 (Narayan-Swamy 2006:239-240). He was also believed to have been part of the 
community for a long period of time.
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male and female combatants or whether it was first created with male combatants only, 
and included women combatants at a later date (in the same way as the LTTE was 
originally set up).
Religious aspects
Suicide bombings in the LTTE are a secular activity whose motivation is never based on 
religion or the gains of afterlife (Schalk 1992,1997a and 1997b, Sri Kantha 2004) due to 
the fact that the LTTE is a secular movement and suicide missions are carried out by 
both Christians and Hindus. My research confirms that LTTE suicide bombing is a 
secular activity with no religious aims. Although in Jaffna the major religion is 
Hinduism, there are also a number of Christian and Brahmin faith combatants within 
the LTTE’s revolutionary family139. Once the combatants join the LTTE they often do not 
practice their religion or are unable to keep within the guidelines dictated by their 
religion1*0. Therefore the values gained in the afterlife which are important for other 
groups of suicide bombers are neither relevant to the revolutionary culture nor their 
perceived symbolism of giving a gift of life.
Religious teachings and constraints are disregarded by many women combatants who 
prepared to sacrifice themselves for the cause and especially for those within the cause 
with whom they have built relationships. This is shown in one of their propaganda 
illustrations on the back cover of the Mavirarkurippetu magazine (Schalk 1992:83), 
which depicts armed young men and women walking together with heads held high. In 
the background there are Christian gravestones and a Hindu funeral pyre. The picture 
(in Figure 10) is titled ‘Spirits of dead heroes and heroines from the tombs of Christian 
and pyres of Hindu unite’. Whilst the title is contradictory in ‘uniting’ Christians and 
Hindus after death, the emphasis here is focused on overcoming religious differences to
139 It is believed that there have been Muslim nationals amongst the LTTE at the earlier stages of its 
formation based on an ideology of a minority Tamil language speakers. Over the years the Muslims have 
disappeared from the fold. Lately there have been a number of bitter incidents between the Muslim and 
Tamil groups based on the LTTE wanting to have Tamil only ethnic groups in Jaffna and certain parts of the 
N.E. province of Sri Lanka.
140 Brahmin women combatants of the LTTE often find it difficult to follow religious directions on food 
preparation and consumption whilst being in active service. (BBC “Inside, Story” programme shown in UK 
History Channel, 17 July 2004)
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attain a common aim. It further creates a picture of equality between male and female 
combatants which overrides the society’s views of masculinities and femininities.
Although a majority of women combatants view the afterlife as being part of their 
religious upbringing, these traditional religious views undergo a change when a woman 
joins the revolutionary movement, as illustrated by Kavitha.
“We must do good in this life so that in our next birth we will be blessed more. When 
we were growing up we believed in re-birth. But now we don’t think like that. We feel 
we have to use this time given here properly by doing good. We don’t think about re­
birth and so on. Our main thinking is how we are living now.”
(Kavitha)
Kavitha’s discourse shows that a change in belief occurred when being continuously 
exposed to extreme forms of existence whilst living under the restrictions imposed by 
the State. The choice of words used in her narrative such as ‘now* and ‘properly9 conveys 
a duality of determination (to carry out the tasks designated by the LTTE) and the 
temporality of life. The change of belief is a complex transition from ‘what used to be’ to 
‘what is currently happening’. This change of thought process also illustrates a move 
away from the consanguine family and its cultural upbringing. New thought processes 
directed by the ‘new’ LTTE family remould the individual’s thinking to fit in with the 
movement’s idealisation of martyrdom as a selfless act that must be venerated.
A selfless act given to others in this life emphasises betterment in the next life as the 
women have been brought up to believe. The pragmatic view of living ‘here and now9 
comes from the understanding of the fragility of life, which also extends into the women 
combatants formation of relationships with one another and the concept of a Tamil 
nation state. The women combatants believe they have a responsibility for the safety and 
welfare of civic citizens, with whom they have an extended kin identity as discussed 
previously.
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Rationalities of Suicide Bombing
“You must explain to her this properly. Because this is very important. We are a 
minority. But the war that was imposed on us was a major one. Many international 
countries helped those who imposed the war on us. Our strength to oppose this war 
was weak. So to fight this big enemy only we invented this Black Tigers. Instead of 
losing many of our combatants in the war we were able to attack big targets but lost 
only one person. Yes, yes they are also a group.”
(Arasi)
Arasi’s explanation has a strong justification for both the creation and use of the Black 
Tigers as the ultimate weapon born out of necessity. The explanation also carries a 
definitive pragmatism based on the cost/ benefit of losing one combatant rather than a 
whole battalion. The death of a suicide bomber must be viewed from a logistically and 
pragmatically as it only requires one combatant to be trained and lost from the 
revolutionary movement, rather than risking a combat unit with no guarantee of success 
(reference my interview with Arasi 2003). Those who elect to apply to be selected for a 
suicide mission also view it as being a career pinnacle. Such selection elevates their 
status and affirms their commitment to the cause (de Mel 2001:225).
Overall life is valued regardless of its male or female identity, and more importantly 
suicide bombings are a rational strategy hence the trained suicide bomber is a strategic 
weapon and a valued resource. It appears that a significant importance is placed on 
individual combatants in the LTTE regardless of their gender identity. The gender 
identity itself creates an agent who is tasked into carrying out the policy/mission. 
However the value of the agent as a highly trained entity remains until their demise.
By analysing the available literature on LTTE suicide missions, it does appear that 
though combatants are sent to perform suicide missions it does not necessarily mean 
they have to die in the process. Death is a by-product of the act, but the act itself does 
not necessarily require the death of the combatant in order for the mission to be 
successful. The suicide bombers of the LTTE do not appear to have the humiliation of 
failure attached to them.
It must also be noted that there is no evidence to show that any of the LTTE’s elite 
suicide squad ever abandoned a mission, which in turn means their exact views will
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never be known as they always (except on one occasion1*1) end up dead. Those who have 
written specifically about the LTTE suicide activities, such as Hopgood (2005), admit 
the difficulty in obtaining data as the death of the subject is a fundamental problem for 
the research1*2.
When conducting research amongst the LTTE, researchers never know who amongst 
their research participants is a future suicide bomber. On the extremely rare occasions 
the LTTE have granted journalists an audience1*3 with trained suicide bombers from the 
elite Black Tiger squad, their identity is never revealed and their faces are covered with 
masks1**.
Altruism in Thatkodai: the Gift o f Sacrifice
The gift of sacrifice made by women suicide bombers was explained to me as,
“The suicide bombers are known to commit ‘Thatkolai’ which means suicide. But 
these people [the LTTE women combatants] are known as committing ‘Thatkodai’. 
‘That’ means self and ‘Kolai’ means killing and ‘Kodai’ means gift. So when you say 
‘Thatkodai’ it means they are giving themselves [as a gift].”
(Kavitha’s Translator)
“Some people say, Christians also say that there is no better love than giving your life 
for a friend. That is what ‘Thatkodai’ means.”
(Kavitha)
The single thread that runs through the combatant women’s own justification for a 
suicide act is the concept of giving a gift. The actual act of giving can be argued as a 
‘materialistic gesture’ where the human value of the gift surpasses the materiality and
141 The single occasion where a member of the Black Tiger squad did not die was due to his ability to leave 
the vehicle full of explosives that was about to explode and escape to safety.
142 The women focused research that is currently available is gathered primarily from failed women suicide 
bombers held in various Israeli gaols (Victor 2004, Channel 4 programme “The Cult of the Suicide Bomber”, 
11 September 2006).
143 LTTE has thus far granted access only to the BBC and to Indian journalist Pratap in the 1990s.
144 It is impossible to predict how many of those I have interviewed will end up as suicide bombers in times 
to come. This uncertainty is primarily based on two facts as at that point they either have not been chosen to 
become members of the elite Black Tiger squad or they are awaiting the allocation of an assignment.
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places it in a superior category of a selfless act. Within this category women are often 
seen as selfless givers.
The words ending Kolai and Kodai convey a powerful message within the suicide 
discourse. The very act of taking one’s own life in suicide, Thatkolai is separated from 
that of committing an act of suicide bombing, which is a selfless act of giving a gift, 
Thatkodai. The interviewees took a great deal of time to explain this difference to me, 
which is significant as it appears that my understanding of the difference was important 
to them. The significance between the words is not recorded in any of the literature by 
the academics that generally regard the women combatants as being ‘used’ by the LTTE 
(de Mel 2001, Coomaraswamy 1996). As Durkheim recognises,
we actually see the individual in all these cases seek to strip him[her]self of his[her] 
personal being in order to be engulfed in something which [s]he regards as [her]his 
true essence.
Durkheim (1952), 
translated by Spaulding and Simpson 2000:225)
The altruistic suicide discussed by Durkheim is strongly reflected in Kavitha’s discourse 
above, which shows that she is aware that the social perception of self-sacrifice through 
bombings and other means are seen negatively.
Amongst many citizens of Sri Lanka, suicide is not culturally frowned upon or 
stigmatised, but is seen as shortening the lengthy period of suffering endured during an 
individual’s lifetime145 (Hopgood 2005:69). This view is very much based on the cause 
and effect in life’s never-ending cycle of birth, death and re-birth. Such a cultural 
perspective remains veiy different from that of Western societies, and contextualising 
the perceptions of suicide along with the revolutionary ethos of death attained during 
the cause of fighting is viewed as a ‘gift’ that is given to one’s friends, family and the 
nation state of Tamil Eelam.
It must be recognised that neither the wider community nor the LTTE revolutionary 
group see human life as cheap or worthless. Though the LTTE’s use of human life to 
further the cause as battlefield combatants or suicide combatants can be viewed as
145 Sri Lanka has the highest rate of suicides amongst its female population according to statistics produced 
by the World Health Organisation in 1991. Also referred to in Hopgood 2005:76.
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contradictory to those who value life, it needs to be seen in a context of ‘war’ conditions, 
whereby the giving or sacrificing of human life is required to achieve their aims and 
objectives. The sentiment of being unable to put a value on life makes it a priceless 
commodity. Hence the women combatants of the LTTE see the sacrifice of life as giving 
the ultimate gift.
“People refer to them as suicide bombers but they are not committing suicide, they 
are gifting their life.”
(Kavitha)
Kavitha’s own insistence that this is a gift signifies an understanding of sacrifice similar 
to that described by Bauman (1992) who claims that the willingness to die for another is 
the “only truly individual of human acts”. He further states that “t]he greatest gift one 
human being can offer another is the gift of one’s life. ‘To die for another’ is the ultimate 
ethical act; one by which all morality is measured” (1992:200).
Many in civic society feel a great obligation to the combatants for the sacrifices they 
make on behalf of the community.
“When you hear the news that many of the fighters have died fighting for us you feel 
bad. It is just like how if one of my relatives have died. I have the same feelings. At 
times like that we help them in other ways by giving money. Yes we do that a lot 
[helped out with food or money or medicines and bandages]. This is something 
everybody does and it is normal. We cannot repay them for the sacrifice. You cannot 
put a value on a life.”
(GV)
In the above discourse, GV harbours a strong sense of personal indebtedness towards 
the combatants who are perceived by her as ‘fighting for us’. The collective usage of the 
word ‘us’ in this instance focuses on a transitional relatedness in kinship that is due to 
the act being committed on behalf of another, the ‘us’ in this instance referring to the 
Tamil community at large. Whilst the relatedness links the combatant women to the 
civic society it invariably creates a complex situation by sharing both its achievements 
(the success in the attack carried out) and losses (of life) thus invoking simultaneous 
senses of gratitude, admiration and of guilt. The relatedness that links the combatants 
and the civic community further carries a sense of familial identity when GV refers to the 
deaths as “It is just like how if one of my relatives have died. I have the same feelings.”
- 1 8 1 -
These sentiments are also echoed in Sri Kantha’s (2004) writing in relation to suicide 
bombers where he states that “all were superheroes of a higher order for Tamils like me. 
They belong to my extended family, and they are the real thing...” (Sri Kantha 2004:3). 
The sentiments expressed by both GV and Sri Kantha corresponds directly with 
Durkheim who argues,
Because altruistic suicide, though showing the familiar suicidal traits, resembles 
especially in its most vivid manifestations some categories of action which we are 
used to honouring with our respect and even admiration, people have often refused 
to consider it as self-destruction.
(Durkheim 1952 translated by Spaulding and Simpson 2000:239).
The identification of the suicide combatants as both heroes and kin places the suicide 
bombers in an elevated position where they are not only removed from the society but 
also venerated. The kin identity forms a lifeline to the perceived heroic act, which then 
(indirectly) allows the civic state to embrace the altruistic glory of the suicide 
martyrdom.
Gendered Dimensions
The suicide bomber’s performance of Thatkodai and not Thatkolai gives credence to the 
paradoxical dualism of the destruction of life in order to give (the gift of life) to the 
nation.
“Yes. Sacrifice is the most important thing. Living for other people and doing good 
for them and not thinking about ourselves.”
(Yalini*)
Yalini’s discourse illustrates a gendered dimension that is implicit in the female roles of 
Tamil culture, which suggests that sacrifice and selflessness are a part of a socially 
constructed womanhood. De Mel (2001:225) argues that the women suicide bombers 
can identify with the cultural upbringing of Tamil women to accept sacrifice as a way of 
life. I would agree with De Mel as women in Tamil society have been socially 
constructed to be selfless givers. Even though women combatants leave the domestic 
sphere and enter into a more public sphere, the values of their upbringing permeates
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into the new roles as suicide bombers. This gendered aspect is also recognised by civic 
women who state,
“They [Tamil women] don’t concentrate on how fair it is or what they want. 
Sacrificing is a main character of the [Tamil] women. There is no surprise in 
sacrificing. Anyway she [Tamil woman] is sacrificing wherever she is no?”
(HA*)
Based on these definitions the self-sacrifice involved in suicide bombing is not an added 
‘extra’ to the culturally accepted social roles of women combatants, and there is a 
noticeable difference between the language used by male and female combatants to 
describe what suicide bombing means to them as gendered individuals. It must also be 
noted that the dictionary definition of martyrdom significantly includes “death or 
suffering for any great cause” (Oxford Dictionary 1980 my italics) .
By analysing my own primary data and the existing secondary data, the gendered 
dimension of the act of suicide bombing is highlighted through language used. The 
interviews conducted by the BBC146 with male ‘would be’ suicide bombers reveal that 
they view suicide bombing as an act of sacrifice, meaning to forgo, forfeit or surrender 
their life. There is a similar argument of gendered manipulation that can be applied to 
the male combatants,147 as reflected in one male who stated that “I feel honoured that 
my death will take our struggle one step closer to Eelam” (Pratap 2001:103). The male 
combatants in this instance tend to see the act of suicide more as an internalised honour 
gained than an externalised sacrifice made.
Whilst acknowledging that it is often difficult to separate biology from culture (Eichler 
1980 referred to in Mackie 1987: 3) it is none the less noticeable that the discourse 
between male and female suicide bombers reveals a gendered division. Interestingly 
men do not use the same words, suggesting that sacrifice could be seen with a 
specifically gendered inflection.
146 BBC “Inside Story” programme shown in UK History Channel, 17 July 2004.
147 As discussed previously, Black Tigers are an elite suicide squad who are hand picked for their high 
discipline and unquestioning loyalty to Prabhakaran. (reference my own interviews, Pratap 2001, Narayan- 
Swamy 2002, Bandara :2002)
“...They would die happily; their only hope was their death would inflict the kind of damage on the enemy 
that would make Prabhakaran happy. Seeming Annai’s [Prabhakaran] happiness was all that mattered -  
then, they would not have lived and died in vain” (Pratap 2001:103/104)
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This is in stark contrast to my own research into the women combatants who view 
suicide bombing to be a gift, a present, an offering, or a contribution. Women suicide 
bombers call it ‘an act of giving’. This may be tied to essentialist views of women’s socio- 
biological roles as nurturers, defining them as ‘givers’. This is opposed to male suicide 
bombers who call it ‘an act of sacrifice’, tied to the masculine role of a ‘non-giver’ or a 
‘receiver’, which their gendered socio-cultural roles have dictated.
Therefore I would emphasise the importance of understanding the multi-layered 
thinking that is contained within the LTTE’s ideology of martyrdom. The theoretical 
justification of Thatkodai (self-giving /gift) as a present to the nation to alleviate the 
nation's problematic state can be debated as a gendered facet of women. Whilst the 
available literature does not address the issue of combatant men carrying a different 
view to combatant women, a number of academics argue that the agency of women is 
deeply embedded in the culture of sacrifice (de Mel 2001, Coomaraswamy 1996, 
Maunaguru 1995).
Friendship, Kinship and Death
Combatant women viewed dying for a friend in a kin relationship or for the nation at 
large as an extension of being physically responsible for the well being of the LTTE kin 
family. Though social scientists such as Bauman (1992:207) may argue this as a “moral 
awakening from the egoistic somnolence in which life is for most people,” the reality of 
life lived amongst friends in kinship carries far greater attachments of care and personal 
sacrifice148.
The selfless act of Thatkodai (‘gift of self) which is steeped in altruistic suicide is much 
more significant on a personal level and works on several levels that are overlooked by 
many authors. A major theme amongst women combatants that appears in
148 Bauman (1992:209) argues that in death and morality there are two kinds of individuals present; the 
hero who acts to promote the cause and the moral person who sees the cause as life /  well being of another 
person. Both these individuals are called upon to sacrifice themselves for the cause that is far nobler than 
the value of their fives.
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Balasingham’s (1993) writing149 is the use of a Active kin identity (as in Kavitha’s 
discourse referred to earlier) that indicates emotions towards ‘a friend’ are stronger than 
those for the consanguine kin family. However, the sacrifices of this nature send ripples 
through the civic community which positions itself within the Active kin structure of the 
LTTE in relation to death. It also forms a part of a transitional consanguinity as 
discussed earlier in Chapter Four.
It must be recognised that the sacrifice of life as a gift to the nation creates a value added 
commodity within the revolutionary movement. “Values [are] often gained when people 
die...[...]...In the end it is death, rather than lives it claimed to preserve, which turns into 
the supreme value. Death itself becomes the cause for the hero of a cause” (Bauman 
1992:209). Therefore, women combatants such as Dhanu and Malathy (whose role is 
discussed in this chapter) have become examples of heroes created in death. They were 
both young women combatants who sacrificed their lives for the cause of the LITE and 
over the years have become highly revered legends.
Arasi discusses two deaths that mean a great deal to her emotionally, that of her sister 
and her close female friend Sambathy. In Arasi’s discourse the death of a fnend appears 
to be discussed with a greater tenderness than the death of a family member.
In relation to the sister Arasi states,
“my sister next to me was in the movement she was martyred. She was next to me so 
we both went through the same experiences. She was martyred in 1998. She was 
bom  in 1975... [after some calculation]... she was 23. We were both together but then 
I had to go to do something else and it [death] happened then. [In] Killinochi. Not 
on any of those 3 operations [Never Ceasing Waves operations150]. This was when 
the army moved forward there was a battle.”
(Arasi)
Whereas, in relation to her friend Sambathy, she states,
149 Women combatant who have fought in the Elephant Pass battle said “our friends and colleagues have 
voluntarily given their lives to a cause which they firmly believed in and held precious to their hearts...they 
died expecting us to carry on the struggle after their death. So when we see them fighting with all their 
strength, when we see them dying, when we are side by side with them as they die, our determination to 
fight the enemy does not diminish, it grows even more stronger”. (Balasingham 1993:84)
150 LTTE conducted a series of attacks against the state Armed Forces code named Never Ceasing Waves. A 
great number of human losses were incurred on both sides.
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“in 1993 during the Poonahari Battle I lost a friend Sambathy. That was very 
shocking. She and I were very close friends. I was with her and saw her dying. When 
I went near her there were shells and rounds all around her. Before that we used to 
talk a lot about the people and about the status of women in the society. After my 
friend’s death, I wanted to fulfil her desires and ambitions”.
(Arasi)
There is a strong sense of reflexitivity in Arasi’s discourse regarding the two deaths that 
are of significance to her. A closer analysis reveals a difference between the two personal 
losses. Sambathy’s death invoked emotionally revealing statements of the shock 
encountered in seeing her friend die, which then directly relates to a close affinity before 
death “we used to talk a lot.” This type of bond between Sambathy and Arasi was 
missing in her discussion of her sister’s death, which was more distant in comparison to 
the death of her friend, and may be due to reasons such as the friend being with Arasi 
during times of hardships and extreme physical endurance. Furthermore, witnessing 
Sambathy’s death added further emotional turmoil in a way that her sister’s death did 
not, thus removing her from the immediacy of her sister’s death. It is the death of 
Sambathy that has inspired and created a yearning as she describes, “7 wanted to fulfil 
her [Sambathy5 s] desires and ambitions” This also refers to the emotional ties that have 
been built with the non-consanguine family of the LTTE which override consanguinal 
ties, as discussed in the previous chapter. Firth (1999) describes this as a key theme of 
friendship that relies on an assumption of “benevolence and loyalty” (1999: xv), which 
extends to women combatants preparing to sacrifice their own self for a friend and the 
greater civic community.
I noticed that those living in Colombo had a disinterest in the war and the suffering 
endured in Jaffna. These observations were confirmed by way of casual conversations 
with women in Colombo who admitted that the war was too far away to concern them. 
Thus when suicide bombings occur in Colombo they bring the message of death to their 
relatively safe lives, and this fosters the same feelings of insecurity as those living in war 
zones. The lack of comprehension of suicide as a gift is perhaps reflective of society 
finding the concept totally alien, as their views are different to the LTTE, as is illustrated 
in the following,
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...there was virtually no support for attacking civilians regardless of whether they 
were in Sinhalese territory or Tamil region. The attitudes regarding attacking 
military targets (Sri Lankan soldiers occupying Jaffna for instance) were more 
varied.
(Bloom 2005:67)
Whilst the Tamils of Colombo and Jaffna may not all support suicide bombing, the 
funding received by the LTTE from the diasporas community is channelled into all 
aspects of the movement’s activities as the LTTE reaches out to a Tamil society which 
extends beyond the boundaries of Sri Lanka.
Celebration o f martyrdom
Death in the LTTE is justified as a form of martyrdom. Suicide deaths in particular 
follow the Tamil linguistic definition of tiyakam, meaning ‘abandonment’ rather than 
‘destruction’ of life, and those who are engaged in such activities are considered to be 
ascetics who have given up the pleasures of life such as intimate relationships (Schalk 
1997a and 1997b).
It is of uttermost importance to understand the concept of tiya[alkam as a reaction 
of encountering death. Tiya[a]kam is a specific type of aggressive mourning 
behaviour in the martial culture of the LTTE.
(Schalk 1992:51)
‘Aggressive mourning’ as referred to by Schalk (1992) above defines instances where a 
sense of loss is felt when a comrade who has been a close friend in a kin relationship 
dies. This sense of loss and bereavement can act as a trigger for avenging the death 
through self-sacrifice, and often of volunteering to be a suicide bomber. Though my 
research did not reveal the range of meanings that are discussed by Schalk (1992) I was 
informed of the ethos and the sentimentality behind the self-sacrifice of undertaking 
suicide missions.
Schalk’s (1992 and 1997a) article on LTTE suicide bombers reveals two main ways in 
which the LTTE constructs its suicide martyrdom ethos. Firstly the root of the 
martyrdom concept lies deep in the revivalist literature used in India during its struggle 
for independence. Whilst Indian independence did not rely on the concept of 
martyrdom as popularised by the LTTE, Schalk (1997a) identifies a common link in the
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use of the concept tyagi from ancient Sanskrit. Whilst the Sanskrit language refers to 
tyagi as ‘one who abandons life’, this changes in the Tamil language to tiyaki, ‘the one 
who loses one’s own life in the act of assisting another’ (Schalk 1997a). Secondly, there 
was a need to identify those who sacrifice themselves for the cause through martyrdom. 
This meaning of martyrdom illustrates a move away from the Indian linguistic roots of 
martyrdom to the Tamil language’s own hybrid version (Schalk 1992:51). Schalk (1992) 
identifies the separation of death on the battlefield from death as a suicide bomber, and 
claims that Caatci151, which literally translated means ‘one who endures submissively5 
and is further defined by the LTTE as ‘one who fights furiously5, is only granted to 
combatants who die on the battlefield. In addition the word Tiyakam*«*, which 
translates as “abandonment” is also used as “martyrdom” and is given specifically to 
suicide combatants (Schalk 1992:51).
Your children love the independence of the motherland more than their life. You 
must feel great and proud of being the parent of those who have given these 
extraordinary beings for a holy aim. Your children have not died; they have become 
history.
(Prabhakaran 1009:218 in Schalk 19973:15 my italics)
The above speech by Prabhakaran instils a sense of pride in parents, as the life of their 
child is not wasted, the child is fulfilling holy aims and is granted a place in history. 
Prabhakaran’s use of the term ‘holy aim’ is not aligned to any religion, as the LTTE is a
151 Schalk(i992)s linguistic linking of LTTE ‘s Hinduism and Jaffna’s Christianity has resulted in him 
arguing that the word “caatcF literally meaning to “submissively endure all suffering to the end without 
using violence” (Schalk 1992:53) was in effect was created by Tamil Christian (Catholic to be precise) priests 
when describing LITE combatants who have been killed in combat. At the earlier part of the struggle there 
was some notable support to the LTTE by the Church giving credence to the church’s willingness to make 
the combatants both martyrs and heroes. Arguably there is a fundamental difference between the literal 
meaning of the word and the adoption made by the LITE which Schalk claims is an anomaly, whereby the 
LITE in fact uses the word to describe aggressive and extreme form of combat committed prior to own 
death in battle field. The word Caacti has some of its roots in colonial period when a person was willing to 
sacrifice own self to uphold a personal conviction (ibid:53-54).
152 Tiyaakam in reference to an armed struggle is to be found in Bhagavad-Gita, the sacred scriptures from 
ancient India that are believed to have been spoken word of Lord Krishna. This notion of the armed struggle 
was revived in India during the period of conflict against the British. A further development of terminology 
extends to Cattiyaccaaski meaning ‘truth-witness’ or Irrattacaaksi meaning ‘blood-witness’. Blood-witness 
was a title handed over by Christian missionaries upon translating the Greek word Martyr from the New 
Testament. An example of this can be seen in Matthew 18, 16 and many other places in the translated 
version of the Tamil language New Testament (Schalk 1992:52).
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secular organisation as discussed previously. However by using this term he is 
attempting to give the fight for a free Tamil nation State some moral justification.
The LTTE’s concept of martyrdom was developed in the 1980’s and actively promoted 
later in that decade. De Mel (2004:77) comments that,
...what animates suicide bombing is the personal status and self-esteem that 
accompanies the act of self-destruction. This self-esteem is constructed and 
reinforced by the militant group’s glorification of the suicide bomber’s
m artyrdom^.
This calculated and rationalised promotion of martyrdom was linked not only to the 
violent armed conflict but also to the suffering of those in the civic society. Whilst the 
civic society had no control over the LTTE’s ideology or its rationale, the LTTE had 
incorporated them into its thought process as a way of gaining an endorsement for its 
activities. The significance of this inclusion is seen by the way martyrdom is celebrated 
in society^.
Schalk (1997a and 1997b) argues that with the Diaspora’s support and the need for 
international exposure the LTTE needed to translate Tamil language specific words, 
such as tiyaki (meaning ‘martyr’) and tiyaakam (meaning ‘martyrdom’), into English 
and other languages for both the overseas Tamil population and a non-Tamil audience. 
With the activation of suicide bombings in 1987, the LTTE made its first public 
proclamation on martyrdom in 1989 at the Marvirar Nal celebrations stating that 
“every freedom fighter who sacrifices his or her life is a martyr...’’(Schalk 19973:4). 
Mavirar1^  means ‘Great Heros’ (Nal means day) therefore every combatant who 
sacrifices their life for the cause is a ‘Great Hero’.
x53 This is a view based on the work of Hage (2003), writing about Palestinian suicide bombers who states 
that self-esteem and the glorification of martyrdom are primary motivational factors for suicide bombers. 
The martyrdom aspect, which is mostly discussed amongst the literature relating to Middle Eastern suicide 
bombings, is seen as an extreme form of religious belief which is manipulated to create an ending with 
immediacy of reward.
154 Bloom (2005:68) had conducted research illustrating that those under the age of 30 with less education 
are more likely to support the LTTE’s violence than those over 30 years with a university education. She 
further states that many saw the armed forces as legitimate targets for suicide bomb attacks.
155 Mavirar is plural and Maviran is singular.
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The martyrdom aspect of death is publicly celebrated in a number of ways by the LTTE. 
Firstly there are set dates for celebrations such as 27th November (dating back to the 
first event in 1989) which honours Marvirar Nal aimed at all the LTTE combatants who 
had died in battle. The death of Malathy (who died by taking cyanide capsule in 1987 
and was the first woman combatant to die in battle) is celebrated on the 10th October, 
and the 5th July is Black Tiger day (when Capt. Miller became the first suicide bomber on 
this day in 1987). All these days consist of a ritualistic ceremony, which includes lighting 
candles, raising flags and parades combined with cultural entertainment such as music, 
dance and plays.
My research period coincided with the anniversaiy of Malathy5s death, which gave me an 
opportunity to experience at first hand the kind of atmosphere that is generated by such 
occasions. Apart from the large paintings and posters that decorated the roads and 
junctions, it was very interesting to note the very prominent shrine for Malathy that was 
built in the stadium where the festivities were conducted. Every person present 
(approximately over a hundred people) attended the shrine to offer flowers, incense and 
prayers. The schoolchildren in their clean and smart white school uniforms appeared to 
be ‘on duty*, distributing picture cards, posters and pocket calendars with Malathy’s 
image, or were engaged in general assistance, and a number of school bands played at 
the celebrations. The atmosphere for the day was very much that of a family event, with 
free food and drink. However it was not difficult to realise that such veneration and 
engagement of children in the process paves the way for the next generation of 
combatants and maybe even suicide bombers.
The celebration of martyrs includes those who died in the battlefield whilst fighting, 
those who had to resort to cyanide poisoning, and those who were engaged in suicide 
missions. The collective memory of them is kept alive by pillars erected by the LTTE that 
can be seen from the road, and have the role of actively reminding civic society of the 
sacrifices made by the combatants of the LTTE. These pillars are known as 
Ninaivuccinnam or “Tokens of Commemoration” (Schalk 1997^44). The tokens that I 
witnessed in Velvettiturai (the home town of Prabhakaran) were for the twelve members 
of the LTTE who were arrested by the IPKF and were on the verge of being handed over 
to the armed forces when they resolved to commit suicide by cyanide poisoning in
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1987156. There were twelve pillars rising from the ground (some 12 feet or more) with 
widening columns that reached towards the sky. Each of the pillars contained a 
photograph of one of the people being commemorated along with the dates of their birth 
and death. Although these structures are not gravestones and do not contain bodies or 
ashes they are painted in the same blue colour as the LTTE gravestones. The deaths that 
had occurred in order for the movement to be built are strongly etched on the memories 
of all present through the impressive nature of these structures. Whilst the pillars 
commemorate the death of combatants who had community and family kin ties, both 
the construction and maintenance of the pillars is carried out by the LTTE with no 
involvement by the consanguine family members (Schalk 1997 b: 45).
The distancing of dead combatants from their biological families is an interesting aspect 
of the LTTE which I suggest feeds into the creation of the non-consanguine LTTE family. 
Schalk’s extensive research into the LTTE reveals that prior to 1991 the dead bodies of 
the combatants were handed back to the family for disposal, with the LTTE attending 
the funeral service and making speeches and salutations to the dead (Schalk I997b:45). 
This position changed after 1991, when the LTTE did not return the bodies to families 
but started to bury them in the LTTE’s own cemeteries known as Tuyilum Illam, 
meaning Sleeping House. The official ceremony typically consists of a farewell speech 
made by a leader from the LTTE followed by a gun salute. This is further followed by a 
ritual reading of a text comparing the dead person to a seed returning back to soil from 
which new plants will emerge. This can also be seen in the context of reincarnation and 
the perpetual cycle of life and death. This type of funeral ritual replaces the religious 
funerals so further highlighting the secularism within the LTTE (Schalk 1997 b: 45).
The cemeteries I visited had neatly arranged rows of headstones with mounds. After the 
initial shock of realising a majority of the dead were in their late teens and early 
twenties, I noticed how extremely well maintained they were. There were no weeds 
growing on them or any paint chippings, in fact they looked immaculate. One of the 
cemeteries I visited located in Mulathir district, Pudukudiirupu had an unusual layout 
with identical neatly arranged mounds all starting from a central podium and spreading 
outwards, reminiscent of the rays of the sun (Figure 13). The reason for identical 
mounds is explained as “The ambition is to give every martyr a visible mound recalling
156 An LTTE leader who visited handed the cyanide capsules to the twelve members.
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his [her] memory as a fighter, not as a private person” (Schalk (1997b 145). At both the 
cemeteries I visited I was informed that not all mounds actually contain bodies. The 
reason I was given for this was that sometimes there were no whole bodies to bury.
It is notable how devoid of religious imagery the LTTE cemeteries were. None of the 
graves had any form of religious symbols attached to them. This gave me a sense of an 
active propagation of the LTTE’s secularist ideologies. All religions have their varying 
practices, especially for death; for instance burial of the dead is usually conducted in the 
Christian faith whereas Hindus normally carry out a cremation. However the LTTE buiy 
all their dead, rather than following the dead person’s original religious background. 
Though Schalk does not engage in the religious difference debate he does say that the 
LTTE find it hard to convince families of Hindu combatants that their family member 
should be buried rather than cremated. He further states that,
Since July 1991 all martyrs have been buried and not burned in the tuyilum illam  
[Sleeping House]. The official reason for this was that the martyr should feel close to 
the soil which [s]he defended. The non-official reason is that Yalppanam [Jaffna] 
suffering from a lack of firewood.
(Schalk 1997b: 45)
The creation of a separate cemetery for the LTTE combatants who die contributes to 
them being recognised as different from civic society. Furthermore, by separating the 
dead combatants from their consanguine family burial grounds (many use part of their 
family land as a collective family cemetery) the LTTE has in effect created their own 
family cemetery, with all the care and maintenance being the responsibility of the 
movement.
The LTTE’s veneration of the dead had been addressed by the State armed forces by 
bulldozing/flattening a number of the LTTE cemeteries (Narayan-Swamy 2006:259). At 
one of the cemeteries I visited they had collected some of the rubble and had showcased 
it with an epitaph to the destruction^7.
The families of martyrs are honoured and are looked after financially from a welfare 
aspect, which is not dissimilar to Palestinian suicide bombers (BBC “Inside Story” 2004)
1571 was informed by the Gatekeeper that the idea to prepare a showcase was given to the LTTE by one of 
the civic women who was part of my interview group, whose specific identity (as well as the name of the 
second cemetery) I wish to withhold for safety reasons.
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*s8. A notable difference amongst the Palestine women suicide bombers is in the 
monetary remuneration received by the families, where noticeably the financial 
remuneration paid to a female suicide bomber’s family is only half that of a male suicide 
bomberx59(yictor 2004:35). The justification of a lesser payment for a woman suicide 
bomber has been that had the male lived, he would have been able to earn a higher 
amount of money than a woman would. Information concerning any payments from the 
LTTE is unobtainable as it operates on a closed book basis. Families of martyrs do not 
discuss financial remunerations, and are often kept in a highly visible social position 
especially during times of festivals. During the celebrations of Mahaveerar Nal (the 
Martyrs day) the parents of dead martyrs are paraded in front of cameras and honoured 
for loyalty shown to the cause, and the sacrifice their children have made to the same 
cause (BBC “Inside Stoiy”160 2004, de Mel 2001). The photographs taken on such 
occasions are posted on the revolutionary group’s web pages for the world to view161. 
Further, there are commemoration cards that can be purchased though the website to 
celebrate the LTTE’s martyrdom from any part of the world (Figure 12). The LTTE 
grants martyrdom to both male and female suicide bombers, and female suicide 
bombers are given the same martyrdom recognition as male suicide bombers in death.
Summary
Female suicide bombers have become a cause celebre in the world of revolutionary 
warfare, raising issues about feminist body politics, individual agency and autonomy 
along with gender identity within revolutionary movements. Social perceptions have 
made the existing male focused analysis of the gender discourse sensationalised in the 
media reporting of women who commit acts of suicide bombings. The essentialist views 
in society may have added to the refusal to accept the reality of the rising phenomena of 
women as suicide bombers and it appears that analysts are less willing to address this 
phenomenon. It is a mistake to overlook the rising phenomenon of women suicide
158 BBC “Inside Story” programme shown in UK History Channel, 17 July 2004
159 A life time stipend of four hundred dollars is paid by which ever the organisation claims responsibility 
for the ittack (eg. Hamas, POL or Islamic Jihad) to male suicide bombers and two hundred dollars per 
month was paid for women suicide bombers (Victor 2004:35).
160 BBC “Inside Story” programme shown in UK History Channel, 17 July 2004
161 www.eelam and www.tamil.net.
- 1 9 3 -
bombers as it clearly suggests a change in the negotiated traditional roles of women as 
combatants in both revolutionary groups and civic society.
The reasons for becoming suicide bombers are both complex and multi-layered. An 
analysis of suicide bombing by the LTTE combatant women reveals that it is an 
empowering act reinstating an individual’s lost agency, and can be seen as the ultimate 
gift given to those they care for and to the nation at large. Feminist academics (see 
Coomaraswamy 1994, 1996,2002, de Mel 2001, 2004 and Maunaguru 1995) had seen 
the role of women suicide bombers as a clear manipulation of women by patriarchy. 
However, the women revolutionaries see this as a career pinnacle, where their complex 
gender negotiation grants them the same1 high* status awarded to the men who become 
suicide bombers.
The reality of the socio-cultural situation dictates limited options for a sexually violated 
young woman in a highly patriarchal society where women’s sexuality is linked to the 
moral virtue of the nation state. In such circumstances the revolutionary group provides 
a valuable social service that the community may be unable or unwilling to provide. 
Some sexually violated civic women who feel vulnerable do end up as strong willed 
combatants who receive no discouragement to pay with their lives. Such women may 
harbour deep-rooted feelings of impurity from a violated body that turns into the 
victim’s right to avenge.
It can be argued that Dhanu became an avenging angel of death rather than a mere 
suicide bomber on a mission and her act was emancipatory by targeting the head of the 
nation state that violated her sexual purity. However it can also be seen as being purely 
instrumentalised in feeding into the cultural construction of women’s roles whereby they 
are in need of purification for the sexual violations committed by others on their bodies. 
Therefore I would say that until society changes its attitudes whereby the worth of a 
woman is not measured by her virginity and sexual violence against women is 
recognised as not being a fault of the victim, there will continue to be a risk that those 
who are marginalised will be directed into carrying out extreme acts of violence.
Whilst the actions of women suicide bombers are highly visible, their motivational 
factors are often overlooked by focusing on religious fundamentalism (Middle East 
based perspective). This narrow view reduces the impact of other culturally dictated 
motivational factors especially those felt by women such as the hatred and hopelessness
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created by the many kinds of personal losses and violations, especially the loss of sexual 
purity. It must also be noted that there are no religious motivational factors within the 
LTTE linking female combatants to suicide bombings. It is seen as an entirely secular act 
that is part of a rational strategy of altruistic suicide. It must also be understood that the 
Tamil society in Jaffna are living in a culture that does not view suicide as a basis for 
stigma.
An analysis of the way in which the LITE deal with their dead highlights a number of 
key points; firstly, the dead are kept alive in the collective social memoiy by building 
monuments in public spaces. Secondly, the dead are separated from the greater society 
and placed in an elevated position by being buried in a cemetery of their own. Thirdly 
the religious, caste and class segregation as practiced in the society is replaced by the 
LTTE’s own set of rituals. Fourthly, the dead combatant is no longer part of their 
consanguine family but a substantial part of the LTTE family. Hence s/he is buried in 
the LTTE’s ‘own’ cemeteiy (which can also be seen as the LTTE family cemetery), by the 
side of their non-consanguine kin members and not in the consanguine family cemetery 
with the rest of their biological family. The women combatants are buried next to male 
combatants illustrating a sexual equality in death through the act of burials.
The gender equality argument must be seen in the context of violent political conflict. 
Whilst women take an equally active role in becoming suicide bombers, it is 
questionable whether they can maintain this form of equality gained through an extreme 
form of self-sacrifice during a post-war era. This in turn questions the sustainability of 
this particular form of negotiated equality achieved by women combatants of the LITE.
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CHAPTER 6
AH-LU-MAI EQUALITY AND EMPOWERMENT 
OF THE NEW WOMAN, PUTHUMAI PEN
Introduction
The term Empowerment is used widely within the feminist discourse implying the 
possession of some form of power. A working definition that I will use here to represent 
this term defines empowerment as a ‘multi-dimensional social process’ that enables 
individuals to gain some kind of control or authority over some aspect of their lives and 
in their society (Page and Czuba 1999). It suggests some change in the existing power 
relations, and relates specifically to individuals and their relationships with others in 
their communities (also see Rappoport 1984, Zimmerman 1984, Afshar and Alikhan 
2002, Wray 2004, Rowlands (1998). The definition of Ah-lu-mai given below represents 
similar sentiments and as such should be treated as the same.
There is no definition of empowerment in Tamil that relates specifically to women which 
recognises the control or authority they have over their own lives. Therefore when 
women combatants came to be recognised for their abilities and resilience, there was a 
need to define this development. The LTTE created the word Ah-lu-mai which is 
reflective of the new woman that is seen amongst their combatant women who regularly 
use the word Ah-lu-mai to mean empowerment. The word Ah-lu-mai encompasses 
‘governance, authority, or leadership roles’ and ‘authorise, give power, make able’ to 
provide a new word that is used by the LITE women to represent their new identity. The 
lack of a direct translation caused a problem during the interviews that was resolved by 
the women combatants and their translator coming to an agreed decision as to what it 
could mean, even though the meaning was imprecise. It must be noted that the word 
Ah-lu-mai is often used by combatant women but never by civilian women.
The war has challenged gender identity in civic society, which in turn has opened up 
possibilities that were unknown and certainly unavailable in the pre-war era for women.
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In this chapter I discuss whether the prolonged war is the catalyst for a notable number 
of women to leave their traditional roles and embrace a completely new way of life. A life 
which offers a new purpose, a new aim and a new ambition but still retains traditional 
views about female modesty, chastity and other forms of normative femininity as 
practiced in the Tamil society. This creates a paradoxical position for women who enter 
the revolutionary movement, and the changing social roles that have enabled Tamil 
women certain freedoms have been credited to the LTTE’s intervention in civic life in 
Jaffna.
In this final chapter I will explore how gender is (re)constructed within the 
revolutionary movement and how such (re)constructions of gender have reverberated 
through civic society and challenge the existing social construction of female roles in 
Tamil society. The chapter will further analyses Ah-lu-mai in relation to the traditional 
and changing roles of women in Tamil society and the creation of the new woman, 
Puthumai Pen. I will also critically examine the role played by Prabhakaran in the 
formation of the new gender discourse to asses the extent to which he has assisted in 
developing women’s roles both within LTTE and in civic society.
Changing view s o f traditional roles
As discussed in Chapter One, Tamil women in Jaffna have a long history tied to the 
cultural values and practices of Southern India. These form the basis of Tamil women’s 
social roles within the confines of the home in Jaffna where women have begun to 
negotiate a new kind of identity. The negotiated identities are the result of a situation 
where women are engaging in new roles, by physically fighting for an independent state 
of Tamil Eelam whilst still maintaining most of the traditional social values.
The texts relating to Jaffna’s Tamil women in civic society are noticeably limited with 
publications by westerns academics ending circa 1980162. Since these available works are 
contemporary (c.1980) I will take the reader through the existing roles as portrayed and 
indicate ways in which they have changed over years. These texts discuss existing 
representations of Tamil woman in civic society, such as “a slave and renouncer, bound
162 See Hayes (1972), Hock et al (1978), David (1980), Reynolds (1980), and Wadley (1980). From 1990 
onwards, there is only Thiruchandran (1993,1994,1997,1998, and 1999) whose work also deals with South 
Indian Tamil women.
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on the exterior but internally powerful” (David 1980: 93). Hoch- Smith and Spring 
(1978) describe a "nurturer/healer and as witch/prostitute (referred to in Wadley 1980: 
14), whereas Hayes uses the “myth of feminine evil" (Hayes 1972 in Wadley 1980: 154) 
which is perhaps an appropriate explanation of the paradoxical dualism that the women 
find themselves in.
The power held by women (known as sakti) in effect forms the basis of Tamil women’s 
overall social position that posits women in an inner and an outer realm in society. The 
inner realm, known as ‘akam’, is the domestic sphere where women are powerful, as 
their voices are heard and their views are aired. In the outer realm, known as ‘puram,’ 
they are visibly controlled by the men in their families as “Jaffna Tamil culture views 
women as outwardly enslaved and inwardly powerful" (David 1980:103-4).
Akam, or the inward power of Tamil women in general (both combatant and civic), must 
not be disregarded as it forms a strong foundation for our understanding of combatant 
women. There is a Tamil proverb that states "through woman is being; and through 
woman is downfall” (Reynolds 1978: 69 as quoted in Wadley 1980: 153) which means 
that within Tamil society a woman is believed to have the power to control and alter 
significant events in life such as health, wealth, happiness and death. The power held is 
so great that "In order to control and direct powers, the dominant ideology states that 
the Tamil woman should be constrained and controlled by her male kin" (Wadley 1980: 
153).
Tradition demands a form of self-control that is embedded deep in patriarchal culture 
giving Tamil women a degree of social power that is recognised as being confined to the 
domestic sphere, but is nonetheless controlled by male relations in the family. The 
creation of the domestic sphere and its boundaries is an act of patriarchal control. There 
is an ambiguous acceptance by society of a woman’s recognised social powers within the 
confines of domesticity based on sexual purity (virginity) and morality linked to 
motherhood, which in turn places women on a pedestal and likens them to goddesses. At 
the same time her sexuality causes a great deal of concern to the four male family 
entities (father, brother, husband and son) that are in charge of controlling it, through a 
guise of stringent female behavioural expectations (Wadley 1980, David 1980).
The socially contradictory position that a Tamil woman finds herself in is of particular 
interest as she is overtly dominated by men, but covertly recognised as having an
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exceptional power as a woman. However the public image is predominantly ruled by an 
assumed social position of women. A closer inspection reveals that women primarily 
interact with kin and non-kin folk, but not necessarily with strangers. This asymmetrical 
social relationship positioning has brought observations from an American academic, 
who notes that:
...the public image of Jaffna women, putting it bleakly, is that women are selectively 
ignorant and incapable of learning crucial kinds of social knowledge, that they are 
dominated and subordinates to men, and that these states of affairs are ideologically 
represented as the state of nature.
(David 1980:106)
Though this notion is not applicable to all women, it is often perpetuated by women who 
actively distance themselves from any open debate about politics. The men in society 
confirm this by claiming that women's unwillingness to participate in such conversation 
is due to their lack of knowledge (David 1980: 107). Whilst David’s observation can be 
argued as dated and as colonialism embedded in orientalism, some parts of his study are 
still true in today’s patriarchal society. However I did see exceptions to the observations 
given by David (1980) amongst many of the combatant and civic women I met in Jaffna 
(including those I interviewed) whom were an educated, socially conscious minority. 
Their social conscience can be attributed not only to education but also to the changing 
political climate that emphasises women as active participants in society.
Reynolds (1980) argues that women’s acceptance of a subservient social position derives 
from Tamil women’s need to be secondary to men in order to maintain a powerful 
position as an auspicious being, who holds the responsibility for the well-being and 
maintenance of the family's lineage through selfless acts of suffering. She argues that 
beliefs such as self-denial and self-sacrifice are seen in religion and that this ideological 
social position then translates as "a salvific condition" (Reynolds 1980: 57) whereby the 
women act in a covert manner to perpetuate their subordinate state and maintain the 
power it yields.
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Social change: rationale and impact
Through my own research I noticed that though women (combatant and civic) agreed 
unanimously that women's status in Jaffna's Tamil society is certainly secondary to 
men; none of the civic female supporters and advocates of equality practiced an 
alternative social role within their own confined domestic sphere. Women are able to 
exert some autonomy within the confines of the patriarchally defined private space 
however it is within the public space that social change is more clearly visible. Thus with 
the controlling mechanism set in the domestic sphere, civic women have embarked on 
social changes in the public domain where even the simple act of women riding bicycles 
through the streets of Jaffna is seen as a symbolic reference to the independence of civic 
women163.
Women riding bicycles was an act bom out of necessity rather than an emancipatory act. 
During prolonged periods of warfare public transport was no longer available and the 
petrol embargo resulted in private vehicles being garaged.
“Here we [are] affected by war. Because war started no buses coming, no electricity, 
no such as thing!!!. So every woman... working woman in Jaffna [was] forced to ride 
[a] bicycle. Otherwise they can’t go for their work. Because work place more than 
two miles from their home. So they have to walk otherwise no other transport.. 
Nobody takes them to office. Who’s here? So they [working women] suffered. I first 
started walking to my school. One week I go walking. It took one hour. 2 
miles...Yeah. Very difficult [to wear a sari, carry books in the heat]. So I [was] forced 
to learn [to ride a] bicycle. So 2nd week I started going by bike. So this thing ‘I am a 
woman I must go on my own’..., I cant expect others to come... I didn’t think like 
that, but the need  forced me to do that....This [social change] induced by war. 
Luckily we are now happy. I saw lot of women older than my age, they are riding 
bicycles and we [were] very happy... So many women. Very grass root memory... 
We[women] are so happy because they [women]are not obliged to younger brothers, 
sons. ‘Son can you take me to the temple, can you take me to the hospital’ that thing 
is out now. Before that we used to do that”.
(BP*)
163 In a culture where female modesty is a key part of the gendered behaviour for women, riding a bicycle 
was seen as a masculine activity or an activity which could only be practiced by pre-pubescent girls.
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This view is shared by GV,
“Tell her this. A woman had to always live depending on her father first, then the 
husband and then son. But now she is going abroad or going to another place leaving 
young children to work. Not that she has no love for her husband or children, but 
she is more capable of doing these things now. She is able to ride the bicycle and go 
about doing what she wants to do. She can now live alone and send her family away 
to educate or work”.
(GV)
The experiences women were having of social change were emancipatory. The 
independence and freedom discussed by them is reflective of their own changing 
attitudes as well as that of civic society as a whole. Added to this, many young men 
joined the revolutionary movement, or left the country through the fear of being shot by 
the State-run army under suspicion of being a rebel, or were forcefully recruited by the 
revolutionary group due to their need for fighters or willingly joined for protection from 
the State. The result was a shortage of able-bodied young men in families who could act 
as chaperones to women in civic society. Hence women had to mobilise themselves by 
any means of transportation available in order to go to the market to purchase food 
items, go to work, or to attend any other need that arises16*. Undoubtedly, this resulted 
in definitive social changes that took place in women’s lives after the start of the war.
“So everything happens, there was a change in the society. Women also no? So we 
can survive. So the concept of the family is changing. So the husband is drunk. 
Before displacement we had to balance everything. We had to adjust to the man. 
Because of this concept. Since the displacement the woman told ok you go I will live 
alone. I can manage well. So there was the courage to do”.
(HA*)
The word ‘courage’ as used by HA encompasses both admittance and reflection of major 
social changes that have occurred in women’s lives. A loosening of the patriarchal grip of 
male control meant that in a post-displacement period Tamil women became aware of 
their own potential and this released a body of women to become combatants and 
assume the role of the male fighter. This particular role is so alien to the traditionally 
passive social roles of Tamil women that it becomes a significant addition to the already 
changing roles of women in civic society.
164 At times when there was no electricity, bicycles were used to power radios through their dynamos in 
order to hear news both nationally and internationally.
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Impact of LTTE on society
The transition made by women from a dependent to a relatively independent role is 
often seen in Jaffna as a radical aspect of empowerment. Some women such as BP, ES 
and DK are also of the view that women change their social behaviour in order to survive 
and that it is a necessity induced by the war rather than a part of a social revolution1^ .
The direct influence of the LTTE on the lives of civic women can be seen in the key areas 
of marriage and widowhood, although the levels of achievement of the LTTE over such 
in-grained social practices are limited. Through self-confidence the women combatants 
are able to influence some of the social restrictions imposed on women’s lives, such as 
choices of marital partners and the social views of widows.
Marriages of personal choice (colloquially known as love marriages’), which are 
generally frowned upon and discouraged in society at large, are accepted by the LTTE 
along with traditional arranged marriages. However the LTTE thoroughly disapprove of 
the dowry system practiced in Jaffna, which they see as being an insult to a woman, 
where her worth is measured in means that include moveable and immovable property 
as well as money. The LTTE issued laws disallowing this time-honoured practice (which 
was undoubtedly an economic relief for many of the poor in Jaffna), but failed to 
eradicate it as the dowry system changed its name to ‘donations’ and was thus retained. 
The metamorphosed dowry as a donation is given to the groom’s family by the bride’s 
family. The difference is that a dowry is agreed prior to the marriage then written down 
and formalised, but the donation is a verbal agreement with no documentation.
One change on this issue can be seen when women combatants retire from the 
revolutionary organisation and marry a man of civic society. Many such women (such as 
AK) have not exchanged any ‘donations’, staying true to LTTE ideologies.
The women combatants who have entered into matrimony have found it harder to 
conform to the expectations of in-laws and those of the greater civic society. These 
expectations are often simple practices such as wearing jewellery or flowers in their hair
165 I have separated the act of war and aggression from social revolution in order to define that social 
revolution in this instance is viewed as part of women’s social evolvement, which is not necessarily tied to 
war and its aggression.
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or any such female-centred beautification. By not following such customs, they convey a 
message of widowhood.
Traditionally widows are shunned from public life and excluded from auspicious 
occasions such as weddings. They are often condemned to wearing white saris and seen 
as bearers of bad tidings, and are not accepted as a part of the functioning society.
Within the Jaffna peninsula, widows are not stigmatised to the same extent as before 
and are now a more accepted part of society. Though the overall status of a widow in 
Tamil society has improved greatly, it is a mistake to believe that the status has totally 
changed. Many women including BP, DK, ES, GV, HA have said that they will not allow 
their widowed mothers to wear white saris and live in the shadows anymore.
The LTTE is very successful in repatriating widows back into civic society. Whilst the 
removal of the socio-historical stigma of widowhood is perfectly admirable, it must be 
noted that since the war there has been a rise in the number of female-headed 
households. Many of these are widowed women struggling to bring up young families 
with the added burden of care responsibilities for the elderly. The women of the LTTE 
have been active in promoting the ideology of a non-stigmatised social status for 
widowed civic women, and have started to address it formally as an issue. The women 
combatants give confidence to the widowed women in civic society and educate them in 
trades that were never open to them before, including undertaking roles that are
traditionally perceived as masculine employment, such as motor mechanics.
*
The LTTE discourages the traditional reverence bestowed upon motherhood and the 
symbolic roles of wives dependent on the women’s fertility166. The LTTE do not hold 
women as the keepers of purity of race and caste, and as being subservient to men in all 
aspects of life (Schalk 1992:80). Neither the traditional nor the revivalist attitude reveals 
the fundamental problem that the LTTE has in creating a combatant woman and linking 
her to history. The rationalisation of women carrying arms has been a difficult concept 
in comparison to the notion of a militant mother that is seeped in history. Thus the 
directional link had to be from either the leader as the ‘creator’ of the combatant women, 
or from borrowing an image from contemporary violent political struggles from other 
nations. This link can be further developed with the introduction from Tamil cultural
166 Infertile wives have a lesser social role than fertile women.
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values of a ‘virgin’ linked to arms; hence the concept of an ‘Armed Virgin’ was bom 
(Schalk 1992:135). Schalk (1992) argues that the LTTE actively promoted the image of 
the armed virgin and purity of the holy cause.
W om en’s initiation and perceived fem inism  in  the LTTE
The involvement of women in revolutionary groups predates women’s engagement in 
the LTTE. The emergence of combatant women in the Vituthalai Pulikal Munani Pen 
(Women’s Front of the LTTE) is undoubtedly a new phenomenon, though a historical 
recording of women’s involvement in political struggles reveals that Tamil women were 
involved in Gandhian style peaceful protests. A number of women (including AK) from 
varying socio-political backgrounds did contribute to the LTTE’s armed struggle from 
the outset. Their roles at the time (early 1980s) were limited to socially defined ‘women’s 
work’, providing safe housing and caring for the sick and injured.
The combatants that joined in the mid 1980s (such as Arasi, AK and Kavitha) had to 
continuously prove themselves in order to claim their place beside male fighters as 
competent combatants. “Women can do everything as good as the men, but we did have 
to work harder” (Arasi). By the time Yalini and others joined the revolutionary 
movement, women combatants were very much seen as a normal part of the 
revolutionary family. Those who joined later (c.1990) did not feel that they had to work 
to gain respect from the male combatants and were able to reap the same benefits as 
established female combatants because their roles had already been defined within this 
gendered sphere.
“They [combatant men] also came from the same society. At the beginning they also 
had their doubts. When they saw how we performed and saw our ‘Ah-lu-mai’ their 
views changed, from looking down on us now they have changed to treating us as 
their equals and respect us more”.
(Arasi)
In order to gain equality and respect the women combatants often undertook tasks that 
were arduous, and above all dangerous. For AK the ability of women combatants to 
perform acts that have historically been in the male domain, such as digging deep wells 
for water (and the socially recognised female act of carrying away of the sand being 
completed by male combatants) is a sign of a reversal of roles.
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“When I was in the Mulatheevu jungle, we had to dig a 60ft deep well. We did the 
drilling and put explosives, went down and if we did the digging at the bottom they 
[male combatants] will take the soil away”.
(AK)
The reversal of traditional roles within the LTTE movement has created a perception of 
equality that has empowered women in revolutionary society to believe in themselves.
“I don’t think there is any difference between men and women in the movement. We 
are all treated equally. Whatever a man is doing in the battle we are also doing the 
same thing” .
(Mallika)
It is interesting to note that except for Balasingham and Schalk, none of the other 
authors discuss the origin of engaging women in armed combat. When I questioned any 
combatant or civic individual, they always claimed that the originator of the idea to 
engage women in combat was Prabhakaran. This is also reflected in Balasingham’s 
(1993) writings.
Mr Prabhakaran, who views the successful induction of women into the armed 
struggle as one of his major achievements, will, without reserve, promote the holistic 
development of the women fighters, as part of his vision of women’s path to 
liberation. For him the independence of women is crucial to their liberation and the 
assertion of courage and self -confidence is a pre-requisite to the realisation of such 
independence
(Balasingham 1993:110-111).
Schalk (1992:84) claims the originator was the western educated academic Nirmala 
Nithyanathan (an English language lecturer attached to the University of Jaffna known 
as a feminist sociologist and a political scientist), who was (with her sister Rajani 
Thiranagama167) actively involved in the LITE during the early days of its formation. 
According to Schalk (1992), Nithyanathan’s role included translating key feminist texts 
relating to women’s involvement in the armed struggles of other regions, such as Latin 
America. Balasingham (2004) claims that the western ‘second wave feminism’ as learnt 
by Nithyanathan during her period of education in the west was neither understood nor
167 Doctor Rajani Thranagama was a lecturer attached to the Medical Faculty, University of Jaffna who was 
allegedly killed by the LTTE due to her criticism of the movement.
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appreciated by Prabhakaran and was viewed as being too ‘radical’ for the female recruits 
from villages to understand.
In Mr Pirabakaran’s [Prabhakaran’s] ideological perspective, Nirmala’s idea of 
women’s liberation represented more the stereo-typed conception of western 
women’s liberation than any emancipation which the masses of Tamil women could 
identify with and embrace as their own. Not only he [Prabhakaran], but also the girls 
who were with us, had difficulty in relating to and comprehending Nirmala’s 
‘radicalism’. She was a world apart from the village girls who had come to join the 
struggle and fight for their homeland and had no real idea of women’s liberation, nor 
necessarily aspired for it.
(Balasingham 2004:87)
Jayawardena (1992) argues that “those who want to continue to keep the women of our 
countries in a position of subordination find it convenient to dismiss feminism as a 
foreign ideology” (1992:1). Therefore Prabhakaran’s dismissal of Nithyanathan confirms 
Jayawardena’s argument that feminism is viewed as a diversion that distracts women 
from familial responsibilities or worse still the “revolutionary struggle for national 
liberations” (Jayawardena 1992:2).
Jayawardena (1992) sees feminism as a tool to understand women’s oppression in the 
public and private spaces, but Prabhakaran viewed Western feminism as an alien 
concept for Tamil women in the LTTE and for himself. His views were veiy much in line 
with traditionalist Tamil society who understand feminism to be “a product o f‘decadent’ 
western capitalism; that is based on a foreign culture of no relevance to women in the 
Third World” (Jayawardena 1992:2). This was a particularly problematic position for the 
LTTE. On the one hand feminism is western and problematic, and on the other the 
movement needs to challenge traditional roles in order to allow women to fight. 
Therefore when an ideology of militancy was developed for the women of the LTTE, it 
was promoted within the patriarchal values of an Armed Virgin. Thus the LTTE were 
able to resolve a problematic situation without overtly challenging the existing 
traditional view through the introduction of an Armed Virgin based on purity. The kind 
of radicalism that is seen in Nithyanathan and her teachings was not an agreeable 
quality for the women of the LTTE to develop (in contrast to the qualities of aggression 
they were expected to develop by becoming combatants).
Balasingham states that Prabhakaran has the ability to relate to women combatants far 
better than Nithyanathan as his own background is more in line with the lower middle
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and working classes from which the majority of women combatants come. In 
comparison Nithyanathan came from an educated and financially affluent background.
I do recognise that there is a confirmed belief amongst women combatants that it is truly 
a long-sighted view by Prabhakaran to allow women to join the LTTE and become an 
equal part of the struggle for Tamil Eelam. As women combatants they are accepted as 
an integral part of the revolutionary group.
The LTTE perceive the struggle for independence as being common to both men and 
women, and the power relation in a post -conflict period will affect both parties equally. 
They hold the view that “the struggle for independence is the frame, base or the 
background for the struggle for rights of women” (Schalki992:78). Hence they argue 
that priority must be given to the cause of an independent state, and then added to this 
are the specific demands of women. The liberation of women is directly linked to the 
liberation of the Tamil state. Enloe (2000) claims that asking women to wait until the 
nationalist goal is achieved is “weighted with implications.” She argues that “it is advice 
predicted on the belief that the most dire problems facing the nascent national 
community are problems which can be explained and resolved without reference to 
power relations between men and women” (Enloe 2000:62). Women combatants of the 
LTTE view this equality linked to their liberation as being a primarily political freedom, 
which will be followed by an economic and social freedom from the Sinhalese 
government (Schalk 1992:79). However Schalk fails to notice that the women in the 
organisation may not be sufficiently independent to state an alternative view.
One theme common to both civic and LTTE women is their belief that a nation state 
needs to be created first before women’s true emancipation can be addressed. It is 
debatable whether normative femininities are the cause of women combatants saying 
that they would want a free state before total emancipation.
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“The movement was started to free us from being oppressed. The main aim of the 
war was to free people who were oppressed and for the people to enjoy freedom. For 
this reason they are ready to sacrifice. Which is something we have to appreciate.
For our society to move forward first the political barrier has to be broken and 
people have to be free. Then only the cultural barriers can be broken. Barriers with 
regard to cast and widows etc can be removed only if the political situation is 
resolved and people are free. Yes. And the main objective of the war is to break the 
internal barriers and be politically free. The internal barrier is male dominated 
society has to break up and also cast and cultural changes has to break up.”
(GV)
Why the LITE cannot achieve both simultaneously is never discussed, but it may be 
because all their learning in relation to women combatants have been from revolutions 
that have fought first to create an independent state and then attempt to liberate women 
from society's constraints. The LTTE claims that it is imperative for women to take part 
in the revolutionary struggle for the ultimate aim of emancipation and truly be a part of 
the achievements within the organisation.
“Women’s participation in the struggle is an important thing. Because our policy, 
LTTE’s policy is emancipating our society is part of our liberating our homeland. So 
here, in the North and East women’s participation is equal to men’s participation. If 
we have to free our society and if we have to make the women’s awareness, first we 
have to free our homeland. Then we can make women awareness. So the women’s 
participation in the struggle is very very important.”
(Yalini*)
The claim that the homeland must be freed before dealing with the issue of equality in 
society resonates deeply with other global revolutionary groups in which women have 
participated (see Wilson 1991, Hale 2001a and 2001b, Muller 2006, Helie-Lucas 1988, 
Knauss 1987, Gordon 1968, Afshar 1985, Eisen-Bergman 1975, Turner and Hao 1998, 
Young 2001, Young 1998, Rovira 2000, Kampwirth 2001 and 2002).
Glass ceiling : Women in leadership
The number of revolutionary organisations where women combatants have reached 
higher levels of leadership are limited. Women combatants mostly appear to gain a 
certain level of leadership where they become commanders of units but are rarely at the 
very top of the organisation. These units could be fighting units as well as support units. 
The Chinese revolutionary combatants create a mixed picture of women reaching the
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levels of heads of departments that were engaged in providing “food sacks, straw shoes 
and clothing for the Red army” (Young 2001:164), as well as being combatant leaders. 
Exceptions are seen amongst organisations such as the Zapatista, where the key 
ideological concept was ‘autonomy’ rather than ‘tradition’ or ‘progress’ (Rovira 2000:6). 
By moving away from tradition and progress, they were able to focus on the revolution 
in an alternative way whereby socially constructed gender roles were not considered to 
be of paramount importance over their ability to be combatants. By this action, women 
combatants had an equal opportunity to become leaders based on their own actions. 
This was also reflective of the Uruguayan Tupamaros revolutionary group, the 
Salvadorian FMLN168 and the Nicaraguan Sandinistas (Lobao 1998, Kampwirth 2001 
and 2002).
A general perception exists amongst LTTE combatant women that leadership of a 
combat unit is a natural progression for women combatants with battle experience. 
There are examples of fighting units led by women and though these are fewer in 
number than the male led units, women combatants view this as an opportunity that can 
be achieved regardless of the social perception that relegates women to the role of being 
led. It is pertinent to note that women are still in a minority as leaders within the LTTE 
although a large proportion of its combatants are females. According to Arasi the 
Central Committee of the LTTE claims that there is one woman in every three members 
at this present moment indicating that at least one third of the LTTE combatants are 
female169.
The emergence of Liberation Tigers on the Tamil national political scene has 
provided Tamil women with opportunities and horizons that would never have 
entered the minds of Tamil women a decade ago.
(Balasingham 1993:15)
Balasingham (1993) claims that being a part of the LTTE has granted women an 
opportunity to learn alternative skills, however, the extent to which women are involved 
in both decision-making and high-level leadership appears to be limited. This is not 
addressed by either Balasingham or Schalk, however Coomaraswamy (1996) states that:
168 FMLN means Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation
169 Information gathered at the interview held by me with Arasi, the Head of Women’s Political Wing of 
Jaffna in October 2003.
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...despite the celebration of armed cadre by LTTE ideologues, there is still no 
evidence that women are part of the elite decision-making process. They are not 
initiators of ideas, they are only implementers of policy made by someone else, by 
men.
(Coomaraswamy 1996:9)
Such statements suggest that the combatant women have yet to achieve full socio­
political empowerment. This may illuminate a certain defect in the LTTE leadership, 
which only develops women up to a certain point and not beyond. Thiranagama’s 
(1990:19) argument is that the women were accepted due to a militaristic need for foot 
soldiers, rather than a need to develop or improve their role in society. Further, women 
would fit into the trained roles easily with a belief that they are on par with men in Tamil 
society, which of course would increase their self-confidence. The change that took place 
within the women’s own social perception of themselves does not appear to be reflected 
at the strategic level of the LTTE. Although a limited number of women hold key 
positions, these are not necessarily positions where the decisions made affect the whole 
of the revolutionary movement.
Although there is a lack of transparency regarding the LTTE leadership which prevents a 
complete picture from emerging that illustrates women’s involvement at the highest 
levels, the evidence from my interviews indicate that the combatant women believe that 
there is an attempt to show an equal representation between men and women at higher 
levels.
“In the LTTE Central Committee there are two men cadres and two women cadres.
The director is M r.... Deputy directors there are two one is a lady and other one is a 
man. And another lady secretary. We will be very friendly. We will talk friendly. We 
will do our work even each other we will help others. The Central Committee of the 
LTTE has a two male and two female participatory units. The director of the 
committee is a male”.
(Yalini*)
The women combatants appear not to be concerned by the fact that the Director of the 
Committee has always been a man and is likely to remain so. The acceptance of a male 
leader does not completely determine the position of women combatants within the 
organisation however it reaches far into the Tamil cultural mindset where women are 
seen in the akam (inner) and puram  (outer,) social location as discussed earlier.
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The issue of women as leaders needs to be looked through cultural norms where an 
individual’s own upbringing plays a part in the desire to lead men and women to war. 
For many years the cultural norms and patterns of behaviour have prepared women to 
take orders and directions. Once they join the LTTE organisation their confidence is 
built up to regard themselves as an equal amongst other men and women, but within a 
hierarchical militarised structure. Promotion of women within the organisation helps 
women combatants strive for more (male-centric) leadership roles.
Women-only committees deal with the decisions that focus on women’s welfare. Men 
primarily deal with the decisions that effect the whole organisation but with some input 
by women.
“There are men working under women. And in the women’s section the women 
leaders made decisions and there was no need to ask the men for any decisions 
regarding the women. Whatever decisions we make we will let them [male 
combatants] know”.
(Kavitha)
On closer examination this contradiction changes to include separate decision- making 
trajectories. The harmonious picture created to illustrate the neutrality of the power 
relation between male and female combatants was that women were the decision­
makers, and men were only kept informed of the decisions made. Women have been 
accepted as part of the revolutionary movement but although the Women’s Section and 
the Women’s Committees are able to make decisions, none of the women combatants 
interviewed say that they have authority to direct men in any strategy or policy led 
matters. This then raises the question as to what levels women can rise to within the 
movement.
An analysis of the power to make one’s own decisions reveals that there are complex 
negotiations of gender relations in transition. The power described by Arasi is veiy much 
a delegated authority with some room to manoeuvre within a given structure created by 
men to achieve the nation state. The roles to which women are directed and have gained 
some empowerment from are primarily in the female domain. The combatant women’s 
decision-making power is limited to making decisions that only concern women within 
the movement. These “women’s issues” remind me of Tickner’s (1992:2) argument that 
women in politics are channelled into policy areas centring on issues relating to women, 
thus giving them a limited amount of controllable power. Such power I would argue is
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controlled by the leadership (which is male) hence such allocated or transferred 
‘controllable power’ bears a strong resemblance to the masculine leadership roles of the 
LTTE.
On rare occasions when the LTTE leaders venture out of the countiy to meet with other 
revolutionary groups there is usually a woman combatant to complete the picture. A 
closer look will reveal the participatory role of the woman combatant in attendance to be 
merely symbolic, as she will not contribute to political discussions. It is therefore a 
tokenistic inclusion, and evidence that the LTTE leadership knows that they need to 
offer a vision of equality to gain favour and widen their appeal.
An example of this was seen a few years ago. The LTTE sent an envoy including a 
number of men and one woman, leaders of various fighting units1?0 to Ireland in October 
2003 to conduct a series of discussions with the IRA and Sinn Fein on how the LITE 
should progress their struggle. The first day of the talk consisted of introductions, a 
photograph session and identifying the aims of the visit. On this day the woman 
combatant Arulvili was visible amongst the group. However from the second day 
onwards, when the talks began in earnest, the LTTE group consisted of men only.
The lack of female involvement in at the higher levels of LTTE politics is an important 
point in an ethno-national liberation group that promotes female equality and women 
are believed to form one third to half of its fighting combatants1?1. The LTTE’s 
involvement of women combatants in decision-making on both a national and 
international stage is extremely limited. Highly eloquent female leaders such as Arasi 
are visible within the LITE but have a relatively obscure international profile. The only 
woman who has been seen in political discussion groups is Adele Balasingham, the white 
Australian wife of the LTTE’s political theoretician1?2.
170 Those combatants in political units are also fighters but currently engaged in political activities.
171 As stated previously, there is no formal record of the exact number of women combatants in the LTTE, 
except for Balasingham’s statement of 1994, which said that one third of the LTTE were women (Schalk 
1997). This figure was taken as a basis by many academics, and the numbers, if not the proportion, are 
presumed to have increased since then. Also see c.f. 169.
172 However, since the death of her husband in 2006, it does appear (contrary to the rumours) that Adele 
Balasingham has taken a back seat in the politics relating to the Tamil Eelam.
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Upon questioning the Gatekeeper on the visible lack of female participation in actual 
discussions, the reply was that women combatants of the LTTE are still not ready for 
such a political role (informal conversation with the Gatekeeper October 2003). This 
view is not from a combatant woman directly, and it needs to be seen as a view from a 
masculine perspective, which forms the strong social foundation that harbours an 
accepted perception of the limited abilities of women as political representatives. The 
view that women are ‘still not ready5 for higher political roles within the LTTE is cause 
for concern. Though there are a number of women in senior ranks within the LTTE, the 
women’s levels of power do not reach to the top but stop at a Glass Ceiling with the 
Head of the women’s Political Wing which is the highest female rank in the LTTE (also 
see Samuel 2000 and Alison 2003). Whilst the lack of female combatants in the 
uppermost positions within the LTTE is identified, one must not make the mistake of 
undermining the leadership roles held by women combatants as they are powerful 
within a complex negotiation both within the organisation and within the greater civic 
community.
Has Prabhakaran contributed to gender equality?
Prabhakaran does not indicate any affinity he may have had with women’s social roles or 
a need to challenge the restrictions imposed on them by society. However he has become 
the champion of major social change that (re)constructed the female identity for women 
combatants which has impacted on civic women. Prabhakaran may not have been 
overtly aware that his actions in engaging women in combatant roles would create a 
feminist challenge and change many Tamil women’s lives. During my visit to the 
Women’s Political Office in Vanni I noted that every room carried portrait photographs 
of him, and women combatants were almost sentimental in their references to him. The 
women combatants I interviewed saw him as unlike any other man in Tamil society, who 
has bravely gone against the cultural normative practices to transpose his faith in 
women (combatants) and in turn to instil confidence in them to succeed as equals to 
men. This progressive view of gender equality is in complete contrast to the society’s 
general view of women and their capabilities. “Pirapakaran [Prabhakaran] is very much 
appreciated by LTTE women, who praise him as King of Tigers” (Schalk 19973:7). In a 
speech below Prabhakaran identifies the contributions women can make as equals to 
men.
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The Liberation Tigers is one of the greatest accomplishments accomplished by our 
movement. This marks a revolutionary turning point in the history of liberation 
struggle of the women of Tamililam. Women can succeed on the ideal path towards 
their (own) liberation, only through joining forces with a liberation movement. 
(Women) [of civic state] can change into revolutionary women who have heroism, 
abandonment (of life), courage and self-confidence. Only when women join forces 
with our revolutionary movement that has formulated (a path) to liberation of our 
women, our struggle also shall reach perfection
(Schalk 1992:50).
The speech remains a call for more women to join the LTTE, especially if they are 
concerned with self-liberation from the patriarchal chains of Tamil society and is 
reflective of the faith he has in women combatants. He regularly vocalises this faith in 
public speeches to encourage women combatants to be more active and civic women to 
join an organisation that appears to practice equality regardless of gender differences.
“In our movement, opportunities are equal to every one. In the name of women we 
are not oppressed there. Our leader is the reason for this. It is important that we rise 
up to these expectations. Our leader has a very high regard towards the women. He
has lot of confidence in the women’s ‘Ah-lu-mai We didn’t have many obstacles
just because we were women. You must understand this properly and explain to her.
We all get equal opportunities.”
(Arasi)
The recognisable admiration in Arasi’s discourse for Prabhakaran is veiy much repeated 
by all the women combatants I spoke with. The veneration of Prabhakaran extends to 
the moment of dying when the women of the LTTE are often known to call out ‘annnay’ 
(older brother)173. Whilst this can be argued as a form of patriarchal reverence, I would 
say this has a much deeper kinship identity that extends beyond a consanguine family 
tie to the very special kind of loyal veneration held by a dying individual. This 
unwavering loyalty is encapsulated in the personal oath taken by each combatant to 
support Prabhakaran. It is also reflected in AK’s discourse when she refers to 
Prabhakaran.
173 Whilst Prabhakaran has been elevated to a level of a national leader, he still carries strong kinship ties 
with women combatants.
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“We [women combatants] didn’t have any problems as our leader has very clear 
ideas about women cadres. He a lw ays gave us the opportunity to be in the fro n t  
and g e t involved in the figh ts  and this was an example to others.”
(AK)
As illustrated in AK’s discourse Prabhakaran actively encourages women combatants to 
take part in the battles and be seen as an example to others. This can be seen as callous 
trickery of a male leadership to direct the women to the frontline, or as a form of 
recognition of women’s capabilities to be brave and active in the frontlines (as viewed by 
the combatant women). It can also be seen as a challenge to the patriarchal society that 
undermines women’s abilities. The women in Tamil society are seen as being incapable 
of taking on the tough, masculine-orientated roles of protectors of the nation. However 
the combatant women have shown that they too are capable of meeting the demands of 
such activities.
Although it can be argued that women combatant’s trust and loyalty to Prabhakaran has 
been exploited by the overt encouragement of the leadership, it none the less appears to 
have made the women combatants feel that they are treated equally within the 
revolutionary movement, unlike the women in civic society who are marginalised for 
being women. Arasi reflects on the combatant women’s recognition by Prabhakaran as,
“Our capabilities, our dedication and our goal were only important to us and we 
didn’t have any obstacles to go up because our leader has lot of confidence in the 
‘Ah-lu-m a f  of the women.”
(Arasi)
Women combatants viewed Ah-lu-mai as a direct result of Prabhakaran’s active 
encouragement and forceful advocacy of equal rights for women. However a closer 
inspection of Prabhakaran’s faith in women’s Ah-lu-mai in regards to his own family 
reveals a lack of the same promotion of equality in his private life in relation to his wife 
(Mathy), whom he has kept completely away from the movement, even though she was 
an activist during her undergraduate days (as discussed in Chapter Four). Pratap 
observed that,
- 2 1 5 -
Prabhakaran married the prettiest of the fasting girls As she sat by his side
during the interview, Prabhakaran’s wife did not speak even once out of turn. She 
wore a printed wrinkle-free sari and a modest blouse. She seems gentle and 
dom esticated.
(Pratap 2001:76)
Pratap’s observations of Mathy present a picture of a traditional Tamil woman and she 
could be regarded as a ‘beautiful auspicious mother’. She continues to wear traditional 
clothing and stays within cultural expectations with a lack of sophistication befitting her 
modesty and respectability. Mathy’s behaviour of sitting quietly by her husband’s side 
without intervening ‘in male businesses’ projects the traditional image of the non- 
interfering ‘good’ Tamil wife. Her demeanour in the public arena presents her as ‘gentle 
and domesticated’ and her appearance and mannerisms are a complete contrast to the 
combatant women. The fact that the social changes for Tamil women are lead by her 
husband appears to have made little difference to her own continuation with tradition 
where normative feminine practices are considered the ‘only5 acceptable form of 
behaviour for women (also see Baneijee 2006).
It can be argued that M ath/s appearance and behaviour can be seen as a clever strategy, 
as contributing to the normative practices for women she continues to be a part of the 
civic society, which became tenuous for many of the women combatants after they 
joined the LTTE, as discussed later in this chapter. This image of Mathy may be 
reminiscent of Elshtain’s Beautiful Soul, a woman who can lay claim simultaneously to 
family and society, and Mathy’s appearance of unselfish devotion is needed in order for 
the country and the family to survive (Elshtain 1987:9).
Mathy’s position does question whether the LTTE’s approach really challenges existing 
attitudes and whether Prabhakaran is committed to truly challenging traditional views, 
or whether he is keen to uphold part of its traditions to gain support from the civic 
society. That said, Mathy’s normative femininity contrasts with the LTTE’s martial 
feminism and seems to upheld the traditional values of civic society, stopping the 
struggle from being isolated from the much-needed support of civic society.
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‘Puthum ai Pen9: the new wom an
Maunaguru (1995:166-7) describes the new phenomenon of Puthumai Pen as a concept 
that was transferred from 20th century Indian nationalism to the Tamil national 
discourse of the 1980s in Sri Lanka. Under the creation and construction of a Puthumai 
Pen the four virtues that all Tamil women are tied to (modesty, charm, shyness and 
respectful fear) were challenged17*. Although Tamil women (both combatant and civic) 
have taken on new roles and (re) constructed an alternative gender identity the greatest 
change (from the traditional view to the newly (re) created alternative) is seen in the 
combatant women.
Balasingham (1993:5) claims that the deepening genocidal oppression resulting from the 
race riots of 1983 propelled young women into a revolutionary world.
Young women broke the shackles of social constraints; they ripped open the straight 
jacket of conservative images of women. The militant patriotism of Tamil women 
finally blossomed as they entered into a new life of revolutionary armed struggle.
(Balasingham 1993:6)
In the new life of armed struggle the main qualities that are valued from women are the 
ability to self-sacrifice and the ability to be courageous in the face of death, clearly 
demonstrating the rise of a new kind of Tamil woman, Puthumai P e n who has self- 
assurance and assertiveness. Thus the combatant woman in Tamil society is taking over 
the traditional image under the guise of “militant nationalism” (Maunaguru 1995:167) 
and changing it to suit the times.
The Tamil women who become combatants become new women. The fearless 
reputation, tough external appearance and the widely discussed (and publicised) sexual 
purity of women combatants have all fed into the public imagination to create and 
harness the image (Schalk 1997a). Their lack of dependency on men in society is in 
direct contrast to the historical relationship between the sexes whereby women
174 Part of the challenge was creation of new words for the usage in language to describe female sexual 
purity, an important part of the Tamil women gender identity within the community, where words for 
violent sexual acts did not exist prior to this time. With the creation of the New Woman words such as 
Paliyalvanmurai meaning sexual violence entered into Tamil linguistic discourse (Maunaguru 1995:166) as 
discussed in Chapter Five.
175 Puthumai Pen is also written as Putiyappen by Schalk 1997a.
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depended totally on men for their needs and welfare. The combatant woman not only 
boasts about her ability to look after herself, but also those around her, including men.
The women of the LTTE are aware that the change in traditional roles of femininity in 
society is a challenge to the patriarchy and view this as a positive and progressive way 
forward. The ability to maintain the change that has occurred in society and in women’s 
lives will be a challenge for combatant women. However they have long since anticipated 
that they will have to be equally pro-active in the future to maintain the momentum of 
social change and the negotiated gender identity of Puthumai Pen, the New Woman.
Identity politics
The normative femininity that is practiced in society distances the combatant women 
from those of the civic society, but also brings forth a slow process of a nuanced change 
in their relationship with one another. In addition to holding the necessaiy social 
appearances required of combatant women as part of society’s collective identity (as 
Tamil women), they also need to fulfil the collective identity of the revolutionary 
movement (as combatants). It is the second of these that differentiates the women 
combatants from civic women and sets them apart in their unique position. This 
separation between the two groups of women removes the combatant women from 
becoming a direct part of the cultural practices that prescribes female roles and governs 
their behaviour.
Both Sangarasivam (2003) and Rajasingham-Senanayake (2001) have acknowledged 
the importance of recognising women combatants for their achievements as women in 
revolutionary warfare rather than labelling them as a ‘consequence’ of a masculine 
separatist struggle.
To confirm with a notion that women’s liberation struggle s were and are simply by­
products of patriarchal nationalist struggles would potentially erase women’s 
histories and women’s experiences and displace women from any history, of every 
day, organised resistance to patriarchal authority.
(Sangarasivam 2003:63)
“We [women combatants] don’t want importance. We want to be simple” (Arasi). Arasi’s 
discourse is strong in rejecting gender-orientated achievements. The simplicity that
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Arasi claims is humbleness and humility which are accepted behavioural traits of 
modest Tamil women who will not crave glory or draw attention to themselves.
“Another thing is we don’t want importance just because we are women. We don’t 
believe in that culture [giving im portance to women]. It is important they recognise 
her ‘Ah-lu-mai’ and her capabilities.”
(Arasi)
Arasi’s insistence on being recognised for her own ability rather than an identity based 
on her gender contradicts the traditional female identity that has been created within 
the culture. It is important to show the community as well as the world that these 
achievements are due to the individual’s effort and commitment to the revolutionary 
cause rather than to a gender-based positive discrimination. This however must not be 
viewed in isolation, as the achievements are both tied to and gained through the 
movement.
The confidence gained by combatant women is often visible and they are happy to 
discuss their achievements. They are also vehement in denying that any aspect of their 
lives is controlled by men in the organisation.
“Under any circumstance we do not get dragged behind the men. We have our own 
individuality. We have authority to make decisions about anything. We will join and 
do things. But we are separate. But nobody can impose their views on us.”
(Arasi)
Arasi takes a strong view in defending her role as a woman combatant in a male 
combatant’s environment. She rejects the notion that as women combatants they are 
hindered in the progressive path of female liberation. Arasi’s apparent refusal to 
acknowledge male dominance may be completely rational as a way of enabling her to 
talk about gender in ways that permit her to continue to believe in equality despite 
debates over the apparent lack of it.
The extent of the male influence over women combatant’s lives that can be seen through 
the intricacies of male-female relationships is often disclosed in a careful manner. 
When Arasi was questioned about working with men within the revolutionary 
organisation she paused for a long time before answering, which suggested that as she 
was guarded in her reply that might indicate a fear of misinterpretation. The deliberate
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caution I detected could be an attempt to disclose cultural confinements that prevent 
‘talking together’ or any social interaction between men and women generally, as male 
and female roles are divided in society and have little or no social mixing. Upon 
reflection it appears the caution is highly likely to be based on the male hierarchy that is 
operating within the LTTE and the repercussion of discussing a socially sensitive subject 
such as male /female interaction. It may also be that Arasi was formulating a line to 
appease what she assumed I wished to hear.
“ They [men] are looking at us in a positive way. How can I say i t ..., We are
very helpful to each other. We talk to each other about our day-to-day problems. 
Whatever we decide we all talk together and come to a decision. We share our work”.
(Arasi)
This paints a picture of modernity where male and female relationships are in a comfort 
zone of familiarity. There is a modesty that is also part of expected feminine behaviour -  
as seen in Arasi’s diffident take on being recognised as a woman. Of course, the crux of 
her argument is that women must be recognised for their individuality rather than a 
collective gender identity.
“Women cannot be separated from the society. They are very important part of the 
Society. So it was inevitable that women also took part in the fight for freedom. 
When the enemy came to war against us he didn’t differentiate between man and 
woman. War is common to everyone. So we also look at it the same way”.
(Arasi)
This view is an acknowledgement of her ability to be a woman and still manage to obtain 
recognition for her achievements. By the same token she refuses that acknowledgement 
in favour of an individual identity that is not based on gender but on acts of 
achievements alone.
Image
The image presented by LTTE women wearing combat fatigues or male shirts and 
trousers, carrying a gun, directly challenges the social conventions of symbolically 
bejewelled and sari clad women as the ideal in line with normative femininity in Tamil 
society. The deeply ingrained views of what women ‘ought’ to be is defined by a series of 
symbols such as appearance, conduct, behaviour and by fitting into a culturally mapped
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out social role in Tamil society. In contrast to this the combatant women’s unyielding 
refusal to be conformist in their appearance openly challenges this social convention and 
caused Coomaraswamy to argue that their appearance is androgynous due to an agenda 
of the LITE to distance women from femininity in favour of “self sacrifice, [and] 
austerity ...(1996:10)”.
...wearing of rich saris, brilliant jewellery, flowers in flowing hair, silver anklets, a 
silver toe ring and red pottu on the forehead. Today the views presented are women 
in combat fatigues, in boots, with no-make up, jewellery or ostentation, often with 
their hair cut in short male styles, wearing a cyanide capsule round their neck
(Coomaraswamy 1996:9).
The argument of Coomaraswamy is viewed by many in Jaffna’s Tamil society as an 
unfair claim against women combatants. It can be argued that by definition women who 
move away from civic society to become combatants would challenge normative 
feminine behaviour and the society’s symbolism. The wearing of traditionally 
symbolised feminine clothing such as saris, skirts or having long hair due is impractical 
(for carrying out the tasks necessary for surviving under extreme circumstance). The 
swapping of feminine clothes for masculine ones and carrying out masculine oriented 
tasks inevitably makes some in society to refer to their maleness. However my research 
participants in civic society explained that the clothing is worn not to appear as men, but 
for convenience of fighting. BP explained that when the women combatants first started 
to wear trousers and shirts those in society did object, but with time they had gained an 
understanding on the practical aspects of such clothing.
“I think their clothes is [are] very necessary for them for the work. Earlier they wear 
like that [shirts and trousers] and people, civilian people don’t like. Why these girls 
are wearing trousers and shirts and they are not very good. Later discussions among 
women some are telling it [is] needed, they are driving tractors and vehicles [in 
battle]...”
(BP*)
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This view is also shared by ES,
“That their field no? They went to the field and fight with the army. So with this 
dress [men’s shirts, men’s trousers] they can do that. Yes it is convenient for them.
So it is like the police it is their uniform no? No [not think that it makes them look  
masculine]. For us no...Yes there is a reason no? And wearing a trouser like that 
won’t be bad. It is not a bad thing. So it’s ok. They won’t show anything[of their 
body]. Not like short blouses. It is ok”.
(ES*)
ES’s acceptance of women combatants clothing contains a particularly interesting point 
of modesty. According to her, the masculine dress worn by women combatants in fact 
doubles up as a garment of modesty that does not reveal any part of the female body, 
thus conforming to the social expectations. Whilst this particular aspect of modesty is 
overlooked in Coomaraswamy’s account of combatant women, the civic women agree 
that it is the practicality such clothing provides than a transformation of gender identity. 
Roja who claims that shirts and trousers or the combat fatigues in fact are less restrictive 
in comparison to traditional women’s clothing confirms this view.
“Also with these clothes we can run and do our training in fact we can do anything 
with these type of clothes. Our stripes [combat fatigues] is not only for fighting. That 
is our considered normal clothing. And we use it for fighting as well. Now we are 
wearing these clothes [shirts and trousers] because the army won’t let us come out in 
the stripes”176.
(Roja)
Arasi contributes to the explanation of ease and comfort in wearing masculine clothing 
specific to the roles they are now playing in Tamil society. “Say in our society nobody 
wears jeans and shirt. The main reason we started to wear was, for our convenience” 
(Arasi). However the masculine clothing offers a dual purpose, which appears to have 
been overlooked in the academic feminist discourse. The combatant women and the 
civic women both stated that by wearing masculine clothing women tend to be far safer 
than wearing feminine clothing.
176 During the period of ceasefire women combatant were not allowed to wear camouflage clothing away 
from Vanni area.
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“...som e girls their face telling [feminine] but their clothes and other things don’t 
tell”.
(BP*)
“Men have a habit of trying to be funny with women. The clothes that we are wearing 
now protects us from that and we feel safer”.
(Mallika)
Civic women and combatant women share these views as confirmed by both BP and 
Roja’s discourse. However some civic women such as DK claim by wearing masculine 
clothing the combatant women contribute to their gaining some form of equal status 
with men both in the civic society as well as in the movement177. Therefore the theory of 
secondary gender equality that emerges here is an effect rather than an aim of wearing 
practical masculine clothing.
How combatant women view civic women
Women combatants, in having to negotiate their multiple femininities in a highly 
gendered society, have claimed that civic women are passive victims of that same 
society.
“Women [of civic society] are soft [passive]. They need to wear lot of jewellery, they 
need more money for marriage and dowry. They also have safety problem....Men 
from young age are used to hard work but women are not like that. They [women] 
are very soft, and they [are] unable to make decisions on their own” .
(Arasi)
The combatant women often use non-complimentary words such as ‘soft’ to describe 
civic women, meaning the civilian women are ‘passive’ and ‘dependent’, qualities which
177 It is also worth noting that there is a school of thought, developing amongst the women of Jaffna’s civic 
society, that challenges the wearing of a sari. “Yes, everybody says that it is a cultural dress, but I don’t think 
that we have to wear a sari to keep our culture” (AK). The challenge to traditional wearing of a sari is viewed 
by some civic women in this research as BP, AK, DK and CH as contributing to female sexualisation and 
objectification by the way it accentuates the feminine body and it also restricts women’s physical
movements thus making them depend more on men. “Sometimes this sexual view comes with the sari If
a girl goes in a sari they [men] can see and they [men] can feel that there is a girl....[...]... When you are 
beautiful they treat you as a doll. So I don’t want to be treated as a doll every time” (DK*). Such recognition 
of femininity as a beautiful doll is also representative of women’s objectification combined with a perception 
of weakness and a form of inability to be independent.
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are seen as weaknesses by the combatant women. The strength of women combatants’ 
self-belief is directly born out of being fighters and contributing to the attempt at 
creating a new nation state. They see this as an achievement that has elevated them 
beyond civic women and far beyond the gender boundaries that constrain women in 
civic society1?8.
“The changes have come about veiy quickly. Because a woman could not go out 
alone in the night before the war. The society did not accept that. Also the woman 
didn’t have the courage to go out on her own. Both prevailed. Because we got 
involved in the war the society began to understand that a woman could go out alone 
and the woman got the confidence that she can go out on her own. The society which 
did not accept a woman going to the seaside, saw the women being in charge of boats 
and fighting from the boats and lead a life in the sea, [the society] accepted it all very 
easily”. (Arasi)
They also view this social position as a responsibility that requires them to educate the 
civic women to be similarly independent and self-reliant.
“The first job is to teach the women to make decisions on their own. Only we can 
teach the women to stand for themselves”.
(Arasi)
“I don’t think that [women in civic society are] fully aware of their status. From the 
beginning women have been dominated, now some women coming out of this 
tradition, and we [LITE] are also slowly trying to assist this [change]”.
(Mallika)
Both Arasi and Mallika’s views on civic women can be described as a personal challenge 
to ensure that civic women who are incapable and passive are changed to take control of 
their own destiny, by being pushed into building a strong mind and overall 
empowerment. Nevertheless the women combatants see the change that needs to take 
place is seen as a task that can only be fulfilled by the LTTE women. The normative 
femininities in Jaffna prepare women from a very young age to serve, sacrifice and
The kind of feminism that is practiced by the women combatants in the LTTE is argued by Schalk to be a 
type of ‘martial feminism’ that describes the kind of ideas that were emanating from a time of transitional 
change aimed at involving women amongst its combatants. Schalk defines martial feminism as a form of 
“civil right for women and on the taking up of arms, and connect the demand for the liberation of the 
homeland’ from what is regarded as an illegitimate occupying force” (Schalk 1994:165).
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forego for the benefit of others, especially men. The women combatants are sufficiently 
aware of the male dominance effecting women that makes their task harder.
How Civic women see the combatant women
The civic women I met were not ‘for’ the war, nor were they ‘against’ the war. This 
mindset needs to be understood in a time, place and space context whereby a long and 
hard thirty years had changed their views about the war. That is not to say that they 
condone it, but rather that they have become somewhat war weaiy.
Age plays an interesting part in the women’s discourse that reflects on their 
achievements both in the civic state as well as in the revolutionary group. The 
differences cut across life choices, education and social upbringing.
Unlike the young interviewees, the older combatant group (age 30 years and more) are 
far more reflective about their experiences. This was also noted amongst older civic 
women who are cautious in saying anything overtly negative about the LTTE’s claims of 
their pioneering contribution to the empowerment of women in civic society. The 
cautious approach may well be due to an awareness of safety of self as well as family 
members, as they are very aware of the early demise of those who criticise the LTTE179. 
The younger women (both civic and combatant) have an approach to life that is neither 
cautious nor reflective, and their abrupt style may be a result of only ever knowing war 
and the instability it brings.
Delving further into the differences between the women reveals that the older group of 
civic women feel much more indebted to the women combatants than the younger 
women in civic community. The respect shown to combatant women by civic women 
appears to be due to social changes that have taken place since the beginning of the war, 
as the older civic women understand the gender development that has ensued since 
women joined the LITE. The younger civic (and combatant) women grew up knowing 
that the LTTE had women combatants hence they did not see it as a phenomenon that 
ought to be recognised.
179 Thiranagam’s colleagues have gone underground due to fear of reprisal as discussed in chapter 1. It must 
also be noted at an earlier stage of fieldwork I became quite aware that Thiranagama and the University 
Teachers on Human Rights in Jaffna (UTHRJ) are not a line of inquiry that I should pursue
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There are highly visible levels of confidence that have been built up amongst the young 
women of Jaffna even though some of them claim that the effect on society was not as 
great as that claimed by older civic women.
The newly gained confidences also make some of the young civic women much more 
self-assured in their dealing with men, creating a considerable concern amongst the 
older generation of women who fear that the young women are ‘asking for trouble’. This 
may be due to a change in the code of conduct from the pre-war era governing women’s 
social behaviour with men in the public space. Despite these criticisms, the older women 
do not openly confront the younger women about their behaviour.
The women aged 30 years and above hold directly opposing views on equality in 
comparison to those who were younger than 30 years of age and this was reflected 
across both the civic and combatant women's groups.
The older educated civic women see the word feminism flaunted around as an 
achievement of modem Jaffna Society, but question the levels of understanding of the 
term. There are still uncertainties as to what equality or emancipation they have 
achieved, or need to achieve, in order to gain equality with men. Some older civic 
women feel that the lack of a formal understanding of equality between men and women 
makes the current view of equality a self-centred act. This is illustrated by HA who 
believes that young women join the revolutionary movement to avoid traditional 
responsibilities as a result of the media and cinema presenting it as a phenomenon that 
claims ‘women are free to do anything’. HA is particularly aggrieved by the lack of a 
theoretical knowledge of feminism when she states,
“Because here we don’t leam  the feminism concept theoretically in this soil. In this
soil there is no political concept regarding feminism”
(HA*).
It is interesting to note that the younger women (both civic and combatant) are more 
critical about their current roles. The older civic women were more comfortable in 
discussing times before the war, and were not at ease when discussing the modern social 
roles of women and the empowerment that has taken place. My research shows two 
opposing views on the contributions of combatant women to civic women’s social 
empowerment. GV is in awe of the combatant women for all their achievements in a
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highly patriarchal society where women’s social roles are very much defined from the 
time of their birth. The older civic women appear to appreciate the level of self- 
confidence that the women combatants exert and view this achievement as being due to 
their engagement in the LTTE. In contrast to this other civic women, especially the 
younger women such as ES and DK, do not view the achievements of women 
combatants with any special dispensation but are of the view that global change itself 
would have altered the roles of women in Jaffna regardless of women joining the LTTE.
The actual cause of women’s empowerment is argued by women of civic society to be the 
result of a prolonged war whilst others give credit to the women combatants of the LTTE 
stating that their radical lifestyle has been the significant driving force for women’s 
social change.
The non-conformity of women combatants to the social practices in Jaffna challenges 
the hegemonic masculinities that are implemented in society and often viewed as being 
nurtured and perpetuated by the women in civic society. The civic women do not always 
approve of women who so radically break with traditions. Since Balasingham joined the 
LITE she has noted,
[pjublic opinion as a mode of social control of women was an issue that surfaced 
again and again in various degrees and forms through out my life in India and Sri 
Lanka....[it] is an issue hugely perpetrated by women themselves
(Balasingham 2003:85).
The view of civic women condoning or colluding with dominant power relations to 
continue traditional cultural values and practices needs to be viewed within the context 
of the complex nature of social interactions women (both civic and combatant) have in 
society. A closer analysis of the difference between the combatant and civic women 
reveals that combatant women are more critical about the other group (civic women). 
When questioned whether being a combatant woman had affected their status in civic 
society, Arasi responded that,
“we [combatant women] are not affected in any way. We are well respected in the 
society. Whatever we ask they [those of civic society] are doing. They have faith in us 
that we will do everything well. We are not just fighters only. We do fight but at the 
same time we take part in all other aspects of the society. Our ideology is a very wide 
one”.
(Arasi)
- 2 2 7 -
The description by Arasi is representative of how the combatant women believe they are 
viewed by civic society. However within civic society the women are identified firstly as 
combatants, and secondly as women. Being identified in a masculine role of a combatant 
means that they are placed outside the traditional feminine roles of the patriarchal 
society which are clearly defined. Whilst the LTTE has maintained some of the 
patriarchal views of femininity, it has also placed combatant women in a socially 
complex location which is also an ambivalent position both culturally and socially. The 
women combatants fail to notice that they are seen differently to male combatants by 
the civic society. Whilst the combatant women have earned respect from the civic 
society, it has come at a price, which they appear to be unaware of.
“And in each and every place they have to fight and they are not getting anything 
very easily. And you know in the society also they praise them and treat them as very 
high-level people. But they don’t move with them closely. With the men [in civic 
society] LTTE cadres they move freely but with the girls still they have difficulty. 
What I am saying is there is a problem in interaction between the society and these 
cadres. Because they are very much apart from the society up. The society feels 
something like that. Because in this society girls can’t achieve that level very easily.
Very much separated from the society. [They are] so different. The difference, from 
my point of view the difference is very good. Their achieving is very good. That is a 
need for this society. These people [civic society]are you know, it will take sometime 
to realise it. Yeah! Sure[admire them for what they are doing]. Even so many girls in 
the society admire them.. But they [civic women] are restricted no?”
(DK*)
There is much recognition by the civic women of combatant women’s achievements. As 
stated in DK’s narrative much of the admiration is based on an understanding that 
combatant women are breaking restrictions in society to fulfil a role. Her narrative 
reveals that the male combatants are able to move freely with men in civic society, in the 
external social spaces (as opposed to internal domestic spaces). Whilst the women 
combatants appear to have been accepted on a certain level to be in the male social 
space, they are not fully embraced as equals by male society. The very same achievement 
that has earned the combatant women admiration from civic women of being in the 
male space, has distanced them from the civic women too.
Whilst it is generally accepted among civic women that women combatants have 
contributed to a substantially elevated social position for women as a whole, civic 
women do not acknowledge the hierarchy assumed by the women combatants. It must 
also be noted that the civic women who do not acknowledge the hierarchical position of
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combatant women do not necessarily criticise the women combatants either. The role 
played by the combatant women is still seen by women in civic society as a major 
sacrifice, following the traditional path of women as ‘givers’ rather than ‘takers’.
“They [women combatants] don’t concentrate on how fair it is or what they want. 
Sacrificing is a main character of the women. There is no surprise in sacrificing. 
Anyway she is sacrificing wherever she is no?”
( HA*)
As previously stated in AH’s discourse to become a woman combatant is in effect to 
become a self-less woman. She will not debate about unfairness or personal needs but 
rises to the role of the combatant who sacrifices her own needs for the benefit of others. 
The self-sacrifice by the women combatants in effect embraces a role that is similar to 
the traditional role dictated by society.
The civic women insist that although the combatant women are attending to what is 
essentially a male activity as a protector they are by no means masculinised by this 
action or experience. “We don’t see them [women combatants] as men. We see them 
like brave ladies who are fighters” (ES*). This view is also shared by other civic women 
such as BP.
“I don’t think [women combatants are masculine]. Masculine means rough type 
what you see. I don’t think they [combatant women] are rough. Some places they 
should have [dealt with] that rough things, in a war they should be very rough, 
otherwise they will get killed. But normally we are talking with them they are not so 
rough”
(BP*).
While the civic women acknowledge the work conducted by combatant women to be 
masculine, they have also retained the combatant women in a feminine role. This is 
reflective of the complexity of women combatant’s gender identities, which are 
constantly negotiated. The civic women’s views on combatant women are particularly 
pertinent for the women combatants who negotiate new identities, and shift paradigms 
in order to remain as a part of the civic society. The shifting of paradigms in effect 
creates ‘the new women’, able to fit into the circumstances they find themselves in.
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S u m m a r y
Tamil women in civic society have the dual roles of being an all-powerful woman in the 
inner realms of the domestic sphere of Akam, and a powerless dependent in the public 
sphere of Puram. Whilst the power of Akam  is recognisably within the home, it is still 
subject to masculine authority. Within the past three decades women’s social roles 
changed. Some civic women have credited the visible changes in women’s social roles to 
the LTTE, and others to the war itself. The women combatants claim that it is the LTTE 
that has paved the way for social change by actively enforcing initiatives in society such 
as the discouragement of the dowiy system and the repatriation of widows into society.
The engagement of Tamil women as combatants dates back to the mid-1980s when 
during this period they were continuously being compared to male combatants, which 
created a need for them to prove themselves as competent as male combatants. The 
women were trained to the same standard as, and fought alongside, their male 
counterparts. The role of gender equality amongst combatants is referred to in Arasi, 
AK, and Kavita’s narratives where they had to work hard and undertake arduous tasks in 
order to prove themselves worthy in a masculine organisation. This need to prove their 
worth was not seen amongst the younger women combatants, such as Roja and Mallika, 
who entered an organisation that already accepted women as equals.
However this perceived equality needs to be seen in the context of women who attain 
leadership positions. It is estimated that one third of the LTTE organisation is made up 
of women combatants, however proportionally the number of women reaching the 
senior ranks is extremely low, which brings into question the true level of equality in the 
movement. It must none the less be recognised that gender relations in the LTTE are a 
series of complex negotiations in transition.
The women of civic society, as well as the combatant women, have recognised 
Prabhakaran to be a champion of women’s social progress. A close analysis into 
Prabhakaran’s relationship with his wife Mathy presents a different picture, whereby the 
traditional role of the supportive wife and auspicious mother is practiced. However the 
women combatants view their ah-lu-mai (empowerment) is a direct result of 
Prabhakaran’s faith in women, which in turn has created Puthumai Pen, the new 
woman. Puthumai Pen, who has emerged from the war period is both tough and
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fearless and above all sexually pure. These qualities have contributed to the public 
image of combatant women as ‘Armed Virgins’.
Undoubtedly, the role played by combatant women within the LTTE revolutionary 
organisation challenges the existing patriarchy and existing gender norms in Tamil 
society. The gender (re)construction within the revolutionary movement has so far had 
a great social impact, the result of which is also seen amongst the confidences and 
empowerment gained by women in civic society. Whilst this chapter discusses the 
achievements of combatant women it also notes the limited numbers of women in senior 
positions of the LTTE, and their lack of contribution to high level decision-making. This 
however is negated by the major social impact women combatants of the LTTE have had 
upon civic women and Tamil society in Jaffna as a whole.
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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION
The overall aim of this thesis is to analyse how gender is (reconstructed within the 
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam movement (LTTE). As the moment was founded upon 
a society that is steeped in a masculine culture which historically defines socially 
marginalised positions for women, it was important to identify how women become part 
of the LTTE. The engagement of women in the LTTE challenges the existing social 
formation in Jaffna’s Tamil society.
In analysing this challenge and the historical roles of women in the light of issues that 
arise from conducting research across an ethnic divide and the complexities involved in 
representing the Other, I identify several catalysts that influence women in the decision­
making process that pushes them towards the revolutionary organisation. The non- 
consanguine kin family that the LTTE is able to successfully construct overrides familial 
ties, and tight bonds form between combatant women through kinship. I conclude that 
these attachments may be extended into acts of suicide bombings where combatant 
women believe they are giving a gift of self to the greater good of the Tamil nation and 
for the cause of the separate state of Tamil Eelam. Gender roles are being 
(re)constructed within the LTTE Revolutionary organisation, and combatant women 
gain a form of equality for themselves, and for women in Tamil society as a whole.
I have made a number of key contributions in this thesis. The main body of the thesis 
analyses the way gender is constructed within the LTTE through in-depth interviews 
with LTTE combatant women. The thesis also analyses the way such constructions 
impact upon the civic society as a whole and in particular the Tamil women of Jaffna. 
This knowledge is further developed as a tool to assess the ways in which the conflict 
effects Jaffna women and in particular women who become combatants.
Ah-lu-mai or empowerment, as described by women combatants, has become the 
foundation of Puthumai Pen, a (re)constructed gender identity that is created through a 
series of events that challenge the gendered attitudes of Tamil society. In the LTTE 
movement the women combatants have opportunities for equality and empowerment.
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The conflict has enabled Tamil women to embrace a new identity that is needed to 
survive in the extreme conditions of a civil war and is far removed from traditional roles 
and a traditional female identity based on subordination.
As new women, the combatant women perform many traditionally male activities that 
may ultimately end in self-sacrifice, an act that they see as giving a gift to society. I 
would argue that these acts and deeds must be seen within the context of a culturally 
restrained female social position and an ethnic war. The women combatants see the 
opportunity to be in the frontline of battles or to participate in suicide missions as 
recognition of their ability, their agency and above all their Ah-lu-mai, their 
empowerment. Whilst it may be argued that the LTTE has manipulated the situation of 
female fear and anxiety to gain much-needed human resources, it can also be seen that 
Tamil women feel more empowered and valued in the highly gendered Tamil society.
The achievements of combatant women have earned them the name of Armed Virgins 
that is both reflective of their new identity as women warriors and symbolic of the sexual 
purity that is valued in patriarchal society. However the fact that it is a symbolic ‘virgin’ 
that has been created within the confines of the armed struggle raises a question as to 
the extent of emancipation that the combatant women have achieved due their 
symbolisation continuing to rely on traditional metaphors of women as protectors of the 
nation and homeland (future mothers of the free).
Another major contribution of this thesis focuses on women’s involvement in suicide 
bombings. Through empirical research, it is evident that the combatant women see the 
act of suicide bombing as an obligatory act of altruism. This is an interesting 
development as at first their view appears to contradict the traditional view of women’s 
roles as life-givers. However through the narrative interviews it becomes clear that in 
fact the combatant women’s discourse shows the act of suicide bombing to be an 
extension of nurturing and giving. The argument of giving is described by the combatant 
women as Thatkodai (giving self as a gift) as opposed to Thatkolai (suicide). The 
dynamism of the role of carer is thus extended into caring for the whole of Tamil nation 
in Jaffna.
Some feminist academics base an argument on biological essentialism, and claim that 
the combatant women have no agency of their own, and act against the nurturing and 
preserving instincts of women. I would argue that combatant women transpose this
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same familial nurturing instinct into one of protecting the nation as a whole. The wide 
range of views about combatant women arises because of their new identity. Some of 
these views debate whether women’s involvement in the conflict leads to emancipation 
whilst some suggest that women play only supporting roles. However if these new roles 
are viewed free from any preconceived notions, it is clear that combatant women have 
moved from historical ‘support’ roles to modern ‘active’ roles.
The thesis further contributes to the discussion of feminist methodology in representing 
the Other. My contribution as discussed earlier arrives from a basis of multiple 
identities that includes myself as the researcher and the participants of the interviews. I 
discuss issues of multiple identities (British, Sinhalese, and Tamil) that require constant 
negotiation throughout the time spent in the field and away from it as challenging. 
These negotiations form a strong basis in the thesis on reflexivity that link me as the 
researcher to the women combatants through our shared Sri Lankan identity, but also 
separate us through ethnicity and language.
The combatant women of the LTTE are aware that their social roles and gender identity 
are negotiated through hard work and are respected by civic society. They engage in 
community work and are driven to change the social position of civic women. The new 
identity seen in combatant women appears to create a complex social interaction 
between the combatant and civic women. The combatant women view civic women to be 
overly dependent on men, whereas the civic women do not always approve of women 
who so radically break with traditions, which causes civic women to distance themselves 
from combatant women. Women combatants raise issues of negotiated identities and 
question their binary position within the normative femininity practiced in civic society. 
This challenge to traditional normative femininity has become a catalyst for the 
separation between the two groups of women. Paradoxically, the combatant women 
have achieved a higher social position than civic women have but are not recognised at 
the same level as male combatants. Tamil society views combatant women differently as 
they are not included in society in the way that male combatants are, and the combatant 
women appear not to be aware of this difference.
Civic women show their support and allegiance to combatant women whenever they are 
criticised. Civic women are notably united in preserving combatant women’s feminine 
identity, disregarding their non-feminine external appearance. Their visible appearance,
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where culturally feminine symbols such as jewellery and saris are replaced by a 
masculinised image of shirts, trousers and combat fatigues, presents an overt picture of 
liberation and emancipation. Taking part in a nationalist conflict, wearing perceived 
masculine clothing, and becoming willing combatants to share the burden of war, does 
not change combatant women into men. Nor do they become men by developing a 
conscience that is contrary to the traditional female social positioning of Kula Makal, 
the good woman who stays within the confines of akam (the inner realm). It is their 
decision to become combatants and they determine their own agency.
A significant part of the gendered theory about the LTTE’s discourse (and revolutionary 
groups in general) requires women’s engagement in the building of a nation state. 
Prabhakaran is aware of this requirement, and a critical look needs to be taken at his 
motives. This reveals two key points; a short-term objective highlighting the grave need 
for trained combatants to continue the armed conflict against the Sri Lankan State army, 
and a long-term objective requiring the engagement of women in the process of nation- 
building. Some view the short-term objective, which forms the foundation for the long­
term aim, as ‘using’ Tamil women. Combatant women claim that Prabhakaran has 
enabled them to challenge the patriarchy that keeps them as subordinate beings to the 
men in their households (father, brother, husband and son). Prabhakaran, with one foot 
firmly placed in patriarchal civic society, continuously states his support for combatant 
women and their Ah-lu-mai (empowerment) that enables them to achieve many things 
within a Tamil patriarchal cosmology. However his view of building a nation state 
supersedes his support and recognition of women for their abilities, and rather than 
achieving both simultaneously, takes priority over female emancipation.
The question of whether the women combatants have achieved equality by their active 
participation in the war needs to be seen within the context of how female emancipation 
is constructed and, more importantly, understood by combatant and civic women. The 
feminist teaching that Nithyanathan tried to introduce to the LTTE is dismissed as being 
too westernised for both combatant women and Prabhakaran to accept. In dismissing a 
developed argument of female emancipation, Prabhakaran successfully presents his 
version of feminism and female emancipation, which is acceptable to combatant 
women, and has been adopted and adapted by them. To claim that Prabhakaran’s 
version of female empowerment is not emancipatory would be to disregard all that has 
been achieved by women as combatants. Therefore it is important to recognise that
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women combatants have made achievements and sacrifices in changing the face of 
Tamil women in Jaffna, however the ability to sustain or maintain such changes is not 
clearly identifiable. The global history of women’s involvement in revolutions highlights 
the risk that much promised equality eventually gets lost in the pursuit of nationalistic 
goals (see Helie-Lucas 1988, Wilson 1991, Hale 2001a and 2001b).
Whilst the women combatants are convinced of their equal status to men both in the 
movement and in society, there is a lack of female representation in senior LTTE 
positions. Culture and upbringing may result in an acceptance of being led but these two 
issues do not in themselves prevent women combatants from leading men. The next step 
is for women combatants to enter the political arena and use the skills and abilities of 
decision and debate. They are still in need of training to engage in the greater nationalist 
debate on a global stage to avoid being overlooked in this arena.
The reality of women’s emancipation within the confinements of war, displacement and 
changing social roles as discussed in this research are complicated. Displacement leads 
to the breakdown of familial structures so paving the way for many other social systems 
to fail. These include the parental inability to provide safety and security for the family, 
women being violated or the continuous threat of sexual violence with the associated 
loss of purity and honour, and children being denied the normalcy offered by schooling. 
These all culminate in a situation where the LTTE can step in as a protector who restores 
their lost agency. By joining the LTTE movement the women gain a new kinship and 
become a part of the LTTE family. Displacement clearly acts as a catalyst in a notable 
number of combatant women’s lives, pushing and pulling them towards the 
revolutionary organisations. The LTTE movement is seen as the only party that can 
protect the individual women combatants, as the family unit no longer provides a basic 
safety and sense of security, and parents or elders lose their authority over the young 
who seek alternatives to their fear and anxiety and lack of future prospects. Through 
empirical evidence I illustrate a previously unrecognised link between displacement to 
the LTTE controlled areas of Vanni and the voluntary enlistment of women. The 
importance of this link contrasts the sense of security with no comforts felt by the 
women in Vanni, to that of other areas that had comforts but no security. This finding is 
key to understanding how displacement has acted as a catalyst to those who later 
became willing combatants.
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This thesis provides an insight into the way the LTTE revolutionary organisation has 
constructed gender that is acceptable to both those within the movement and those in 
civic society. This is a specialised piece of research around a small group of participants, 
and so it’s findings are not generalised across the whole organisation, but contributes to 
the currently limited knowledge of the women combatants of the LTTE. The limitations 
of the research has in fact opened up possibilities for further research and development.
One question is whether women’s involvement with the LTTE has accelerated the social 
process of raising both groups of women’s awareness of their social position within a 
gendered society, or whether social change is a side effect of a prolonged war that 
sweeps women towards a new gender identity irrespective of their individual beliefs and 
values. It is apparent that the war and the LTTE’s recruitment of women may each have 
changed social roles on their own, but together they are a more powerful force for social 
change and have radically altered the perception of women in society. From the evidence 
gathered during my research it is clear that the rate of social change seen in today’s 
Tamil society would not have been possible without women’s involvement in the L IT E .
The combatant women of the LIT E express a desire for women to make a difference in 
society. They harbour strongly held beliefs that they can and do make a difference. 
They hold a keen sense of obligatory altruism and an awareness of being effective. They 
have achieved a form of equality that is unique within the historical framework of Tamil 
women in Jaffna. The (re) constructed gender identity has taken women from an identity 
of a ‘Beautiful Soul’ to that of a ‘Just Warrior’ (Elshtain 1987) or an ‘Armed Virgin’ 
(Schalk 1997a). This new (re)constructed identity combines both existing traditional 
normative femininities with newly created ones to form a new woman, Puthumai Pen.
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A p p e n d ix  i  
Th e  T h r ee  M a in  Tam il  Revo lutio nary  Gr o u ps  
AND THEIR INTER-AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS
LITE — Liberation Tigers o f Tamil Eelam
Started in: 1972
Leader: Vellupillai Prabhakaran
Can be described as an urban guerrilla movement with a great deal of military 
significance.
PLOTE — Peoples Liberation Organisation o f Tamil Eelam
Started in: 1980
Leader: Uma Maheshwaran
(Maheshwaran was a leader in LTTE prior to starting PLOTE).
Second largest revolutionary group.
TELO — Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation
Started in 1979
Leader: Sri Sabaratnam
The group was destroyed by the LTTE in 1986.
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R elationships between the LITE, PLOTE and TELO revolutionary 
organisations
Uma Maheswaran, a known orator of a sound political background developed at the 
TULF, joined the LITE in 1977. Unlike other members of the early LTTE he was not a 
long-term friend of Prabhakaran. The general perception of Prabhakaran was that he 
“was a practical man but without any grasp of ideology which ‘Towards a Social 
Eel am’180 was seeking to convey (Narayan-Swamy 2002:69). Prabhakaran viewed 
blood shedding as a primary part of a revolution and disagreed with those who said that 
the people must be politicised before taking up arms. He counted killing not only as 
important but also as necessary for a revolution to be recognised, and maintained that 
he did not kill without reason and if he had to kill there would be no hesitation 
(Narayan-Swamy: 2002).
Prabhakaran and Uma continued in their revolutionary cause until the severance of 
their relationship amidst scandal and bitterness. This severance was primarily due to 
different visions of the future of Tamil militancy, however it manifested itself as Uma’s 
alleged sexual relationship with Urmila181, a non-combatant woman within the LTTE 
organisation. Sexual relationships between men and women were counted as a very 
serious crime in the LTTE. Prabhakaran’s disapproval of all sexual relationships is 
reflected in the LTTE constitution at the time, as love affairs and family life were viewed 
as impediments to the commitment to revolutionary politics. In 1984 Prabhakaran made 
a statement referring to the relationship breakdown, as “....a leader of a revolutionary 
movement should commit himself totally to the discipline of the organisation. If a leader 
violates the basic rules and principles, then there will be chaos and the organisation will 
crumble” (Narayan-Swamy: 2002:67). This whole episode became an embarrassment to 
the LITE office in London who decided to introduce Anton Stanislaus Balasingham to 
Prabhakaran and the organisation in the late 1970s. The LITE had no strong affiliation 
to any one political ideology until Uma brought in Marxist ideologies. Prabhakaran was 
not known to have an interest in Marxism, however in the 1980s when Anton 
Balasingham joined the LTTE, Prabhakaran would listen to lectures on Marxism given 
by Balasingham. Balasingham was also committed to the Tamil cause, and eager to play
180 in 1979 Balasingham wrote this major piece of LTTE theoretical work giving a visionary perception of 
how Tamil Eelam should be)
181 There have never been any witnesses to the alleged alliance between Uma and Urmila.
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a more significant role. He is now viewed as the LTTE’s theoretician and political 
ideologist. Uma was eventually expelled from the LTTE in 1979 after many altercations 
especially as he viewed himself as the inheritor of the LTTE legacy.
Upon leaving the LTTE Uma formed the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil 
Eelam (PLOTE). PLOTE has been defined as a ‘bunch o f contradictions’ (Narayan- 
Swamy 2002:178) because of its regular voicing of unity between the Tamils and 
Sinhalese whilst simultaneously conducting a series of offences against the state. As a 
young man Uma harboured many idealistic views that helped develop his Marxist 
theories. Uma’s ability to campaign against individual revolutionary groups and his 
ability to call ‘mass work’ (meaning the Tamils should join in the organisation and 
commit themselves to the cause) attracted many young Tamils to the PLOTE movement. 
In July 1983 PLOTE was believed to have in excess of 10,000 combatants182 (Narayan- 
Swamy: 2002). However it is interesting to note that although PLOTE were credited 
with having the largest number of combatants it appears not to have the same power to 
recruit and retain members as the LTTE. Uma’s inability to lead caused much 
discontentment amongst its members, resulting in escapes and executions. Recruits who 
ran away from the organisation’s isolated training camp in Tamil Nadu were captured 
and executed183 as a strong deterrent to others. PLOTE was credited with killing over 150 
of its own men184. The politics of Tamil Nadu and the favours that were bestowed upon 
the organisation further contributed to its downfall. Uma fell out of favour with the 
leading Indian Politician M.G.Ramachandran, who supported the cause of Tamil Eelam. 
Many viewed this disfavour as self-inflicted, which would have severe repercussions on 
the organisation (such as a lack of support for collecting arms, etc). PLOTE is said to 
have favoured an easy life during its latter stages of power and turned to drug 
smuggling, further contributing to Uma’s own despotisms (Narayan-Swamy: 2002).
During this period Sabarattinam, who was also known as ‘Tall Sri’, became the leader of 
the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO) after the arrest and imprisonment of
l82Unfortunately Narayan-Swamy does not state his source.
183 It is believed that all the revolutionaiy groups involved in the Tamil struggle had resolved into the 
practice of executing their own members who run away from their respective organisations.
184 PLOTE had a number of ways in which they conducted executions. One was to get the victims to dig their 
own graves and get others to throw grenades. A second favoured method was to put the victim inside a 
cauldron of boiling oil (Narayan-Swamy:2002)
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the former leaders, Thangadurai and Kuttimani (who were subsequently killed in prison 
during the 1983 riots). The demise of two out of the three leaders would have ended the 
TELO as a revolutionary group, had it not been for the intervention of the Indian 
government who provided support including finance and arms (Narayan-Swamy 
2002:184). The Indian government adopted TELO as it lacked any formal ideology, 
which aided the Indian political mechanism to mould the TELO organisation as they 
wished. During August and September 1983 the TELO began mass recruitment, sending 
the new recruits directly to India for training. However Sri lacked the personality of both 
Parabhakaran and Uma, and resolved to raise his personal status amongst other 
revolutionary groups. He publicised that he was wanted in connection with the 
Neelavelli Bank robbery, which carried a reward of 200,000 Lankan Rupees and also a 
life sentence. This was Sri’s way of showing that he too was a key player amongst the 
revolutionary leaders. Sri further lacked the foresight needed to stay involved on the 
right side of the Indian politicians who were providing support for his revolutionary 
organisation, even enraging M.G.Ramachandran (known as MGR) who was the main 
supporter of an autonomous Tamil Eelaml8s.
TELO lacked the experience in guerrilla warfare that may have allowed them to build a 
close relationship with the civilian population. In his doctrines Mao emphasises the 
need for support from the civilian population in order to succeed in battle endeavours. 
The Jaffna-based TELO leader was of the opinion that getting closer to the civilian 
population might create problems of over-familiarisation, and he strongly believed that 
the civilian population must have some fear of the ‘boys’186.
In Broken Palmyra Thiranagama, Hoole et al (1990) states,
l8s MGR was also an ardent supporter of the LTTE.
186 ‘Boys’ is a term used to describe the combatants.
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“ as time went by they realised that the struggle would be on for much longer than 
two years. They developed a grievance against those of their erstwhile colleagues 
who had gone for careers and studied abroad and had prospered. While having come 
to realise the shortcomings and limitations of their organisations, they were too 
proud to leave it and join another. They would rather work to bring TELO into 
prominence as against other groups, for their personal ambitions and prospects of 
power now hinged on the success of the organisation to which they committed. Their 
grievances extended to contempt for those who pursued ordinary civilian interests. 
They regarded themselves as superior to civilians who were obliged to accept their 
[TELO] idea o f what was good for them [the civilians] ” (pp48).
TELO as an organisation ceased to exist after April 1986 when the LTTE attacked all 24
TELO camps simultaneously. TELO and PLOTE both suffered from lack of firm
leadership. The TELO were very soon eliminated by the LTTE. Subsequently PLOTE and
all other Tamil revolutionary groups were simply wiped out by the stronger and more
disciplined body of the LTTE.
Table 1 - A Glossary o f  Revolutionary Groups Involved in  the Conflict
ENDLF Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front
ENLF Eelam National Liberation Front (this consisted of 
EPRLF + TELO + EROS)
EPRLF Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front
ERCP Eelam Revolutionary Communist Party
EROS Eelam Revolutionary Organisation
GUES General Union of Eelam Students (student wing of 
EROS)
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
PLA Peoples liberation Army (the armed wing of the 
EPRLF)
PLOTE Peoples Liberation Organisation o f Tamil Eelam
TEA Tamil Eelam Army
TELA Tamil Eelam Liberation Army
TELF Tamil Eelam Liberation Front
TELO Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation
TESO Tamil Eelam Supporters Organisation
TLO Tamil Liberation Organisation
TNT Tamil New Tigers
TULF Tamil United Liberation Front
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A p p e n d ix  2 
Chronology
T ab le  2  - C h ro n o lo g y  o f  E ven ts
1 9 4 8  The Ceylon Citizenship Act no.18 demanded proof of eligibility for
citizenship through descent.
1 9 5 6  The Official Language Act endorsed Sinhalese as the official language of 
education and commerce.
1957 The Bandaranayake-Chelvanayakam pact was drawn. The aim was to 
resolve the growing tensions between the Tamil and Sinhalese nationals.
1 9 6 5  The Senanayake-Chelvanayakam pact was created to address the issue of
Sinhalese being the official language.
1971 The ‘standardisation’ policy was introduced aimed at addressing the
education imbalance between Tamil and Sinhalese nationals.
1 9 8 5  The Sri Lankan government held peace talks with the Tamil revolutionary
groups in Thimpu, Bhutan. Negotiations broke down resulting in an 
escalation of war.
1 9 8 7  The Indo-Sri Lanka pact was made between Rajiv Ghandi and President
Jayawardhane. The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was deployed in 
the Northern parts of Sri Lanka (troops withdrawn in 1990).
1 9 8 9  Peace talks resumed after Prime Minister Premadasa agreed with the
LTTE to remove the IPKF. Talks continued for 14 months, however 3 
months after the departure of the IPKF the LTTE and the Sri Lankan State 
army resumed fighting.
1 9 9 4  Chandrika Bandaranayake-Kumaratunge became Prime Minister and 
opened talks with the LTTE. A bilateral truce was agreed. 100 days later 
the LTTE pulled out of the agreement.
1995  to  War escalated with the LTTE fighting the state armed forces in a bid to
2 0 0 1  capture Jaffna.
2 0 0 1  Ranil Wickramasinha became Prime Minister and pledged to open a 
dialogue with the LTTE. A unilateral truce was offered by the LTTE and 
reciprocated by the government.
2 0 0 2  The Norwegian government brokered a truce, which was accepted by both 
the LTTE and the State. The first and second round (16-18 September; 31 
October-3 November) of talks on the possibility of a separate Tamil state 
took place in Thailand. The third round of talks (2-5 December) were held 
in Oslo and focussed on a Federal Constitution. Both parties then signed a 
ceasefire agreement (CFA).
2 0 0 3  The fourth round of talks were held in Thailand (6-9 January) and the 
fifth round of talks were in Germany (7-8 February), but by April the 
LTTE suspended talks and demands of interim governance of the North 
and North East provinces. The sixth session of peace talks were held in
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2005
2 006
2007
Japan (18 - 21 March). The LTTE refused to attend the seventh round of 
talks scheduled to be held on 29 April-2 May 2003 in Japan.
A fragile ceasefire maintained amidst discussions. Within the LTTE ranks 
there was a split from one of its commanders known as Colonel Karuna in 
Batticaloa. The first suicide bomb attack since 2001 took place in July.
A new round of talks takes place in Geneva on 22-23 February 2006 and 
on 28-29 October 2006. However the ceasefire failed and war resumed 
whilst both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government claimed they were 
upholding the CFA agreement.
Negotiations failed and a new wave of violence erupted in the country.
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A p p e n d ix  3  
P olitical In fo rm atio n
List o f Prime M inisters o f Sri Lanka
• Don Stephen Senanayake (February 4 ,1948  - March 26,1952)
• Dudley Shelton Senanayake (March 26,1952 - October 12,1953)
• John Lionel Kotalawela (October 12,1953 - April 12,1956)
• Solomon Ridgeway Dias Bandaranayake (April 12,1956 - September 26,1959)
• Wijeyananda Dahanayake (September 26,1959 - March 21, i960)
• Dudley Shelton Senanayake (March 21, i9 6 0  - July 21, i960)
• Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias Bandaranayake (July 21, i9 6 0  - March 27,1965)
• Dudley Shelton Senanayake (March 27,1965 - May 29,1970)
• Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias Bandaranayake (May 29,1970 - July 23,1977)
• Junius Richard Jayawardhane (July 23,1977 - February 6 ,1 9 7 8 )
• Ranasinghe Premadasa (February 6,1978 - March 3 ,1989)
• Dingiri Banda Wijetunge (March 3,1989 - May 7,1993)
• Ranil Wickremesinghe - (May 7,1993 - August 19,1994)
• Chandrika Bandaranayake-Kumaratunga (August 19,1994 - November 14,1994)
• Sirimavo Ratwatte Dias Bandaranayake (November 14,1994 - August 10, 2000)
• Ratnasiri Wickremanayake (August 1 0 ,2 0 0 0  - December 9, 2001)
• Ranil Wickramasinha (December 9 ,2 0 0 1  - April 6, 2004)
• Mahinda Rajapaksa (April 6, 2004 - November 21, 2005)
• Ratnasiri Wickremanayake - (November 21, 2005 - present)
List o f Presidents o f Sri Lanka
• William Gopallawa (May 22,1972 - 4 February 1978)
• Junius Richard Jayawardhane (4 February 1978 - January 2 ,1989)
• Ranasinghe Premadasa (2 January 1989 -1  May 1993)
• Dingiri Banda Wijetunge (2 May 1993 - November 12,1994)
• Chandrika Bandaranayake-Kumaratunga (November 12,1994 - November 19, 2005)
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• Mahinda Rajapaksa (November 19, 2005: present)
Source: www.priu.aov.lk/Primeminister/formerprimeministers.html. access 17.9.2007
Acronyms o f key political parties involved in  the conflict referred to in  the 
thesis.
Tamil
• TNT -  Tamil New Tigers (pre-runner to LTTE)
• LTTE - Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
• PLOTE -  Peoples Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam
• TELO -  Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation
Monitoring authorities
• IPKF -  Indian Peace Keeping Force
• SLMM -  Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission
The follow ing groups w ere also involved in  the nationalist struggle, but 
were not part o f th is thesis.
Tamil
ENDLF - Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front
ENLF -  Eelam National Liberation Front (this consisted of EPRLF + TELO + EROS)
EPRLF - Eelam Peoples Revolutionary Liberation Front
ERCP -  Eelam Revolutionary Communist Party
EROS -  Eelam Revolutionary Organisation
GUES -  General Union of Eelam Students (student wing of EROS)
PLA -  Peoples liberation Army (the armed wing of the EPRLF)
TEA -  Tamil Eelam Army
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TELA -  Tamil Eelam Liberation Army 
TELF -  Tamil Eelam Liberation Front 
TESO -  Tamil Eelam Supporters Organisation 
TLO -  Tamil Liberation Organisation 
TULF -  Tamil United Liberation Front
Sinhalese
JVP - Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (means -peoples liberation front)
Ruling political parties 
NSSP - Nava Sama Samaja Party 
SLMP - Sri Lanka Mahajana Party 
SLSSP - Sri Lanka Sama Samaja Party 
UNP -  United National Party
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A p p e n d i x  4
L is t  o f  In t e r v ie w s
Some dates are w ithheld due to safety reasons as my movements have been recorded by 
the Armed Forces a t check-points.
Table 3 - L ist o f  In terv iew s (in  a lp h ab etica l ord er)
Roja - Mallika *Date withheld for safety 
reasons-October 2003
translated by BP
Yalini -  Arulvili -Aruna *Date withheld for safety 
reasons-March 2003
translated by Kavitha
Yalini *Date withheld for safety 
reasons-October 2003
no translator used
Kavitha 11.10.03 translated by BP
Arasi 10.03.03
. rirr . r „ r ____  _ __
translated by BP and 
Gatekeeper
Arasi *Date withheld for safety 
reasons-October 2003
translated by Kavitha
AK 09.10.03 translated by Gatekeeper
BP 6.10.03 no translator used
CH 10.10.03 translated by BP
DK 11.10.03 no translator used
ES 07.10.03 no translator used
FP 14.10.03 translated by BP
GV 08.10.03 translated by HA
HA 08.10.03 no translator used
- 269 -
A p p en d ix  5 
J o u r n e y s
The Journey to LTTE controlled area (Vanni D istrict)
Undertaking trips to areas that researchers may consider as dangerous often have 
hidden benefits. The visits I made to the territory in both March and October 2003 
granted me an opportunity to view how the region was governed, and to encounter the 
difficulties that Tamil people endure on a daily basis, such as the army checkpoints on 
entering and leaving Jaffna. Visits allow you to see the environment surrounding the 
location and how it has changed. The journey to Kilinochchi was undertaken in a three- 
wheel taxi. The experience of riding in a vehicle that exposes you to the elements, brings 
home the reality of the dangers of research in these circumstances. We travelled through 
empty countryside with notice boards in three languages (Tamil, Sinhalese, and English) 
warning that the land on either side is mined. There were towns with homes and a local 
hospital in ruins. Against the backdrop of a giant causeway we crossed into the heart of 
LTTE territory, Kilinochchi, which was similar to the LTTE camp at the border with neat 
and clean streets. Each time I visited Kilinochchi I noticed changes to the landscape. My 
first visit was made in April 2003 before the rainy season, when the roads were still in 
an excellent condition, which had changed drastically by the time of my October visit 
when there were holes in the road. On my second visit the billboards recruiting young 
schoolgirls to join the LTTE were no longer on the roadside. This may have been due to 
the SLMM bringing pressure to bear on the LTTE to cease their recruitment of children 
and young people.
The arrival at the border crossing was rather unsettling. Both checkpoints have 
similarities and differences. For instance, at Muhamalai the army checkpoint is large- 
scale and the checks conducted are much more extensive (e.g., the army will check 
under vehicles for bombs whereas the LTTE checkpoints will not although both keep 
details of the individuals and vehicles that pass through). Another difference is that no 
photographs can be taken at the army checkpoints, where there are no such restrictions
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in place at the LITE checkpoint. After the Red Cross hut there is approximately a one- 
mile stretch of ‘no-mans-land’, which is monitored by the both parties of the conflict, in 
addition to the SLMM and the Red Cross. When crossing over to the Kilinochchi side 
there is an immaculately neat and tidy LTTE camp area where all passengers and 
luggage are checked and various kinds of taxes imposed on goods brought over to 
Kilinochchi from other areas.
First visit
On my first visit, the young taxi driver who drove me was clearly fearful of entering the 
first of three camps that day. I remained in the vehicle until the LTTE combatant on 
duty ascertained my identity through the driver and then directed both of us to another 
impeccably well-kept hut, which acted as an office. Here I was questioned as to what I 
was doing there and whom I was going to see (by then the same information had been 
given by the driver to the LTTE guard). As I had already secured this visit beforehand, I 
was able to mention that the visit was recommended by Arasi. However as I was a 
British person, I had to pay a slightly higher entiy tax than a Sinhalese would have paid 
to enter Kilinochchi. Goods are taxed based on the items brought in or travelling 
through the LITE held territory. The taxes are invariably higher on luxury goods such as 
foreign produced bottles of whisky than the locally brewed Arrack.
When the driver and I left the political wing office we were instructed to go to another 
office to obtain an exit visa. At this place the driver and I were questioned at length, with 
the driver (and his limited knowledge of English) acting as an interpreter. The questions 
extended to my domestic circumstances and residency. They requested addresses of my 
home and my parents, their dates of birth and their occupation, number of siblings and 
their details. I felt these questions were intrusive and I answered in the most economical 
fashion with incorrect answers given to some as I was concerned about the safety aspect 
of some of my family still living in Sri Lanka, as well as those in England. I felt 
uncomfortable and uneasy, which may have because I was on an open veranda with 
three rather intimidating male combatants and one very frightened driver. I smiled and 
kept my voice steady, and maintained eye contact, so as not to appear discourteous, 
secretive or challenging in any way. When we were finally told we could leave, it was a 
great relief.
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By then it was getting dark and we needed to be across the border before the gates 
closed for the evening. This is an area where there is only one guest house run by the 
LTTE in Kilinochchi itself, and no other guest accommodation anywhere else in the area. 
Often those who fail to cross the border before the gates close spend the night in a 
nearby house, and the Gatekeeper reported to me that people who live near the border 
welcome and are accommodate strangers with kind hospitality.
The second visit
The second visit was relatively bureaucracy-free in comparison to the first visit to 
Kilinochchi and I had a different driver. However the army checkpoints were still time- 
consuming, in contrast to the LTTE checkpoints that were not. Interestingly on my 
second visit there was no tax payment, and I was able to cross the camp without any 
delay. Being pleasantly surprised I asked the driver what his conversation with the LTTE 
consisted of that got us through the checkpoint so easily. The driver said he had 
introduced me as an LTTE supporter from London who had come to see Arasi. This 
information made me feel quite uncomfortable, but I understood that the reality of the 
situation was to appear to be partial to the organisation that I was researching.
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A p p e n d ix  6
A n t e c e d e n c e
Com batant W om en
A rasi (age 30) is from Jaffna. She is the Head of Women’s Political Wing and is the 
highest-ranking female of the LTTE. She is based in Kilinochchi and is an exceptionally 
articulate woman. She has a great deal of battle experience and is held in high esteem by 
both her fellow combatants and the civic women such as BP, CH and others who were 
not participants in this research. Her father’s occupation was a mechanic and he allowed 
Arasi some freedom of movement. He encouraged her to study with a view to going onto 
university for a higher education. The only obstacle to her freedom in her home life was 
her grandmother who was very much a matriarch who preserved traditional women's 
gender roles.
Arasi had six siblings: four sisters and one brother. The sister nearest to her age also 
joined the LTTE and died in the Kilinochchi battle at the age of 23. The death of Arasi’s 
father had meant the family had to move to live with an uncle, as it was not socially 
acceptable for a family to live without a male head of household.
Arasi’s political conscience developed around the age of 14. Arasi’s narratives reflect that 
her appreciation of the LTTE was not limited just to herself and her family but were 
shared by those in the community. The hardships endured by the combatants were very 
much appreciated. She joined the movement at the age 18 whilst studying for her 
Advanced Level examinations. The police arrested Arasi’s Father whilst she was still in 
her mother’s womb. This part of the narrative may have been conveyed perhaps to 
impress upon me that law, repression and incarceration had begun early in her life and 
that she was no stranger to hardships of such kind.
Kavitha (age 30) is from Jaffna. She is currently in charge of the Jaffna District LTTE 
Political office. Her father was a fisherman, and her mother a housewife. She is fifth in a 
family of seven siblings, two older brothers, two older sisters and two younger sisters.
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No other sibling of Kavitha’s family had joined the movement -  except for a cousin 
brother. Kavitha’s first politicisation about the LTTE came in 1985 at the age of 13. She 
has been successful in education as she passed her advanced level exams with good 
grades, but was prevented from attending university because she was five marks below 
the entry requirements. She then joined a teacher training school and became a primaiy 
school teacher in the government sector. The continual displacements acted as a major 
catalyst in her decision to join the LTTE. Her parents were not surprised by her decision 
to join at the age of 25.
A runa (age 24) is from Kokuvil area of Jaffna. She has a twin brother who is also an 
LTTE combatant. He joined the movement before Aruna in 1995. Aruna joined the LTTE 
in 1998 at the age of 19, some 3 years after her twin brother. She also has an older 
brother and a younger sister. She was studying for Advanced Level examinations when 
she decided to join the movement at the age of 19. Since then she has gained battle 
experience.
Yalini (age 23) is from Arialai area of Jaffna. She is presently working as part of the 
team engaged at the LTTE’s Political Wing in Kilinochchi. Yalini’s father was a 
shopkeeper in Thinnavelli, near Jaffna University. She is the middle child with an older 
sister and an older brother as well as two younger sisters. Yalini was in the advanced 
level class for six months before she decided to join the movement. She was an 
academically gifted student. Her joining the LTTE created a great deal of confusion 
amongst her family and her school. She has stated that there were no problems for her 
at home but she found the continuous displacement and disruption to her education 
hard to deal with. Though Yalini’s parents did not approve her joining the movement 
early on, it now appears that they are rather proud of her involvement. The fact that 
Yalini’s family is proud to have a daughter in the movement also meant that they will not 
ask her to return home, which in a way seem to have severed the tightly constructed 
family ties. Yalini is not experienced in battle but has been to the battlefield once as part 
of her training to assist those who were wounded. Yalini left home under the pretext of 
going for tuition classes and went over to the LTTE camp to join the movement in 1998 
at the age of 18.
Arulvili (age 23) is from Nallur area of Jaffna. She was the former head of the LTTE 
Political office in Jaffna (Currently run by Kavitha). She is the eldest sibling of seven
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brothers and two sisters. She is unable to separate the politicisation of her adolescent 
life with the turning point of joining the movement. She sees the major displacement of 
civilians in Jaffna as a key turning point in her political awareness. She was attending 
Advanced Level classes for three months when she decided to join the LTTE. Arulvili 
was 18 years old when she joined the movement.
M allika (age 21) is from Vanni. She is a combatant whose main role in the LTTE is to 
play music for the burial ceremonies at the graveyards of combatants who have died in 
battle. Her father had a business in Colombo and suffered a financial loss during the 
1983 riots. She is the eldest of three children and joined the movement at the age of 15 
years, on the day when an air strike killed and injured a number of schoolchildren in her 
school. Due to Mallika’s young age both her parents and the LTTE wanted her to return 
home, but she refused to go back. As she had left school at an age when she should have 
been studying she attended the basic schooling given by the LTTE up to the age of 18, 
when she was given an option to stay in the LTTE as a combatant or to return home.
Roja (age 22) is from Alavetty. She is currently a combatant. Her father was a farmer 
who died (in 1999) when Roja was 19 years old after receiving continuous beatings from 
the army for having his children enrolled in the LTTE. She is the second child of a family 
of five female children. Roja and her older sister joined the LTTE at separate times. 
Roja’s sister joined the movement at the age of 12 and Roja joined at the age of 15. Roja 
claims her reason for joining was not due to a sibling connection, but due to many 
displacements (Roja was displaced 6 times). Roja’s education was disrupted and she left 
school to join the movement long before her ordinary level exams, therefore she joined 
the LTTE’s own school until the age of 18 when she was offered a position in the LTTE or 
a move back home.
AK (age 34) is originally from Puloly in Jaffna, and is the eldest sibling in a family of 
seven children, four girls and three boys. She was a combatant commander in the LTTE 
before she left the organisation due to a serious injury received in the Elephant Pass 
battle. She is now married to a non-combatant man and has one boy aged five. Both AK 
and her sister joined the LTTE by invitation from the movement. AK’s father was a 
businessman in Kurunegala. He was beaten up and returned to Jaffna after the racial 
riots of 1958 and 1972, but the 1983 riots completely ruined him both financially and 
emotionally. Being unable to go back to his business resulted in him spending more time
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with Tiger combatants. AK came to know the organisation and Prabhakaran through her 
father’s involvement with LTTE. The combatants were welcomed in his home. They were 
often fed and given a place to stay when they needed it. In addition, the LTTE camp that 
was behind the house contained many wounded combatants from Mullateevu battle and 
the family used to attend to the sick at the camp. This involvement was the beginning of 
AK’s interest in the LTTE. Though her father was a very strict man who controlled the 
family and all its movements, he allowed his children to become involved with the LTTE. 
AK and her friend Navamani (who later became a combatant and died in battle) used to 
collect food parcels from other houses and deliver them to the sick combatants in the 
hospital under the watchful eye of the army. She was re-sitting for her Advanced Level 
examinations when she joined the movement.
Once AK recovered from wounds she received during the battle of Elephant Pass, she 
was involved for the next two years in The Rehabilitation of Women Programme run by 
the LTTE. The rehabilitation programme is similar to a therapy group, where war 
traumatised women are cared for, but their main focus is to find them a safe place to 
live. AK was involved in setting up ‘Pannai’, co-operatives where women and children 
were trained in sewing and agriculture. AK left the movement in 1998 (her own 
decision) as she had been in the movement 10 years and “desired to come out and do 
some work outside”. By this time she had started to work in the TAG (Theatre Action 
Group is a therapy group who helps those affected by war though theatre and drama). 
AK was also interested in a man named Z and her friends proposed marriage to him, 
which he accepted. Though AK has been a combatant and Z a non-combatant, they were 
both doing the same work within the TAG. This appears to have been a common basis 
for their relationship. AK was against the idea of giving a dowry and Z did not like the 
idea of receiving one. In her discourse she states how it was difficult for her in-laws to 
understand her due to her views being different to women in civic society. An example of 
this was her unwillingness to conform to traditional images of a married woman by 
wearing jewellery, a big pottu on her forehead and a sari. Though she would occasionally 
wear all those things to appease her in-laws, it was done with resentment. AK has a son, 
but she says that if she had a daughter she would bring her up the same way as her son.
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Civic w om en
BP is middle-aged (age was not given) and is from Jaffna. She used to be a teacher at a 
prestigious girl’s school. BP had six siblings in her family, five sisters and one brother. 
Her brother lives in London, one sister in Australia, another in Sweden and two in 
Colombo. She worked until major displacement in 1998 when she resigned from her 
employment. She did not come back to her house in Jaffna, as she would have to live 
alone as her husband was conducting research for his PhD in the Batticaloa and 
Trincomalee areas. She referred to Jaffna being an “open prison” with army everywhere, 
and lacking basic facilities such as transport and food.
At this time BP started getting involved with the Theatre Action Group “TAG”. The 
Group was first known as the Drama College where they promoted plays because the 
founder of the group was only interested in acting. BP refers to “Cultural Caravan”, an 
event that took place c.1998 when women from the North and North East war zones 
went to Colombo and preformed stories reported by those living in war zones. BP 
counted this as a political act. Many young men wanted to join the LTTE to get way from 
the army persecutions. This theme was one of several taken up as a play. BPs activities 
and the support she provided for the LTTE has brought her to the army’s attention and 
she tends to get harassed at checkpoints. BP regards the TAG and herself as not being 
affiliated to the LTTE. But they do provide services to the LTTE if asked. BP sees 
parallels between the work of the TAG and the provision of social support within the 
community by the LTTE.
CH (age 26) is originally from Colombo, and was the only Christian in the interview 
group. She has one brother who is two years older. CH’s father worked as a cook at a 
club in Colombo. CH states that her lineage originated from Trincomalee. Her mother 
and father have a mixed Tamil and Singhalese racial identity and were bom and brought 
up in Colombo. CH does not identify with her Sinhalese identity and concentrates solely 
on the Tamil identity. Whilst in Colombo, she and her brother were brought up in 
relative isolation by her mother, as she never trusted her Sinhalese neighbours. Her 
mother was fully aware of the depravity in the neighbourhood. CH believes this was the 
reason why her mother kept the children away from others. Her mother’s unwillingness 
to socialise with neighbours extended to taking her children to bath at the common 
water tap at 5am, long before the neighbours woke up. Her mother had always had a 
fear of Sinhalese neighbours ever since the previous race riots in 1970s. CH grew up
- 2 7 7 -
within the war period c.1983 when the family moved to Trincomalee, but she was 
unaware of the full effects of the war until much later on, when she joined the TAG. This 
is mainly due to being shut away in a Catholic Boarding school and to an extent being in 
Trincomalee, which suffered in a different way to that of Jaffna, due to its mixed 
communities. Without having a home of their own CH and her family moved around 
amongst members of her mother’s family until they were able to buy a piece of land and 
built a house of their own.
Her brother joined the LTTE at the age of 14. CH never saw her brother in LTTE 
uniform, as she was boarding at a convent school. On one visit, her mother informed her 
that her brother had left home and joined the movement, but the mother had gone to the 
camp and brought him back. In 1990 when the LTTE were in Trincomalee, the brother 
had witnessed them digging out a stash of hidden arms. Prior to that he had drawn a 
detailed sketch of the tiger symbol on a book and had hidden it (he clearly idealised and 
admired the Tigers). Her brother was interested in bodybuilding where he would have 
had the opportunity to meet and befriend those who were in the movement. When he 
got older, he joined the LTTE again and became a combatant (she also mentioned in 
passing that he had developed mental health problems during his time with the LITE). 
She further stated that female combatants did not go to Trincomalee at the time. It was 
always male combatants who attended towns for recruitment purposes. They did not 
wear their LTTE uniform and so were inconspicuous, with all recruiting carried out 
through underground connections.
In 1996, when she completed her Advanced Level examinations, she became involved in 
working for the community by assisting in the delivery of polio vaccine. During this 
period she met a woman named ‘S’ who was an NGO that dealt with the civic population 
who were disrupted in the war. S got CH involved in a political workshop, where the 
attendees let their emotions out and cried for the losses they had suffered. This session 
gave CH a sense of having grown up very much unaware of the circumstances 
surrounding her life and times. CH felt angry at the political climate, at the Sri Lankan 
soldiers, her own family and society at large. This anger made her understand why her 
brother had joined the LTTE. The anger felt by CH was channelled into working with the 
workshop group, but she admits it could well have been channelled into fighting for the 
LTTE. It became a question of who was with her at the time to direct her and help her 
cope with anger she felt. CH blames the war of “tricking” her into having no grand ideas.
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Her ambition was to pass her Advanced Level examinations, be employed in a small job 
and be married by the age of 25.
[n.b. CH died of misdiagnosed throat cancer in 2004]
DK (age 27) is from Jaffna, and is a professional middle-class woman living and 
working in Jaffna with her mother and one female servant. She is unusual in many 
respects, firstly by living in an all female household, secondly working in a highly male 
work environment and thirdly she is in charge of the family business. DK’s older sister is 
an accountant and lives overseas. DK’s father was a professional in charge of the family 
business and died of hepatitis during the war period due to lack of medical facilities in 
Jaffna. DK went to school in Jaffna, and then went to Colombo University. She dislikes 
the lifestyle and racial tensions in Colombo, which she views as a Sinhalese area. DK 
describes her business as being hard at best of times, but being doubly hard for her as a 
Tamil and a woman, where tenders are issued in Colombo, and often include bribery, 
sexual favours and corruption.
HA is middle-aged (age also not given) from Jaffna. She is an unmarried professional 
woman who holds a Master’s degree. She is from a financially affluent middle-class 
family who owned land. HA is the eldest child of three younger brothers and three 
younger sisters. The father wanted the children to study and experience life, but he did 
not want the girls to work. HA explains that in Tamil culture it is the men who go out to 
work and not the women. Hence when she was told she can only study but not work, she 
told her parents that she wanted nothing from them and she would support herself with 
her good education. None of HA’s brothers or sisters joined the LTTE. They were much 
more focused on their studies. At the time of the LTTE coming to power in Jaffna HA 
was an undergraduate. The recruitment of women as combatants was formulated late on 
in 1984. As her main aim was education, she felt that she was too old for battle training 
and she was going to study for her Master’s degree in India. She viewed the war as a 
form of social liberation.
GV is middle-aged (age also not given) from Jaffna. She is a married, middle-aged 
wealthy middle-class professional woman who holds a masters degree. She admits that 
as the only child she was brought up in a narrow-minded environment. However coming 
from a relatively well-educated and wealthy middle-class has meant that she knew what 
she wanted then and for the future. She identifies herself as a typical Jaffna woman with
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deep attachment to her house and her garden which carried a great deal of symbolic 
meaning in her life. GV was married for only 45 days before her displacement. GVs 
social background made it possible for her to delay marriage until she was much older. 
She saw being displaced as both educational and liberating.
ES (age 27) is from Jaffna and is an academic attached to a university. She is the second 
child of a family of two brothers and one sister, and neither she nor her siblings are 
married. Her Father was an engineer who died of a heart attack just before the start of 
war. After the death of her father her mother, who was educated to graduate standard 
(attended Peradeniya University), decided to run the family without any male support. 
Her elder brother and younger sister are medical students; her younger brother is an 
undergraduate studying Computer Science. She believes that the many displacements 
have caused her to lose out on a medical degree but she has ended up graduating with a 
degree in agriculture.
FP (age 40) is a housewife with two sons aged 10 and 11. She was bom in Anuradhapura 
as the ninth child (her twin brother died at birth). Her father was a farmer originally 
from the village of Kopai in Jaffna, and her mother came from the village Punguditheevu 
in Jaffna. Her parents had an arranged marriage. Her father's family moved to 
Anuradhapura to farm when he was a small child and he grew up there and 
subsequently became a farmer himself. There were ten children in the family, six boys 
and four girls. Her mother made it a point to bring up all the children equally, however 
the female children were educated to Ordinary Level standard only and the male 
children beyond this, as it was seen that the male children needed more education in 
order to obtain gainful employment. FP states that she would allow a female child to 
continue studies as times have changed. She regrets not studying as she wishes to work 
now. FP was actually aware of racial tensions at the age of 14 years when she and her 
family fled from Anuradhapura during 1977 race riots. They moved from Anuradhapura 
to Thirunelveli. FP’s father did not work in Jaffna but her brothers found employment 
there and supported the family. Her father died in 1987 after being shot in the foot by 
the IPKF after being mistakenly identified as another combatant’s father. Her mother 
died some four months after her father's death. By this time she was registered in an 
arranged marriage to a man she already knew and she got married in 1989. After her 
marriage she moved into her husband's house as he had been living alone since the 
death of his parents. Her husband is employed but not in the government sector hence
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FP views his job as "not a good job". This very reason has prompted her to educate her 
children. In 1991 she was pregnant with her eldest child when she had to leave home and 
run for safety. This was during a counterattack conducted by the LTTE in Jaffna, which 
was occupied by the SL Army. FP is pleased that her child was bom without any of the 
medical complications that many babies bom during this period suffered. FP found it 
difficult to live with the problems of not having enough money or basics such as soap, 
kerosene oil to cook, sugar, milk etc, as they were either unavailable or very expensive. 
FP and her family survived by borrowing once the dowry money finished under the 
extreme living costs.
- 2 8 1 -
A p p e n d ix  7 
Term inolog y
Table 4  - Fam ilial C onsanguine T erm inology
Father A ppa
Mother A m m a
Brother Sahothran
Older Brother Annay
Younger Brother Thambi
Sister Sahothari
Older Sister Aidca
Younger Sister Thangachchi
Aunt A nty
Father’s Sister M arm ie
Mother’s Older Sister Periya Am m a
Mother’s Younger Sister ChinnaAm m a
Uncle M am a
Father’s Older Brother Periya A ppa
Father’s Younger Brother Chithappa
Mothers Brother M am a
Grand Father (Maternal and Paternal A ppapa /P a ttah
Grand Mother (Maternal and Paternal) A ppam m a /A m m am m a
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A p p e n d ix  8  
Data  o n  D ead  W o m en  Co m batants.
Data in relation to dead wom en com batants
The following tables illustrate the total including number of female combatant deaths 
from the beginning of the conflict to the current cease-fire period (from 27th November 
1982 to 31st October 2002).
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Table 5 - Total deaths from  27/11 /1982-31 /10 /2002
1986 1 The body was unidentifiable
1987 14
1988 11
1989 2
1990 72
1991 208
1992 75
1993 125
1994 12
1995 288
1996 285
1997 507
1998 648
1999 493
2000
.....  .........
743
- 284 -
2001 270
2002 15
TOTAL 3,768
Source: Tamil Eelam Heroes Office Political Wing, Tamil Eelam Liberation Tigers, 
located in Mulathir district, Pudukudiirupu, collected during field trip to Jaffna in 2003. 
Total number of women killed 3,768*Total number o f men killed 17,651 
*Above figures also include deaths occurred as killed in action as well as illnesses -  
which is counted as heroic death’ based on being fighters a t the time o f illness and death. 
There have been other deaths since the cease-fire, some due to illness and others being 
shot by the army -  but no female deaths since this record was made.
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Table 6 - D eatils o f  the num ber o f  deaths o f  fem ale Black Tigers, 27/11/1982-
3 1 /1 0 /2 0 0 2
Jaffna 12 00 00
Batticaloa 2
Vanni 2 2
. . . . . . . . . . . .  .  . . . . . . . . . . . . .  I
Trincomalee - 2
,— —  «  -  -- -I
Mullativ 1 2
M annar 1 1
Other districts 1
TOTAL 18 46
Source: Tamil Eelam Heroes Office Political Wing, Tamil Eelam Liberation Tigers, 
located in Mulathir district, Pudukudiirupu, collected during field trip to Jaffna in 2003.
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Table 7 - Total N um ber o f M ale and Fem ale Black Tiger Deaths, 1987-2001*
1987 1 0 0
1988 0 0 0
1989 0 0 0
1990 4 0 0
1991 4 * 1* 0
1992 0 0 0
1993 18 0 0
1994
r
12 3 0
1995 31 7 0
1996
i________ ...
26 7
f
O
1997 21 6
...................
9
1998 29 13 0
1999 30 7 9
2000
1___  ______ -
41 11 3
2001 24 10 5
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T o ta l 2 4 1 6 5 2 6
Source: Sri Kantha (2004) based on Sooriya Puthalvargal 2003, LTTE's Memorial 
Souvenir 2003:
*1 have included Dhanu in this list, which was not reflected in the original source 
** accidental deaths occur during training and on rehearsal runs for specific missions.
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Table 8 - W om en Black Tiger Participants by Age, 1991-2001
19 5
20 8
21 16
1
22 7
23 1
24
..............................
7
25 7
26
---- .
3
27 4
28 1
29 2
30 and 31 0
32 1
Age not known 3*
TOTAL 65
- 289 -
Source: Sri Kantha (2004) based on Sooriya Puthalvargal 2003, LTTE’s Memorial 
Souvenir 2003
* Dhanu is included in the unknown age category. She was not included in the 
originating source.
- 2 9 0 -
A p p e n d i x  9  -  M a p s  & P h o t o g r a p h s
CHENNAI
KAN<JlHIPU RAM MAHABALIPURAM  
TIRU KKALIKUNDRAM
./TAMIL NADU^P0WDICHERRY
; f t  TR IC H Y  f t  KUM6AKONAM
|  *  • tha'njavur
r 3
•  MADURAI J A F F N A
/" EELAM
I f y^^piNCOMALEE
X *  KANYAKUMARI
Figure l  - M ap o f  Sri Lanka in  re la tio n  to  In d ia  ( l )
Source: tamilnation.org. access 17.9.2007
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□  international airport
F igure 2 - Sri Lanka in  re la tio n  to  In d ia  (2 )
Source: tamilnation.org. accessed 17.9.2007
F igure 3 - M ap o f  Ja ffn a , N orth ern  Sri Lanka
Source:
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F igure 4  - M ap o f  T am il E elam
Source: tamilnation.org. accessed 17.9.2007
Flags
V-V-r
F igure 5 - T he F lag o f  Sri Lanka (d ep ic tin g  a L ion)
Source: geographic.org. accessed 17.9.2007
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F igure 6 - T he LTTE Flag (d ep ic tin g  a T iger)
Source: tamilnation.org. accessed 17.9.2007
Photographs of Billboard images
BSSftSSS
gnascrsSNj^ft) aiumm
F igure 7 - S ch o o lg ir ls  and  C om batant W o m en
Source: Author’s photograph, October 2003
F igure 8  - S toryb oard  o f  G irls an d  th e  E ffects o f  W ar
Source: Author’s photograph (October 2003)
Logos and Other Pictures
F igure 9  - T he B lack T iger Logo
Source: Eelam web page. Access 11.3.2006
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Figure 10 - M artyr’s T ogeth er (P ictu re)
Source: Eelam web page. Access 11.3.2006
-296-
F igure 11 -  K u p p i  - t h e  cyan id e ca p su le  (P ictu re)
Source: Hindu News. Access 12.5.2006
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2 _ l l >  O J i f i -  o U i f t b A i l  a j J o o d H i b i < f i ( £ t b  f i b & C & t f l i )
i i io n
m
F igure 12 - M artyr’s D ay Card
Source: Eelam webpage. Accessed 7.9.2007: Basic Translation of the script for woman 
with gun and flowers “You who gave your life to Eelam, You appear now as tombs, We 
have come to follow you, We praise and worship your w ays.”
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Figure 13 - LTTE C em etery, P udukiirupr, M ulath iv  D istr ict
Source: Author’s photograph, October 2003
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